CARPENTIER
THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS

with

THE COMMENTARY OF SANKARĀCHĀRYA.

SANKARĀ'S INTRODUCTION.

The object and the subject, indicated respectively by the second and first personal pronouns, thou and I, which are as opposed in their natures as darkness* and light, being once proved to be incapable of sharing each other's essences, their (essential) attributes must also be held to be equally incapable of being confounded with each other. Hence the imputation of the object, indicated by the second personal pronoun thou, and its attributes, to the sentient spirit, the subject, indicated by the first personal pronoun I, and vice versa, the imputation of the subject and its attributes to the object, must be held to be false. Nevertheless this is an immemorial popular practice caused by error and ignorance, namely,—by imputing to each other each other's essence and each other's attributes, and by indiscrimination of the mutual difference between the utterly discriminate (or distinct ideas of) attribute and subject, uniting as twins

* Sankara compares the second person with darkness, because according to the Vedantic theory, there is but one being or entity in the universe, and there cannot be a real "Thou." The second person therefore is not only false in itself, but it is also productive of erroneous knowledge. The service of false knowledge is also considered in the Brihad Aranyak Upanishad as a way that leads to darkness. It is curious that Plato so speaks in a way, similar to Sankara's, of darkness and light in connection with non-entity and real entity. ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβή προσατέμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαί χαλεπὸς. Ὁ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσατέμενος ἰδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας, &c., Sophist. 254.
(i.e. mixing up) truth and falsehood,—to say, "I am this—this is mine."

[The author here anticipates a question from the opposite party which] asks "What is meant by this IMPUTATION?"
Answer—The form of one recollected thing appearing as per previous observation in another. Some say, it is the imputing of one's attributes to another. Some say, it is an error occasioned by want of discrimination between the thing imputed and that to which it is imputed. Others again say it is the fabrication of attributes contrary to that to which something is imputed. But in every case the appearance (or resemblance) in one of another's attributes is inseparable [from the above definitions].
For this is a popular notion—pearl-oyster appears like silver—the one moon appears as a second. Well, but how can there be an imputation of objective attributes to the animating soul† which is no object [of sense]? Any one may impute to an object situated before him, another and a different object. But you are declaring the objectiveness of the animating soul which is not indicated by the second personal pronoun. The objection is thus answered. This (the animating soul) is not altogether a no-object—because it is the object of the first personal pronoun, and because the manifestation of the animating soul is not un-

* One of Plato's causes of mistaken notion is, that when two persons having been previously seen and their forms still impressed on the "waxen tablet" of the mind, are yet, owing to distance or imperfect observation, mistaken the one for the other. 

† *prastakā, Θαύμα This is held to be the soul, the subject of all personal actions and enjoyments in the world,
evident. Nor is it an invariable rule, that a different object may be imputed only to an object situated before you. For to the sky, though unevident or invisible, children impute superficial blueness, &c. Therefore the imputation of that which is not the spirit to the animating soul is not impossible.

Learned men call this imputation, thus defined, Ignorance,* and the apprehension of substantial essence by discrimination they call Knowledge. Such being the case where there is an imputation of anything, it is not in the least affected by the fault or merit caused by such imputation. All who deal practically with proof and provable, whether popular, \([i.e.\) depending on natural reason\] or Vedic \([i.e.\) depending on authority\] commence as a premiss with this imputation of the Spirit and the No-spirit to each other, known as the product of Ignorance. For all the Sastras have injunction or prohibition or Emancipation for their object. But how can Perception and other proofs, and Sastras, be held as objects consisting in Ignorance? or (conversely) how can objects consisting in Ignorance be held as Perception and other proofs, or Sastras either? Answer—Because there can be no proving, or observation, and deduction, on the part of one, destitute of the fancy that the body and organs are \("\text{Myself and Mine;}\)" for in such a case no effort at proof or observation and deduction is conceivable. No practice of Perception, &c., can, in truth, take place without recourse to the organs of sense. Nor without a receptacle for the organs (or body), can there be any act. Neither does a person act with a body to which the existence of Spirit (or self) is not imputed. Nor again in the absence of all this can the unattached Spirit be a receptacle of right apprehension. Neither can there be any scope for proof in the destitution of such a receptacle of right apprehension. Therefore objects consisting in Ignorance are themselves Perception and other proofs, and Sastras also. And because

* \textit{Avidyā}. This Ignorance does not imply a mere want of knowledge, but rather the existence of a conceit of knowledge which is false—not unlike the \textquoteleft \textquoteleft Αγνοία of Plato \textquoteleft τὸ μὴ κατειδώτα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέων. \textit{Sophist. 229. C.}
the case is here common with the brute creation. Just as the brutes
in connection with the ear and other senses, on getting a sensa-
tion of sound, &c., recede when it is hostile, and proceed
when it is friendly—as also on perceiving a person before
them, stick in hand, they begin to run away, thinking, "This
person wishes to strike me," but on perceiving one with fresh
grass in hand, face him: so men also, though endowed with
intelligence, when they perceive strong persons, fierce in their
looks, and proceeding with hostile cries, sword in hand, recede
from them, but go up and meet others that are in a contrary
attitude. Therefore the practice of men in matters of proof and
provable is the same with the brute creation. The practice of
the brutes with reference to perception and other sensations, is well
known to be without discrimination or thought. Owing to a
community of sensation, the practice of men, though gifted with
intelligence, is also in respect of Perception, &c., for the moment
ascertained to be similar. But in Sastric practice, although the
agent, not ignorant of the relation of the spirit with the next
world, acts intelligently, yet that which is revealed in the
Vedant—i.e. the Spirit, sheer truth, above the feeling of hunger
and thirst, not subject to the distinction of Brahmin, Kshetriya,
&c., not a (mere) fleeter* (i.e. not of the world) is not dependant
on acts or ceremonies—because of its incongruity (with such
ceremonies) and of its opposition to acts. Previous to such
spiritual† knowledge, the directing Sastra does not transcend the
condition of an object consisting in Ignorance. For the texts
"Let a Brahmin offer sacrifices, &c.," [can only] prevail by
countenancing the imputation to the Spirit of distinctive castes,
stages, ages, conditions, &c. We have (already) said that Im-
putation implies the notion of something in that which is not
that thing:** For instance when one, on his son, wife, and

* संघारी—one who repeatedly passes through the world.
† Or self-knowledge.
** चतुर्भुज नातुवृत्ति: A very felicitous expression equivalent to τό ἔπερον
ἔπερον δοξάζειν.
others being unsound or whole (in body), imputes [sympathetically] to himself the same external attributes by saying, "I am myself unsound or whole." So also (does he impute to himself or the Spirit) the attributes of the body—thus: "I am fat," "I am thin," "I am fair," "I stand," "I go," "I pass over." So also the attributes of the organs, thus: "I am dumb, or unmanly, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind." Likewise the attributes of the mind, such as desire, intention, hesitation, perseverance. Also after imputing (the subjective) indicated by the first personal pronoun to the animating spirit, observant of all the movements of the mind, he again imputes, conversely, him, the animating spirit, all observant, to the mind, &c. Thus is this inherent imputation without beginning and without end. It is a knowledge produced by error—it is the inducer of the state of agents and patients—it is borne out by all popular evidence. The whole Vedanta undertakes the manifestation of the knowledge of the Spirit's unity for the purpose of destroying this source of [all] mischief [i.e. the above popular error]. That this is the purport of all Vedanta texts, we shall show in this Sári-raka Mimánsá. The following is the first Sutra of the Vedánta Mimánsá Sástra which we desire to expound.

I.—Then therefore Brahma-inquisitiveness.

There (in the Sutra) the word "atha" or "then" is received in the sense of succession—not of undertaking—because Brahma-inquisitiveness is incapable of being undertaken, and because there is no connection of an auspicious sense with the meaning of the sentence. The word "atha," though of another sense, serves by the sound (or enunciation) the purpose of an auspicious particle. Because also of a desideratum in the preliminary subject, the sense of succession is unavoidable for its completion. The particle then being one of succession, it is necessary to declare what Brahma-inquisitiveness requires as its regular preliminaries, just as Duty-inquisitiveness requires as a rule the reading of the Vedas.
The study of the Vedas is a general antecedent [qualification]. But then is the comprehension of prescribed acts here the especial antecedent [qualification]? By no means—because even before Duty-inquisitiveness, Brahma-inquisitiveness is possible in one that has studied the Vedânta. Nor is there any order [of succession] here intended to be declared, as there is in the rule of succession in the cutting out [first] of the heart and [then of the] other [limbs of the sacrificial victim] for (there) an order was to be declared—[and] because there is no proof in the [respective] inquisitivenesses of Duty and Brahma, that the one is a member of, or requisite qualification for, the other. Also because of a difference in the fruits and objects of inquiry. The knowledge of Duty has for its fruit the enjoyment of objects,* and that (again) is dependent on observances. But the knowledge of Brahma has eternal emancipation for its fruit—nor is that dependent on any other observances. [The merit of] Duty as an object of inquiry is future—it is not in being at the moment of knowledge, because it is dependent on personal acts [which are to be performed after the comprehension of duty]. But here [the already] existent Brahma is the object of inquiry, because it is eternal and not dependent on personal acts. Also because of a difference in the direction of the [respective] precepts. The precept, which is the definition of Duty, enlightens an individual,† enjoining him to its own object [the observance of ceremonies], but the Brahma-precept rests contented with only enlightening the individual, because enlightenment is the effect of precept, but the individual is not enjoined in the enlightenment [i.e. there is no injunction connected with it]. Just as the enlightenment of an object by contact with the sight—so it is. Therefore something is now to be declared [as a preliminary] after which Brahma-inquisitiveness is laid down [by the author of the Sutra].

* ṣvâsthâpanam Govindânanda defines this वसैयाौिे सूं which clearly is equal to the ἴδων of Philebus.

† The Asiatic Society’s edition has an incorrect reading here न [अवबोधयति]
[What is it?] Answer.—Discrimination of eternal and non-eternal substances. Aversion to the enjoyment of fruits here and hereafter. The accomplishment of the [six] exercises of mental subjugation, bodily restraint, &c., and a desire of liberation. After these preliminaries, it is possible, even before Duty-inquisitiveness, and [of course] after it too, to inquire after Brahma and also to know it—but not otherwise. Therefore by the word "atha" or "then," succession after the accomplishment of the [antecedent] exercises, as stated above, is taught.

The word "atas" or "therefore," signifies the cause or reason. Whereas the Veda itself represents the transientness of the fruits of burnt offerings and other exercises for the attainment of prosperity—as for instance the texts "Here [in this world] the enjoyment gained by works decays—so also in the next world the enjoyment gained by merit decays," &c. and also at the same time exhibits the supreme good† to be from the knowledge of Brahma, as in the text "The knower of Brahma attains the supreme [good]‡"—therefore after the accomplishment of the exercises as stated above, Brahma-inquisitiveness is to be entertained.

Brahma-inquisitiveness means inquisitiveness after Brahma. The definition of Brahma will be presently given, "From whom the Production, &c. of this." Therefore other meanings of the word Brahma such as (the Brahmin) caste, &c., are not here to be apprehended. "Brahmanas" [the compound being a genitive tat-purusha] is genitive in the objective sense, not that of relation [or subjectiveness]—for inquisitiveness must have an object of inquiry and no other object is pointed out. "But even if the genitive were taken in the sense of relation, the objective—

* Chhandogya 538. अक्ष is here held by Sankara to mean पराशिके विद्याम:.
† परं पुष्पाप्य literally, the supreme object of the soul—τάγαθὼν or sumnum bonum, or τὸ ἀρίστον as when stating the question between Pleasure and Wisdom, Plato says: ὀπότερον αἰτῶν τοῦ ἀρίστον ἡγεμόνετερον. Philebus, 65 B.
‡ Taittiriyya, p. 51.
ness of Brahma would not be excluded, for a general relation may involve an especial object. Will you say that to give up the evident objectiveness of Brahma, and, by the door of a general relation, to fabricate an implied objective would be vain labour? But I tell you it will not be vain—because in Brahma there are involved endless propositions for discussion, [which otherwise would be excluded].” To this objection it is answered—Not so—because in the reception of the chief are virtually included all those that are dependent on it. Brahma is the chief, for it is the most desirable object of apprehension by knowledge. That chief being accepted as the object of inquisitiveness, those are virtually included without inquiring into which there can be no inquiry into Brahma, and thus they do not require to be inserted in a separate sutra. Just as by the saying “the king is marching,” the marching of the king with his retinue is [virtually] mentioned—so it is here. [The genitive is in the sense of the objective] also because of its consistency with the Veda. The text “From whom these creatures are produced...Him inquire into—He is Brahma” manifestly set forth Brahma as the object of the inquisitiveness. The Sutra [only] follows the same sense by taking the genitive in the objective sense. Therefore “Brahmanas” is genitive in the objective sense.

Inquisitiveness means desire of knowledge. Knowledge up to comprehension is the object of the desire expressed by the desiderative affix san, because it is the end of the desire. Brahma is a desirable object of comprehension by approved knowledge. The comprehension of Brahma is indeed the object of the soul—because it destroys endless evils such as Ignorance, the seed of the world. Therefore Brahma is to be inquired into.

Now again, is that Brahma manifest or non-manifest? If manifest, it does not require to be inquired into. If non-manifest, it cannot be inquired into. To this objection it is answered: Manifest is Brahma, eternal, pure, intelligent, free-natured, all-knowing, endowed with all power. For the word Brahma has
etymologically the sense of eternity, purity, &c., because it follows the sense of the verb brīh. The existence of Brahma is also manifest because of its being the spirit or self of all. Every one indeed believes in the existence of the spirit or self, and not that “I am not.” If the existence of the spirit were not manifest, every one would believe (or say) “I am not.” Now the spirit is Brahma.

But if Brahma is manifest in the world as spirit, then the objection recurs, that it is already known, and does not require to be inquired into. Not so. For there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Men, destitute of the Sastra, and the Lokāyatikas [a sect of Buddhists] believe the soul to be nothing more than the body [or physical organization] endowed with sentience. Others say, the organs being sentient are themselves the soul. Others again, the Mind. Some say, it is only a momentary notion. Others, the Vacuum. Others again maintain, there is, besides the body and its members, a fleeter both agent and patient. Some, that it is only patient, not agent. Some say, it is, besides that, God, all knowing and all powerful. Others again maintain, that He is the spirit of the patient. Thus are there many diverse opinions resting on reason and sastric texts, and the semblance of both. Under these circumstances one that may, without consideration, take up any of these notions may be barred from eternal emancipation, and may come to evil. Therefore, by setting forth Brahma-inquisitiveness, the settlement of the Vedanta texts, aided by arguments not hostile to them, is undertaken as the requisite of eternal Emancipation.

It has been said Brahma is to be inquired into. Now what is the definition of Brahma? To this the illustrious author of the Sutra says:

2. FROM WHOM THE PRODUCTION &c. OF THIS.

Janma or production is the first of the series [indicated by the &c.]. It is thus an inclusive Bahuvrihi compound, expressing the qualification (of that series). The compound implies Production, Continuance and Dissolution. The priority of Production de-
pends on Vedic statement as well as on the (necessary) condition of a substance. The Vedic statement is to this effect, because we see the (serial) order of Production, Continuance and Dissolution in the text "From whom these creatures are produced &c." The (very) condition of a substance implies the same, because of the incidence of continuance and dissolution to a subject which by production has obtained entity. "Asya" (of this,) has reference by the force of the [demonstrative] idam to the subject presented just before us by Perception &c. The genitive implies the subject of the attributes of which Production is the first in the series. "Yatas" (from whom) refers to the cause.

The purport of the expressions is this: that all knowing and all powerful Cause from which come the Production, Continuance, and Dissolution of this Universe, modified by name and form, containing many agents and patients, the repository of actions and effects, having mutually adapted spaces, times, and causes, and the form of whose arrangement cannot be conceived even by the mind, is Brahma. Production, Continuance and Destruction are (only) mentioned here, because the other changes of state in entities are included in these three. If (the six states) Production, Being, &c. mentioned by Yāśka were here received, then one might suspect that since those states were only possible during the continuance of the Universe, the Production, Continuance and Destruction of the Universe were not held as from the (First or) original cause. Therefore to preclude such suspicion, the three (above-mentioned) are only received i.e. the Production which is from Brahma, and the Continuance and Dissolution which are in the same. Nor can the Production &c. of the Universe, qualified as above, proceed from any other (cause) whether it be unsentient Prodhāna, or Atoms, or non-entity, or a fleeting agent, save and except a God qualified as above. Nor yet of itself, for here peculiar spaces, times, and causes, are wanted.

* Taittiriya, 132.
But [some asserters of a Divine cause think that this is a mere logical inference to establish the existence of a God other than a fleeting one. Is that (i.e. Inference) set up here too in the Sutra "From whom the Production &c.?” By no means. For the object of the Sutras is to weave a wreath of Vedanta texts. The Vedanta texts, illustrated by the Sutras, are in reality discussed here. The knowledge of Brahma is consummated by the purport of the meaning of texts after discussion: it is not consummated by Inference or any other instrument of accurate knowledge. But though the Vedanta texts are the authoritative setters forth of the cause of the Universe's production &c.—for the greater confirmation of their sense neither is Inference, when unopposed as a proof, to Vedanta texts, excluded. For the Veda itself allows argumentation.* Thus [the Spirit] “is to be heard of, cogitated, &c.” “The instructed and intelligent may get into Gandhára, so here the person who has an instructor gets knowledge.”† Thus the Veda itself shows the help which human intelligence imparts to Scripture.

The Vedas &c. are not sole proof in the inquiry into Brahma, as is the case in the inquiry into Duty. But here Veda &c. and also personal comprehension &c. are, as far as they are adequate,—proofs. For the knowledge of Brahma is perfected by personal comprehension, and because its object is an existing substance. In things to be done, no intellectual comprehension is necessary; hence the Scriptures &c. are alone proof. Also because things to be done depend on personal acts or wills for their completion.

* The Edition of Ananda Chandra Vedántavágisa adds the word चच्चाच्छादय as an auxiliary."

† Chhandogya, p. 459. The story to which this text alludes, is that of a person who was blindfolded and abducted by robbers from his native country, Gandhára, and left helpless in the woods, suffering from hunger and thirst, and every moment in danger of being devoured by wild beasts. His eyes were at last opened by a kind-hearted traveller, conversant with the geography of the place, who showed him the way to his country. So here the learned instructor enlightens those who are lost in the wilderness of the world on the true way to eternal Emancipation.
Vedic as well as worldly acts may be done, or not done, or done contrariwise (by their agents). As one may go by horse, or by foot, or another way, or not go at all. So, "In the sacrifice Atirātra he is to receive the vessel shodasi."—"In the sacrifice Atirātra [under different circumstances] he is not to receive the vessel shodasi." "He is to make a burnt-offering at sunrise." "He is to make a burnt-offering before sunrise." Thus injunctions and prohibitions, as well as alternate precepts, general and special behests, may all be accomplished.

But a substance cannot alternately be thus and not thus—cannot [optionally] be or not be. Alternations are dependent on the notions of men, but the knowledge of a substance just as it in reality is, i.e. true knowledge, is not dependent on personal notions.* What then? it depends only on the substance itself. To say of one and the same post that it is [either] a post or a man, or something else, is not true knowledge. That it is a man or something else is a false notion. That it is a post, is alone the truth—because it is dependent on the substance itself. Thus the determination of an existing substance is dependent on the substance itself. Such being the case, the knowledge of Brahma too is dependent on the substance itself—because it relates to an existing substance.

But then if Brahma be an existing substance, is he not an object of other proofs, and thus the discussion of Vedanta texts is become futile? By no means. Brahma not being an object of sense, there can be no connection with other proofs [for the other proofs have perception for their basis.] The senses have naturally externals for their objects. They cannot have Brahma for their object. Had Brahma been an object of sense, it might have been held that this work (the universe) was done by Brahma. But where the work alone [and not its author] is receivable by the senses, it is not possible to determine whether the work was

* Sankarāchārya appears here to combat the same doctrine which Plato ascribed to Protagoras, and contended against in Theaetetus i.e. πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων εἶναι.
done by Brahma, or some other agent. Therefore the Sutra "From whom the Production &c." is not for setting up inference.—What then? it is for the illustration of Vedanta texts. But what are the Vedanta texts which are here designed to be illustrated by the Sutra? "Bhrigu Váruṇi resorted to his father Várṣa. Teach me, Sir, Brahma?"—thus introducing the question the Veda concludes "From whom these entities are produced, by whom the productions subsist, in whom departing they are resolved, enquire of Him—He is Brahma." And the specifications of that text, "From Joy indeed these entities are produced, by Joy the productions subsist, in Joy departing they are resolved."† And other texts are also to be illustrated of the same kind relating to the cause, which is verily eternal, pure, intelligent, free, and all knowing. By showing that Brahma is the cause of the Universe, it is demonstrated that He is all knowing. Now confirming the same, he adds:

3. Because it is the cause of the Sastra, [or] because the Sastra, is its [manifesting] cause.

Brahma is the cause of the great Sástra, the Rig Veda &c., supported by numerous [subsidiary] systems of science, bringing to light, like a lamp, all objects, and being as it were all knowing. Indeed of such a Sástra, defined as the Rig Veda &c., endowed with the quality of all knowledge, the production cannot be from any other than the Omniscient. Whatever sástra containing proximity proceeds from any particular individual, as grammar &c. from Panini &c., even though its significance is but partial (or little), yet that individual is in the world held to be more knowing than his work. What shall I say then of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that Great Being, from which Great Being, as the cause, proceeded without effort, and as a mere sport, after the manner of the human breath, that mine of all knowledge called Rig Veda &c., diversified by many varieties of sákhás, and the source of the classification into varna and ásrama of gods, animals and men? As it is said

* Taittiriya, 123.  † 1ibid, 128.
in the Veda, "this Rig Veda was breathed out of this Great Being."* Or [as another way of expounding the Sutra] the Sástra, Rig Veda &c., such as has been described here, is the cause or proof of the accurate essential knowledge of this Brahma. The purport is, that Brahma is known as the cause of the production &c. of the Universe from the authority of Sástra only. The text of that Sástra was cited in the preceding sutra, "From whom these creatures are produced &c." But what is the use then of this sutra, since in the preceding sutra by citing the same kind of Sástra, it was shown that Sástra was the cause of the true knowledge of Brahma? Answer: there the Sástra not having been clearly mentioned in the wording of the Sutra, it might have been suspected that the production &c. of the Universe was mentioned only as a matter of Inference. To obviate that suspicion, this sutra was given—"Because the Sástra is the cause or authority."

But how again can Brahma have the Sástra for its authority? Since by the saying, "the Veda, having works as their purport, whatever has not the same purport is futile"† it is shown that the purport of the Sástra is works. Hence the futility of the Vedanta, from its not having works as the object. It must either be connected [as a supplement] with the [previous Sástra, containing] injunctions to works, by having for its object the manifestation of the agent gods &c., or its purport must be to set up devotion &c. as another species of works. But there can be no [Sastric] declaration of a manifest substance, because a manifest substance is an object of perception, &c. And because in such declaration, being destitute of anything to be avoided or sought after, there can be no human object [or Good]‡ to be attained. Wherefore that texts such as "he wept" may not become objectless, their purport has (by Jaimini the author of the Mimansa) been declared to be hortatory, by the Sutra, "Let precepts be understood to be hortatory from their consistency with an injunction."§ That works are by the declaration of their instruments

* Brihad Aranyaka, 455. † Mimansa, I. 2, 1. ‡ प्रक्षेप. § Mimansa, I. 2, 7.
and appliances also involved in Mantras, such as "ishetwa," has been stated (by the same author). Nowhere among the texts of the Vedanta is significance found or concluded except in connection with injunctions. Nor can there be any injunction in the matter of the essence of an evident subject, because injunctions involve objects of actions. Therefore the Vedanta texts are supplementary injunctions to works by the manifestation of the essence of the agent gods and others required in actions. But perhaps you would not confess this for fear of introducing (theories) foreign to your purpose. Still you must acknowledge its having, as objects, devotion &c. authorized by your own texts. Hence there is no Śastra-manifestability of Brahma. Thus having been objected, it is answered:

4. BUT IT IS—BY CONSTRUCTION [OF THE VEDAS].

The particle "tu" (but) is for repelling the previous objections. It, Brahma, is known from the Vedanta Śāstra to be the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the production, continuance and dissolution of the Universe. How? By construction. In all the Vedantas, the texts are governed by the general purport as the settler forth of the meaning. "O gentle pupil, this was originally an entity, one only, without a second."* "This was originally only one spirit." "This Spirit, which is all intelligent, is that Brahma, which is without an antecedent (cause), without a consequent (effect), without anything inherent or (similar), without an external (second)."† "This before us is the immortal Brahma itself."‡ It is not reasonable to fabricate any other meaning of the words in these texts, when by construction their purport is understood to be the settlement of the essence of Brahma—for in that case, violence would be done to the Veda, and a fabrication would be introduced, which is not Vedic. Nor can the purport of those texts be held conclusively to be the settlement of the essence of the agent gods, &c. [with a view to works], because of texts like the following which preclude acts, agents, and fruits, viz. "Then who is to see, whom, and by what (organ) ?"§

* Chhandogya, 387. † Brihad Aranyaka, 257, 502. ‡ Chhandogya, 387. § Brihad Aranyaka, 471.
Nor is there the objectiveness of perception &c. even in the essence of the manifest substance, because the identity of Brahma with the Spirit or self could not be comprehended except by the Sāstra "Thou art the same." As to what has been said on the futility of instruction where there is nothing to be shunned or sought, this is no fault—because the soul's object can be attained from the cessation of all pain by the comprehension of Brahma's identity with the Spirit or self, without anything to be shunned or sought. In the setting forth of gods, &c., there is no absurdity even on the acknowledgement of our declared sense of devotion, but it does not follow that the Vedanta texts have for their purport injunctions of devotion to Brahma, because the notion of duality, such as act and agent is done away with by destitution of anything to be shunned or sought in the state of Unity. There cannot be a revival of the notion of duality already destroyed by the notion of the unity of Brahma, so that a Brahma may be set forth as related to injunctions of devotion. Although on other subjects no authoritativeness of Vedic texts is seen except in relation to injunctions, yet, up to the fruition of spiritual knowledge, the authoritativeness of the sástra, relating to it, cannot be gainsaid. Nor is the authoritativeness of the sástra [here] a matter of Inference, so that it might require an example observed elsewhere. Therefore the provableness of Brahma from the Sástra is demonstrated.

Here some others object, "Although Brahma may be provable from the Sastra still He is manifested by the Sástra only as the object of the enjoined devotion. As the consecrated stake, the consecrated fire, and other things popularly unknown, are manifested by the Sástra, having enjoined observances as their purport, so also here. Whence is this? Because the Sástras have persuasion or dissuasion for their object—as those learned in the purport of the Sástra have said. "Its purport is evident—the comprehension of works or duty." "Exhortation—this means a text persuasive of acts." "Its information is
Having used the words contained in them in the sense of having works for their purport."† "The Veda having works as their purport, whatever has not the same purport, is futile."‡ Therefore persuading the soul to some special object and dissuading it from some (other) special object, the Sastra has its purport. Other [parts of the Sastra which do not obviously inculeate works,] are also subservient to the same purport. The Vedanta texts too, having the general characteristic of the Sastra, must have their purport in the same way. [The Vedanta, thus,] having injunctions as its end, it is only consistent to say that as the performance of burnt offerings and other ceremonies is enjoined on those who are desirous of Heaven and other (sensuous enjoyments), so is the knowledge of Brahma enjoined on those who are desirous of immortality.

But then a distinction in the objects of inquiry has been declared here. Thus in the chapter on works the future (merit of) duty is the object of inquiry. But here the existing and always perfect Brahma is the object of Inquiry. Hence it is reasonable to distinguish the fruit or effect of the knowledge of Brahma from the fruit (or effect) of the knowledge of duty which is dependent on (subsequent) observance. But (we the Mimánsakas say) it is not reasonable (to make such a distinction) because Brahma is set forth as connected with injunctions to certain works. Thus "Oh, the spirit is to be observed."§ "He who is the Spirit, destitute of blemish, is to be sought, is to be inquired into." || "He is the spirit—thus should one serve Him." "Let one serve the Spirit, which is knowledge."¶ "The knower of Brahma becomes Brahma itself."* Such being the precepts, in anticipation of the question, "Who is that Spirit, Brahma?" all the Vedanta texts are bent on the setting forth of His essence to the following effect: "Eternal, all knowing, all pervading, always full, always pure, intelli-

* Mimansa Darsana, p. 7. § Brihad Ar. 225.
† Ibid. p. 34. || Chhandogya, 571.
‡ Ibid, p. 39. ¶ Brihad Ar. 249.

* Mundaka, 323.
gent, and free natured, is the Intelligence and Joy Brahma." From devotion to him proceeds the fruit, (even) Emancipation, invisible [indeed to the world but] visible (or manifest) in the Sastra. Without involving injunctions to be executed, in the mere indication of a substance like one's declaring "the earth is seven-continned," or "That king is marching," there could be no significance in Vedanta texts because of the absence of anything to be avoided or pursued. But [may it not be said?] that even in the indication of a mere substance, such as "this is a rope, not a snake," there is significance in the dissipation of fright caused by a mistake. So here also by the indication of the unfleeting substance, Brahma, significance is manifest in the dissipation of the fright caused by mistaking it for a fleeting substance. There might be such significance if the mistake for a fleeting substance were [really] to cease on the mere hearing of the essence of Brahma, like the mistake about the serpent, on the mere hearing of the essence of the rope. But it does not so cease, because we see in him, who has heard of Brahma, the same fleeting characteristic of pleasure and pain as before. And in the text "to be heard, to be cogitated, to be reflected on," we see that after hearing, there must still be cogitation and reflection. Therefore Brahma is to be received as proved by the Sastra only as the object of the enjoined devotion.

[To the preceding objections, the Vedánti] replies, Not so, because there is a distinction between the fruits (or effect) of the knowledge of works and of Brahma. Works by (organs of) the body, by words, by mental (operations), called Duty, are manifested by the Sruti and the Smriti, inquisitiveness after which is directed in (Jaimini's) Sûtra, "Then therefore Duty-inquisitiveness." Sin, also, such as Injury &c. is to be inquired after for the purpose of renouncement, because it is defined in prohibitory exhortations. The fruits (or effects of these two) Duty and Sin, good and evil, defined by exhortations, are well understood from Brahmá down to a tree, as visible pleasure and pain, enjoyed (or endured) only by body, speech and mind, as the result of
the connection of objects with organs. In embodied persons, commencing with men and up to Brahmá, there is laid down a diversity in pleasure. Thence comes (or is inferred) a diversity in (the merit of) Duty as its cause. From a diversity in (the merit of) Duty, proceeds a diversity in the claimants. Diversity in claimants, caused by [a diversity in] pursuits, abilities &c., is well known. Thus the departure of the performers of sacrifices and other ceremonies is alone by the northern route, because of distinguished learning and meditation. The departure (of others, noted) only for the (virtuous) exercises of ishta, púrta, and dattá,* is by the southern route in the order of smoke, &c. Even there (again) a diversity in pleasure (or enjoyment), and a diversity in its cause, are deducible from the Sastra: “Having remained during the term of the merit.”† So also from men downwards to the denizens of hell, and to trees, the quantum of pleasure (or enjoyment) is obtained only by the performance of duty as defined by exhortation. Hence we find it of various terms in duration. So likewise by observing diversity in the sufferings of embodied souls, whether ascended to upper regions or descended to lower regions, we deduce a diversity in their cause, i.e. Sin, as defined in prohibitory exhortations, and also in its perpetrators. Thus the diversity of pleasures and pains, proceeding from embodiment on the part of those possessed of faults, such as Ignorance, caused by diversities of Merit and Demerit, are evident from the Sruti and Smriti, as well as (logical) Inference,

* Ishta implies personal devotion and piety in religious acts and hospitality. Púrta implies works for the benefit of the public. Datta implies acts of private charity and kindness, as in the following lines quoted by Govindananda:

वाचिकूपसंगमादिप्रवत्ततायतमानि च
ब्रवमदानमारम् पूर्णिक्षितमिदिशियते
श्रणामर्धन्तः भूतामार्थायतिविंचर्म
वैविष्णवः च विदाये दरमिदिशियते

† Chhandogya, 344.
to be transient, and have the form of fleetingness. Thus the text, "of an embodied entity there is in sooth no termination of pleasure and pain," confirms the fleetingness as described. From the text "Pleasure and pain do not touch the entity which has no body,"* which denies the touch of pleasure and pain, we find that it denies, with reference to the unembodied entity, called Emancipated, that it is the effect of Duty defined by exhortation. For in the case of an effect of Duty, a denial of the touch of Pleasure and Pain would not hold good. If it be said that unembodiedness itself is the effect of Duty, [we reply] Not so, because it is self-existing, as it appears from texts like the following, "Knowing the great lord to be constantly existing as unembodied spirit in many transient bodies, the wise do not grieve."† "This soul is indeed without the vital air, without mind, pure, unattached."‡

Therefore it is established that the eternal unembodiedness, called Emancipation, is distinct from the effects of observances. But there may be in it something which is constant in an altered form [and therefore the result of action]? For when a thing is changed, the idea that it is the same is not precluded, as the earth and other elements (in the category) of those who declare the eternity of the Universe, and as the Gunas in the case of the Śāṅkhyaś. [No, for] this is a real entity, eternally uniform, [i.e. immutable], all pervading like ākāśa not subject to any

* Chhandogya, 600, 601.
† Kaṭha 107.
‡ Mundaka, 287.
§ वामवत् I have represented this by its common synonyme "ākāśa" which is popularly known. I think it is not translatable in a Western language, unless it be by the "inane" of Lucretius. The word "ether," by which Oriental scholars of Europe have rendered it, does not clearly represent ākāsa which pervades all cavities even on the surface of the earth, where "ether" can have no existence. There is ākāsa in our cups and pots, even within our bodies, which are surely not eterial. The idea conveyed by ākāsa appears to be the same as that which "inane" conveys in Lucretius:

"Nec tamen undique corporeâ stipata tenentur
Omnia naturâ; namque est in rebus Inane."
mutations, eternally full, without members and self-luminous. Wherein Merit and Demerit with (their corresponding) works, and the three times have no dwelling place, that is unembodiedness called Emancipation. Thus the texts "Different from merit, different from demerit, different from this effect and cause, different from the past and the future." Therefore it is Brahma alone, after which this inquisitiveness is undertaken. If it were instructed as a means having a duty for its end, and if emancipation proceeded from such duty as its effect, then that emancipation would be non-eternal (or transient). And if such were the case, it might be held that emancipation was only something which excelled in a certain degree the numerous (other) transient fruits of works already described as existing in diverse measures. But Emancipation is, by all asserters of Emancipation, held to be eternal. Therefore the instruction of Brahma as a means having duty for its end is not fitting.

Further, texts like the following, showing that Emancipation immediately succeeds the knowledge of Brahma, exclude any other intervening work: *vis. "He who knows Brahma, becomes Brahma himself." "His works too cease on that cause and effect being observed." "Comprehending the joy of Brahma he fears no one." "O Janaka, thou hast attained fear-

Quod tibi cognosse in multis erit utile rebus
Nec sine errantem dubitare et quaeere semper
De summa rerum, et nostris diffidere dictis:
Quapropter locus est intactus, Inane, vacansaque." I. 330-335.
It is remarkable that one of the synonyms of ākāsa is गुण्य or INANE. And Sankaracharya gives a definition of ākāsa (in his commentary on the Taittirīya Upanishad p. 67) which singularly corresponds to the theory of Lucretius: "Esse in rebus inane tamen fateare necesse est."

* * * * * *
"Transit enim fulmen coeli per saepta domorum,
Clamor ut ac voces."
Sankarāchārya says:

अकाशाय नाम नव गुणाः: अकाशकरो मुरैंदेवाः।

* Kaṭha, 101. † Mundak. 302. ‡ Tait. 119.
lessness."* "Then only he knew himself saying, "I am Brahma,"
"thence he became the total."† "Therein what delusion (can
there be)?—what grief? to him who beholds but unity!"‡ Again
the text, "The Rishi Vámadeva beholding this, declared, I have
become Manu, the sun too,"§ may be cited to exclude any other
duty intervening between the beholding of Brahma and becoming
the total:—just as (when you say) "stopping he sings," no other
work is understood to intervene between the stopping and the
singing. Texts like the following again, show that the
effect of the knowledge of Spirit is only the cessation of the
obstacle to Emancipation: *viz. "Thou art our father who crosses
us over the extreme shore of Ignorance."|| "I have heard
from persons like yourself that the spirit-knowers gets over grief.
But, O Lord, I am grieving, let my Lord cross me over from
the shore of grief." "The illustrious Sanatkumára shows him,
whose sins had been blotted out, the shore [or terminus] of
darkness."¶

And there is the Nyáya sutra, composed by the Achárya (Go-
tama), "By the successive destructions, [commencing from the
last] of Pain, Birth, Effort, Fault, and False knowledge, and the
destruction of each immediately following the other, comes
Emancipation."** The destruction of False knowledge pro-
ceeds from the knowledge of the identity of Brahma with the
Soul. Nor is the knowledge of the identity of Brahma
with the soul after the figure of a community of quality
[which involves false identification]; thus, "The mind is endless
(in its conceptions); the Viswe-devas are endless, hence he ac-
quires the endless world."† Neither is it after the figure of

* Brihad Ar. 702.
† Brihad, 198. In the sense of το πάν or το ὅλον
‡ Isa, 14.
§ Brihad Ar. 216.
|| Prasna, 256.
¶ Chhandogya, 475, 476, and 527.
* Nyaya Sutra, I. 2.
† Brihad Ar. 542.
Imputation, as "Let one meditate, the Mind is Brahma," and "the instruction, Aditya is Brahma"—where the sight of Brahma is imputed to Mind, Aditya and others. Nor is it a contemplation occasioned by any special act, like, "the air is the Absorbent, the Prána (the vital air) is the absorbent."* Neither is it after the figure of the purification of the members of an object as [in certain sacrifices] the ceremony of beholding the butter. If the knowledge of the identity of Brahma with the soul were taken in the figurative senses of community &c., then violence would be done to the construction of words having for their purport the manifestation of the substantial identity of Brahma with the soul in texts like the following: "Thou art the same." "I am Brahma."† "This spirit (or soul) is Brahma." And texts like the following setting forth the effects of the cessation of Ignorance would also be excluded: "The joint of the heart is pierced, all doubts dissipated."‡ Nor could texts like the following, teaching the identification, be consistently expounded on the admission of the figures of community &c.§ "He who knows Brahma becomes Brahma." The knowledge of the identity of Brahma with the soul is not therefore after the figures of community of quality &c. Therefore the science of Brahma is not dependent on personal acts. What then? Like the knowledge of a substance, the object of Perception and other proofs, it is dependent on the substance itself. By no sort of reason is it possible to fabricate the introduction of objectivity into such Brahma or into his knowledge. Nor can objectivity be introduced into Brahma as the object of the act of knowing—for the objective of the act of knowing is excluded by the texts, "It is different from the known, yet transcending

* Chhandogya, 245.
† Brihad, 217.
‡ Mundak, 302.
§ The Asiatic Society's edition has here a most dangerous mistake, against which the reader must be warned: it has सम्बद्धिदिवेश धामस्यमाप्पं वें, instead of सम्बद्धिदिवेश न धामस्यमाप्पं वें.
the unknown."* "By whom one knows all this, by what can one know him."†

The objective of the act of devotion is also excluded thus: after introducing the non-objectiveness of Brahma by the words: "He was not manifested by speech by whom speech is manifested," it is added, "Know thus, He is Brahma, not this whom the world worships."‡ If you say that on Brahma's unobjectiveness being established, the Sastra "Because the Sastra is its manifesting cause," becomes inconsistent, (I reply) Not so, because the Sastra has for its object the cessation of distinctions fabricated by Ignorance. The Sastra does not intend pointedly§ to manifest Brahma as an object. What then? Manifesting him as the animating soul unobjectively, it destroys the distinctions of knowable, knower, and knowledge, fabricated by Ignorance. Thus says the Sastra: "It is known of him by whom it is not known [consciously on the part of the subject knower]. He does not know by whom [in conceit] it is known." "It is not known to the knowers—it is known to the unknowers."|| "You cannot see the seer of the sight—you cannot hear the hearer of the hearing—you cannot know the knower of the knowing."¶ Therefore by the stoppage of the fleetingness, fabricated by Ignorance, through the manifestation of the eternally free spiritual essence, there is in Emancipation no fault of transiency. It may indeed be reasonable to say, on the part of him with whom it is held as a product, emancipation requires some act, whether mental, oral or bodily. So also on the supposition of its being a modification. On these two suppositions there would surely be transiency in Emancipation—for neither curds &c. which are modifications [of milk &c.], nor pots

* Kena, 39, 40.
† Brihad, 472.
‡ Kena, 43.
§ रद्वः
|| Kena 50, 51,
¶ Brihad, 579.
&c. which are products [of earth &c.] have ever been found to be eternal in the world.

Nor is there any need of acts on the score of attainableness, for if Brahma be essentially the soul's self, there can be no attainableness [for nothing has to be attained where there is real identity]. Nor even if essentially different, is there any attainableness on the part of Brahma, because, being all-pervading, Brahma is already eternally attained in essence by every one like Akāsa. Nor again is Emancipation an object of refinement that an operation may be required. Refinement may be either by the accession of some virtue, or the removal of some blemish. But no accession of virtue is here possible, for in Emancipation there is the essence of Brahma which admits of no accession or excess. Nor can it be by the removal of blemish, for in Emancipation there is the essence of Brahma who is eternally pure.

If you say that Emancipation having its own intrinsic virtue obscured, becomes cleared on the refinement of the spirit by means of [meritorious] works, like the virtue of brilliance in a mirror on being refined by rubbing (or brushing)—[To this we reply] Not so—because the spirit is incapable of works. Works cannot have their being (or accomplishment) without altering (or modifying) that in which they inhere. But if the spirit could be altered (or modified) it would be concluded to be transient. And texts like the following would in that case be done violence to, viz.: "This is called unalterable." Hence is that idea not to be countenanced. Therefore the Spirit can have no inherent works. And as to works the subject of which is exterior, the spirit cannot be refined by them, for it is not objective. But is not the soul known to be purified by works inhering in the body, such as bathing, washing, wearing the sacrificial cord? No—for it is a spirit received by Ignorance to be consisting of the body and its members that is purified. Bathing, washing, &c. evidently inhere in the body. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that by such body-inhering works something consisting of the body, but acknowledged through Ignorance to be the spirit, is purified.
As by the [restoration of the] organic harmony of functions, the result of medical treatment inhering in the body, the effect is the recovery of the fancied [soul] consisting of the body, in which [soul] is produced the notion, "I am well," so by works like bathing, washing, and wearing the sacrificial cord, that is purified in which is produced the notion, "I am pure, I am refined"—and that [soul] consists of the body. By the same notionist, the cause of Ego, the purport of the expression Ego, are all works accomplished—and the same has the fruition of their effects. As it is said in the Veda, [Mantravarna] "Of the two, one enjoys the taste of fruits, the other, abstinent, only looks around."* Also, "the learned have said, the enjoyer is the one connected with the body, organs, and the mind." Again, "One is God, latent in all beings, all pervading, the inward spirit of all beings, the overseer of acts, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the intelligent, the sole, and destitute of qualities."† And "He pervaded all space, brilliant, unbodied, unwounded, without muscles, pure and unaffected by sin."‡ These (last) two mantras also show Brahma's incapableness of accession or excess, and His eternal purity. And the state of Brahma is Emancipation. Therefore neither is Emancipation an object of refinement. And no one can show any other door for the admission (of the idea) of an act in Emancipation. Therefore excepting knowledge only, not even a smell of acts can be here inferred.

But is not knowledge itself a mental act? No—for there is a distinction. For an act is that which is laid down independent of the essence of a substance, and it is dependent on the mental operation of an individual. As in texts like the following:

"Let [the priest] meditate when about to say vasпат (or make the offering) on the god for whom the butter has been received." "Let the sacrificer mentally meditate on Sandhyā." Meditation is thinking, and though a mental act, yet it can be done, or not done, or done contrariwise, by a person, because

it is dependent on the person himself. But knowledge is the
consequence of proof, and proof has for its object a substance
just as it is. Knowledge therefore is incapable [so far as it
may be called an act] of being done, or not done, or done con-
trariwise. It is dependent only on the substance itself. It
is not dependent on exhortation nor on any person. There-
fore though knowledge is a mental function, there is a great
distinction in it. Again, in the text "The male, O Gautama,
[Image 0x0 to 391x622]
is the fire, &c."* the notion of fire in the male and female is
(doubtless) a mental function—but, being caused by an ex-
hortation, it is only an act, and is dependent on the person [who
from reverence for the text fancies so]. But that which is a
notion of fire, in veritable fire itself, is not dependent on an ex-
hortation, nor is it dependent on [any] individual. What
then? It is dependent on the substance which is an object of
Perception. Hence it is knowledge not an act. The same is
to be understood in respect of (all other) substances of whatever
proof be they the objects. Such being the case, knowledge
which has for its object the veritable spirit Brahma, is not
dependent on an exhortation. Therefore, since there is no ob-
jective substance to be avoided or sought, the potential, im-
perative, and other verbal moods and affixes found in texts
regarding it, having no object of exhortation, become ineffective
like the sharp blade of a razor applied to stones. What then
is the intention of texts like the following which have the ap-
pearance of the imperative ; e. g. "The spirit is to be observed,
heard, &c.?" We say their intention is to divert (men) from
objects for which there is a natural tendency. The individual
who inclines to outward objects, wishing his own welfare and
depreciating evil, but does not thereby obtain the supreme good,
him, being in quest of the supreme good, texts like the follow-
ing, divert from the pursuit of efforts consisting of natural
works and instruments, and direct to the current [of thought]
which leads to the spirit within himself: "The spirit is to be

* Brihad Ar., 1049.
observed."* Him, thus directed to the search after self-knowledge, instruction is given on spiritual truth, without any object to be avoided or pursued in texts like the following: "All this which (you see) this is the spirit."† "Where everything is only his spirit, there whom can he see and by what? whom can he know, and by what"?‡ "By what can he know the knower?"§ "This spirit is Brahma."‖ If you find that the knowledge of the spirit has no duty for its end, or it does not operate to the avoiding or pursuing [after any object]—well, this is our ornament, that on our comprehension of the identity of Brahma with self, there is a cessation of all duty and the consummation of our work. Thus saith the Veda: "If the soul knows itself to be the self-same [Brahma,] for what wished-for object, for whose desire [of enjoyment], should he afflict his body?"¶ The Smriti too: "O Bhárata! thus thinking, let one be wise and work-consummated." Therefore Brahma is not manifested as the object of enjoined devotion.

As to what some have said, "that there is no section of the Veda which declares a mere substance, without persuasion or dissuasion," or an injunction, and its complements, we meet such an assertion with a direct negative. For the soul, manifested by the Upanishads, has no other complement. The soul that is manifested in the Upanishads is Brahma—the unfleeting—distinct from the four kinds of things such as products, &c., self-subsisting, and without any other complement. It is impossible to say, "He is not," or "he is not manifested," since He is represented as "the Spirit, who is neither this nor that" [not anything visible], and since it is impossible to deny the existence of the spirit (or self). But as the spirit is the object of the expression Ego, is it not inconsistent to say that He is manifested only by the Upanishads? No—[not inconsistent], since he is again spoken of as the Witness of that

* Ātmā means spirit and also self. The injunction is like γνωθι σεαυτον.
† Brihad Ar., 925.
‡ Ibid, 929.
§ Ibid, 473.
‖ Ibid, 602.
¶ Brihad Ar., 882.
[expression Ego]. The witness, as distinct from the agent, the object of the expression Ego, [the witness who is] the soul existent in all beings, the same [having no diversity], one, eternally uniform, is not manifested in the Chapter on Works, or [understood] by any in logical argumentation. He is the Spirit of all—therefore no one can deny Him, or turn him into an object of injunction—because He is the spirit of the very person that may gainsay Him. Since He is the spirit of all, He cannot be an object to be avoided or sought. All perishable things, produced by modifications, perish up to [i. e. except only] the soul. The soul is imperishable, because in Him there is no cause of destruction, and He is eternally uniform because in Him there is no cause of change. Hence He is eternally pure and free-natured. Therefore "there is nothing superior to the soul—that is the extreme, that is the supreme attainment."* The text again, "I ask about Him, the soul of the Upanishads," proves by the qualification—"of the Upanishads"—that the soul is chiefly manifested in the Upanishads. To say therefore that there is no portion of the Vedas the purport of which is an existing substance [only], is mere boldness.

As to what has been advanced by men learned in the purport of the Sastra, that "its purport is evidently the exposition of works, &c.," that, having for its object the inquisitiveness after Duty, is to be considered as the purport of Sastras containing injunctions and prohibitions. Again [as to Jaimini's Sutra] "The Veda having works as their purport, whatever has not the same purport is futile," those who understand this by itself [in its extreme literality] must hold that all instructions on existing things are futile. But if [by a more liberal interpretation they allow that] with a future object in view, it instructs on existing substances without any [immediate] relation to persuasive or dissuasive injunctions, then what reason is there [for contending] that it gives no instruction on the existing eternally

* Katha, 116.
uniform substance? An existing thing, while being instructed, does not become an act. If you say that although a thing is not an act [in itself], yet because of its being an instrument of action, its instruction may be with a view to an action,—to this we do not object. Though it may be with a view to an action, yet the substance on which instruction is given has the capacity for stoppage of action [too]. But of an (ordinary) thing, the [only] use is its being calculated for an act. Nor does it follow from this that the substance [once taught] becomes un-taught [if unused with a view to an act]. [If you retort that] granting the instruction [of a thing capable of use for an action] is valid, what is that to you [who maintain that Brahma is of no use for an action]? Answer. The instruction of the spiritual substance too, uncomprehended [before], is to be considered effective in the same manner [as that of sacrificial instruments]. By its comprehension, the cessation takes place at once of the false knowledge which is the cause of the fleeting world, and that cessation is taken as the use of the instruction,—and thus the purport remains good by the instruction of the substance, which proves an instrument for the effect just mentioned.

Further, the text "a Brahmin is not to be put to death," is also taught as a dissuasive. But that is not an act, nor the instrument of an act. If there be futility in all instructions not having an act for their purport, then would follow the futility of dissuasive instructions, such as "A Brahmin is not to be put to death." But this futility is not desired by you. Nor by conceiving the existence of a desire of the act, implied by the very sense of the verb han, can it be possible to fabricate, for the negative particle, the purport of a [contrary] action, not found [in the verb at all], besides the abstinence implied in refraining from the act of slaughter. This is the natural sense of the negative particle, that it expresses the non-existence of that to which it refers. The sense of non-existence too is the cause of abstinence. That sense, again, like the fire of burnt-out fuel
extinguishes of itself. Therefore in texts like “a Brahmin is not to be put to death,” we hold the sense of a prohibition [in-culcating] abstinence by refraining from the act signified by the verb—which is different from vows like that of the Brahmachāri [in which is implied an action contrary to the one connected with the negative]. Therefore [Jaimini’s Sutra above cited] is to be considered as laying down the futility only of such narratives and statements of existing things as are unconnected with the consummation of any personal object (or good).

As to what has been said that a mere subject being declared without the acknowledgment of an injunction to duty becomes futile, like the saying “the earth is seven-continented,” that is refuted by the observation of a use even in sheer declarations of substances, as “this is a rope—this is not a snake.” But has it not been retorted that unlike the usefulness of the declaration of the essence of a rope, there is futility [in the declaration of Brahma] because of our evidently finding the [continued] fleetingness of Brahma as before, even after it has been heard? To this we reply—it is impossible to show the fleetingness as before, of one who has comprehended the identity of Brahma with self, for that is opposed to that identity. It cannot be pretended that because pain, fear, &c., have been known to be inherent in one that fancies that the body and its members are himself, it follows that the same person on the comprehension of self being Brahma, produced by Vedic proof, and the [consequent] cessation of that fancy, would still be possessed of the same pain, fear, &c., the products of false knowledge. Because the pain is known of a rich householder, pluming himself on his wealth, when plundered of that wealth, it does not follow that the same person, when retired from the world and destitute of the conceit of wealth, would still be subject to the pain occasioned by the plunder of the wealth. Nor again, because the pleasure has been known of a man decked with an earring, caused by his pluming himself on that earring, does it follow that the person, relieved of his earring, and destitute of the conceit thereof,
has still the same pleasure, caused by being so ornamented. Thus
has it been said in the Veda, "pleasure and pain cannot touch the
entity which is unembodied."* If you object that unembodiedness
becomes on the fall of a body (by death), not while it is living, I re-
ply, Not so—because false knowledge is the cause of embodied-
ness. It is not possible to fabricate the embodiedness of the spirit,
otherwise than by false knowledge, denoted by the fancy that
the body is one's self. We have already said that unembodied
ness is eternal, because of its not having any work for its cause.
If (again) you say that embodiedness has for its cause the perfor-
mance of merit and demerit on the part of the spirit, I retort,
Not so—because the spirit having no relation with the body, there
can be no performance of merit and demerit on its part. To say
that the spirit's relation with the body is caused by its performance
of merit or demerit, and, again, that the same merit and demerit
are caused by the same relation, is to maintain a (vicious) inter-
dependence, and therefore the fabrication of this eternal series
is like setting up a troop of blind men (each leading and being
led by the other)—because also of the spirit's having no possible
agency in consequence of its having no work for its substratum.
If you say that the agency [of the spirit is like that] of
kings, &c., [which] is known to be effective by mere presence,
I reply—Not so. [The analogy does not hold] because their
agency is accomplished by their relation to servants, acquired
by gifts of money, &c.,—but it is impossible to fancy that the
spirit, by means of the body and its members, [acquired] by acts,
like gifts of money, can have anything caused by the relation
of master over them. The cause of the relation is evidently false
conceit. By this argument the [vicarious] merit of a sacrificer
on the part of the spirit is disposed of.

Some again say here "that the fancy of the spirit, itself
different from the body and its members, that the body and the
members are its own, is attributive, (or metaphorical) not false." To
this we reply—No—because known distinctions of substances

* Chhandogya, 600.
can alone [optionally] bear the attributive or chief sense. Where a known substantial distinction is implied as in the case of [Kesari] a peculiar animal, with a body possessed of manes, it takes, under the rules of direct and indirect significations, one well-known idea of the word "Lion" as its chief meaning, and another, equally known as its metaphorical sense, of a heroic man, possessed of fierceness and courage approximating to the qualities of a lion. In such a case the word and idea of a lion, applied to a hero, become a metaphor, but not in the case of an unknown distinction of substances [as when the word and idea of a snake are applied to a rope under a mistake of the actual difference]. In the latter case, the application of a word and its idea to another [not literally indicated by that word] can only be caused by an error, and they are not metaphorical: as under hazy darkness, in the case of an object, not understood in its peculiarities as a post, the word and idea of a man have [by the observer's mistake] a post for their object;—or as when, suddenly, [and without examination] to a pearl-oyster the word and idea of silver are seriously applied. In the same manner, how can the unadvised application of the word and idea of Ego to the composition of the body and its adjuncts, caused by indiscrimination* of spirit and no-spirit, be called metaphorical? Such application of "Ego" to the body and its adjuncts involves, even on the part of the learned, understanding the distinction between spirit and no-spirit, an indiscriminate use of words and ideas, like that of a flock of goats and sheep. Therefore the notion of Ego applied to the body and its adjuncts, on the part of those who assert the existence of a spirit different from the body and its adjuncts, is false, not metaphorical. Hence from embodiedness being the product of false notion, is established the unembodiedness of the learned, even while alive. Thus also say the texts of the Veda with reference to the knower of Brahma;

* Here there is a dangerous mistake in the original of the Asiatic Society's Edition. For अभ्रोग्यनुथितकल्पयोग्यसत्ताय read अभ्रोग्यनुथितकल्पन सिद्धि &c.
"As the outer skin of a snake, left on an ant-hill lies dead, so this body lies. But this unembodied immortal life is itself Brahma—even light."* "With eyes, but as if without eyes,—with ears, but as if without ears,—with speech, but as if without speech—with mind, but as if without mind—with the vital air, but as if without vital air." So also the Smriti, declaring the signs of the stable in wisdom by the words "what is speech to the stable in wisdom?" shows the disconnection of the learned from all inclinations. Therefore there remains not, as before, fleetingness to him who has comprehended Brahma as self. But who has fleetingness, as before, he has not comprehended the identity of Brahma with self. This cannot be gainsaid.

As to what has again been said that in consequence of finding cogitation and reflection following the hearing, Brahma must be the object of an injunction, and that [the signification of the texts] does not conclude with the declaration of his Essence; the objection is invalid—because the end of cogitation and reflection is, comprehension. If Brahma, after being comprehended, had been made the end of any other imperative act, then there would have been (in him) the objectiveness of an injunction. But it is not so—for the end of cogitation and reflection too, is, like that of hearing, comprehension [itself]. Therefore it is not congruous to say that Brahma is provable from the Sastra as the object of enjoined devotion. Hence it is established that by the construction of Vedant texts, Brahma's Sastra-provableness is absolute. And such being the case, the undertaking of this [Vedanta] Sastra, "Then therefore Brahma-inquisitiveness" is justified. If the end had been the enjoined devotion, then because of the very undertaking, "Then therefore the Duty-inquisitiveness," a separate Sastra could not have been undertaken. It would have been the undertaking of what had already been undertaken, and headed, "Now therefore the inquisitiveness, after the supplementary Duty," like the

* Brihad Ar., 871.
"Now therefore the inquisitiveness after the end of sacrifices and the soul's good." But the comprehension of the identity of Brahma with self had not been proposed [in the former treatise]. Hence with this end in view—the undertaking is reasonable of a fresh Sastra: "Then therefore Brahma-inquisitiveness." Therefore all injunctions and all other proofs have their consummation in this conviction, "I am Brahma." After the comprehension of the spirit's Unity, where nothing is to be shunned or sought, there can no longer remain (valid) proofs—without objects and without (subjective) provers.

Further, the learned have [well] said, on the cessation of the attributive and false self,* and the ideas of "son, body, &c.," being excluded on the conviction "I am the very existent Brahma," how can there be any action (or observance of duty?) The soul's position as prover (or examiner) is previous to the knowledge of the spirit to be inquired after. The prover himself becomes inquired after, [and known] devoid of sin, fault, &c. As the notion of self in the body is fabricated for the purpose of proof, so this proof itself is popularly used only until the ascertainment of the spirit. Here ends the fourth Sutra.

Thus have we declared that the Vedanta texts, necessary for the comprehension of the soul being identical with Brahma, and, by their purport, applicable to that identity, have their consummation in Brahma, even without the introduction of works. It has also been declared that Brahma is all-knowing, all-powerful, the cause of the production, continuance and destruction of the universe. But the Sánkhya and other schools, believing that the evident substance is to be got at by other proofs, and inferring other causes, such as Pradhána &c., construe the texts of the Vedanta as having those causes for their purport. They desire to trace the cause from the effect, by means of Inference alone, in all the Vedant texts bearing on the creation. The connection of

* Here, too, there is in the original of the Asiatic Society's Edition a mistake calculated to puzzle and mislead the reader. For गृहसिद्धांग: read गृहसिद्धांगः
Pradhána and the soul are deducible as eternal—so think the Sánkhyas. But the followers of Kánda infer from the same texts God as the efficient, and atoma as the material cause. And other logicians too, supporting themselves by semblances of texts and semblances of reason, start up here as objectors. Thereupon the Achárya (Vyása), versed in verbal criticism, texts, and proofs, for the purpose of demonstrating that Vedanta texts have the knowledge of Brahma for their purport, refutes those semblances of texts and semblances of reason, by turning them into objections [which have to be disposed of]. Thereupon the Sánkhya, believing that unintelligent Pradhána, composed of the three qualities, is the cause of the universe, contend (thus): “The Vedánta texts, which, you say, exhibit, as the cause of the universe, the all-knowing and the all-powerful Brahma, are applicable also to Pradhána as the cause. The all-powerfulness of Pradhána too is manifest from its own modifications, the objects of that power. And so its all-knowingness How? Thus—that which you believe to be knowledge is an attribute of the Sattva quality—as the Smriti, “From sattva is produced knowledge.” The Yogis, who are men, endowed with created organs,* are celebrated as all knowing by means of that knowledge which is an attribute of the Sattva quality. For it is well-known that in the extreme excellence of Sattva is all-knowingness. Nor is it possible to imagine all-knowingness, or any knowingness (either) on the part of a mere soul, without created organs, a sheer intelligence. But because of Pradhána’s being possessed of the three qualities, there exists in the (equipoised) state of Pradhána, the sattva (quality) which is the cause of all knowledge. In the Vedanta texts, all-knowingness may be attributed to Pradhána, even though an unintelligent entity. Surely you too who have arrived at the all-knowing Brahma, can only infer that all-knowingness from the capacity of all-knowledge—for Brahma does not continue in the

* The Asiatic Society’s edition has a dangerous error here again. It has कार्यकार्यमः instead of कार्यकर्ममः:
very act of knowing [i.e. of obtaining the knowledge of] all objects. Then in case of the eternity of knowledge, Brahma must be deprived of absoluteness with reference to the act of knowledge. And if you say knowledge [like perception or observation of some kind] is transient, then on the cessation of the act of knowledge, Brahma itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness can only be inferred from the capacity of all-knowledge. You too desire a Brahma which before production [of the universe] exists devoid of all causality. Nor can yet one conclude the production of [actual] knowledge in the absence of the instruments of knowledge, such as the body and the organs of sense. Further, the causality of Pradhána like that of clay, &c., is consistent in Pradhána, a component of many things, because of the possibility of modification; not so, however in Brahma which is an uncompounded unity." These objections being received, the following sutra is undertaken:

5. **Not so, because of observation,—It is unheard.**

Unsentient Pradhána, of Sankhya fabrication as the cause of the universe, can have no place in Vedanta texts. It is unheard. How is it unheard? Because of observation—because the observantness of the cause is heard. How? Thus, commencing with the texts "O gentle pupil, this was in the beginning an entity." "One only without a second," it is added "It observed—Let me be multiplied, let me be produced," and "it created the light."* In these texts, the universe manifested by names and forms and expressed (here) by the word idam (this), being determined before production to be an existing spirit, its creativeness, in its own antecedent state indicated by the word entity, of light and other things _after observation_ (i.e., its observant creativeness of light and other things) is declared. Also in other texts, "This was in the beginning one (only) spirit. There was nothing else. He observed [saying] Let us create the worlds. He created these worlds."† These declare also a creation after observation. In some places, having exhibited the soul of

* Chhandogya, 387, 398, 399.  
† Aitireya, I. 1, 1.
sixteen parts, it is said "He observed, *** he created the vital air (the first part)." The word "ikshati" stands for the radical signification of the verb after the manner of yajati, not the verb itself. Hence texts, like the following, declarative of an omniscient God as the cause, may also be cited here: "From Him who is omniscient, conversant with every thing, whose meditation is knowledge itself, this Brahma, name and form, and food, are produced."†

As to what has been said (by the Sankhyas) that Pradhána itself becomes all-knowing, by virtue of the Sattwa (quality) whose attribute is knowledge, that is not congruous. For in the state of Pradhána, because of the equipoise of the (three) qualities, knowledge which is an attribute of the quality Sattwa, is impossible. But, it has been further said, that by its capacity for all-knowledge, there shall be omniscience. Nor is this congruous either. If in the equipoise of the (three) qualities, Pradhána can be called all-knowing, by pleading the capacity for knowledge, inherent in the Sattwa (attribute), then it may also be called little-knowing, on the plea of the capacity of precluding knowledge, inherent in (the other two attributes) rajas and tamas. Further, the state of Sattwa without an observant‡ [spirit] is not called knowledge. Nor has unintelligent Pradhána any inherent observantness. Therefore the omniscience of Pradhána is not demonstrable.

And it is no example (against us) to say that the omniscience of Yogis is held established,—because they have sentience, and because their omniscience is caused by the excess of (the quality of) Sattwa. "But the observantness of Pradhána may be imagined, as caused by (its contiguity to) the observant

* Prasna, 231, 241.
† Mundaka, 271. The Asiatic Society's edition here misquotes the text. It has प्रभु नामसब्धमहस्पतिः instead of प्रभु नाम कपिद्रश्व
‡ साधारिण्या. This plainly refers to the Sankhya doctrine that Prakriti's creativeness is not without the presence of the Purusha who is Sákshi, witness or observer.
(spirit) just as the burning quality of an iron substance is caused by (contiguity to) fire." But in that case it would be [more] reasonable to hold that the cause of the universe is that original omniscient Brahma, by virtue of whom the observantness of Pradhána becomes conceivable. As to what has been said that the original omniscience of even Brahma is not established, since in the act of eternal knowledge, there can be no independence in the act of knowledge—to this objection, the answer is this. Let me ask you, Sir, simply this—why should there be any loss of all-knowledge in the act of eternal knowledge. He who possesses an eternal knowledge, capable of embracing all objects, is omniscient. This cannot be gainsaid. In the event of knowledge being non-eternal, one knows sometimes, — and sometimes does not know, — and thus is his omniscience also wanting. In the eternity of knowledge there is no such fault. If you say, in the eternity of knowledge there can be no separate (or independent) indication of the object of knowledge, I reply, No such thing. Because, although the sun is constantly shining hot, yet we find room for the expression, the sun burns, the sun shines. But is not the notion of the sun’s burning and shining based on the existence of some object being burnt and shone upon? But previous to production (or creation), the knowledge of Brahma cannot be connected with an object. Hence the example (of the sun) is inapplicable. But it is not inapplicable, for even where there is no object, we find it spoken subjectively of the sun, “he shines,” and therefore it is quite consistent even in the absence of an object of knowledge to speak subjectively of Brahma, “he observed.” Moreover, in anticipation of the object, the texts, declaring observantness; are justly applicable to Brahma. Now what is that effect, which, before production becomes the object of God’s knowledge? We say, it is name and form, which can neither be described as essentially himself, nor again as different from him, [as yet] unmanifested [by production] but in His will about to be manifested. By whose grace even Yogis have evident knowledge of the past and
future, as adepts in the Yoga sastras willingly admit, what need be repeated of that eternally pure God's ever-abiding knowledge of the Creation, Continuance and Dissolution [of the universe]. As to what has been said that before Production, Brahma's observantness is impossible, because of his having no connection with body and organs, neither is this objection to be uttered, for like the light of the sun, Brahma being eternally knowledge in his very essence, no need can be imagined on his part of instruments of knowledge. Besides, it is the fleeting soul, possessed of ignorance &c.,* the production of whose knowledge is dependent on the body and its organs, not that of God who is destitute of any thing which may be a cause of obstruction to knowledge. The following two Mantras also demonstrate God's independence of the body and organs, and his free and unintercepted knowledge. "He has no created thing [as a body] nor organs,—nothing equal or superior to him is seen. His energy is heard as supreme and versatile,—the work of his knowledge, which is power, is natural or self-produced."†

"Without hands or feet, he is swift, and a receiver. He sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows whatever may be an object of knowledge, but none knows him. They call him the primeval great soul."‡

But is it not the case that there is no fleeter, other than God possessed of causes of obstruction to knowledge? For the Veda says: "There is no seer apart from him, no knower apart from him."§ Then why do you speak of the origin of the fleeter's knowledge, being dependent on the body and organs, and not of God's?

To this it is answered: It is true there is no fleeter, apart from God, but still there is a semblance-relation with the collective body and its organs, as there is the semblance-relation of Akāsa with pots, jugs, hills, caves, &c. And as a fiction of

* अविचर ignorance in the sense of false knowledge. See Note page 3.
† Swetaswatara, 363.
‡ Swetaswatara, 332.
that semblance-relation, such expressions as pot-holes, jug-holes, and the ideas they convey, even though they are inseparable from Akása, are practically current in the world. So also is seen the false notion of distinctions in Akása, created by the same semblance-relation, such as pot-ákása &c. In the same manner occurs the false notion here of the distinction between God and the fleeter, caused by want of discrimination, which is the inducer of the semblance-relation with the collective body and its organs. And the importation of the idea of self on the part of the [self] existent spirit itself, in the collective body and its organs, which is no-spirit, is observed to prevail by the traditional conceit of false notion. Fleetingness being thus accounted for, the observantness of the fleeter [alone] is demonstrated to be dependant on the body and its organs.

As to what has been said that the causativeness of multiform Pradhána is manifest like that of earth &c., and not of unique Brahma, that is [sufficiently] answered by the statement that Pradhána is not heard (i.e., not spoken of as such in the Vedas). And how [in addition to the positive authority of the Vedas] the causativeness of Brahma alone and not Pradhána &c., can be logically deduced, shall be afterwards expounded in the Sutra (II. 1, 4) commencing with the words “Na vilakshanát asya.”

Here the objector says “As to what you have said that unintelligent Pradhána is not the cause of the universe because observantness [on the part of the cause] is heard (i.e., mentioned) in the Vedas, that observantness is applicable even to Pradhána—because we see that the unintelligent is often treated and spoken of [figuratively] as intelligent. On observing a [river’s] bank being near the state of tumbling down [by the force of the stream], we say pipatishtati, it wishes to fall down. Thus the unintelligent bank is treated as intelligent. In like manner Pradhána, though unintelligent, may be treated as intelligent, just prior to the act of creation, viz. “It observed.” As in the world an intelligent
"person having bathed, dined and cogitated [in his mind], 'I will go by carriage to the village in the evening,' is moved thereto by the same rule, so Pradáhána too in the forms of "Mahánt &c., is moved by rule—hence it is treated as intelligent. "But why give up real observantness and fabricate a fictitious one? Because we find in the Veda such a fiction in the case "of light and water being treated as intelligent thus, 'that light "observed—those waters observed.'*

"Hence it is found that the observantness of the [creative] "entity is fictitious, because it is mentioned in connection with "fictions." Against this allegation of the opposite party, the following sutra is undertaken.

6. IF YOU SAY, IT IS FIGURATIVE—NOT SO, BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF SPIRIT.

As to what has been said that unintelligent Pradáhána is expre-ssible by the word entity, and that it may have fictitious observantness, like that of water and light, that is a vicious explana-
tion. Why? Because of the mention of Spirit. Beginning with the words, "This, O gentle pupil, was in the begin-
nning an entity,"† and describing the creation of light, water, and food, by the words, "It observed, it created light,"‡ and denoting that substantial observant entity (spirit) and those light, water, and food, by the word "divinity," the Veda said, "That divinity observed (or cogitated) "Let me, entering these three divinities, by means of this soul [which is myself] manifest name and form."§ If unintelligent Pradáhána be there held to be the figurative observer, then, the same, being the sub-
ject, would be denoted by the words "that divinity." But then such a divinity could not stand for a soul by the word self. For the soul is taken to be intelligent, the director of the body, the sustainer of the vital airs, both by popular consent, and by the radical meaning of the word. How can it be the self of

unintelligent Pradhána? Self implies identity, but the sentient soul cannot be the identity of unsentient Pradhána. Here sentient Brahma is received as the chief observant,—and the application to the soul of the words "his self," becomes conclusive.

Likewise in the text—"He is the minimum [the universe in its undeveloped state] all this is identical with him. He is the reality. He is the spirit. Thou art the same, O Swetaketu." Here the Veda having indicated the subject-spirit, the minimum, by the term spirit ("He is the Spirit") declares the same to be identical with the sentient Swetaketu:—thus "Thou art the same, O Swetaketu." But the unsentience of water and light is evident from their objectiveness, and because of their being declared to be manifestable by name and form, and that unsentience cannot, like the word spirit, have any principal causativeness. Hence their observantness must reasonably be figurative, like that of a river-bank. And that observantness again is dependent on their possession by [Brahma, the one] entity. But the observantness of the entity [itself] cannot, as already stated, be figurative, because of the mention of "Spirit."

Here it is further objected—the word "Spirit" is applicable to unsentient Pradhána also—because of its being the accomplisher of all objects of the spirit; just as the word spirit [or self] of a king is applicable to the officer who accomplishes all his objects, thus "Bhadrasena is my own spirit, or self" [in the sense of a plenipotentiary]. For Pradhána [or soul] encompassing the enjoyment and emancipation of the Purusha, performs an office like that of a minister for his king, acting with reference to peace, war, &c. Besides the one word spirit or self [or essence] may be commonly applicable to the sentient and unsentient—since we find such expressions as Bhutátma, Indriyátma, ["matter-self" i.e. the essence of matter, "organ-self," i.e. the essence of the organs] like the applicability of the one word "jyotis" [light] both to the sacrifice [Jyotishtoma], and

* Chhandogya, p. 442.
also to flame. How then can the mere word spirit preclude the figurativeness of the observation? The reply to this is thus given.

7. Because Emancipation is declared of one identified with Him.

The unsentient Pradhána cannot have refuge in the word spirit—because the Veda having introduced entity, minimum, as the subject [i.e., the cause of the Universe] by the words “He is Spirit,” and having taught the identification with the same of the sentient Svétatetu about to be emancipated, by the words, “Thou art the same, O Svétatetu,” declared the fact of emancipation, by the words, “the soul that has a preceptor knows; of him, the loitering is only while he is not emancipated,—and he shall be emancipated.”* If the text “Thou art the same” were to cause a sentient spirit, desirous of emancipation, to assume identity with the unsentient Pradhána, indicated by the word entity or spirit, then the text would be tantamount to “Thou art unsentient,” and in that case the Sastra would be self-contradictory, much to the detriment of the soul—and, therefore, of no authority. But it is not proper to conclude the innocent Sastra as of no authority. If the authorized Sastra were to teach an ignorant soul, desirous of Emancipation, that unsentient no-spirit was the Spirit, and that [poor misguided] soul, through faith [in the Sastra], after the manner of the blind man and the ox-tail,† did not cease from that notion

* Chhandogya, 459, 460.
† The story of the blind man and the ox-tail is variously told. One narrative introduces us to a blind person in quest of his wife at her father’s house. He met a herdsman of his father-in-law in a meadow, and asked the favour of his leading him to his destination. The herdsman could not leave his master’s cattle alone in the field, but presented an ox which he was sure would lead the blind man home, if only he kept hold of his tail. As instructed by the cattle-keeper, the blind man took fast hold of the animal’s tail, and followed his steps. The ox feeling somewhat uncomfortable by an unusual drag on his tail, began to kick, trot, and bellow. This only served to make the
of the Spirit, nor learn of the [real] Spirit, contrary [to the above false doctrine inculcated on him], he would, at the same time, be debarred from good and incur evil. Therefore as the Sastra teaches the rightful observance of the Agni-Hotra and other ceremonies for a person desirous of attaining Heaven and other enjoyments, so also it properly teaches, to the person desirous of Emancipation, the rightful doctrine of the Spirit, saying, "He is the Spirit—Thou art the same, O Swetaketu." Such being the case, the inculcation of Emancipation to the truth-holder follows by the example of release [to the honest man falsely accused of theft] by his holding a red-hot axe. On the other hand if the real Spirit were taught to be something not the principal [cause of the Universe], like the teaching "I am the vital air," then the Sastric doctrine ["Thou art the same"] would be only a figure [or fiction], calculated for a mere transient fruit. The teaching of Emancipation would not follow from this. Therefore there is no figurativeness in the application of the word Spirit to the entity [or real] minimum. But to a servant, where the distinction of master and servant is manifest, the application of the word Spirit or self, as "Bhadrasena is myself [alter ego] may be figurative." Again, because a figurative word is found in some place, therefore it is not correct thus to fabricate figurativeness in a case which depends on the verbal proof [of the Sastra]—for that would introduce scepticism everywhere.

As to what has been said that the word "Atmá" [spirit, es-

blind man's grasp the harder; for he was afraid of the consequences of his guide giving him the slip. After long struggle in a forest, the parties were benighted, when a servant of the blind man's father-in-law, accidentally seeing his master's bullock under the grasp of a stranger, and, in the dark, fully persuaded that the man was a robber, snatched the animal from him, and after dealing a goodly number of kicks and blows, left the blind man half dead—no way benefited by the herdman's advice as far as the attainment of his wished-for home was concerned, and only enriched by a mending's hard kicks which imperilled his life.
sense, self] may stand commonly for the sentient and unsen-
tient, as the word "jyotis" [light] does for the sacrifice (jyo-
tishtoma) and for flame, that is not cogent—because it is not
right to affix many [diverse] meanings. Therefore the word
Spirit has chiefly the sentient for its object. It is applicable
to material objects only by the imputation of sentiency—as "the
spirit of matter"—"the spirit of organs." And even if the
word "Ātmā" [spirit] have a general signification, still with-
out some governing reason, either in the subject or the context,
you cannot fix it to any object arbitrarily. Nor in the instance
before us is there any thing fixing it to the unsentient, for the
subject is the observant entity or Spirit, and the context is the
sentient Śvetaketu. And we have already said that it is not
possible for the sentient Śvetaketu to have the unsentient for
his spirit. Hence it is certain that the word "Ātmā" [spirit]
has here the sentient for its purport. And the word "jyotis"
too is by popular usage applied to "flame"—it is only by Vedic
figure that it is applied to a certain sacrifice because of its simi-
litude to flame. Hence the instance cited is no example.

Besides having in the previous Sutra [I. 1, 6] expounded the
word "Spirit" to the exclusion of all doubt as to figurativeness
and generality, the present Sutra, "Because Emancipation is
declared of one identical with Him," is for setting forth an
independent reason for the exclusion of the causativeness of
Pradhāna. Hence the unsentient Pradhāna is not indicated
by the word "Entity" [in the Upanished texts where the same
is used for the pre-existent cause of the Universe].

What other reason is there for not taking Pradhāna as the
import of the word Entity?

8. Also because there is no intimation of a
relinquishment.

If in the texts "He is the Spirit—Thou art the same," the
no-spirit Pradhāna were the object of instruction as the pur-
port of the word "Entity," then lest the pupil after hearing
that instruction might, by virtue of his no-spirit idea, be identified with it [by devotion], it would be requisite for the tutor, desirous of inculcating the Spirit as principal, to intimate the relinquishment [of his first precept]. As a person, desirous of showing [his pupil] the [subtle] star Arundhati, first fixes his observation to a neighbouring star of a large magnitude, [though] not the principal object of instruction, as if it were itself Arundhati, and then [after thus fixing his observation], gives that star up and makes [his pupil] ken [the real] Arundhati, so [here the spiritual preceptor after introducing Pradhána] would say "This is not the Spirit." But he has not said so. The comprehension of the Entity [or cause of the Universe] alone appears to be the object and end of the 6th Chapter [of the Chhandogya]. The word "also" in the Sutra shows that the question has not been done violence to. If there were an intimation of relinquishment, then there would be violence done to the question. For the question proposed was that on the cause being known, all is known. For we thus hear at the commencement of the text: "Did you ask of the instruction by which what is unheard becomes heard, what is uncogitated becomes cogitated, the unknown becomes known? How, O Lord, is that instruction? As, O gentle pupil, by one clod of earth all earthy (things) are known. The fabric is nominal, and a mere recourse to a term. That it is earth, is alone the truth. Such, O gentle pupil, is the instruction."* But if Pradhána were taken as the purport of the word Entity, and were known with or without the idea of relinquishment, as the cause of all objectivity, still the class of subjectivity would not thereby be known. For subjectivity is not a fabrication of Pradhána, therefore Pradhána is not indicated by the word Entity.

What other reason for Pradhána's not being the import of the word Entity?

* Chhandogya, 383.
9. Because of resolution into the Spirit.

On the subject of the same cause, the import of the word Entity, it is found in the Veda thus: "When it is said of the soul "swapiti," [it sleeps] then it attains the Spirit, it is resolved into the Spirit. Hence the word "swapiti"—for the soul is resolved into the Spirit."* The text declares the well-known popular term for the soul, "swapiti." Here the word "swa" stands for the Spirit. That which is the subject cause, the import of the word Entity, the soul resolves itself into the same, gets into it. The meaning of the verb "i" with the preposition "api" is well known to be "Resolution"—for we find the words "Generation" and Resolution applied to Production and Dissolution. The soul is awake when, perceiving objects of sense, because of its special semblance-relation to mental states, it is connected with that organization [the body]. When being subject to its [various] affections, it dreams, then it is characterized by "mind." On the cessation of both these semblances, in the state of deep sleep, being destitute of the characteristics caused by those semblances, it becomes dissolved as it were into Self, and hence it is said that it is resolved into the Spirit. As the word "hridaya" (heart) has been expounded in the Veda, viz.—"This Spirit is in hridi, (the heart)," and so follows its distinction "hridyayam"† [hridi = ayam, this in the heart] and hence the term "hridaya," and as the Veda exhibits the radical derivation of the words "asanyā" and "udanyā" [hunger and thirst] viz. "The waters digest the food, the heat digests the drink."‡ so likewise the sentence "it is resolved into the Spirit indicated by the word Entity," shows this meaning by the exposition of the appellative "swapiti."

But the sentient soul can never get into unsentient Pradhāna by way of identification. If, again, Pradhāna were indica-

* Chhandogya, 430. † Ibid, 546. ‡ Ibid, 438.
ted by the word "swa"* as identical [with the soul] even then the absurdity would follow that the sentient is resolved into the unsentient. And another text, viz., "being unified with the intelligent Spirit, it knows nothing external or internal,"† proves that in the state of deep sleep there is a resolution into the sentient. Therefore that in which is the resolution of all sentients is itself sentient, and it, not Pradhána, is the purport of the word Entity, the cause of the Universe. What further reason is there against Pradhána being the cause of the Universe?

10. Because of a uniform finding.

If, after the mere argumentative manner, various causes had been found also in the Vedanta texts, that is to say, somewhere the sentient Brahma as the cause of the Universe, somewhere the unsentient Pradhána, somewhere another again [such as atoms] then there would have been a fabrication in some places of texts about [figurative] observation out of complaisance to the theory of Pradhána's causativeness. But there is no such thing. For there is a uniform finding in all the Vedanta texts of sentient-causativeness. As from a blazing fire sparks scatter on all sides, so from this Spirit, all pránas spring up to their [various] receptacles. Thus, "from pránas, the gods, from gods, the worlds." "From that, i.e., this Spirit, the ákása was produced." "From the Spirit alone is all this." "This prána is produced from the Spirit."‡ All these texts exhibit the causativeness of the Spirit. And we have already said that the word Spirit stands for the sentient. And this is a great reason for the authority of all the Vedanta that there is a uniform consistency with reference to the causativeness of the sentient,

* The Bibliotheca Indica's edition is again dangerously wrong here—having वाह्यन instead of वाह्यन.
† Brihad, 790.
‡ Chhandogya, 525. In the citation of these texts, also, dangerous errors have crept into the text of the Bibliotheca edition: चावन एव instead of चावन एव. चावन एव instead of चावन एव.
like [the authority of] the eye, &c., with reference to colours, &c. Therefore, because of this uniform finding, the all-knowing Brahma is the cause of the Universe.

What other reason is there for taking the all-knowing Brahma to be the cause of the Universe?

11. Because also of its being heard (or so found in the Veda).

That, by the word *sva* (spirit or self) the all-knowing God is meant, as the Cause of the Universe, is also heard (or found in the Veda). In the Swetáswatara Mantra Upanishad, on the all-knowing God as the subject, it is said, "He is the cause, the Supreme Lord of all organs (or instruments)—nor is there any producer or Lord of him."* Hence it is demonstrated that the all-knowing Brahma is the cause of the Universe, not unsentient Pradhána, or anything else. Commencing from the sutra, "From whom the production, of this &c.," down to the (present) sutra "Because, also of its being heard," the purport of the Vedanta texts that have been cited under them, *viz.*, that the all-knowing, and all-powerful God is the cause of the production, continuance, and dissolution of the Universe, has been logically expounded. And by the statement [10 Sutra]. "Because of a uniform finding," it has been shown that all the Vedanta texts are asserters of a sentient cause. Then why again bring in the following array of sutras?

Answer, Brahma is comprehended in two ways: 1st, as possessed of different semblances of modification in name and form; 2nd, as destitute of all semblances. Thus: "Where it is like a duality, there one sees another."† "But where every thing is identical with itself, there whom can it see, and by what?" "Where one sees no other, hears no other, knows no other, that is the acme. But where one sees another, hears another, knows another, that must be little, [for it may have another equal or greater than itself]. The acme is immortal, the little is mortal (or terminable."‡ The wise [*e., the all-knowing

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* Swetas. 364. † Brihad Ar., 471 and 928. ‡ Chhandogya, 517.
Spirit, who having set forth all forms and having made names, remains respecting them."* "Without parts, without acts, tranquil, guileless, unstained, the supreme embankment of immortality, like a fire after fuel is burnt out."† "Not this, not this." "Not gross, not subtle, not small, not large." "Small (or limited)‡ on the one hand, yet full (or unlimited) on the other." Thus in thousands of ways do the texts exhibit the two forms of Brahma as varied under Knowledge and Ignorance. In the state of Ignorance there is the universal practice of holding Brahma [both] as the object and subject of devotion. Some of these devotions of Brahma are for [sensuous] enjoyments, some are for graduated emancipation, and some for perfection of works. The distinctions being according to the variations of their semblances of especial qualifications. Although the object of devotion is but one God, the Supreme Spirit, qualified by all those especial qualifications, yet the effects vary according to the quality of the devotion. As in the text "In whatever way one worships Him, that he becomes." Also, "What the soul meditates in this world, that it becomes when departing from hence." Also the Smriti, "O son of Kunti! whatever state a person thinks of, when he gives up his body at the end, that he attains, being ever engaged in the same contemplation."§

Although one and the same Spirit is latent in all bodies, immoveable or moveable, still in consequence of differences in semblance-relations to the mind, differences are mentioned in respect of dignity and capacity even in the immutable, eternal, uniform Spirit, progressively manifesting itself. Thus, "He who has an extended knowledge of him, the spirit—" Here the Smriti also has it. "In whatever substance is excess of glory or beatitude, know it to be the product of a portion of

* The Bibliotheca Indica's edition of the original, cites this passage wrong—making it चालिबादन् instead of चालिबदन्.
† Brihad Ar., 370. ‡ Brihad Ar., 909. § Bhagavad-gita, viii. 6.
my brilliance." Here that which has excess of glory is inculcated as God, being an object of worship.

And here too (in the Brahma sutras) the author will declare that in the solar orb, the golden soul is supreme, because of its having for its denotative freedom from all stains. The same may be noticed in the Sutra [I. 1, 22.] "Akāsas, [is Brahma] from having its denotative." Thus the knowledge of the Spirit too, the cause of immediate Emancipation, though inculcated by the door of specific semblances, may be dubiously taken for the supreme or the reverse, since no specific semblance is intended to be declared, and therefore it must be determined by the discussion of the tendency of the texts. As in the Sutra "Joyful, because of reiteration." Thus the one and the same Brahma is inculcated in the Vedanta texts to be worshipped and understood as requiring semblance-relation, and also as excluding semblance-relation. The following part of this work is undertaken for the purpose of elucidating this. And that which was declared in the Sutra [I. 1, 10] "Because of a uniform finding," i.e., the exclusion of another unsentient cause, the same is here treated by the exposition of other texts concerning Brahma refuting all causes opposed to Brahma.

12. Joyful, because of reiteration.

In the Taittiriya Upanishad, after premising "the breaden," "the breathy," "the mental," "the intelligent," it is added, "Different from the same intelligent is the inmost joyful Spirit." Here the doubt occurs—"Is the Supreme Brahma indicated by the word "joyful,"† which is the real truth, know-

* परापरविस्मलेः The words immediately preceding these in the Asiatic Society's edition, viz. परापरविस्मलेः are not found in Ram Mohun Roy's edition, or in that of Ananda Chandra Vedantavagis. As the Editor of the Asiatic Society's edition always notices its variations from Ram Mohun's, but has taken no such notice here, the words seem to have crept in through a mistake.

† Taittirya, 81.
ledge, and the infinite?"* Or like the "broaden," &c., is it Brahma in another sense? What is then the result? The "joyful" must be a secondary spirit in another sense of Brahma. Why? Because it occurs in the same series as the secondary spirits "broaden," &c. Or let it be called "joyful," because it is the inmost of all,—but it cannot be the primary Spirit, for it has "pleasure," &c., for its limbs, and its embodiedness is declared. Had it been the primary Spirit, there could not have been a touch of pleasure," &c. But here we find that "pleasure is its head,"† and we hear also of its embodiedness, "this is the embodied spirit of the former one."‡ That is to say this "Joyful," is the embodied spirit of the former "Intelligent." The touch of pleasure and pain cannot be precluded from an embodied entity. Therefore the joyful spirit is a mere fleeter.

To these objections, it is thus answered: "Joyful, because of reiteration." The Supreme Spirit is fit to be joyful. Why? Because of reiteration. The word joy is many times repeatedly applied to the great Spirit. Referring to the "joyful," it is said, "He is the flavour."§ Thus declaring his flavouredness, it is added, "This (soul) obtaining the flavour, becomes joyful. Who could breathe, who could live, if this joy were not in [the universal expanse of] Akaśa.|| This alone diffuses joy."¶ "This is the determination of joy.*** "The soul attains this joyful Spirit."†† "Knowing the joy of Brahma, he is afraid of nothing."‡‡ "He understood joy to be Brahma."§§ In another text again, the word joy is found to be applied to Brahma, viz., "Brahma, the Intelligence and Joy." Hence from the frequently repeated application of the word joy to Brahma, we find Brahma is the joyful Spirit.

As to what has been said that because of its occurring in the

same series with the secondary spirits, "breaden," &c., the joyful is also a secondary spirit, this is no fault—because the joyful is inmost of all [or farthest of all]. The Sastra, desirous of instructing on the primary spirit, and following out the popular notion, [first] declaring the breaden, the body, the no-spirit, notoriously taken to be the spirit by the extremely stupid, and like an image of melted copper thrown into a crucible, making them receive, as spirit, the further and further no-spirits, similar to the preceding ones, at last for the greater facility of instruction, taught that the inmost (or furthest) of all, the joyful, was the primary spirit. This is the secret [of the Sastra]. As in the pointing out of the star Arundhati, after showing many stars as secondary [and unreal] Arundhati, that which is shown last, becomes the chief [and real] Arundhati, so here also the joyful, being the ultimate, is also the primary spirit.

As to what you say that the conception of pleasure, &c., as head, &c., is inapplicable to the primary spirit, that is caused by the foregoing un-ultimate [proximate] semblances. It is not a natural [or genuine conception]. Here there is no fault in it: for the embodiedness too of the joyful is shown [merely because it is] the series of the bodies breaden, &c., but there is no undisguised embodiment here as in the fleeter. Hence the Joyful is the Supreme Spirit.

13. If you say, Because of the particle of modification, it is not; then I reply, No, because of the sense of abundance.

Here [the opposite party] says, the Joyful cannot be the Supreme Spirit. Why—because of the particle of modification. [Panini IV. 3, 82.]* This is a word different from the radical, being an expression implying a modification [of the radical], because in joyful, (ánandamaya) the import of the affix mayat

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is a modification. Therefore like breaden, &c., this word joyful implies an object of modification (or composition). If you argue thus, we reply, No—because the particle “mayat” is held [by grammarians] also in the sense of abundance. For [in Panini V. 4, 21.] “Mayat in the sense of fulness,”* this sutra affixes “mayat,”—also in case of abundance, as (annamaya) “breaden sacrifice” expresses abundance of bread. In the same manner the joyful signifies Brahma, abundant in joy. The abundance of joy in Brahma appears thus: After speaking of joy in a hundred-fold degree, beginning from the human, and proceeding upward and upward, the joy of Brahma is concluded to be incapable of excess [or any higher degree]. Hence (the affix) “mayat” is in the sense of Abundance.

14. Also because He is declared to be its cause.

Hence also (the affix) “mayat” is in the sense of abundance, because the Veda declares that Brahma is the cause of joy, thus “this one diffuses joy.”† He who diffuses joy obtains celebrity as abundant in joy. As a person who causes other’s opulence in the world, obtains the reputation of himself being abundant in opulence, so here. Therefore from the congruousness of mayat having also the sense of abundance, the Supreme Spirit is verily the joyful.

15. The same is also sung as the Brahma of the Mantras.

Hence also is the Supreme Spirit the Joyful, because after the text “the knower of Brahma attains the supreme (good)” it is added “Brahma, the truth, the knowledge, the infinite.”‡ In this mantra, the same real Brahma who is distinguished by the attribute, “the truth, the knowledge and the infinite,” from whom all immovable and moveable creatures are produced in order, commencing with ākāsa, who also, after creating all things and entering into them, remains in the recess, inmost of

* Siddhanta Kaumudi, p. 722.  † Tait. 100.  ‡ Ibid, 56.
all, for whose recognition it is (successively) added, "another inner spirit," the same Brahma of the Mantra is here sung; "He who is the other inner spirit is the joyful." Of the Mantras and Brahmanas, the same purport may be reasonably concluded, because they are not conflicting. Otherwise the real subject would be lost and an unreal introduced. Nor is there after the Joyful another inner spirit named, as there is after the breaden, &c. The same is the object of the text. "This is the instruction received by Bhrigu and imparted by Varuna. He understood that joy was Brahma."* Hence the Supreme Spirit is himself the Joyful.

16. NOT THE OTHER, BECAUSE OF INCONGRUITY.

Hence also is the Supreme Spirit Joyful—not the other. The other means another than God, namely, the fleeting soul. The soul is not expressed by the word Joyful—why? because of incongruity. Referring to the Joyful, it is declared "He desired, let me be many, let me be produced." And "He exercised meditation, having exercised meditation, he created all this—whatever there is."† Here a desire prior to the production of the body, &c., and the identity of all modifications in process of creation, with the Creator, and the creation of all modifications, cannot be congruous in any other than the Supreme Spirit.

17. BECAUSE ALSO A DISTINCTION IS INCULCATED.

Hence also the fleeter is not the joyful, because, in reference to the joyful, it is declared, "He is the flavour, this one [the fleeting soul] obtaining the flavour, becomes joyous." Thus is a distinction between the soul and the joyful, inculcated. For that which is (already) obtained cannot become (an object) to be obtained. How then is the spirit to be sought, and "there is nothing higher than the obtainment of the spirit," as both the sruti and the smriti have it,—since you have said that which

* Taitt. 128.  † Ibid. 87, 30.
is already obtained, cannot become an object to be obtained? Well—but still the existing spirit in which the identification with the Supreme is not (in truth) abolished, is found to have the popular persuasion, caused by non-comprehension of truth, that the body and its members, which are no-spirit, are the spirit. Therefore the spirit is not sought, but to be sought, by the embodied soul, though it is itself the spirit, not obtained, but to be obtained, not heard of, but to be heard, not cogitated, but to be cogitated, not known, but to be known, &c. And thus a distinction is deduced.

But texts like the following disallow any real seer or hearer other than the all-knowing God, viz., “There is no seer other than this, &c.” But God is different from the embodied agent and patient, the creature of ignorance called the cognition-spirit:—as from the juggler, holding a sword of hide and ascending to the sky by means of a cord, the real juggler, standing on the earth, is different; or as from the ākāsa in a pot, limited by semblance, the ākāsa which is unlimited by semblance, is different. Relying on this sort of difference between the cognition-spirit and the Supreme Spirit, the two sutras are laid down, viz. “Not the other, because of incongruity,” and, “Because also a distinction is inculcated.”

18. Because also of desire, the imagination [of the Sankhyas] is not to be regarded.

In respect of the joyful it is said, “He desired, let me be many, let me be produced.” Hence, because of the description of desiringness, neither is the imagined non-sentient Pradhána, fabricated by the Sankhya, to be regarded as the joyful or the cause. Though Pradhána was refuted in the fifth sutra, “Not so, because of observation: it is unheard,” yet, taking occasion incidentally from the desiringness set forth in the preceding sutra, it is again refuted for the purpose of showing the uniform finding of the Veda.
19. [The Sastra] teaches also his unification with this.

Hence also the word Joyful is not applicable to Pradhána or to the soul, because [the Sastra], teaches the unification of him, i.e., the soul awakened [to true knowledge], with this, the Joyful real spirit. Union with his self is Unification, that is to say, Identification, meaning Emancipation. The Sastra teaches this unification. "When indeed he fearlessly attains a position of unification in this invisible, unembodied, ineffable, (Brahma) destitute of illusion, he attains fearlessness, but when he fancies the slightest difference from him, then he falls into fear." In other words, if he fancies even a small difference and distinction from that Joyful one, then he does not cease from fear of the world; but when he stands as identically the same with this Joyful one, then he ceases from fear of the world. But this can consist only with the reception of the Supreme Spirit, not the reception of Pradhána or of the soul either. Hence it is demonstrated that the Joyful is the Supreme spirit.

Here it may be thus objected; In the texts, "this soul is breaden-flavour-full—after this breaden-flavour-full, another soul, further inward, is the life-full—another soul, inward, is the mind-full—another further soul, inward, is the intelligence-full,"—the affix "mayat" has been used in a series of modification-senses. How can it now after the manner of the half old, half young, suddenly get, "in the Joyful," the sense of abundance, and have Brahma for its object? If you say it is used so in the Mantras, then the breaden and other [secondaries] would also relate to Brahma. To this it is answered: it is evident that the breaden and other secondaries have no relation to Brahma, because it is said in regard to them, after it and after it, further and further, another and another spirit: but after the Joyful no other further spirit is mentioned. Hence the Joyful is Brahma; because otherwise there would be an abandonment of the right subject and a fabrication of a wrong one.

* Tait., 100, &c.
To this it is rejoined: although there is no mention in the Vedas of another further spirit after the joyful, as there is in the case of the breaden and other secondaries, still the joyful is not Brahma. Because with the joyful as the subject, it is mentioned, "his head is pleasure, the south wing is gratification, the north wing is delight, the spirit is joy, the tail [or rear] is Brahma, the stand (or support)." Such being the case, the very Brahma who is the subject in the Mantra, "Brahma, the truth, the knowledge, the infinite,"† the same is here spoken of as "Brahma the tail [or rear], the stand (or support)." It is from a desire of making him known that the five receptacles are invented, beginning with the breaden and terminating with the joyful. Then how can there be an abandonment of the real subject and the fabrication of an unreal one?

But is it not as a member of the joyful that it is said, "the tail (or rear) is Brahma, the stand (or support)," just as with reference to the breaden and others, it is said, "this is the tail (or rear), the stand (or support), &c.?" Then how can Brahma have self-supremacy? We reply, because he is subject. But even if he were comprehended as a member of the joyful, still his subjectiveness would not be given up, because the joyful is itself Brahma? To this it is answered: In that case the same Brahma would be the joyful, the spirit, the body,—and the same Brahma (again) the tail, the stand, a (mere) member of that body, which would be (manifest) inconsistency. But if you (elect between the two and) take one of the alternatives, then the declaration of Brahma can only consist in "Brahma, the tail, the stand," because it is joined with the word Brahma:—

* not in the expression "joyful," because that expression is not joined with the word Brahma.

Moreover, after the saying "the tail is Brahma, the stand," it is added [in the Taittiriya Upanishad], "In that sense is

* Tait., 83, 84. प्रतिशिष्ठा is thus expounded by Sankara (Tait., 69) प्रतिशिष्ठि अनेकि प्रतिशिष्ठा।

† Tait., 66.
this sloka."* "He becomes a mere non-entity [a vile, unmanly person], if he thinks that Brahma is a non-entity. If he think that Brahma is, then [right-minded] people know him to be an entity [a real manly person]."
† And in this sloka, from its laying down the merit and demerit of acknowledging the entity and non-entity of Brahma, without drawing after the joyful, it follows that in the words, "the tail is Brahma, the stand," there is the self-supremacy of Brahma. Nor would it be reasonable to notice any doubt on the entity or non-entity of the joyful spirit: because the joyful, qualified by pleasure, gratification, &c., is manifest to all the world.

But why is the self-supreme entity Brahma distinguished as the tail of the Joyful in the words—"The tail is Brahma, the stand?" This is no fault. "The tail"—that is, like a tail, "the stand" means the supreme receptacle—that is, the one nest (or resting-place) of all worldly joys is the Brahma-joy. This is here the signification, not membership. Another Vedic text says, "Of this joy, the other creatures subsist, but on a tittle."‡ Moreover, if the joyful were Brahma, then by the memberships of pleasure, &c., a Brahma would be arrived at, distinctly definable; but in texts relating to Brahma, he is declared to be indefinable, because of his being called incomprehensible by speech and mind. Thus, "speech and mind [lit. with the mind] not apprehending [Brahma] stop short of Him. Knowing the joy of Brahma, one is not afraid of anything."§

Again, if [the affix "mayat" were taken in the sense of abundance, and] Brahma were held to be abundant in joy, then the existence of sorrow would also be introduced, because in the world the [relative] idea of abundance suggests [the co-existence of] its opposite, scantiness. In that case, violence would be done to the text, which inculcates the want of any different idea in Brahma, the acme: viz., "where he sees no other, he hears no other, he knows of no other, that is the

* Tait., 84. † Tait., 85. ‡ Brihad Ar., 816. § Tait., 78.
The joyful again is also divisible as to its body, according to the division of [its members] pleasure, &c., but Brahma is not divisible as to its body, for the following text inculcates its infinitude: "Brahma, the truth, the knowledge, the infinite."† Because also of another text, "One is God, latent in all beings, all pervading, the inward spirit of all beings."‡

Nor is the reiteration of the [adjective] "joyful" observed in the Veda. The idea of the noun alone is reiterated everywhere in its several senses. Thus, "He is the flavour. This soul obtaining the flavour becomes joyous. Who could breathe, who could live, if this joy were not in Akása? This alone diffuses joy. This is the determination of joy." "Knowing the joy of Brahma, he is afraid of nothing." "He understood joy to be Brahma."§ Now had it been ascertained that the word "joyful" was the predicate of Brahma, then the repetition of the "joyful" might have been admitted, even though in succeeding passages the word "joy" alone were used. But we have already declared that the joyful is not Brahma by reason of its having pleasure for its head, &c. Therefore, seeing in another text, viz., "Brahma, the Intelligence and Joy,"|| the application to Brahma, of only the radical sense of [the substantive] joy, the texts "if there were no joy in Akása," &c., must be understood to have reference to Brahma, and not as reiterations of the "joyful."

As to the reiteration of the word joyful with the affix "mayat" in the following text, "The soul attains this joyful spirit," it has no relation to Brahma, because it occurs in the series of the modified spirits, breaden, &c., which are attainable by no-spirits. But [may it not be objected], if the attainable joyful has the state of Brahma, [only] like the breaden, &c., then the fruit of the attainment of Brahma by the learned must also be unascertainable. This is no fault. For by the very ascertaining of the attainment of the joyful, the fruit is ascertained of the attainment by the learned of Brahma in the state of the tail.

* Chhandogya, 517. † Tait., 56. ‡ Swetasvatara, 365.
and the stand—because such is the exposition of the text, "Even that is the signification:—of whom speech falls short," &c.

As to the citation of the Text, "He desired, let me be many, let me be produced," in contiguity with the Joyful, that being connected with the still more contiguous text, "Brahma, the Tail, the Stand," does not declare the Brahmaship of the Joyful, [but of the Tail].

The succeeding Vedic text too depending on Brahma, *viz.* "He is the flavour," has no relation with the Joyful. But [may it not be objected], the text, "He desired," being in the masculine, cannot reasonably refer to Brahma. This is no fault, because in the following text, Brahma is the subject even by the application of the word spirit in the masculine: "From that, which is the same as this spirit, Akāsa was produced."*

As to the understanding of Bhrigu, the son of Varuna, "He understood that Joy was Brahma,"† there, in the absence of the affix *mayat*, in the absence too of any declaration that pleasure was the head &c., the Brahmaship of Joy is consistent. Therefore without recourse to some qualification, though it may be the smallest, there is no consistency in the idea of Brahma having absolutely pleasure for his head &c.—and here the object is not to set forth a qualified Brahma. Witness the text which declares his transcending the range of speech and mind. Therefore the affix *mayat* is to be understood, as in the Breaden &c. so also in the Joyful, in the sense of modification, not abundance.

As for the Sutras, they are to be expounded thus—"Brahma, the Tail, the Stand." Here a question arises, Is Brahma intended to be set forth in the capacity of a member of the Joyful, or in his self-supremacy? To the [primâ facie] idea of membership, because of the word "tail," it is thus replied: "Joyful, because of reiteration." Joyful is the spirit, and here Brahma is the Tail, the Stand. Hence the self-supreme Brahma is set forth—because of reiteration. And because in the concluding sloka,

* Tait. 67.  
† Ibid, 128
"He becomes a mere non-entity" &c., the one only Brahma is reiterated.

[As to the next or 13th Sutra], "If you say, because of the particle of modification, it is not: then I reply, No, because of the sense of Abundance." By the word "modification" is intended the word member. The refutation is [here] challenged of what has been said, that because of the word "tail," a member, there is no self-supremacy of Brahma. This is met by saying, that is no fault, because the word member is consistent also in the sense of abundance. In the idea of Abundance is involved the idea of Approximation, and the sense of approximation to a member. After the assertion of the members, head, &c. of the Breamden &c., having also spoken of the other members, head &c. of the Joyful, [the text] speaks in the sense of approximation to a member, "Brahma, the Tail, the Stand," not, however, with the intention of declaring a member, the reason whereof, "because of reiteration," proves the self-supremacy of Brahma.

[The 14th Sutra is] "Also, because He is declared to be its cause." Brahma is declared to be the cause of all products of modification, including the Joyful: thus "He created all this, whatever it be."* But the entity Brahma, the cause, cannot be, in its primary sense, a member of the Joyful, his own modification (or product). And the other Sutras are to be considered, to the extent of their scope, as expositions of the very Brahma, declared by the word "tail."

20. He is within, because of the inculcation of his attributes.

Thus saith the Veda: "Now he who is seen within in the sun, the golden person, gold-bearded, gold-haired, all gold, up to the tip of the nails inclusively, his eyes are like the red lotus, [refulgent] as a monkey's tail, his name is "ut" (or superior), he is risen superior to all sins. He who knows (or understands) thus, rises superior to all sins."† So much for the

* Tait. 90.  † Chhandogya, 60-62.
divine site [for purposes of meditation]. Now for the divine form. "He who is seen within the eye, the person" &c.* Here a question arises. Is it some fleeting individual who, by the attainment of pre-eminence, owing to excess of learning and works, is declared to be the person within the orb of the sun and within the eye, as an object of devotion, or is it the eternally perfect supreme God? The prima facie view is, he is a fleeter. Why? Because he is declared to be possessed of form. In the solar person, a form is given, the similitude of gold-bearded &c. And in the ocular person, too, the same form is found by attribution. "The form of this one is the same as of the other [the solar]."†

But the Supreme God cannot be consistently supposed to have a form, because of the text, "He has no sound, no touch, no decay."‡ Because also a receptacle is declared [of the solar and ocular person], "This one who is in the sun, this one who is in the eye." But a receptacle cannot be laid down of the Supreme God who, without receptacle, stands in his own glory, and is all-pervading. "Witness the two texts—Where does he stand, Sir? In his own glory."§ And, "Like Ākāsa, he enters all things and is eternal." Because also of the texts which limit (or define), the dominions of the solar and ocular persons: "He rules both those worlds which are above that [orb the sun] and the desirers of divine enjoyments."‖ This is the limit of the dominion of the solar person. "He rules both those worlds which are under that (eye), and also the desirers of human enjoyments."¶ This is (the limit of) the ocular person's dominion. But a dominion, with limits, cannot be consistently attributed to the Supreme God, because of the text which declares his unqualifiedness: "He is the lord of all, He is the sovereign of all creatures, He is the preserver of the creation, He is the embankment, the protection against the overwhelm-

* Chhandogya, 65. † Ibid, 66. ‡ Katha, 119. § Chhandogya, 518. ‖ Chhandogya, 64. ¶ Ibid, 67.
ing of these worlds."* Therefore the Supreme God is not within the eye and the sun.

Meeting this [primà facie] argument we say, "He is within, because of the inculcation of his attributes." The person set forth in the texts, "This one within the sun, this one with the eye," is the Supreme God himself, and not a fleeter. Why? "Because of the inculcation of His attributes." For his, the Supreme God's, attributes are here inculcated. Thus, "Having declared His name is "ut," i.e. the name of him, the solar person, the interpretation follows, that He is free from all sin, viz. "He is risen superior to all sins." And then there is the attribution: the same interpreted name is also of the ocular person, viz. "What is that one's name, is this one's name." And it is of the supreme spirit that freedom from all sin is declared. "The Spirit, destitute of sin &c.'†

Again, In the ocular person, "the same is Rich, the same Saman, the same the sacrificial instrument (uktha), the same Yajus, the same three-fold Veda."‡ This text identifies [the ocular person] with the Rich, Saman, &c. This is applicable to the Supreme God only, because from causality of the total follows identification with the total. Referring also to the elements of earth, fire, &c. as seats of the divinity, and the Rich and Saman, speech, breath, &c. as the divine self, it is said, "Of him the Rich and the Saman are the two joints."§ Thus far the divine seats. So also the divine self, "The two joints of that one, are the two joints [of this one]." This too is applicable only to one who is identical with the total. "Those who sing on the harp sing even Him—hence they become wealthy."|| Thus in worldly songs too he alone is represented being sung. This too, can be consistent (only) on taking it as the Supreme God. From the following passage too, of the Bhagavad-gītā, worldly beauty and dominion, when it is described as independent, bring in the supreme divinity. Thus: "Whatever

* Brihad, 896. † Chhandogya, 61, 62, 571. ‡ Chhandogya, 66.
§ Ibid, 63. || Ibid, 68.
essence there is, possessed of wealth, beauty, and power, know thou to be the product of my parts."

As to what has been said that the description of a form, "gold-bearded" &c. cannot be consistently applied to the Supreme God, to this we reply, there may be even of the Supreme Being an illusive form by virtue of his will out of compassion for worshippers. As it is said in the Smriti: "This is an illusion created by myself that thou seest me, O Narada! But thou must take me to be [in reality] endued with the qualities of all creatures."

Moreover where the supreme divine form is inculcated bereft of all qualifications, there it becomes "Without sound, without touch, without form, without decay."* But because of his causality of the Total, the Supreme God is also represented as an object of devotion, qualified with some of the attributes of modification: Thus, "He is all-doer, all-desirer, all smell, all flavour," &c.† Likewise he may be represented "gold-bearded" &c.

As to what has also been said with reference to the description of a receptacle, that he cannot be the Supreme God, to this it is replied, that there may be for the purpose of devotion, the inculcation of a particular receptacle even of Him who dwelleth in his own glory, because since Brahma pervades the whole, like Akāsa, it follows that He is within, and identical with every thing. The description of the limit or definition of glory, too, required by the division into the divine seats and the divine self, is for the purpose of devotion. Therefore the Supreme God, himself, is represented as within the eye and the sun.

21. **Because also of a difference being declared by implication, it is another.**

There is also, besides the souls conceiving themselves to have the sun and others for their bodies, another even the in-ruling God—for thus is the implied declaration of the Veda: "He

* Katha, 119.  
† Chhaandogya, 205.
who remaining in the sun is different from the sun, whom the
sun does not know, of whom the sun is the body, who rules
the sun within, this is thy spirit, the immortal in-ruler.”
There from the words “different from the sun, whom the sun
does not know,” another in-ruler, the intelligence-spirit,
different from the knowing sun, is plainly pointed out. He
ought here also to be taken for the solar individual, because
the Veda has a similar application here. Hence it is proved that
the supreme God himself is here inculcated.

22. **Akāsa [is Brahma], because of its [denotative] sign.**

This is noted in the Chhandogya: “What is the course [or
goal] of this world? He said, “Akāsa, for all these creatures are
produced from Akāsa, and are resolved into Akāsa. Certainly
Akāsa is superior to all these. Akāsa is their refuge.” Here
lies a doubt. Is the Supreme Brahma signified by the word
Akāsa, or is it the material element, Akāsa? But why doubt?
Because it is observed to be applied to both. The word Akāsa,
though well known in the Veda and in popular parlance to be
applied to a particular material element, is still occasionally
applied to Brahma, when by the force of the purport of the text
or by the indication of some uncommon attribute, Brahma is
ascertained to be its meaning; as in the following texts, “If
this Akāsa were not the Joy.” “Akāsa is the sustainer of
name and form: from which those two [name and form] are
different, [or in which those two remain] that is Brahma.”
Hence the doubt.

Well, here, the material element of Akāsa is proper to be taken
as the signification. Why? Because that is readily suggested
to the understanding by the more prevalent use [or the primary
meaning] of the word. Nor can this word Akāsa be understood

* Br. Aranyaka, 618, 619. There is again a dangerous error here in the
Asiatic Society’s edition. Instead of आदित्यादर्शार्थ आदित्या न चेत it
should be आदित्यादर्शार्थ यथ आदित्या न चेत.
† Chhandogya, 77. ‡ Tait. 100. § Chhand. 623.
to be equally applicable to both, because then (the vice of) ambiguity would be incurred. Hence it is proper to apply the word Akāsa metaphorically to Brahma. By reason of all-pervasion and many other attributes, Brahma becomes indeed similar to Akāsa. But it is not proper to take a metaphorical sense, where the primary sense holds good. The taking of the primary sense here holds good enough.

But is not the taking of the material Akāsa inconsistent with the purport of the text, "All these creatures are produced from Akāsa itself." This is no fault; for the causativeness of the material Akāsa in the series of the air &c. is reasonable. In sooth, it is clearly understood that "From this spirit, Akāsa is produced, from Akāsa the air, from air fire, &c." And the superiority and ultimate refuge-ship of Akāsa are also consistent relatively to other creatures. Hence by the word Akāsa, the material Akāsa is comprehended.

On these sayings, we declare, "Akāsa, [is Brahma] because of its denotative sign." It is reasonable here to comprehend Brahma under the term Akāsa. Why? Because of its denotative sign. This is the sign of the supreme Brahma: "All these creatures indeed are produced from Akāsa itself."† That the production of all creatures is from Supreme Brahma, is the definite settlement in all the Vedānta texts.

But has not the causality of material Akāsa too been shown in the order of air, &c.? True, it has been shown. Still, if the primary cause, Brahma, were not taken, then the tenet "from Akāsa itself," and the qualification of the creatures, viz., the word "all," would not be consistent. Again, the texts "[All creatures] are absorbed in Akāsa"‡ and "Akāsa is superior to [all] these—Akāsa is the ultimate refuge," are [denotative] signs of Brahma. Absolute superiority is indeed declared to be in the supreme Spirit alone. Thus—"superior to the earth, superior to the sky, superior to heaven, superior to these worlds."§ Moreover

* Tait. 67. † Chhandogya, 77. ‡ Chhandogya, 77. § Chhandogya, 207.
ultimate refuge-ship too can be primarily applicable to no other than the Supreme spirit, because of His being the ultimate cause. And there is the text: "Brahma is Intelligence and Joy, the ultimate refuge of the giver of wealth (the pious sacrificer)."* Again, Jaibali, having censured the position of Śālavatya because it was vitiated by the fault of finitude, and desiring to declare something infinite, referred to Ākāsa, and unifying it with the Udgitha, he thus spoke of the same Ākāsa in conclusion: "This is the supremely excellent Udgitha—this is the Infinite."† And that infinitude is a (denotative) sign of Brahma.

As to what has been said that by force of the general acceptation [of the term], material Ākāsa is primarily understood, to this we reply that though primarily understood [to be material Ākāsa], this first meaning is not maintainable on observing the attributes of Brahma to be involved in connection with the term. The application of the term Ākāsa, has also been shown, thus: "Ākāsa is the sustainer of name and form" &c. And the application of the synonyms of Ākāsa to Brahma is also found: "In the supreme Imperishable, Vyoman (or Ākāsa), revealed in the Rich (or the three Vedas) are seated the Vishy-devas."‡ "This science of Bhrigu and Varuna, rests in the supreme Vyoman (or Ākāsa)."§ "Om Ka is Brahma, Kha (ākāsa) is Brahma, Kha (ākāsa) is everlasting."|| The word ākāsa occurring at the beginning of the sentence must, by reason of its signification at the conclusion, be reasonably held to have Brahma for its object. As in the sentence, "Agni (fire) reads the Anuvāk," the word Agni, though occurring at the beginning, is found to have a boy for its object. Therefore it is demonstrated that the word Ākāsa means Brahma.

* Brihad Ar. 675.
† Chhandogya, 77. ‡ Swetaswatara 339.
§ Tait. 128.
|| Chhandogya, 207. Brihad Ar. 960.
22. Therefore the Breath.

In the Udgitha, introducing the topic with the words, "O panegyrist, the divinity which is the object of panegyrics"—[and the question] being repeated [by the panegyrist] "which is that divinity? [Ushasti] said the Breath, for all these creatures enter into (are absorbed in) the breath on dissolution [and] leave [i.e. spring from] the breath [on production]—this divinity is the object of panegyrics."* Here the doubt and its settlement may be observed as before [in the previous sutra]. By texts like the following: "The mind has the breath for its bond:" "The breath of breath,"
† the word Prána (breath) is found to have Brahma for its object. But the word Prána (breath) is both in the world and in the Veda applied primarily to a modification of the air. Hence the doubt which is to be accepted here by the word Prána? What is consistent here? It is consistent to accept the five-formed modification of the air for the word Prána, because as we have already said the primary meaning of the word Prána leads thereto.

But is not the acceptance of Brahma [as the purport of the word Prána] reasonable too here, because of its denotative sign—for here too there is observed in the conclusion of the sentence the divine office of the admission [on dissolution] and production of creatures? Not so. For in the actual prána or breath too is found the admission and production of creatures. For thus saith the Veda: "When the soul sleeps, the speech dissolves itself into Prána or the breath, the eye [gets into] the breath, the air [gets into] the breath, the mind [gets into] the breath. When he awakes they are produced again from the breath itself."‡ And this is evident that while during sleep the functions of the vital air [or breath] remain unsuspended, those of the organs of sensation are sus-

* Chhandogya, 87 &c.
† Br. Aranyak. 888.
‡ Chhandogya, 245.
pended, and they re-manifest themselves on awakening. And the conclusion of the sentence about the ingress and egress of creatures into and out of the primary [or literal] breath stands good [or uncontradicted] in consequence of the organs comprising the strength [or substance] of creatures. Again, the Sun and Food are represented as the divinities of chanting and warding immediately after the breath, the divinity of panegyrics; but those two have no Brahma-ship,—therefore the breath too, being in the same community, has no Brahma-ship either.

These objections being premised, the author of the Sutras says: "Therefore, the breath." Because of its (denotative) sign, as settled in the former sutra. Therefore, because of its denotative sign, the word prāṇa (breath) too is fit to be (held as) Brahma, for the denotative sign of Brahma is also found in the Veda in relation to Prāṇa; viz. "All these creatures enter into Prāṇa itself (on their dissolution) and spring from Prāṇa (on their production).". Thus the production and dissolution of all creatures being declared to have Prāṇa for their cause, lead us to the Brahma-ship of Prāṇa.

But has it not been said that even on the acceptation of the primary Prāṇa (or literal breath) the ingress and egress are not contradicted, because the same have been shown to be true of sleeping and awaking? Here it is said [in reply]: in sleeping and awaking, the ingress and egress of the organs only, are found to have Prāṇa for their locus—but all creatures are not [found to have the same locus]. Here (in the text just cited) all organs as well as all embodied animated beings [have Prāṇa for their locus] for the text is "All these creatures" &c.: and even where Vedic texts about creatures [bhūta, lit. a creature, a production] have reference to the primary productions (or elements), there too [Prāṇa's having] the denotative sign of Brahma is uncontradicted. But do we not find in the Veda that in the states of sleep and waking, the organs of sense, together with their objects, are [literal-
ly] resolved into breath and produced from breath? Thus "when asleep, he does not see any dream, and becomes unified with this breath, then speech together with all names (nouns, or words) are resolved into this."* In that case too the word Prána stands for Brahma because of its denotative sign.

Again with reference to the saying, that the word Prána has no signification of Brahma, because of its contingency with the Sun and Food, that is illogical, because the word Prána being by force of the conclusion of the sentence understood to have Brahma for its signification, the [argument from mere] contiguity is good for nothing. As to what has been alleged that the word Prána is primarily by general acceptation applied to the five-formed [aerial modification], this allegation is to be refuted like [the previous argument] about Akása. Hence the Brahma-ship of Prána, the divinity of panegyrics, is proved.

Here again some cite [against us] the text, "the breath of breath;" "the mind O gentle pupil, has the breath for its bond;" this argument is also illogical. Because the doubt is dispelled by the variation in the word and the subject. Thus in the phrase, the father of the father, the father in the genitive is one person, and the father in the nominative is another person, and thus father's father is understood—so in the sentence the "breath of breath" [Prána's prána] it is ascertained that a prána, different from the commonly known prána, is the prána or breath of breath. But there can be no indication of difference in [such a sentence as] "He himself is his own." Whatever is indicated on any one's subject, it is there found, though under a different name, indicated as the subject. As in relation to the Jyotishtoma sacrifice, the word jyotis [a luminary] in the sentence, "let him offer the jyotis in every spring" has [the sacrifice] Jyotishtoma for its purport, so on the subject of the supreme Brahma, how can the word Prána in the text "the mind has Prána for its bond" imply merely a modification of air? Therefore this not being subject to a dubiety, the

* Kaushitaki Brahmana Upanishad, 84.
example is not to the point. But in regard to Prāna, the divinity of panegyrics, the dubiety, as well as primâ facie objections, and their solution have all been shown.


Thus it is read [in the Veda] “Then (again) the luminary which shines above that firmament over the whole creation, animate and inanimate, highest and best, is the same as that which is the luminary within this soul.”* Here lies the doubt: “Are the luminaries, the sun, &c., here expressed by the term “luminary,” or is it the Supreme spirit? Even words, having other primary significations, have been (already) declared, because of their denotative signs, to have Brahma for their purport. Are there such signs here—or are there not—this is the point under discussion. What then is arrived at? By the word “luminary” are comprehended the sun &c. alone. Why? Because of the well known acceptation. For the two words “darkness and luminary” [i.e. light] are well known to refer to two objects which are mutually opposed to each other. The nocturnal shades and other obstructives of the functions of the eye are called “darkness,” and the sun &c., as assistants of the same functions are (called after the term) “luminary.” So also is the Vedic expression, “shines,” well known to have the sun &c. for its subject. Nor can any text [in its] primary [sense] be claimed for such a sentence as—“Brahma, devoid of form, shines.” Because also of the Veda limiting the range of the luminary to the firmament [or Heaven]. But the firmament cannot reasonably be assigned as the limit of Brahma’s range, who is the cause of all moveable and immoveable creatures, and is identical with the Total. Of a created luminary, bounded in dimension, the firmament may be the limit, as also the Brāhmaṇa, “the luminary above the firmament.”

* Chhandogya, 194.
But is not the assignment of the firmament as the limit, inconsistent also in the case of the created luminary, because of its reaching every where [in infinite space]? Then let there be a first created light, not made of three components. By no means: because there is no use of a light, not made of three components. If you say, this is the use, that it may be worshipped,—I say that cannot be. Because we find that the sun &c., fitted for another [substantive] use, serve (also) as objects of worship. Because also of the unqualified text, "let me make each of them, and each of their three-fold components, three-compounded."* Nor is there any well-known acceptance that created light, uncompounded of three components, has the firmament as the limit of its range. Then let the word "luminary" stand for that light composed of three-fold components.

But has it not been said that the word "luminary" is also applied to fire &c. under the firmament? That is no fault. For of the luminary which ranges everywhere, the acceptance for the purpose of worship, of a definite locality, such as "above the firmament," is not contradictory, but the fabrication of a peculiar locality for Brahma, who is devoid of a peculiar locality [i.e. form or member] is not consistent. And the text inculcating a multiplicity of sites is rather more congruous in the created luminary; viz. "Over the whole creation, the highest and best." And the text, "this is the same as that which is the luminary within the soul," is observed to be the imputation of the supreme

* Chhandogya, 410. This process of three-compounding of the gods, Light Water, and Food, is thus explained by Sankara एकैकस्यात् चिह्नकरणे एकैकस्यात् प्राधान्यं इवादिः गुणमावे ब्यथं च रत्नं रेगिकन्त विभट्टर्यं खात्। नन्तु तिल्खण्डं प्रयक्त चिह्नकरणाशितं। This exposition leaves us very much in the dark as to the nature of this composition. With the assistance of Ananda Giri's gloss on the passage we can only form the following idea of this mystical compound.

The divinity Light has \( \frac{1}{3} \) Light + \( \frac{1}{3} \) Water + \( \frac{1}{3} \) Food.
The divinity Water has \( \frac{1}{3} \) Water + \( \frac{1}{3} \) Light + \( \frac{1}{3} \) Food.
The divinity Food has \( \frac{1}{3} \) Food + \( \frac{1}{3} \) Light + \( \frac{1}{3} \) Water.
luminary to the gastric luminary.* Imputations are caused
by a community of property: as "the earth is his [Prajapati's]
head: the head is one, and so is this syllable [bhu the
earth]".† As to the gastric luminary it is notoriously no-
Brahma, because it [the gastric luminary] is found in the
Veda to be endowed with warmth and sound: "this is its
sight" [which the context expressly declares to be the same as
the feeling of warmth] and "this is its hearing" (that is
sound).‡ Because also of the text, "let this be worshipped as
seen and heard."§ And what is agreeable to the sight becomes
well reported. Add to this the text "He who understands
this"—thus [proving the gastric luminary to be] no-Brahma,
because of its little fruit—for the worship of Brahma calls for
great fruits. Nor is there in the texts themselves about the
"luminary" any thing else [which may be taken for a de-
notative of Brahma, as in the case of the breath and Akása.
Neither is Brahma declared in the preceding text, viz. "The
Gayatri is this Total" where the metre also is declared.

Even if it were conceded with some difficulty, that in the
preceding text, Brahma is declared, still there is no recognition
of him here. There, the text "the three-footed is the immortal in
the firmament"|| is found to give the firmament for its repository;
while here, the text "luminary above the firmament" settles
the firmament as the limit of its range. Therefore the "lumina-
ry" here is to be taken for a created luminary.

Meeting the above objections, we declare that the "lumi-
nary" here is to be taken for Brahma. Why? because of the
mention of the feet—that is, because feet are mentioned. In
the preceding text, Brahma is declared to be four-footed by the
following mantra, viz. "Such is its greatness—still superior to
it is the soul. One foot of his is the whole creation. The

* The Hindu idea of the gastric "luminary" or fire, appears to be
equivalent to the idea of the gastric juice.
† Brihad Ar. 978. ‡ Chhandogya, 198. § Ibid, 199. || Ibid, 185.
three-footed immortal is in the firmament of this Total."* There
the three-footed immortal of the four-footed Brahma is declared
to be of a form related to the firmament. The same is here
recognized, as declared in relation to the firmament. By leaving
that, and fabricating a created luminary, the real subject would
be lost, and an unreal one manufactured. Not only does the
word "luminary" refer to Brahma by the rule of contiguous
succession, but in the supreme science of Sandilya too, Brahma
follows by the same rule. Therefore the "luminary" here
must be construed as Brahma.

As to what has been said that the words "the luminary
shines" are well known to be applicable to created luminaries,
this is no fault [by which to vitiate our argument], because if
Brahma be received by the sense of the context, there is no spe-
cification in the above words by which Brahma can be exclu-
ded; and allowing the [primary] signification (of the words)
to be created shining luminaries, they can be alike applicable
to Brahma also. Because again of the Mantra Varna, "by
which [sentient light], the sun being enlightened, imparts
heat" (i.e. shines). It may also in another way be said that
this word "luminary" is not confined to the light which assists
the functions of the eye. It is also found to be applied else-
where: thus, "This person takes his seat by the verbal luminary
[or light of speech] of those who have imbibed the mental lumi-
mary." Therefore whatever enlightens a person's mind is expressed
by the term luminary. Such being the case, the word "luminary"
is demonstrated to refer as above, because of the sentient Brahma
being the cause of the appearance of the whole universe [which
comes to light only because of His light]. The same is proved
by texts like the following: "The universe shines [i.e. comes
to light] after Him, the shiner: by his light this total shines."†
"Him gods worship, the luminary of luminaries, the immortal
life."‡

* Chhandogya, 184.
† Katha, 142. Swetaswatara, 367. Mundak, 304. ‡ Br. Ar. 887.
As to the assertion that the statement of the Firmament as the limit of range is not applicable in the case of the all-pervading Brahma, the reply is, that there can be no inconsistency in the fixing, for the purposes of devotion, of a peculiar locality for Brahma. But has it not (also) been said, that there must be an (insuperable) objection to the fabrication of a peculiar locality for Brahma which has no definite locus? This is no flaw in our argument, because the formation of a peculiar locus, by reason of peculiar semblance-relations, is consistent even in the case of Brahma who has no peculiar locus. Again, the worship of Brahma in relation to peculiar localities, i.e., the sun, the eye, the heart, is observed in the Veda. Hereby a multiplicity of receptacles is proved by the text "around the whole creation."

As to this that has been said, that because of its attribution to the created gastric luminary, inferred by warmth and sound, the luminary above the firmament must be a created luminary; neither is this a cogent objection: for there may reasonably be a typicality of Brahma in the form of the gastric luminary, like his typicality in regard to name &c. And according to the text "let him worship both the seen and the heard of,"* there must be visibility and audibility by the door of the typical.

The objection that it must be no-Brahma, because of the mention of small fruits, this too is quite gratuitous; for there is no reason for a definite rule that for so much fruit it may betake itself to Brahma, but not for so much. For where the supreme Brahma, bereft of all peculiar relations, is inculcated as the Spirit, there one uniform fruit is understood, viz., Emancipation. But where Brahma is inculcated in his relation to special qualities or to peculiar types, there (various) fruits, great and small, [but all] sensuous in this fleeting world are

* Chhandogya, 199. Here again there is an absurd mistake in the citation of this passage in the Asiatic Society's edition. It is द्वेष दुश्चर्य मन अपारित | It should be द्वेष दुश्चर्य मन अपारित.
found in texts like the following: "The giver of food, the giver of wealth obtains wealth—even he who understands so."* Although in the word "luminary" itself, there is nothing denotive of Brahma, yet the sign which is observed in the preceding text should be accepted. And thus it is asserted by the author of the Sutra: "Luminary: because of the expression of feet." But how can the text about the "luminary," relinquishing its own [primary] signification, be diverted by the vicinity of "Brahma" contained in another sentence? This objection does not vitiate our argument, because in the sentence, "That which is the luminary above the firmament," Brahma, asserted in the preceding sentence, being recognized from its relation to the Firmament by the very first word that is read, viz., the pronoun "that," and being thus indicated by his own independent force, the word "luminary" is also in its signification, capable of having that object. Therefore, Brahma is here to be set forth as "luminary."

25. If you say, It is not so, because of the expression of the metre [Gayatri] then we retort, No!—because in that way the devotion of the mind is declared, and in another way [the worship of Brahma] is noticed.

Now as to the assertion that even in the preceding sentence, Brahma is not spoken of, because the metre called "Gayatri" is spoken of in the text, "Gayatri is this total substance whatever this be"†—that assertion must be renounced. How again can it be said, that because of the expression of the metre, Brahma is not spoken of—since in the Rich or mantra "such is its glory,"‡ the four-footed Brahma is manifested. But this is not it. Introducing the Gayatri [as the subject] in the text, "The Gayatri is this total," and expounding the same under the distinctions of substance, earth, body, heart, speech and breath, it is added further, "that same Gayatri is four-footed and six-formed, the same is manifested in this Rich,

* Br. Ar., 916. † Chhandogya, 181. ‡ Ibid, 184.
Thus the mantra refers to the same Gayatri expounded in the above forms. How can it abruptly introduce a new subject and] speak of Brahma, the four-footed? The word "Brahma" too, which occurs there, viz., "Whatever it be, it is Brahma," must have the metre for its purpose, for the metre is the subject. And the text "whoever understands this Brahma-Upanishad" is intended to signify [the mystery of] the Veda-Upanishad. Therefore, because of the mention of the metre, Brahma cannot be the subject.

If the above objection be urged, the reply is, it does not vitiate [our argument]: because in that way the devotion of the mind is declared. In that way, through the door of the metre called Gayatri, the devotion of the mind to Brahma, and the fixing of the mind on him, following it, is inculcated by the Brahmana text, "the Gayatri is this total." Now the [metre] Gayatri composed only of [certain] syllables cannot possibly become identical with the Total. Therefore, that which is ascertained to follow the modification called Gayatri, even Brahma, the cause of the universe, is declared in the sentence, "It is this Total." As in the text, "This Total indeed is Brahma." The effect we shall assert is inseparable from the cause—the identity being evident from expressions like "the [mere] recourse to words." Thus, there and elsewhere, is the worship of Brahma manifested through the door of modifications: "For Him do the Rig-vedins conclude to be [recognized as the object of worship] in the great weapon, (Uktha,)—Him the Yajur-vedin priests (recognize) in the Fire, and Him the Sama-vedin chanters (adore) in the great Sacrifice." Therefore even in the expression of the metre Gayatri, Brahma is indicated in the previous sentence. The same is thus found in the sentence about the "luminary" for the purpose of laying down another rule of worship.

Others say Brahma is directly imported by the word Gayatri, because of the community of number. As the Gayatri is

four-footed, with six syllables in each foot, so is Brahma four-footed. Thus elsewhere too, the word which expresses the metre is found to be used, because of the community of number, in another sense. In introducing the text, "As these five [Air, Fire, Sun, Moon and Water] and those five [Breath, Speech, the eye, the ear, the mind] being together ten make up a Krita," it is added "the same is this Virat, the consumer of food." In this respect too, it is Brahma that is expressed not the metre. In every way Brahma is the subject of the preceding sentence.

26. It is also the same, because of its congruity with the implied inculcation the creatures, &c. As feet.

That Brahma is the subject of the preceding sentence may also be concluded from this: because it inculcates by implication the creatures &c., as His feet. For after indicating the creation, the earth, the body, the heart, it is added—"The same is this four-footed six-formed Gayatri." Now the creation &c., cannot be concluded as the feet of the mere metre without Brahma as its support. Again, without Brahma as the support, the following Rich would be incongruous: "Such is his glory." And by the following Rich, Brahma is indicated by the very purport of the words themselves: viz. "One foot of His is the whole creation. The three-footed Immortal is in the firmament of this total:" because hereby is His identity with the total demonstrated. This Rich is also represented in the [hymn] Purusha-sukta as having Brahma for its object.

The Smriti also shows this form of Brahma: thus, "I remain pervading this whole universe with one of my portions." The following too establishes the same—"What that is is Brahma." Such being the case, the primary signification is consistent. So also does the following text prove: "These are the five Brahma persons." And this text, "In the apertures of the heart is the Brahma-person," can only be consistent with the in-

* Chhandogya, 250, 251. † Ibid, 185. ‡ Ibid, 193.
tention of setting forth the connection with Brahma. Therefore Brahma is the subject of the preceding sentence. The same is introduced as Brahma, being recognized from his relation to the firmament in the sentence about the luminary. This is settled.

27. If it be objected that because of a diversity in the instruction, it is not so: the reply is, [the objection is] not [valid] because there is no inconsistency in either case.

What had been asserted in the preceding sentence that "the three-footed Immortal is in the firmament of this total," was the setting forth of the firmament in the locative case in the sense of a receptacle, but here in the text "over that firmament," it is in the ablative case in the sense of a boundary. Therefore because of a diversity in the instruction, there is no recognition of Him here. Hence the idea must be given up.

To this it is replied, This does not vitiate the argument, because there is no inconsistency in either case. In either case, whether it [the firmament] be set forth in the locative or in the ablative, the recognition [of Brahma] is not inconsistent. As in the world, an eagle in contact with the top of a tree is observed to be represented both ways, [that is to say] an eagle on the top of the tree, and also an eagle over the top of the tree: so Brahma, being in the firmament, may be represented as over the firmament.

Another [expounder] says that as in the world an eagle, even though not in contact with the top of a tree, is found to be described in both ways, as an eagle on the top of the tree, and also an eagle over the top of the tree: so likewise Brahma, being above the firmament, may be described as in the firmament. Therefore there is here a recognition of Brahma already ascertained in the preceding sentence. Hence it is proved that the word "luminary" refers to the supreme Brahma.
28. **Breath [is Brahma] because thitherward is the leading of the text.**

There is in the Kaushitaki-Brahmana-Upanishad an anecdote of Indra and Pratardana, commencing with the words "Pratardana, son of Devadása, approached the favourite mansion of Indra with the glory of war and with manliness."* It is stated there, "He (Indra) said, "I am breath, identical with knowledge. Worship me as such, as life, as immortal."† Again a little after: "Now Breath, indeed, is alone identical with knowledge. Having assumed this body, it raises it up.‖ Further on: "Let not one desire to know Speech, let him know the Speaker."§ And finally: "This breath is itself identical with knowledge [or is itself the knowing spirit], the joy, the undecaying, the Immortal."|| In all these, lies this doubt: Is the mere air here indicated by the word "Breath?" Or is it a divinity? Or the living Soul? Or is it the supreme Brahma?

But according to a previous Sutra: "Therefore, Breath,"—is not the purport of the word "Breath" already settled to be Brahma? Here too there is the denotive sign of Brahma, "the Joy, the Undecaying, the Immortal &c." How then can a doubt exist here at all? We say [a doubt is admissible for discussion] because of the observation of a multiplicity of signs. The saying of Indra, "Know me alone,"¶ is denotive of a di-

* Kaushitaki Brahmana Upanishad, 73.
† Kaushitaki Br. Up., 78. The reading of the original in the Kaushitaki (Mr. Cowell's edition) is "स च वाच प्राणेष्यि प्रकाशायं सामायुक्तिविलयाय।" The citation in the Uttarā Mimāṃsā Bhāshya is "घनोच्छ वाच प्राणेषि प्रकाशायं स तमायुक्तिविलयाय।" As I am translating the Uttarā Mimāṃsā Bhāshya, I have rendered the passage as it is cited here. प्रकाशाय I have rendered "identical with knowledge" after Mr. Cowell. It admits of two other renderings: "The spirit of knowledge," and "The knowing or intelligent spirit." One or other of these must be had recourse to when the word is used as a substantive.
vinity. The sentence, "Assuming this body, it raises it up," is a denotative of Breath [as a modification of the air]. The precept "Let not one desire to know Speech, let him know the Speaker," is denotative of the living soul. Hence a doubt is admissible [for discussion].

And here Breath being primarily taken to signify air, it is [in answer to the objection] declared, Brahma is to be understood as expressed by the word Breath. Why? Because thitherward is the leading of the text. For so the construction of the passage is found to have Brahma for its purport in the consideration of the sentences preceding and following: Thus at the commencement, Indra said, "Ask a boon." Pratardana desired the highest of human objects [the summum bonum] saying, "You yourself select for me a boon which you think the highest good for mankind."† Thereupon Breath was represented to him as the highest good, how then can it not be the Supreme Spirit? Certainly the highest good cannot be attained otherwise than by a knowledge of the Supreme Spirit. Such it appears from texts like the following: "By knowing Him alone, one gets over death—there is no other way of attaining supreme felicity."‡ Again, "Whosoever knows me, his everlasting welfare is not destroyed by any act, not by theft, nor by murder of learned Brahmans &c."§ This too can only take place by the comprehension of Brahma, for it is well known that on the knowledge of Brahma, all works cease. Thus "His works too cease on that cause and effect being observed."|| In these and similar texts, the status of the knowing spirit is shown

* Ibid, 96. A curious mistake here in the citation in the Asiatic Society's edition of the Uttara-mimansa-bhashya: "न वा विज्ञानोऽन्" instead न चार्च विज्ञानीत।
† Kaush. Brah. Upa. 74.
‡ Swetaswatara, 327.
§ Kaush. 77 चुरूङ्गया is thus expounded by Sankarananda: चुरूङ्गया वेदद्वे वाहिकयाथिन्य चुरूङ्गया वेदद्वे। विज्ञानय दृश्यः।
|| Munduk, 302.
to be in Brahma. Nor is it possible for the unsentient air to have the status of a knowing spirit. Further, the conclusion of the Kaushitaki is, "The Joy, the Undecaying, the Immortal." The status of Joy &c., is not possible elsewhere than in Brahma. "He is not magnified by good deeds, nor is he reduced by evil deeds. For it is He that causes him to perform good deeds whom it wishes to raise above these worlds. And it is He too, who causes him to commit evil deeds whom it desires to sink below these worlds. This is the protector of the world, this is the ruler of the world, this is the Lord of the world."† The lead of all these texts can be followed, if the supreme Brahma be the subject—but not if breath be taken in its primary signification. Therefore the Breath is Brahma.

29. IF YOU SAY IT IS NOT SO, BECAUSE IT IS INCULCATED AS THE SPIRIT OF THE SPEAKER,—THAT ONLY SHOWS THAT IN HIM IS THE ACME OF THE RELATIONS OF SELF.

As to what has been said that Breath is Brahma, on that there is this conjecture, the supreme Brahma cannot be signified by the word "Breath." Why not? Because it is inculcated as the spirit (or rather soul) of the speaker. As to the speaker, he was Indra, a certain divinity possessed of a body. He spoke to Pratardana of his own spirit or soul. Beginning with the words, "Know me only," and followed by the words, "I am Breath, the knowing spirit," how can Breath, thus inculcated by a statement of egotism, as the spirit of the speaker, be Brahma? For Brahma cannot be a speaker, as texts like the following, show, "Without speech, without mind." And the speaker complimented himself, only with virtues relating to his body, which cannot consist in Brahma, as is shown by sentences like the following: "I killed

† Ibid, 102. The citation of this passage too in all the editions of the Uttarà Mimànsà Bhàshya slightly varies from Mr. Cowell's edition of the original Kaushitaki. I have translated the citation and not the original as in Mr. Cowell's.
the three-headed son of Twastri. I gave up to the wolves the devotees in whose mouth there was not a single sound of the Veda."* And the status of Indra as breath is shown by his mightiness, for by the text "Breath is might," is notified the divinity which is well known to be the lord of might. And whatever is held to be a deed of might, it is, they say, the work of Indra. And as to his being the Spirit of Knowledge, it may also be congruous, because a divine spirit has unobstructed knowledge. For, they say, the divinities are of unobstructed knowledge. The inculcation of an [ordinary] divine spirit being thus settled, the sentences about the highest good are to be applied to the same as they may be fitting. Therefore, Breath is not Brahma, because of the inculcation of the speaker Indra's spirit.

The conjecture being thrown out, it is thus resolved. Verily in Him is the acme of the relations of self. The relation of self is the relation of the animating soul. The acme or abundance thereof is found in this in-dweller. The text, "While Breath resides in this body, so long is life,"† shows the independent duration and conclusion of the life of Breath flowing in the spirit of knowledge,—not that of any distinct inferior deity. Again the text: "In the existence [of Breath] consists the supreme good of the pránas (or organs),"‡ shows that Breath is

* Kaushi. Brah. Upa. 76.
† Ibid 79.
‡ Kaush. Br. Up. 82. This text was evidently mistaken by the editor of the Asiatic Society's edition of the Uttara Mímásá Bháshya for the language of Sankaráchárya himself, instead of a citation from the Kaushitaki. The words are variously read and interpreted. Mr. Cowell editing the Kaushitaki reads them after Sankaránanda thus: ष्टिन्त तु रथ प्राणाणि निर्वेषयः But Sankaráchárya and his commentator Govindánanda read them differently, ष्टिन्त च प्राणाणि निर्वेषयः Govindánanda supplies the ellipsis thus: ष्टिन्ते प्राणिनां I think Sankaráchárya's reading is more in harmony with the context, and as I am translating him, I have rendered the passage according to his citation.
identical with the soul, the asylum of the organs. So also commencing with the sentences, "Breath alone is identical with knowledge. Having assumed this body, it raiseth it up,"* and "Let not one desire to know speech, let him know the speaker,"† it is added, "Just as the circumference of a wheel is placed upon the spokes, and the spokes upon the nave, so the rudimentary elements are placed upon the rudiments of "prajña" [knowledge or intelligence] and the rudiments of "prajña" are placed upon prāna [Breath]. This Breath is identical with Knowledge—the Joy, the Undecaying, the Immortal."‡ Thus the text concludes [the Breath] to be [the centre], the animating soul, of the functions of the physical organs like spokes on the nave. The following conclusion "Let one know this my soul"§ is also congruous on the comprehension of the animating soul, not on that of an inferior or posterior body. And there is another text, "Brahma is this spirit (or soul), all perceiver."|| Therefore, because of the abundance of relations to self, this is the inculcation of Brahma, not the inculcation of a divine spirit. Why then is the spirit of the speaker inculeated?

30. **But by the observation of the Sāstra, the inculcation is like that of Vamadeva.**

The divinity Indra, looking upon his own spirit by intuitive perception¶ according to the Sāstra as the Supreme Spirit, and

* Kaush. 83.
† Ibid, 96.
‡ Kaush. 99, 100. In the citation of this passage again, the Asiatic Society’s edition of the Uttara Mimansa Bhashya is apt to puzzle and mislead the reader. The first part of the first sentence is, by marks of quotation, so separated from the second sentence, that the concluding part of the first sentence appears as the language of Sankaracharya himself. The first sentence in the above citation I have rendered in the words of Mr. Cowell—the brackets alone being my own.
§ Ibid, 102.
|| Brihad 503.
¶ The original is ब्रह्म इमेनेन, which Govindānanda thus explains: अभासारकोपस्तव्याधिना यन्नि अविन्न यतो शिबं इमेनाभें
[thinking in himself] "I verily am supreme Brahma," delivered the precept, "Know me alone." Like the text, "The Rishi Vāmadeva beholding this, declared, "I have become Manu, the Sun too;" because of the text, "Whoever among the gods awoke to a sense of himself became the same [Brahma, the Total]."* But as to what has been added that after saying "Know me alone," Indra lauded himself by [recounting] the slaughter of the son of Twastri &c., which were [proofs of] bodily vigour, that is to be repudiated. To this it is replied; The narrative of the slaughter of the son of Twastri was not for the laudation of Indra, set forth as an object of knowledge, as if he had said, "Since I have done such deeds, therefore know me." What then was [the narrative] for? For the laudation of Knowledge. After relating the slaughter of Twastri and other rash acts, as the reason, he deduces the laudation of Knowledge by his subsequent language—viz., "Of me, [though] such a [murderous] person, not a hair has been injured. He who knows me, his future bliss cannot be impaired by any act."† The purport of the sayings is this: Whereas not a hair has been injured of me, who have become Brahma, notwithstanding that I have committed such cruel deeds, therefore whosoever else knows me, his future bliss cannot be injured by any kind of action. But by the saying, "I am Breath, the knowing spirit," Brahma alone was intended to be set forth as the object of Knowledge. Therefore this is a text relating to Brahma.

31. If you say, No! because of the denotative signs of the soul and primary Breath, then we retort, No! because of triple worship and because the same (signs) are consistent here owing to its (Prana's) being the refugee.

Although in consequence of finding the acme of relations to self, it cannot be held as the inculcation of a posterior (or inferior)

* Br. Aranyakas, 215, 216. † Kaush. 77.
divinity, still it cannot be held as a text of Brahma. Why not? Because of the denotative sign of the soul, and because of the denotative sign of Breath. The denotative of the soul is clearly observed in the following text: "Let not one desire to know speech—let him know the speaker, &c."* This is a declaration of the soul, affected by (active) organs such as attachment, &c., and the director of actions and their instruments, that it is the object of Knowledge. So likewise the denotative of the primary Breath: viz. "The Breath verily, the spirit of Knowledge, having assumed this body raises it."† Now the assumption of a body is an attribute of the primary Breath. Because in the discourse on Prāna, referring to Speech, &c. and Breath, is the text: "Breath, the most excellent said to them. Don't labour under a delusion. I alone dividing myself into five forms [the five vital airs] and propping up this body do support it."‡ Those who read this passage "assuming this body," their exposition would be, "having assumed this soul or assemblage of organs, it raises it." As to the spirit of Knowledge, it is quite consistently applicable to the soul because of its sentience. It is also consistently applicable to the primary breath, because of its being the refuge of other Pranas or organs, the causes of Knowledge. Again, by taking the animating soul and the primary Breath, both the ascertained characteristics of Breath and the Spirit of Knowledge become consistent—viz., the characteristic of unification in respect of co-existence, and the characteristic of distinction in essence: Thus, "That which is Breath is the spirit of Knowledge, that which is the spirit of Knowledge is Breath."§ And, "These two dwell together in this body, and get out together."|| But if you receive Brahma (to be the signification of Breath), then what can be distinct, and from what? Therefore the animating soul and primary breath are either or both to be here understood, not Brahma.

If the foregoing be the objection, we reply, Not so: because

* Kaush. 96.  † Ibid. 83.  ‡ Prasna, 179.
of triple worship. If such be the case (as you represent it) then must there be entertained a triple worship, viz. The worship of the animating soul, the worship of the primary Breath, and the worship of Brahma. But this cannot consistently be held as the meaning of one and the same precept. Both from the exordium and the conclusion, the uniformity of the precept is arrived at. After the introduction, "Know me alone," having added, "I am Breath, the spirit of Knowledge; worship the same myself, as the Life and the Immortal," the conclusion is—"The same Breath is the Spirit of Knowledge, the Joy, the Undecaying, the Immortal."

Thus the exordium and the conclusion are found uniform. Then it is reasonable to take to one only object [as the signification of the text]. Nor can the denotative of Brahma be applied to any other object, because the ten elements and the ten rudiments of Knowledge cannot be consistently consigned to any other object separate from Brahma.

This again is found to be the inculcation of Brahma, because of [Prána’s] being the refugee, which appears, as elsewhere from its being in Brahma by virtue of the denotatives of Brahma, so also here by its connection with the denotatives of Brahma, the supreme Bliss, &c. As to the representation of the denotative of primary Breath, "Having assumed this body, it raises it," that representation is bad, because the functions of [literal] breath too, being dependent on the Supreme Spirit, can be ascribed to the Supreme Spirit. Thus the text: "No mortal lives by inspiring or respiring breath. They live by another, in whom these two (inspiration and respiration) find shelter."* And although there have been shown the denotatives of the soul, in texts like, "Let not one desire to know speech, let him know the speaker," yet they do not contradict the position of Brahma as the subject, because, from texts such as "Thou art the same," "I am Brahma," &c., the soul cannot be altogether separate from Brahma. It is only by betaking itself to dis-

* Katha, 136.
tinctions created by semblance-relations, understanding, &c., that the soul, being in reality Brahma, is said to be agent and patient. The text, "Let him not desire to know speech—let him know the speaker," intended for setting forth the soul's identity with Brahma on the abandonment of the distinctions created by semblance-relations, cannot contradict a doctrine which aims at turning the animating soul inward to itself. And other texts such as, "That which is not manifested by speech—by which speech is manifested, that, know thou, is verily Brahma, not this which the world worships,"* represents that the soul, affected by the functions of speech, &c., is itself Brahma.

As to what has been said that the text, "These two dwell together in this body and depart together," represents a distinction between Breath and Knowledge, and cannot therefore be consistent with the doctrine of Brahma,—that does not vitiate our argument: because the establishment of a distinction is not inconsistent between the understanding and Breath, the repositories of the capacities both of knowledge and action, becoming semblances of the animating soul. But they are the same, being essentially identical with the animating soul, the object of the two semblances: hence the unification is not absurd: "Breath is itself the spirit of knowledge."

Or there may be another sense in which the words [in the Sutra] "No! because of triple worship, and because the same (signs) are consistent here, owing to its (Prāna's) being the refugee," may be expounded, as follows:—The signs of the soul and primary Breath are not contradicted even on taking it as the incultation of Brahma. How? Because of triple worship. Here a triple worship is intended to be set forth of Brahma: (1) By the attributes of Breath; (2) By the attributes of Knowledge; (3) By his own spiritual attribute. There the attribute of Breath is thus expressed: "Worship [me] the life, the im-

* Kena, 43.
mortal. Life is Breath."* "Having assumed this body, it raises it; therefore let one worship even this as the [sacrificial] instrument."† Next the attribute of Knowledge thus: After the exordium—"We shall explain how all creatures become unified for the same Knowledge," it is added, "Speech verily milked one portion thereof. For it the name was placed outside as a rudimentary element."‡ "Having mounted by Knowledge or Speech, he finds by speech all names."§ And the attributes of Brahma are thus given: "Verily these ten rudimentary elements depend on Knowledge; and the ten rudiments of knowledge depend on the elements: from either alone no form would be accomplished. There is no division of this union; just as the circumference of a wheel is placed upon the spokes, and the spokes upon the nave, so the rudimentary elements are placed upon the rudiments of knowledge, and the rudiments of knowledge are placed upon Breath. This Breath is verily knowledge, &c."|| Therefore the one worship of Brahma is here intended to be set forth as triple, by the attributes of these two semblances and His own attribute. Elsewhere too, the worship of Brahma has been supported by attributes of the semblance [soul] such as "mental" "breath-bodied"¶ (i.e. having breath for its body). And here also the same is joined, because of the unity of signification comprehended from the exordium and conclusion of the text, and by the comprehension of the denotatives of Breath, Knowledge and Brahma. Therefore it is proved that this is the inculcation of Brahma.

Here ends the first Section of the first Chapter of Sankaracharyá's Sariraka Mimánsá Bháshya.

* Kaush. Brah. Up. 78. † Ibid, 83. ‡ Ibid, 89. The reading in the Mimánsá Bháshya is एकोमन्वयिति not एक। अवलम्बिति as in the Kaushitaki, Asiatic Society's edition. As I am translating the Bháshya, I have rendered it "become unified," instead of adopting Mr. Cowell's "are also absorbed."
§ Ibid, 91. Here I have availed myself of Mr. Cowell's translation. || Ibid, 98-100. I have here again adopted the translation of Mr. Cowell. ¶ Chhandogya, 203.
SECTION 2. CHAPTER I.

Obeisance to the Supreme Spirit! In the 1st Section, it has been declared that Brahma is the cause of the production, &c. of the whole universe beginning with Akāśa. The pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, all-spiritedness (or identity with the Total) and similar attributes have been virtually declared. Some doubtful sentences have been decided as having Brahma for their purport by setting forth reasons for expounding certain words, which had other significations in common parlance, as having Brahma for their object. There are other sentences again, not clearly denoting Brahma, and giving occasion to the doubt: Are they expositions of Brahma, or have they any other meaning? For the settlement of such doubts the 2nd and 3rd Sections are undertaken.

1. BECAUSE OF THE WELL-KNOWN INSTRUCTION EVERYWHERE.

Thus is it said in the Veda: "This total verily is Brahma, being produced from it, being absorbed into it, and living in it. Thus let the tranquilized person worship. Now persons are full of aims. According to his aim in this world, so does a person departing from this (world), become. Let him form his aim, [thus] mental, breath-bodied &c."* Here then the doubt: Is an embodied spirit set forth as an object of worship under the attributes "mental" &c.? Or is it the Supreme Brahma? What then is arrived at? An embodied [spirit]. Why? Because his relation, as the ruler of acts and organs, to the mind &c., is well known, but not of the Supreme Brahma. So say the texts, "Without breath, without mind, pure &c."† But in the text, "this Total is Brahma," is not Brahma got at by its own expression? Then why is the conjecture of an embodied spirit being the object of worship? This is no fault. This text is not intended as an injunction to the wor-

* Chhandogya, 201—203. † Mundaka, 287.
ship of Brahma. Wherefore then? It is an injunction to tranquillity. Whereas this total is Brahma, being produced from it, absorbed into it, and living in it, therefore, being tranquillized, let one worship. This becomes the purport. Whereas the whole of this production of modifications is Brahma itself, because of production from it, absorption into it, and living in it, and whereas the whole being one, there can be no attachments or affections, therefore, being tranquillized, let one worship. Now the text being an injunction to tranquillity, it cannot be made to ordain the worship of Brahma. A worship is indeed enjoined by the words, “Let him form his aim.” Aim or purpose means contemplation. But its object is laid with the denotatives of the animating Soul, “Mental, breath-bodied.” Therefore, we say, this worship has the animating soul for its object. The Vedic phrases “All-doer, all desirer”* indicate also by their equivalents or synonyms the animating soul as the object. The following text also idealizes, not the unlimited Brahma, but the animating soul, like the extremity of a pencil in dimension, having the heart for its locus, and being small as an atom: viz. “This my spirit within my heart is smaller than a corn or barley.”† But is not the phrase “superior to the earth,” likewise, no ideal of a limited substance? To this we say, that smallness (i.e. inferiority) and superiority cannot both simultaneously find place in the same thing, because it would involve a contradiction. As one of the two can only be received, it is proper to take that which is first found, namely, smallness. As for superiority, that will stand for the requirement of the Brahma status. But it being settled, that the animating soul is the purport of the text here, the celebration of Brahma in the sequel, viz. “This is Brahma,” is also to be held as having the animating soul for its purport, because that is the proper object of investigation here. Therefore by the attributes of “mental,” &c., the animating soul is set forth here as the object of worship.

* Chhandogya, 205.  
† Chhandogya, 206.
The foregoing objections we meet by declaring that the supreme Brahma himself is here set forth as the object of worship by the attributes "mental," &c. Why? Because of the well known instruction everywhere. That which is well known in all the Vedanta texts, namely, the import of the word Brahma being the Cause of the Universe, is here also observed at the exordium of the sentence, viz. "This Total verily is Brahma." It is reasonable to hold that the same is inculcated as distinguished by the attributes "mental," &c. By this exposition, the loss of the real subject and the fabrication of an unreal one, will be averted. But has it not been alleged, that in the exordium of the sentence, Brahma is mentioned only with the intention of laying down the duty of tranquillity, not with the intention of declaring His essence? To this the reply is, that although Brahma is mentioned with the intention of laying down the duty of tranquillity, yet on the attributes "mental," &c., being set forth, the same Brahma becomes [referred to as] contiguous. The animating soul is neither contiguous (expressly), nor can it be reached by any word in the text. Hence the incongruity (of the above allegation about the animating soul).

2. Because also of consistency with the qualities intended to be set forth.

"Intended to be set forth" means "desired to be uttered." Although in the Vedas, which are not the product of any person's composition, there cannot be, owing to the want of a speaker (i.e. author), any desired sense (or purport), yet such is ascribed (to them) by (the consideration of) acceptable results. For in the world, whatever appears acceptable as the meaning of a word is called the intention (of the author). Whatever is unacceptable is (considered) not the intention (or purport). Likewise in the Vedas too, that which is signified acceptably, becomes the intended sense or purpose. That which is otherwise, is held to be not the intended sense. The acceptable or unacceptable
in Vedic sentences is arrived at by their drift or no-drift. So here, the qualities desired to be uttered, which are delivered acceptably for the purpose of devotion, namely, the pursuit after truth and the rest are consistent in the Supreme Brahma. The pursuit after truth is idealized in the Supreme Spirit, because it has no capacity for obstruction in creation, conservation and absorption. As a quality of the supreme Supreme who is a "spirit devoid of sin," this is observed—"truth-desiring, truth-intending."* "Ākāśa-spirited," &c. meaning one whose spirit is like Ākāsa. Because of the attributes of all pervasion, &c. Brahma’s likeness to Ākāśa becomes reasonable. "Superior to the earth," &c., this also shows the same. If [Ākāśa-spirited] were construed to signify one whose spirit is Ākāsa, even that would be reasonable. Brahma, the cause of the whole universe, and identical with the Total, has the attribute of Ākāśa-spirited. Therefore "All-doer," &c. Thus qualities intended to be set forth, as of an object of worship [*i.e. all desirable qualities] become consistent in Brahma here.

As to what has been said that "Mental, Breath-bodied," is a denotive of the animating soul, and that it is not congruous in Brahma, we assert even that is congruous in Brahma. Because of his identity with the Total, the attributes "mental" &c., which are connected with the animating soul, become also connected with Brahma. Thus the S’ruti and Smriti both declare about Brahma: "Thou art female, thou also male. Thou art a boy, thou also a girl. Thou walkest as a decrepit by a staff, thou becomest also a (new)born (babe), thy face on all sides."† "He has hands and feet on all sides, he has eyes, heads and faces on all sides, he has ears on all sides. He remains in the world, covering the Total."‡ "Verily without breath, without mind, limpid," this text has reference to pure Brahma. But the text "Mental, breath-bodied" has reference to a qualified Brahma. This is the distinction. Therefore we arrive at the con-

* Chhandogya 536. † Swetaswatra, 336. 345. ‡ Ibid 331.
clusion that because of Consistency with the qualities intended to be set forth, the Supreme Brahma himself is here inculcated as an object of worship.

3. But because of incongruity, not the embodied.

The preceding Sutra showed the consistency in Brahma of the qualities intended to be set forth. In the present sutra is shown the incongruity of the same with the embodied (soul). The word "but" is for the purpose of ascertaining [the distinction between the two]. According to the argument already expressed, Brahma is verily endowed with the qualities "Mental" &c., but the embodied soul is not endowed with the qualities "Mental" &c., because the qualities of "truth-intentioned," "Ākāsa-spirited," "speechless" [or unspeaking and without organs] "unaffected" (i. e., without desires or attachments), "superior to the earth," and similar other qualities cannot consistently be applied to the embodied (soul). "Embodied" means existing in the body. But is not God also existent in the body? True it is, He is in the body, but He is not in the body only: because his pervadingness is mentioned in the Veda, "Superior to earth," "superior to the sky, "extending everywhere like Ākāsa," "eternal." But the embodied soul remains only in the body: because it has no existence elsewhere than the body, the site of its passion [i. e. enjoyment or suffering].

4. Because also of the implied representation of the object and the agent.

Hence also the embodied has not the qualities of "Mental" &c., because there is the implied representation of the object and the agent: thus "Having departed from hence I shall attain this one." "This one," that is, the real spirit, endowed with the qualities, "Mental" &c., and the object of worship, is by implication represented as the object,—the object to be reached. "I shall attain" means in other words "I have reached." But where