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http://www.archive.org/details/introductiontosoOOIewi
An Introduction to Sociology
BY
ARTHUR M. LEWIS
CHICAGO CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY
1913
Copyright 1912 By CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY
JOHN F. HJGGINS
PRINTER AND BINDER
376-382 MONROE STREET CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
PREFACE
This book is precisely what its title calls it — "An In- troduction to Sociology." It makes no claim to add anything new to sociological theory. It is intended for a class of readers who have not yet been reached by tlie sociologists of the university chairs. Technical terms are studiously avoided, so that it may be comprehended by men and women who have never passed through the universities or had any special training in this or any other science. While it contains some criticism and much appreciation, its chief function is explanation. It does not for a moment presume to tell the readers all they should know about the science of society. The purpose is to give a condensed history of its origin and development and a general idea of its present position. It is the result of a pains-taking reading of the chief masters of the science, and the author hopes that its effect will be to create or to stimulate an appetite for reading the works which it expounds and from which it freely quotes.
The contents of the book were first presented in the form of twelve lectures from the stage of the Garrick Theater, Chicago, in the autumn of 1911, to an audience composed chiefly of working men. Eleven hundred members of the audience were sufhciently interested in its publication to pay for their copies at the close of the course and before a line of the book itself was written. It will be observed that the lecture form is not followed in the book ; there is no attempt at a verbatim reproduc- tion of the lectures themselves. The amplifications of
PREFACE
the platform are neither necessary nor desirable in a book.
The reader who has no previous acquaintance with the literature of sociology will probably be considerably surprised at the immense strides made in the scientific analysis of social phenomena during- the last half cen- tury. He will also be gratified to learn, that while this country is backward in almost every other science, and in scientific research generally, especially as compared with Germany, in sociology, thanks to the labors of Lester F. Ward, America holds a foremost place.
Our social problems grow ever more acute and attract, in an ever-increasing degree, the serious attention of the thinking world. If these problems are ever to be solved^ the solution must be found in the scientific study of their causes and the scientific appHcation of the knowl- edge derived from that study. For this reason, sociol- ogy makes a direct appeal to all who are interested in making the sad world better for our children than it has ever been for us. It is in the hope that this modest volume will make some small contribution in this direc- tion, that the author sends it forth.
Arthur M. Lewis. Chicago, Sept. 28, 1912.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. The Theological Difficulty . . 10
II. The Free Will Difficulty . . 21
III. The Great IMan Difficulty . . .26
IV. August Comte — The Law of Human
Development . . . . .33
V. Comte's Classification of the Sciences 45 VI. Herbert Spencer — Structural Sociol- ogy . . . . . . . 56
VII. Herbert Spencer — Data of Sociology 66 VIII. Herbert Spencer — Analogical Sociol- ogy 73
IX. Transition From Spencer to Ratzen-
hofer ....... 88
X. The Place of Karl Marx in Sociology 96
XI. Small's Estimate of Marx . . . 106
XII. Sociology and the Social Sciences . 116
XIII. Sociology and .the Scientific Method 125
XIV. The Social Forces 144
XV. Factors of Social Progress . . . 155
XIV. Ward's Scheme of the Social Process:
Happiness 161
Progress 164
Action 169
Opinion 171
Knowledge 176
Education ..... 185
Summary ...... 191
XVII. Indirect Action vs. Direct Action . 194 XVIII. The Purpose of Sociology . . . 204
An Introduction to Sociology
CHAPTER I
THE THEOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY
The first half of the nineteenth century enriched our modern languages with two great words — Biology and Sociology. The honors in both cases fall to France which still held, as it had held throughout the seven- teenth century, the foremost place in philosophy and science. John Fiske attributes the origin of the word "Biology" to De Blainville, but Professor Huxley, with his usual thoroughness, has shown that it was first used in a book published in 1801 by Jean Lamarck, the real father of the modern evolution theory. As to the origin of the word "Sociology," there is no disagreement. The undisputed honor falls to August Comte who first used it in a book written in 1838. Biology was the great science of the nineteenth century, with Lamarck as its Coper- nicus and Darwin as its Newton, In this century, the foremost place will fall to the "science of society*' which is, as Ward well says : "the last and highest landing on the great staircase of education."
The chief root out of which sociology has grown is the ever-increasing conviction of the universality of causation. Science has no existence apart from the idea of law. Wherever we have penetrated the secrets
10 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
of the universe thus far we have found "cause and effect" regnant. As Starcke well maintains : "all science is founded on faith in the universality of causation."
Whatever difficulties may have existed as to the ap- plication of this concept to the older sciences, they exist " no longer. Astronomy, Physics and Chemistry have been given over completely to what the Duke of Argyle called "The Reign of Law." The sciences dealing with living things — the sub-sciences of biology — are rapidly moving in the same direction, and the steadily increasing perception that the same fate awaits the phenomena of social activity has brought society within scientific reach.
This wholly desirable attitude has not been achieved without overcoming obstacles similar to those which long blocked the progress of the earlier sciences. We shall better understand the process if we consider these difficulties at some length.
The barriers which opposed themselves to the found- ing and developing of sociology were chiefly three. The first was purely theological. It may be stated as "belief in Divine Providence." There was a time when Divine Providence directed the stars and determined the weather, but astronomy has banished it from the one and meteorology is driving it from the other. It has, in fact, been expelled from field after field of human thought and is making its final and hopeless stand in the field of social phenomena. If society were ruled by "divine will" there could be no direct science of society. If the divine will were limited by law, which theolo- gians would hardly concede, there might be a science
THE THEOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY 11
of the divine will, and this might serve indirectly as a sort of social science in the second remove.
This would mean, however, the abolition of mys- teries which are sacred to the religious mind, and vvhich will only disappear with the disappearance of religion. The poet Cowper observed that "God moves in a mysterious way" and the greater and earlier poet who wTote the Book of Job presented God as an in- scrutable mystery: "Canst thou by searching find out God?" In the scientific world belief in divine provi- dence has lost its foot-hold. It is worn only, when worn at all, as a Sunday coat to insure respectability. It is ex- pressed merely as a pious opinion to keep the theologi- cal fraternity from snapping at one's heels.
In the ranks of the working class Divine Providence long held sway. In the minds of many it still rules, thanks to their utter lack of scientific education. What with long hours of labor and meager access to real books it seemed as if the laborers could never be eman- cipated from their superstitions.
Fortunately for them a new educating force has arisen which serves them largely in the place of a scientific training. It is in fact a scientific training in itself. This new emancipating force has been brilliantly expounded by two writers — Paul Lafargue and Professor Veblen. The latter has given it a happy name. He calls it: "The cultural incidence of the machine process."
The working mechanic has indeed ouitstripped his bourgeois brother in the shedding of outworn beliefs. The scientific education of the bourgeois is of the slen- derest, while the machine process has wrought long and well on the mind of the proletariat.
12 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
"How comes it," asks Lafargue, "that the bourgeois, who receive a scientific education of greater or less ex- tent, are still trammeled by religious ideas, from which the workers, without education, have freed themselves?" And here, in part, is his answer given in "Social and Philosophical Studies," a book of immense value to the student, and published by Charles H. Kerr & Co., at the easily accessible price of 50 cents:
"The labor of the mechanical factory puts the wage- worker in touch with terrible natural forces unknown to the peasant, but instead of being mastered by them, he controls them. The gigantic mechanism of iron and steel which fills the factory, which makes him move like an automaton, which sometimes clutches him, mutilates him, bruises him, does not engender in him a supersti- tious terror as the thunder does in the peasant, but leaves him unmoved, for he knows that the limbs of the mechanical monster were fashioned and mounted by his comrades, and that he has but to push a lever to set it in motion or stop it. The machine, in spite of its mirac- ulous power and productiveness, has no mystery for him. The laborer in the electric works, who has but to turn a crank on a dial to send miles of motive power to tram- ways or light to the lamps of a city, has but to say, like the God of Genesis, "Let there be light," and there is light. Never sorcery more fantastic was imagined, yet for him this sorcery is a simple and natural thing. He would be greatly surprised if one were to come and tell him that a certain God might if he cltose stop the ma- chine and extinguish the lights when the electricity had been turned on ; he would reply that this anarchistic God would be simply a misplaced gearing or a broken wire, and that it would be easy for him to seek and to find this disturbing God. The practice of the modern work- shop teaches the wage-worker scientific determinism.
THE THEOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY 13
without his needing to pass through the theoretical study of the sciences."
This also explains why and how the industrial work- ers of the cities have distanced the laborers of the country.
One of the most hopeful things in the sociological outlook is this unconsciously scientific attitude of the great mass of industrial workers. It is of great import- ance that the student of the science should have a clear grasp of its causes. It is a clear case of the spread of the idea of the universality of causation in a large and increasingly important division of the community. It, of course, takes the form of a general break down of what Spencer calls the "theological bias." We shall now consider Veblen's exposition of this intellectual result of the mechanical process.
The following passages are chosen — not occurring successively — from Chapter IX of his book, "The Theory of Business Enterprise." The chapter gives the name of the theory in its title: "The Cultural Inci- dence of the Machine Process":
"The machine process pervades the modern life and dominates it in a mechanical sense. Its dominance is seen in the enforcement of precise mechanical measure- ments and adjustment and the reduction of all manner of things, purposes and acts, necessities, conveniences, and amenities of life, to standard units. The bearing of this sweeping mechanical standardization upon business traffic is a large part of the subject-matter of the fore- going chapters. The point of immediate interest here is the further bearing of the machine process upon the growth of culture — the disciplinary effect which this movement for standardization and mechanical equiva-
14 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
lence has upon the human material. This discipline falls more immediately on the workmen engaged in the me- chanical industries, and only less immediately on the rest of the community which lives in contact with this sweeping machine process.
"Mechanically speaking, the machine is not his (the workman's) to do with as his fancy may suggest. His place is to take thought of the machine and its work in the terms given him by the process that is going for- ward. His thinking in the premises is reduced to stand- ard units of gauge and grade. H he fails of the precise measure, by more or less, the exigencies of the process check the aberration and drive home the absolute need of conformity,
"If he takes to myth-making and personifies the ma- chine, or the process, and imputes purpose and benevo- lence to the mechanical appliances, after the manner of current nursery tales and pulpit oratory, he is sure to go wrong.
"The machine process throws out anthropomorphic habits of thought. * * * 'pj-jg machine
technology rests on a knowledge of impersonal, material cause and effect, not on the dexterity, diligence or per- sonal force of the workman, still less on the habits and propensities of the workman's superiors. * * * It inculcates thinking in terms of opaque, impersonal cause and effect, to the neglect of those norms of validity that rest on usage and on conventional standards handed dtown by usage.
*** *****
"Its scheme of knowledge and of inference is based on the laws of material causation, not on those of im- memorial custom, authenticity, or authoritative enact- ment. Its metaphysical basis is the law of cause and effect, which in the thinking of its adepts has displaced
THE THEOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY 15
even the law of sufficient reason. * * * Anthro- pomorphism, under whatever disguise, is of no use and of no force here.
"The intellectual and spiritual training of the machine in modern life, therefore, is very far-reaching. It leaves but a small proportion of the community untouched ; but while its constraint is ramified throughout the body of the population, and constrains virtually all classes at some points in their daily life, it falls with the most di- rect, intimate, and unmitigated impact upon the skilled mechanical classes, for these have no respite from its mastery whether they are at work or at play."
Professor Veblen continues the development of his argument with great skill. He contends that the school- ing of the machine has led the trades unions into a mental attitude which has no reverence for the common law. And this because the common law is founded on the metaphysical doctrine of natural rights and the sa- cred theories of personal status and private property, all of which ideas are alien to the logic of the machine pro- cess. The machine technology produces this result not so much by contradicting conventional ideas as by ignor- ing them to the point of causing them to lose their force.
Our author next shows that the machine process is back of the "Socialistic disaffection." His writing on this part of his theme reminds one of the peculiar style used by Galileo and Descartes and others who in the middle ages tfied to advocate certain theories without appearing to the vigilant watch dogs of the inquisition to do so. The Professor's subsequent career is evi- dence enough that it is still hazardous to hold Socialistic
16 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
ideas in universities, though, through the sheer in- crease in numbers, it is becoming less and less conspicu- ous and therefore less disastrous. This seems to be the only explanation of Veblen's use of such terms as "socialistic vagaries" v^hen his main argument is quite favorable to the socialist idea.
Again, while there is an undercurrent of sympathy for the "Socialist disaffection" there is an open flouting of the pettifogging measures of those whose insight or courage falls short of the program of Socialism. This comes out in the following passage from a footnote, which deserves to be printed in letters of gold.
Speaking of "the unpropertied classes employed in business" and therefore outside the direct impact of the machine process Veblen says :
"This pecuniarily disfranchised business population, in its revulsion against unassimilated facts, turns rather [instead of to Socialism] to some excursion into prag- matic romance, such as Social Settlements, Prohibition, Clean Politics, Single Tax, Arts and Crafts, Neighbor- hood Guilds, Institutional Church, Christian Science, New Thought, or some such cultural thimblerig."
"Pragmatic romance" and "cultural thimblerig" stir in one a joy such as Keats tells us he experienced when he came across such descriptive phrases as "sea-shoulder- ing whale."
Veblen is considered at length here because he re- veals with great clearness one of the master forces mak- ing in the direction of Sociology. The book from which the above quotations are made, published by Scribners, and his "The Theory of the Leisure Class," published by MacMillan, have met with no reception at
THE THEOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY 17
all consonant with their importance for sociology. "The Theory of the Leisure Class" is a much more valuable contribution to American sociological literature than many more pretentious volumes and for the question under discussion here, the student will be well repaid by a careful reading. The following is from the latter part of the chapter on "Devout Observances":
"The workman's office is becoming more and more exclusively that of discretion and supervision in a pro- cess of mechanical, dispassionate sequences. So long as the individual is the chief and typical prime mover in the process ; so long as the obtrusive feature of the in- dustrial process is the dexterity and force of the indi- vidual handicraftsman ; so long as the habit of interpret- ing phenomena in terms of personal motive and propen- sity [which is the essence of theology] suffers no such considerable and consistent derangement through facts as to lead to its elimination. But under the later developed industrial processes, when the prime movers and the contrivances through which they work are of an im- personal, non-individual character, the grounds of gen- eralization habitually present in the workman's mind and the point of view from which he habitually apprehends phenomena is an enforced cognizance of matter of fact sequence. The result, so far as concerns the workman's life of faith, is a proclivity to undevout scepticism."
This whole theory of the effect of m'achinery on thought explains, as Veblen points out, why the So- cialists of Germany, while capturing the industrial cen- ters make small headway in the rural districts. In America this is not so pronounced because our farmers have not been steeped for centuries in what Marx called "the idiocy of country life."
Professor Henderson of the University of Chicago, is
18 AN INTRODUCTION Tt; SOCIOLOGY
reported as saying in a lecture of a few days ago that religion is losing its hold on the business world because business men "associate religion with miracle" and mir- acle is foreign to the business habit of thought. And this is much more true of the machine worker.
The anti-theological effect of the machine process on the mind of the worker is paralleled by the same effect of the natural sciences on the workers in that field. As Veblen says: "As regards the educated classes, social- istic views are particularly likely to crop out among the men in the material sciences." We refer to Socialism in this connection because it is a conspicuous instance of the steady drift toward a science of society.
The machine process and what might be called the scientific trend work well together toward a common sociological result. Veblen, indeed, makes the machine process the cause of the scientific trend, though there is much to be said for their mutual interaction. ..With the exception of a few theological phrases sudh as "creator" which Darwin used and which, McCabe tells us, he afterward repented, as so much unfortunate truckling to public opinion, the great English biologist is an eminent example of the modern scientific spirit. And Veblen has no hesitation in making Darwin's scien- tific method the consequence of the intellectual atmos- phere generated by the early English machine industry. This is a daring application of "economic determinism" and worth reproducing here in full:
"This early technological advance, of course, took place in the British community, where the machine pro- cess first gained headway and where the discipline of a prevalent machine industry inculcated thinking in terms
THE TIIEOLOG;a\L DIFFICULTY 19
of the machine process. So also it was in the British community that modern science fell in the lines marked out by technological thinking and began to formulate its theories in terms of process rather than in terms of prime causes and the like. While something of this kind is noticeable relatively early in some of the inor- ganic sciences, as, e. g., Geology, the striking and de- cisive move in this direction was taken toward the mid- dle of the century by Darwin and his contemporaries. Without much preliminary exposition and without feel- ing himself to be out of touch with his contemporaries, Darwin set to work to explain species in terms of the process out of which they have arisen, rather than out of the prime causes to which the distinction between them may be due. Denying nothing as to the substan- tial services of the Great Artificer in the development of species, he simply and naively left Him out of the scheme, because, as being a personal factor, He could not be stated and handled in terms of process. * * * His results, as well as his specific determination of fac- tors at work in this process of cumulative change (in organic evolution) have been questioned ; perhaps they are open to all the criticisms leveled against them as well as to a few more not yet thought of; but the scope and method given to scientific inquiry by Darwin and the generation whose spokesman he is, has substantially not been questioned, except by that diminishing contin- gent of the faithful who by force of special training or by native gift are not amenable to the discipline of the machine process."
The student who approaches sociology through this book — and this will probably be its function to most of its readers — may as well be told the plain truth here at the outset. Theological ideas, in this, as in any otb.er scientific field, are as so many heavy weights hung to the waist-belt of a foot-racer — rapid progress v.ill be
30 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
impossible until they are thrown aside. The immense superiority of the sociological works of Lester F. Ward to those of, say Giddings, for example, is largely due to Ward's rigid adherence to the scientific spirit when theology is in question. As we shall see presently, the acknowledged founder of the science, August Comte, saw clearly that the laying of the theological ghost must be the initial step in the scientific interpretation of social activity.
Happily, in this respect. Sociology is heir to the labors of the giants who toiled in the fields of physical and biological science. AH that is necessary for her is to adopt the method and weapons which crowned with suc- cess the epoch-making labors of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Kant and Laplace, in astronomy and physics, and Darwin and his colleagues in organic sci- ences.
Theology, driven from one field after another, makes its final stand in the science of society. Here it is in its last trench, and while it is discouraging to note that the oft-tought battle must be waged again and again, there is some compensation in the reflection that when it is vanquished here it can never again rear its hoary head to mock the upward struggles of the marching hosts of men.
CHAPTER II
THE FREE WILL DIFFICULTY
Following after and growing out of theological con- cepts is another belief in violent conflict with the idea of a science of society. This is the much-discussed doctrine of the freedom of the will. If the free will theory, in its ordinary and generally accepted meaning is true, sociology is impossible. That theory, if true, presents a difficulty wholly insurmountable.
This objection was clearly stated by the English His- torian, Anthony Froude, who held to both the doctrine and its — for sociology — disastrous consequences. Froude says :
"When natural causes are liable to be set aside and neutralized by what is called volition, the word science is out of place. If it is free to a man to choose what he will do or not do, there is no adequate science of him. It is in this marvelous power in men to do wrong . . . that the impossibility stands of forming scientific calculations of what men will do before the fact, or scientific explanations of what men have done after the fact."
The free will doctrine has never gone unchallenged since the days when Democritus held that all things in the universe, including human actions, were governed by rigid unescapable necessity. The general mass of mankind have always felt that many if not all their acts were impelled by forces beyond their control, and words and phrases were formed to express this feeling. Such
21
23 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
are fate, destiny, fortune, the finger, or the will, of God. The Calvinistic faith, with its doctrine of predestination, is a total denial of free will.
In our day there is a greater and g^-owing general sentiment which echoes the position of John Stuart Mill: "Given the motives which are present to an indi- vidual's mind, and given likewise the character and dis- position of the individual, the manner in which the in- dividual will act might unerringly be inferred."
This conception, as it presents itself to the general mind, is admirably set forth by Archbishop Whately in his "Elements of Logic" :
"Everyone is accustomed to anticipate future events, in human affairs, as well as in the material world, in proportion to his knowledge of the several circumstances connected with each ; however different in amount that knowledge may be, in reference to different occurrences. And in both cases alike, we always attribute the failure of any anticipation to our ignorance or mistake respect- ing some of the circumstances. When we fully expect, from our supposed knowledge of some person's char- acter, and of circumstances he is placed in, that he will do something which, eventually, he does not do, we at once and without hesitation con- clude that we were mistaken either as to his char- acter, or as to his situation, or as to our acquaint- ance with human nature, generally ; and we are accustomed to adduce any such failure as a proof of such mistake ; saying 'It is plain you were mistaken in your estimate of that man's character ; for he has done so and so;' and this as unhesitatingly as we should at- tribute the non-occurrence of an eclipse we had pre- dicted, not to ^any change in the Laws of Nature, but to some error in our calculations."
THE FREE WILL DIFFICULTY 33
Among philosophers Emanuel Kant is generally sup- posed to be a free will adherent. That this is a mis- taken assumption his statement as follows clearly
proves :
"Whatsoever difference there may be in our notions of the freedom of the will metaphysically considered, — it is evident that the manifestations of this will, viz.: human actions, are as much under the control of nature as any physical phenomena. It is the province of his- tory to narrate these manifestations ; and let their causes be ever so secret, we know that history, simply by taking its station at a distance and contemplating the agency of the human will upon a large scale, aims at unfolding to our view a regular stream of tendency in the great succession of events ; so that the very course of inci- dents, which taken separately and individually would have seemed perplexed, incoherent, and lawless, yet viewed in their connection and as the actions of the human species and not of independent beings, never fail to discover a steady and continuous though slow develop- ment of certain great predispositions of our nature. Thus for instance, deaths, births, and marriages, considering how much they are separately dependent on the free- dom of the human will, should seem to be subject to no law according to which any calculation could be made beforehand of their amount : and yet the yearly registers of these events in great countries prove that they go on with as much conformation to the laws of nature as the oscillations of the weather."
While the free will doctrine has still some following in the general, and especially the cloudy-minded relig- ious world, it has been definitely and totally abandoned by scientific men. "There can, of course," says Pro- fessor Guenther, "be no question of free will to the scientifically-minded man." "Human actions are/' he
24 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
elsewhere says, "determined by causes that He behind, not before them." Says Ernest Haeckel: "The great strug-gle between the determinist and the indeterminist, between the opponent and the sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended today, after more than two thou- sand years, completely in favor of the determinist,"
This culmination of the free-will controversy was a necessary fore-runner of the founding of the science of sociology. Among the sociologists this is clearly recog- nized. The sociologists are determinists by the first demands of their science. They cannot go forward a single step on any other basis. This necessary attitude of the sociologists is well exemplified by one of the greatest among them, Lester F. Ward, who writes as follows :
"The will, that higliest power of the mind of which we boast so much, is, if not a chimera, at least a far different thing from what it appears to be. The real paradox here is the truth that it is an effect as well as a cause. Like the universe, like life, like man himself, like the other faculties of the mind, the will is a genetic product of cosmical law. The illusion consists in sup- posing that our will is subject to our orders, that it is in any sense free. Yet here in the dependence of the will we have a paradox which clings with the utmost tenacity, even to the most enlightened of mankind. They have been compelled to admit the monistic principle in the celestial bodies, in the inorganic world, perhaps in the organic world. They may be even willing to agree that man is himself a genetic product, that brain has been mechanically evolved, that sensation and even thought are the effects of antecedent causes, but, when the great demi-god will is sought to be rolled in, they take fright and resist this last encroachment. These
THE FREE WILL DIFFICULTY 25
several classes of mind only show the degrees of causal power with which they are endowed. A full comple- ment of causality never allows itself to be arrested by the consideration of consequences. If the universe is the theater of law, freedom is a delusion."
The method of this book is to allow the authorities to speak for themselves and, as far as possible, in their own language. The reader, by this time, has probably heard enough to be convinced that our ancient friend "free will" has had his day and ceased to be. His pain- less anaesthetic death at the hands of science adds one more milestone on the road to scientific interpretation of social phenomena.
CHAPTER III
THE GREAT MAX DIFFICULTY
The writer recalls reading in his theological youth a lecture by an eminent preacher of the English Church on "Old Testament History." If memory fails not it was one of Cannon Liddon's Bampton Lectures, though for our purpose the precise authorship is of small im- portance. The whole body of this "divinity" literature has steadily lost its value with the passing years and the rising tide of natural science. The only value for us of the lecture in question is that it is representative of a common theological attitude toward history. The lecturer had a very simple and easy explanation of He- brew history of the period of Elisha. It consisted of a comfortable and well-assured explanation of Elisha himself. God foresaw that the Hebrew race was ap- proaching a crisis in its career and that a strong man would be needed to shape its destinies. Therefore, in his creative laboratory he constructed EHsha, equipped him for his task, and sent him forth at the proper mo- ment to fulfill his historic mission.
For the type of thinker who accepts this as an ex- planation of the human drama^ the perplexities of his- tory vanish. All he needs to do is to study the great men and perceive in their acts the will of the great God who shapes them for the occasion. In some quar- ters, where the insistent demands of the scientific spirit have caused the Deity's share in the proceedings to be
THE GREAT MAN DIFFICULTY 27
dropped, the "great man" is still held to be the only explanation of the annals of mankind.
For Sociology, however, the "Great Man Theory," as commonly understood, is "a lion in the path," and its removal is an imperative necessity. This does not mean that great men are not great. Nor does it imply any detraction from their fame and credit. What stands in the way is not the Great Man but the "Great Man Theory." In the case of "free will" there is no denial of the existence of the will but only repudiation of the notion that it is free and its decisions uncaused. The science-impeding character of the great man theory lies in its assumption that the great man is a sort of un- caused first cause.
The standard text-book of the theory is Thomas Car- lyle's "Heroes and Hero Worship." Like most of Car- lyle's books it is a combination of first class writing and second rate thinking. The essential nature of the theory is that it regards history as dependent upon the appearance of some one man at a certain critical mo- ment. Fortunately these human stars usually blazed forth when their light was most needed. Had they failed the tide of history would have set in some other unknown direction. Carlyle's treatment of Luther is a case in point. Without Luther, the Reformation which bears his name had been impossible. For Carlyle, this is not enough. Without this one man, the whole of subsequent history would have been otherwise, including the history of the Western Continent. Carlyle goes the length of making all this hinge not merely on Luther but on one of his acts. Speaking of Luther's behavior at the Diet of Worms, Carlyle says:
28' AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
"It is, as we say, the greatest moment in the modern history of men. English Puritanism, England and its parliaments, Americas, and vast work these two cen- turies; French revolution, Europe and its work every- where at present; the germ of it all lay there: had Luther in that moment done other, it had all been other- wise."
What shines forth most clearly in this extravagant language is not the importance of Luther, but the pov- erty of Carlyle's sense of historical causation. Modern Sociology has, and must have, an entirely different view. For it the Reformation would have been achieved, Lu- ther or no Luther. The secular powers of Germany and some other countries were ripe for a revolt against the tremendous monetary drain of Rome, and they were ready to form in a solid, phalanx behind the first man who should raise the standard of revolt. Without that backing, Luther would have been trampled like a reed. With those forces lying in wait it was only a question of who should be first to strike. To change the simile, the air was full of sparks and had not Luther's fallen in the powder magazine some other would. It was only a question of days or weeks or at the most months. The times had reached a pitch where the explosion was inevitable. In civil history the actual demonstration of this truth is, in the nature of things impossible. Once the deed is done there is no chance for another to prove that he would have done it had the first champion failed.
There is another field, however, where these condi- tions do not obtain and the proof of the independence of development of any one man is abundant. This is the equally if not more important history of science.
THE GREAT MAN DIFFICULTY 29
The history of science is replete with instances of dual and sometimes treble and even quadruple independent discoveries of epoch-making things and truths. When the development of ideas reaches a certain stage and the thought of the time is ripe for the next step forward, it is made — and its making clearly depends on no one "great man."
As I have treated this question at length in my chap- ter on Carlyle in "Ten Blind Leaders of the Blind," the evidence will be condensed here.
The telescope has played an important role in modern thought and if it had not been invented by either of the Dutch spectacle makers. Jansen and Lippershey, in 1609, it is certain Galileo would have made one a little later.
While Priestley was busy in England with a new gas he had discovered, and which Lavoisier in France pro- nounced to be oxygen, an essential and combustible ele- ment in air — and the nemesis of phogiston — the same discovery was being independently made by a poor apoth- ecary, Scheele, in Kj oping, Sweden.
The famous "Nebular Hypothesis" usually attributed, by most American writers, solely to Laplace, was clearly expounded by Kant half a century earlier in his "Theory of the Heavens," and then apparently lost to sight, and, independently, rediscovered by the Frenchman. In Europe, however, Kant's claim is fully recognized and the theory is often referred to as the Kantian Hypoth- esis.
After Herschel had discovered the new, and then far- thest known, planet Uranus in 1781, its movements were seen to be perturbed at a certain point in its immense orbit, a perturbation which could only be explained, by
30 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
Newton's gravitation, by the presence of some other large and unknown body in that neighborhood. The dual and independent discoveries of this body (Nep- tune) by the Frenchman Lever rier and the Englishman Adams is not only celebrated but notorious, it having furnished one of the most unpleasant international con- troversies as to priorit}', in the annals of science.
In the history of the mathematics which led to Nep- tune's discovery, it will be remembered that when the ordinary calculus had ceased to meet the expanding needs of astronomers the "Differential Calculus" had three independent births, in three different countries, through the respective labors of Newton, Leibnetz and Lagrange.
The twin birth of Darwin's theory of "Natural Selec- tion" is probably better known than the nature of the theory itself. Wallace was ready for publication be- fore Darwin and would undoubtedly have been first in print had he been at home to attend to its print- ing himself. Fortunately Darwin's priority was easily established to the full and generous acknowledgment of Wallace, and science was saved the humiliation of hav- ing one of its greatest conquests lashed to the name of a victim of the fantastic vagaries of spiritualism.
These evidences of the independence of scientific progress of any one great man are inexhaustible, and we will close this brief list with one of great importance to Sociology. The "Materialist Conception of History" came before the world under joint authorship. The Communist IManifesto in which it was first announced bore the names of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. From its interesting preface we learn that, while Engels
THE GREAT MAN DIFFICULTY 31
awards the laurels to Marx, we should have had this brilliant and revolutionary generalization from Engels, though Marx had never lived.
Despite the steady growth of the evidence against the great man theory it still lingers as a sort of rudi- mentary idea. There are still living, people who imagine that Rousseau created the French Revolution, that Washington conjured forth the struggle for independ- ence, and that "Uncle Tom's Cabin" abolished American chattel slavery. But the real social forces responsible for these civil transformations are steadily rising into view, and the poetic and romantic interpretation of his- tory is receding in a corresponding degree. With the decay of theological and metaphysical modes of thought, there is an ever-increasing conviction that the great man is more the creature than the creator of the signal ad- vances of his time.
The eloquent advocacy of the theory by Carlyle has been more than counterbalanced by the merciless analy- sis of Herbert Spencer. Spencer, in his "Study of So- ciology,"' rang the death knell of the great man theory :
"Even were we to grant the absurd supposition that the genesis of the great men does not depend on the antecedents furnished by the society he is born in, there would still be the quite sufficient facts that he is power- less in the absence of the material and mental accumu- lations which his society inherits from the past, and that he is powerless in the absence of the co-existing population, character, intelligence, and social arrange- ments. Given a Shakespeare, and what dramas could he have written without the multitudinous traditions of civilized life — without the various experiences which, descending to him from the past, gave wealth to his
32 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
thought, and without the language which a hundred generations had developed and enriched by use? Sup- pose a Watt, with all his inventive power, living in a tribe ignorant of iron, or in a tribe that could get only as much iron as a fire blown by hand-bellows will smelt, or suppose him born among ourselves before lathes ex- isted ; what chance would there have been of the steam engine? Imagine a Laplace unaided by that slowly de- veloped system of mathematics which we trace back to its beginnings among the Egyptians ; how far would he have got with the Mecanique Celeste? Nay, the like questions may be put and have like answers, even if we limit ourselves to those classes of great men on whose doings hero-worshippers more particularly dwell — the rulers and generals. Xenophon could not have achieved his celebrated feat had his Ten Thousand been feeble or cowardly, or insubordinate. Caesar would never have made his conqiiests without disciplined troops, inherit- ing their presffge and tactics and organization from the Romans who lived before therrf. And, to take a recent instance, the strategical genius of Moltke would have triumphed in no great campaigns had there not been a nation of some forty millions to supply soldiers, and had not those soldiers been men of strong bodies, sturdy characters, obedient natures, and capable of carrying out orders intelligently."
Thus, Spencer, reviewing dramatic events in Euro- pean history, concludes :
"If you should wish to understand these phenomena of social evolution, you will not do so though you should read yourself blind over the biographies of all the great rulers on record, down to Frederick the Greedy and Na- poleon the Treacherous."
CHAPTER IV
AUGUST COMTE — THE LAW OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
The science of sociology, by common consent, begins with August Comte. Like all other departments of thought it had its more or less distinct foreshadowings ■ — as Spencer would say, its adumbrations — in the an- cient world, but its birth as a science, properly so-called, is largely the result of the labors of the French Posi- tivist and founder of "Positivism."
A system of social science is the last thing to be looked for in the works of Comte. Such a system must be the ripe result and not the beginning of the science, and we have no right to expect one in the writings of its great pioneer.
Comte did indeed put forth considerable effort in this field and even went so far as to give the chief outlines of the society of the future. In all this he failed piti- fully. Those who know only of his ideas in this field can form no opinion of his tremendous contribution to modern intellectual advancement.
Comte did two things. He did them so well, they will forever remain as monuments of his genius. They were great things and will rank always as among the notable achievements of the mind of man.
These two things are: The law of human develop- ment, and the classification of the sciences. They will form the respective subjects of this and the following chapter.
Thanks to the labors of Harriet Martineau, English
83
34 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
readers have an advantage over the readers of the French original. In her translation she has condensed the six French volumes into one English one and sacrificed lit- tle but the repetition incidental to work done in the form of lectures, and extending over a period of twenty years.
Comte's "Law of Human Development" is funda- mental to his whole philosophy and it throws a flood of thought on the phenomena of social and scientific pro- gress.
As to the nature of this law we will allow its dis- coverer, through the medium of Miss Martineau, to speak for himself. The third paragraph of the first chapter reads as follows:
"From the study of the development of human intel- ligence, in all directions, and through all times, the dis- covery arises of a great fundamental law, to which it is necessarily subject, and which has a solid foundation of proof, both in the facts of our organization and in our historical experience. The law is this : That each of our leading conceptions — each branch of our knowledge — passes successively through three different theoretical conditions : the Theological, or fictitious ; the Metaphysi- cal, or abstract ; and the Scientific, or positive. In other words, the human mind, by its nature, employs in its progress three methods of philosophizing, the character of which is essentially different, and even radically op- posed ; viz., the theological method, the metaphysical and the positive. Hence arises three philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of Phe- nomena, each of which excludes the others. The first is the necessary point of departure of the human under- standing; the third is its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition."
comte's law of human development 35
The insight displayed in the above passage is all the more amazing when one remembers it was written in the pre-Darwinian days. Here is convincingly stated, what has since become universally admitted among scientific men, that theology belongs to the infancy of the human race. Thus has theology, which was described by Mr. Gladstone, as "the crown and flower of human knowl- edge," become the pariah of the scientific world.
No writer, with the possible exception of Karl Marx or Lester F. Ward, recognized more clearly the es- sentially reactionary character of theological thinking. When Comte spoke of it as "theological, or fictitious," he dealt it a terrific blow. Only such an iconoclast could have founded modern sociology.
Comte's "law of human development" is a radical rupture with the general mental attitude of his day, and in this lies its chief virtue. Men who trod mincingly, and timidly avoided the impact of the prejudices of their time, have done useful work, but they could never be great pioneers in the world of thought. The judicious time-server is swallowed in the maze of his own apolo- getics. Only the fearless man becomes a milestone in the march of mind.
We might now proceed to the further statement of Comte's "law" in language of our own which would avoid the grievous blunders into which the brilliant Frenchman fell, but again we will quote his painstaking translator :
"In the theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects — in short absolute
36 AN introduction: lo ^L-LluLUGi
knowledge — supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings. ,
"In the metaphysical state, which is only a modifica- tion of the first, the mind supposes, instead of super- natural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena is, in this stage, a mere reference of each to its proper entity.
"In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phe- nomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws — that is, their invariable relations of succession and re- semblance. Reasoning and observation duly combined, are the means of this knowledge. What is now under- stood when we speak of an explanation of facts is sim- ply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and some general facts the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science."
In the above passage the fundamental error into which Comte fell and which stamps and vitiates all his writings, stands plainly forth. In this glaring and per- sistent blunder is the explanation of the tardy recogni- tion of the real merit of his labors. But for this error Comte might have had almost as rapid and signal a triumph as Darwin himself.
Darwin's errors were incidental and advanced with small enthusiasm. His hopeless theory of Pangenisis, for example, is presented as a "provisional" theory, and its relegation to the scrap heap in no way affected the bulk of Darwin's work.
Comte's errors, on the contrary, crop out everywhere and are defended by him with an emphasis often lack- ing when he is advancing his really great truths.
comte's law of human development 37
Comte's grand error lies in his failure to differentiate between "efficient causes" and "final causes" — causes finales and cjiisce efficientcs. Final causes belong to theology and are properly denounced and discarded, but efficient causes are essentially a part of the scientific method, and should have been explained and defended. In his violent reaction against the former, Comte al- lowed himself to be drawn into a sweeping inclusion of the latter. The unfortunate but inevitable result has been that many scientific men have cursorily read his work, and regarded him with suspicion, when, had they looked beyond his error they would have hailed him as a brother. With the lapse of time this mistaken esti- mate is being corrected and Comte is coming to his own.
The limits of this work do not allow an extensive treatment of this question and the reader is now re- ferred for its further development to the earlier part of the first chapter of Lester F. Ward's two-volume mas- terpiece: "Dynamic Sociology," a work about which we shall have much to say later and from which we now quote :
"While, to the mind of all other philosophers, the ar- bitrary, original, and the final cause stand in plainest con- trast with the necessary, efficient, or mechanical cause, the former being, as Comte justly asserts, the basis of all theological reasoning, while the latter seems the al- most indispensible postulate of science itself, he fails utterly to perceive any difference between them, and is found attacking with equal vehemence conclusions flow- ing from the one and the other class."
And again:
"As a further and necessary consequence of this ob-
38 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
stinate blindness, we find Comte multiplying the number of what he calls 'primordial' problems beyond the lim- its of finite powers, impossible for man ever to solve, and fit subjects only for the labors of theologians and metaphysicians. Among these it is amusing to notice quite a number which were actually solved during Comte's own life-time. For example, he repeatedly as- serts that the chemical constitutions of the heavenly bodies belong to this class of insoluble problems ; y€t, even while he wrote, Kirchhoff and Fraunhofer were collecting from the sun and the stars the evidence of their composition."
Thus did Comte join together things which are, and should be kept, separate.
For illustration of their essential difference let us take the origin of the earth. According to the theologian who explains the origin of the earth in terms of its purpose — its final cause, the earth v/as created by the Almighty to be the dwelling place of man, while the scientist smiles at so childish an explanation, and seeks the efficient mechanical cause of its origin in the nebu- lar hypothesis of Kant and Laplace.
All this, however, does not affect the validity or value of Comte's "law of development" to which we now re- turn.
There are two interesting and important features of this law which are presented by Comte as its grounds and evidences. The first we shall mention briefly here as it will come up for further consideration in the en- suing chapter. This is that every science, in the course of its progress, passes through the three stages or pe- riods to which the human race itself is subject. Every
comte's law q^ human development 39
science is, at its birth, theological in character. Later it throws off the swaddling- clothes of its babyhood and appears in the metaphysical garb of its youth. Ulti- mately it emerges into the full dress of its scientific ma- turity. Says Comte:
"There is no science which, having attained the positive stage, does not bear the marks of having passed through the others. Some time since it was (whatever it might be now) composed, as we can now perceive, of metaphysical abstractions : and, further back in the course of time, it took its form from theo- logical conceptions. We shall have only too much oc- casion to see, as we proceed, that our most advanced sciences still bear very evident marks of the two earlier periods through which they passed."
Before we proceed to the second evidence we will consider Comte's usage of the word "positive." This is important inasmuch as it is Comte's most frequently used term and indeed appears in a title role, Comte naming his system "The Positive Philosophy."
Fortunately Comte's use of the term and its popular usage are practically identical. In popular usage "posi- tive" is chiefly an expression of ^emphasis. We say a thing is positively so when we feel sure of the fact or facts. We are positive of a thing when it can be demon- strated, as in the case of the majority of universally accepted scientific truths, especially in the experimental sciences. Fitting examples are, the functions of the bodily organs as demonstrated in physiology, and the composition of bodies and gases as shown by chemical analysis and synthesis. Thus positive and scientific, as adjectives, are practically synonymous, and are fre- quently so used by Comte. There is not the least excuse
40 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
for any attempt to cloud with mystery, the word posi- tive, as it is used by the founder of modern sociology.
The second ground of the "law of human develop- ment" has to do with the individual. Comte holds that the three periods of race development are re-enacted in the life of the individual. He states it as follows:
"The progress of the individual mind is not only an illustration, but an indirect evidence of that of the gen- eral mind. The point of departure of the individual and the race being the same, the phases of the mind of man correspond to the epochs of the mind of the race. Now each of us is aware, if he looks back upon his own history, that he was a theologian in his childhood, a metaphysician in his youth and a natural philosopher in his manhood. All men who are up to their age can verify this for themselves."
Of course, it is obvious that a person still in the thrall of theological beliefs would present no evidence of the operation of this law. Such would only constitute ex- amples of mental development arrested at the sucking bottle stage.
It is well v/orth noting that this is not the only "re- capitulation theory" in modern thought. Comte's theory that the experience of the individual recapitulates the experience of the race applies to the mental world. Modern biology gives a similar theory in explanation of certain evolutionary phenomena in the organic world.
The biological recapitulation theory broached by Wal- ther and Meckel, and still more cogently advocated by Ernest Von Baer early in the nineteenth century, found its chief exponent in Ernest Haeckel. This theory be- longs to the science of embryology in which Haeckel
comte's law of human development 41
is one of the highest authorities. The theory, briefly stated, is, that the chief stages of organic evolutionary development wliich mark the rise from moneron to man are repeated or reca])itulated in the nine months' life his- tory of the human embryo before the infant comes forth into the world. This "biogenetic law" as Haeckel calls it, is well stated and illustrated by his fellow countryman and fellow scientist, William Boelsche, in "The Evolution of Man." "The biogenetic law," says Boelsche, "recog- nizes in the embryo the portrait of the ancestor."
■Bolsche also shows that the "biogenetic law" is not limited in its operation to the human family but is ac- tive throughout the animal kingdom. He says :
"No matter what embryo we may study, whether it is that of a lizard, a snake, a crocodile, a turtle, ostrich, stork, chicken, canary, duckbill, marsupial, whale, rab- bit, horse, or finally a long-tailed American monkey or anthropoid (man-like) gibbon — the embryo at a certain stage of its development always shows a perceptible tad- pole or fish stage. Its neck shows the m.ark of the gills. Furthermore, the limbs which the embryos are just forming at this stage have likewise the plain outlines of fins."
This theory has also been- deafly and forcefully stated by an American who has laid the people of his country under heavy and lasting obligations by his brilliant and thoroughly luiman contributions toward a higher and nobler standard of education — Professor J. Howard Moore, instructor in biology at the Crane High school. Says Professor ]\Ioore, in his "Universal Kinship":
"The embryonic development of a human being is not different in kind from the embryonic development
42 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
of any other animal. Every human being at the begin- ning- of his organic existence is a protozoan, about 1/125 inch in diameter; at another stage of development he is a tiny sac-shaped mass of cells without blood or nerves, the gastrula ; at another stage he is a worm, with a pulsating tube instead of a heart, and without head, neck, spinal column, or limbs ; at another stage he has as a backbone, a rod of cartilage extending along the back, and a faint nerve cord, as in amphioxus, the lowest of the vertebrates ; at another stage he is a fish with a two-chambered heart, mesonephric kidneys, and gill-slits, with gill arteries leading to them, just as in fishes; at another stage he is a reptile with a three-chambered heart, and voiding his excreta through a cloaca like other reptiles ; and finally, when he enters upon post- natal sins and actualities, he is a sprawling, squalling, unreasoning quadruped. The human larva from the fifth to the seventh month of development is covered with a thick growth of hair and has a true caudal ap- pendage, like the monkey. At this stage the embryo has in all thirty-eight vertebrae, nine of which are cau- dal, and the great toe extends at right angles to the other toes, and is not longer than the other toes, but shorter, as in the ape."
This biological theory is given at length here not only because it supports Comte's theory by analogy but be- cause it seems highly probable that the two principles are not mere analogies but have a much closer relation- ship.
In these materialistic days we have learned that thought is a function of the brain and that the charac- ter and quality of the thinking is very largely, probably entirely, dependent on brain organization.
If it be true, as the biogenetic law holds, that the human creature comes into the world with the brain de-
comte's law of human development 43
velopment and therefore the mental equipment of a rather remote savage ancestor, we may cease to wonder that theological beliefs had a peculiar attraction for us in our early years.
CHAPTER V comte's classification of the sciences
In Comte's system, the thing which stands second, if indeed, it is not equal, in importance to the "law of human development" is his classification of the sciences. As will appear, it is important for sociology because it reveals the character of the science of society and places it in its proper relation to other sciences. Thus we get an estimate of its scope and importance as a branch or department of knowledge.
In this field of classification Comte did an immense service, not only to sociology but to all the sciences. Especially did he serve the cause of education by organ- izing scientific knowledge in a comprehensive order, lift- ing it forever out of the confused, scattering and dis- jointed maze in which he found it.
In classifying and arranging the sciences in their re- spective positions, Comte did not place them side by side as so many co-equal brothers. Rather he placed them in position of sequence or succession comparing closely with the relation of parent and offspring. One science is placed at the head. The next is derived from it, and is dependent upon it. In this way Comte traces the main line of descent throughout the entire range of hu- man knowledge. This achievement alone will assure the great Frenchman a permanent niche in the Pantheon of the immortals.
The main principle of the classification is the evolu- tionary principle later made familiar by Spencer. The
44
COMTE S CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES 45
I begins with tiie most general and therefore the most inclusive of all sciences. It then proceeds step by step to the less and less general, but more and more complex sciences. It thus conforms to Spencer's formula of pro- gress from the simple to the complex.
As Lester F. Ward states it: "Each new science, as ,,e descend the scale, is less general, and therefore is embraced within the limits of the preceding, to which it stands in the true logical relation of species to genus, while at the same time possessing special characteristics of its own wliich distinguish it from all above it."
Here is the order as it appears in the Positive Philos- ophy:
(1) Astronomy.
(2) Physics.
(3) Chemistry.
(4) Biology.
(5) (Cerebral Biology; i. e. : psychology.)
(6) Sociology.
It W'ill be easily seen how thoroughly this arrange- ment complies with the idea of a decreasing generality and increasing complexity. It also, and for this very reason, realizes the notion of each succeeding science being "embraced," as Ward uses the term in the above quotation, in its predecessor. Astronomy deals with celestial bodies and the laws relating to them. Physics deals with molar and molecular processes. Chemistry deals with atomic processes. In the natural order of things all these come before life which is the subject of biolog)^ Biology dealing with organic processes precedes and is the parent of psychology which deals v.ath psychic processes. Out of these mental processes come social
46 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
relations and social process. s which are the subject-mat- ter of sociology.
It may well be that Comte's chief claim to fani.i ni.iy finally rest on his having been the first man to recog- nize the grand unity of all things, from the whirling nebulae to systems of taxation. In this respect Comte has had but one successor, Mr. Herbert Spencer, the author of the "Synthetic Philosophy." When two men, whose genius is of the highest order, labor upon th3 same problems, dealing with the same subject-matter, it would be somewhat surprising if the results did not bear some general resemblance. This is precisely what happened in the case of Comte and Spencer. This gen- eral resemblance has led some to the mistaken conclu- sion that Spencer was merely a disciple of his French predecessor, and this conclusion has been warmly and justly repudiated by Mr. Spencer himself.
Spencer, in his efforts to disconnect himself from Comte, has undoubtedly gone to the opposite extreme. He denied flatly even a general resemblance between his own classification of the sciences and the classification of Comte. The documents which throw the greatest light on this subject are two letters which passed be- tween Mr. Spencer and Lester F. Ward, which letters are reproduced as a very extensive foot note on page G5 of Ward's "Pure Sociology."
In the year 1895 Mr. Spencer received and glanced ever the essay by Ward on "The Place of Sociology Among the Sciences." Mr. Spencer wrote to the author saying that in glancing through it he was "startled 'y some of its statements. Spencer declares himself amazed by Ward's statement that, "Spencer himself,
comte's classification of sciences 47
notwithstanding all his efforts to overthrow it, actually adopted it (Comte's classification) in the arrangement of the sciences in his Synthetic Philosophy."' Against this statement Mr. Spencer argues at some length. He explains that he omitted dealing with inorganic nature in his "Synthetic Philosophy'' simply because the scheme, even as it stood, was too extensive.
"Two volumes were thus omitted — a volume on as- tronomy and a volume on geology. Had it been possi- ble to write these in addition to those undertaken, the series would have run — astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, sociology, ethics. Now in this series, those marked in italics do not appear in the Comtean classi- fication at all. In the part of the Synthetic Philosophy as it now stands, the only correspondence with the Com- tean classification is that biology comes before sociology ; and surely any one would see that in rational order the phenomena presented by a living individual must come before that presented by an assemblage of such living individuals. It requires no leading of Comte for any one to see this."
Notwithstanding this sweeping disclaimer on the part of Mr. Spencer the position taken by Mr. Ward in the first place remains unshaken. This wall appear when we follow ]\Ir. Ward's example and reproduce side by side the order of the classification adopted by each:
SYSTEM OF AUGUSTE COMTE. SYSTEM OF HERBERT SPENCER
1. Astronomy. 1. Astronomy.
2. Physics. 2. Geology.
3. Chemistry. 3. Biology.
4. Biology, including 4. Psychology.
5. Cerebral Biology. 5. Sociology.
6. Sociology. 6. Ethics.
7. Ethics.
48 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
Both Comte and Spencer begin with astronomy. The first difference appears with the second choice. Comte follows astronomy with physics and chemistry; Mr. Spencer chooses to occupy this space with the science of g-eology. In thus diverging the advantage is un- doubtedly on the side of the Frenchman. This classi- fication of the sciences is not intended to include the name of every science, but only of those which make the trunk of the tree ; the branches and twigs fall into their proper places and are included by implication. All Comte's terms in the series are sections of the trunk, with the exception of the last. Mr. Spencer on the con- trary, after beginning with the primary section of the trunk, introduces a branch, as geology has no proper place in such general categories. As Ward very prop- erly maintains, in such a general classification geology would be a subdivision of astronomy, just as zoology is a branch of biology and not entitled to a place in this list. After this departure there comes a reunion at biology. Mr. Spencer charges that the division is re- opened immediately following biology, inasmuch as he places psychology as rfext in succession, whereas Comte does not include psychology at all. In this Mr. Spencer is mistaken. His mistake would have been spared had he read his French predecessor more closely.
Psychology is fully treated by Comte under the head of Cerebral Biology. It would have been better had Comte given cerebral biology s^ line to itself in his list, but his not doing so does not justify the assertion that he omitted it from his scheme. On the contrary, his reason given for the omission stamps him as one of the most daring thinkers of his time. Comte explains that
comte's classification of sciences 49
his refusal to separate biology and psychology is due to his belief that they are inseparable. He takes the essentially materialistic position that the mental pro- cesses are based in the organization of the brain, and that all mental phenomena are dependent on physiologi- cal organization and function. In this proclamation Comte clearly anticipated the science of our time. The rest of the categories are identical. Spencer concludes with ethics and Comte added ethics as the final term of his series in his later work "Polytique Positive." In this the two philosophers fell into a common error — an error of precisely the same nature as that which led Spencer to place geology in his category. Ethics, as we are coming to see more clearly every day, is merely a division of' sociology and has no more right to fol- low sociology in this main classification than botany would have to follow biology.
Comte has several methods by which the consistency of his classification is tested. The first has already been given — consisting of procession from general to special, or from the simple to the complex.
Another test which Comte regards as important and for which he claims complete originality is as follows: The three principal methods of science are observation, experiment and comparison. As we proceed in Comte's hierarchy from Astronomy at the beginning to Ethics at the end there is, as Comte argues, a progressive ap- plication of these methods of research. In Astronomy, the most general and simple of the sciences, observation alone is available ; in Physics, which comes next, experi- mentation is possible as well as observation. When we
50 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
reach chemistry, experiment is the chief weapon, while in biology, sociology and ethics we depend mainly on comparison.
We now come to one of the most valuable of Comte's theories. He insists that another test of the validity of his scientific categories is to be found in the state of positiveness at which any science has arrived. Each science, like each individual and like the race itself, passes through the three successive stages, theological, metaphysical and positive.
Astronomy, the most general of all, has passed through the theological and metaphysical stages and has now reached the positive or scientific stage. This is undoubtedly the case though the uninformed often make their first appeal in behalf of religious beliefs to the majesty and grandeur of the heavens. There is in reality no department of human thought where the su- pernatural has been so completely abolished and natural law recognized as supreme, as in astronomy. It is a long time since any scientist of repute tried to find in astronomy a niche in which to hide his gods. Lester F. Ward well says: "About the last instance of this kind was that of Newton, who brought in the divine agency to account for so much of observation as his theory failed to explain, and this is now set down as one of the unfortunate weak points in his biography to be forgotten as fast as possible."
Physics, which comes next in generality and next in the classification, although next most positive, is still in the grip of metaphysical conceptions. In biology, metaphysics and theology still have a hold, but every day
comte's classification of sciences 51
sees the biological sciences become more positive and less theological and metaphysical.
Now we come to that science of which Comte is generally conceded to be the founder, the science of society — sociology. Comte justly declares this late-born and highly complex science to be still in the theological and metaphysical stage, with theological ideas dominat- ing. This is in itself proof that the science is in " its infancy, just as a theological type of mind was insep- arable from the infancy of the race, and seems to be inseparable from the infancy of the individual. In ethics the case is even worse.
The whole development of society is popularly sup- posed to be subject to providence; to control of a divine will which is independent of law and the fiats of which cannot be prevised or even understood. This means death to science wherever it may be found and the his- tory of science is the story of the overthrow of this theological position in one field after another. This was accomplished by the discovery of those laws of na- ture— or "methods of nature" as Lewes, Comte's great disciple, called them — which really prevail ever)rwhere in the universe.
Newton, Kant and Laplace drove theology out of as- tronomy by discovering gravity and nebulae. Mayer, Helmholtz and Lavoisier emancipated chemistry from superstition with the conservation of energy and the indestructibility of matter. Lamarck, Darwin and a great army of their colleagues and disciples have since Comte's day driven the shadowy spectres of theology out of biology with evolution and natural selection. Comte struggled to do as much for Sociology and failed
52 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
completely. His great merit is that he saw the need of such a science and foresaw the nature of its task.
Later in this book we shall deal at considerable length with the sociology of Lester F. Ward. While we are considering, however, the classifications of Comte and Spencer, it seems fitting to present the classification which Mr. Ward makes the basis of the first volume of "Dynamic Sociology." Ward's improvement over Comte and Spencer lies in his reduction of the number of basic concepts to three — primary, secondary and ter- tiary. These three divisions cover the evolution of the universe and its contents. These are called by Ward "aggregations" and are as follows:
Primary aggregation — inorganic — chemical relations.
Secondary aggregation — organic — vital relations (in- cluding psychic relations).
Tertiary aggregation — social — social relations.
It will be observed that Ward's primary aggregation, dealing with inorganic phenomena, covers the field oc- cupied by Comte's astronomy, physics, and chemistry and by Spencer's astronomy and geology. The second- ary aggregation covers Comte's and Spencer's biology and psychology while the tertiary aggregation covers their sociology and their ill-considered final term, ethics. This classification by Ward has the evolutionary charac- ter and the great simplicity which mark all his work, and which constitutes Mr. Ward the greatest living so- ciologist.
The great merit of Comte and Spencer lies in the fact mentioned early in this chapter. They alone in all
comte's classification of sciences 53
hiftory have attempted to, and in great part succeeded in, co-ordinating the field of universal knowledge. We are beginning to understand that science does not con- sist of a great mass of facts, but rather in the ascertain- ment of the laws which lie behind the facts and which constitute their relationship to each other. The supreme thing in science, therefore, is not the facts themselves but rather their relationships, and as the universe is un- doubtedly one grand unity all its phenomena must be re- lated. A real investigation of the universe consists in the discovery of these relationships of facts, which give their meaning.
Ward, in Dynamic Sociology, says:
"From the array of great names which philosophy and science have given to the world, I have singled out those of August Comte and Herbert Spencer as the subjects of these brief sketches, not so much in conse- quence of any assumed pre-eminence in these two men above others, as because they alone, of all thinkers of the world, have the merit of having carried their gen- eralizations from the phenomena of inorganic nature up to those of human action and social life. Of all the philosophers that humanity has brought forth, these two alone have conceived and built upon the broad princi- ple of the absolute unitv of Nature and her laws throughout all their manifestations, from the revolu- tions of celestial orbs to the rise and fall of empires and the vicissitudes of social customs and laws. This grand monistic conception is the final crown of human thought, and was required to round out philosophy into a form of symmetry, whose outlines, at least, admit of no further improvement."
It is hardly necessary here to go at great length into the absurd Utopian social scheme which Comte advanced.
54 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
It has been abandoned everywhere except by here and t!icre a belated follower.
He was opposed to the use of that powerful weapon wdiich the working men of his day were already look- ing toward — political action. His condemnation of this method was aimed at the precursors of the present So- cial Democrats. He naively explains that he expects the rich to support him in this attitude — as they did, of course, so long as it only meant political action by their opponents.
In Comte's positivist society there were to be four so- cial orders. Capitalists to supply the direction of indus- try ; workers to give their labor for production ; women who were to provide social feeling; and a new priest- hood of philosophers who were to provide education and arbitrate all difficulties between capital and labor, and persuade labor not to resort to force or political action but always give heed to the moral suasion of their superiors.
Comte wrote a great deal of extravagant and sense- less flattery of women in general, and his own wife in particular, but he nevertheless proposes to leave about their wrists that old and cankering chain — economic de- pendence. Women are to be supported like all the other orders, by the labor of the workers, who are to be men only. Capitalists are to have an honored place as direcctors of industry, and there is some considerable space and effort devoted to the folly of Socialists who propose to abolish them. The evolution of the capital- ist from a useful director to a useless parasitic owner, although it had begun, was, as yet, invisible to Comte.
I
COMTES CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES 55
All this was to be brought about by positivist clubs, which were to be established in all the cities of the civilized world and have for their object the propaganda of this philosophy with its new-old social order.
It is another case of the irony of fate that such clubs and groups have been established in almost every town and city in the civilized world — but alas they are not composed, as Comte dreamed, of the advocates of a four-class society ; they are made up of the Social Dem- ocrats he so fluently condemned. And these Social Democrats advocate a society that will be classless, where women will be economically independent of men or each other, where the capitalist will be transformed into a worker, no matter how much he may protest against the metamorphosis, and the workers will direct their own affairs without requiring hierarchies of alleged su- periors to do it for them.
CHAPTER VI
HERBERT SPENCER — STRUCTURAL SOCIOLOGY
Of Herbert Spencer, Ward says, "he probably de- served the title of Eng-land's greatest philosopher," and he adds, "when we have reached England's greatest in any achievement of mind, we have usually also reached the world's greatest."
Whatever criticism may be made of the sociologists, they cannot be justly charged with having neglected the subject of religion. The part played by religion and theology in the social process, receives very serious and extensive treatment at the hands of Comte, Spen- cer, and Ward.
For a time Spencer was hailed with enthusiasm by many religionists because he presented what seemed to be a satisfactory solution of the age-long war be- tween religion and science. Spencer did undoubtedly solve this problem. He pointed out that the struggle between the two forces was due to a misunderstanding as to their proper and legitimate territories. In order to remove this misapprehension forever he divided the universe into two parts — the knowable and the un- knowable. The first, he held, belonged to science; the second must be reserved for religion.
Religion had been so roughly handled by science, it had been driven from pillar to post, until the promise tc religionists of a field which was to be left to their undisputed sway was a welcome relief. Their cheer- fulness, however, was short-lived, for it turned out
56
spencer's structural sociology 57
to be based on a misunderstanding of Spencer's idea. To them the "unknowable" was identical with the "unknown."
It will be freely admitted, notwithstanding our tremendous advances in knowledge, that what we know is infinitesimal as compared with what we do not know. It was the realization of this which led to Newton's famous simile of gathering a few pebbles on the shores of the great ocean of knowledge. If then, according to Spencer, this vast area of the un- known was to be left to the unchallenged possession of religion while science must needs be content with the relatively small tract of the known, religion might congratulate itself on the division.
The error lay in the very material difference between "the unknown" and Mr. Spencer's "unknowable." It is quite perceivable, for example, that the population of a town may be unknown, and yet be "knowable" by means of an effective census. A thousand illustra- tions might be given to show that vast domains of "the unknown" belong to science because they are "knowable." While science does not occupy these domains now, they will surely be the subjects of its future conquests.
It has been the efforts of religion in the past to prevent science from conquering parts of the tmknown and adding them to the known that has resulted in what White calls "The Warfare Between Science and Theology," and which Draper describes as "The Con- flict Between Science and Religion." It might be remarked in passing that the recent description of so profound a scholar and historian as Dr. Draper as
58 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
"a chatterer" by a prominent Catholic has done nolh- ing to inspire public confidence in some of Dr. Dra- per's critics. Draper's monumental labors can hardly be swept aside by a silly remark.
It might be argued that the religious apologists did not attempt to hold for themselves certain territory as belonging to "the unknown," inasmuch as they claim to have a knowledge of it even to minute de- tails. It cannot be admited, however, that the origin of the human race belonged to the known, in the middle ages, on the strength of the Babylonian legend of the Garden of Eden. If, therefore, the religious world persists in refusing to be limited to Spencer's "unknowable," and in clinging to the knowable un- known, there can be no cessation of "The Conflict Between Science and Religion" until science has added victory to victory and religion, reaping defeat upon defeat, is finally driven from the field.
Spencer's two great categories really mean that the claim of religion is limited to such of the unknown as cannot be known — the unknowable, while to science belongs all the known and all of the unknown which is knowable. This division of the universe is pre- sented with a certain under-current of grim irony as a "reconciliation" between science and religion. It is really a polite way of saying that science means knowledge, while religion is a synonym for ignorance. It is cleverly compared by Ward to the man who offered to divide the house with his wife — taking the inside for himself and giving the outside to her.
One of the difficulties which sociologists had to
spencer's structural sociology 59
overcome was due to the notions which almost all historians entertained as to what constituted history. In order to understand the societies of the present it was essential to know the societies of the past from which they came. This led directly to a searching of the pages of history. The search was fraught with disappointment. The various histories teemed with matters of small importance, while things of vast importance were hardly mentioned or completely ignored.
Out of all proportion to their real importance was the space given to kings and courts, with their petty intrigues and incessant scandals. Their pages reeked of the carnage of bloody and useless wars of succes- sion. Armies -camped on every page and battles were fought in every paragraph. Almost every sen- tence was stained with the blood of a soldier or the amour of a king. Back and forth the chapters swung like a pendulum — from court to camp and from camp to court. This type of history, now happily obsolete, or nearly so, has been well styled "drum and trumpet history." Among the pioneers who wrought the change Herbert Spencer holds a foremost place. We will now quote a paragraph from Spencer which in Professor Small's opinion "marks an era in social consciousness."
"That which constitutes History, properly so called, is in great part omitted from works on this subject. Only of late years have historians commenced giving us, in any considerable quantity, the truly valuable informa- tion. As in past ages the king was everything and the people nothing, so in past histories, the doings of the king fill the entire picture, to which the national life
60 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
forms but an obscure background. While only now, when the welfare of nations rather than of rulers is be- coming the dominant idea, are historians beginning to ocupy themselves with the phenomena of social progress. The thing it really concerns us to know is the Natural History of society. We want all facts which help us to understand how a nation has grown and organized itself. Among these, let us of course have an account of its government ; with as little as may be of gossip about the men who officered it, and as much as possible about the structure, principles, methods, prejudices, cor- ruptions, etc., which it exhibited ; and let this account include not only the nature and actions of the central government, but also those of local governments, down to their minutest ramifications. Let us of course have a parallel description of the ecclesiastical government — it'- organization, its conduct, its power, its relations to the state ; and, accompanying this, the ceremonial, creed, and religious ideas — not only those nominally be- lieved, but those really believed and acted upon. Let us at the same time be informed of the control exercised by class over class, as displayed in social observances — in titles, salutations, and forms of address. Let us know, too, what were all the customs which regulated the popular life out-of-doors and indoors, including those concerning the relations of the sexes, and the relations 'of parents to children. The superstitions, also, from the more important myths down to the charms in com- •tnon use, should be indicated. Next should come a de- lineation of the industrial system ; showing to what ex- tent the division of labor was carried ; what was the connection between employers and employed ; what were the agencies for distributing commodities ; what were the means of communication ; what was the circulating medium. Accompanying all which, should be given an account of the industrial arts technically considered; stating the processes in use, and the quality of the pro* ducts. Further, the intellectual condition of the nation
spencer's structural sociology 61
in its various grades should be depicted ; not only with respect to the kind and amount of education, but with respect to the progress made in science, and the pre- vailing manner of thinking. The degree of aesthetic culture, as displayed in architecture, sculpture, paint- ing, dress, music, poetry, and fiction, should be de- scribed. Nor should there be omitted a sketch of the daily lives of the people — their food, their homes, and their amusements. And, lastly, to connect the whole, should be exhibited the morals, theoretical and practical, of all classes, as indicated in their laws, habits, proverbs, deeds. These facts, given with as much brevity as con- sists with clearness and accuracy, should be so grouped and arranged that they may be comprehended in their ensemble, and contemplated as mutually dependent parts of one great whole. The aim should be so to present them that men may readily trace the consensus subsist- ing among them, with the view of learning what social phenomena coexist with what others. And then the corresponding delineations of succeeding ages should be so managed, as to show how each belief, institution, cus- tom and arrangement was modified, and how the con- sensus of preceding structures and functions was devel- oped into the consensus of succeeding ones. Such alone is the kind of information, respecting past times, which can be of service to the citizen for the regulation of his conduct. The only History that is of practical value is what may be called Descriptive Sociology. And the highest ofifice which the historian can discharge is that of so narrating the lives of nations as to furnish ma- terials for a Comparative Sociology, and for the subse- quent determination of the ultimate laws to which so- cial phenomena conform."
The above passage is of especial value for two reasons. First, it marks a distinct advance in historical • theory. Second, it indicates Spencer's place in the history of Sociology.
62 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
The one adjective which better than any other de- scribes Spencer's philosophy as a whole, is "evolution- ary.
Spencer was pre-eminently the "Evolutionary Philosopher." In this respect his "Principles of Biology" is unsurpassed. This cannot be said, how- ever, of his "Principles of Sociology." There are two methods of regarding the phenomena of any science — the static and the dynamic. A crude illus- tration of the difference between the two is the differ- ence between a photograph and a moving picture. The static method views things at rest, the dynamic method considers them in motion. In sociology the statist is mainly occupied with social structure; the dyna- mist gives his chief attention to the social process.
In Spencer's concept of real history, given above, the catalogue of things is more conspicuous than the idea of the process of things and the operation of social forces, which mark the latest and highest development of historical theory.
The ultimate test of the relative values of the two is to be found in the nature of the universe itself. By this time we know that the universe, including its contents, is not static but dynamic. In the lan- guage of the ancient Greek philosopher: "Nothing is, everything is becoming." This is why the universe is comprehensible to the evolutionist alone. The dif- ference between the descriptive, static, structural sociology of Spencer and the dynamic sociology of the later sociologists, such as Ratzenhofer, Ward and Small, is, to borrow an excellent simile from Small, the
spencer's structural sociology 63
difference between a department store and an economic system. It is the difference between an exhibit of a collection of concrete articles and a body of inter-relat- ing social forces.
In biology Spencer's method was dynamic; in sociology he was static. In biology he dealt mainly with process ; in sociology he dealt chiefly with structure. This does not mean that either method is absent in either case. The structural concept is present in his biology, and the dynamic method is present in his sociology. This was unavoidable in the nature of the case. Structure implies function and process; function and process necessarily imply and involve the idea of structure. The point is that, while in his biology the structural concept is subordinated to the dynamic concept, as it should be, in his sociology the structural concept is predominant. This is a curious confirmation of the notion of Comte — that each science must pass through successive stages. Here we see in the mind of Spencer two sciences in different stages of their development.
The student who wishes to thoroughly grasp Spencer's place in the science of sociology would do well to read closely the earlier chapters of Professor Small's "General Sociology." A careful study of Small's keen and penetrating analysis and criticism of Spencer's method (yet friendly withal), will go far to enable the student to understand more recent de- velopments in sociological theory. As a preliminary to such a study we will quote the following passages :
"The forms of expression that Spencer uses indicate that, when he planned his sociological studies, the proper
64 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
material of history — or, as he would phrase it, "de- scriptive sociology" — seemed to him to be a species of details to be ranged side by side or in series in a regu- larly classified exhibit. He spoke of connections between them, and of laws governing them; yet he had not ad- justed his views of society to the most significent ele- ments in his own philosophy. Social facts were to him as the plants which they classified were to the herbarium- making botanists of his generation. To him the mor- phological features of social facts, their arrangement into orders and genera and species, their side-by-side- ness, rather than their interworkings, seemed decisive. Of course, certain perceptions of interrelations between the groups of social facts are in evidence in everything that he wrote. These perceptions, however, played at first a quite subordinate role in his program as a col- lector and classifier of social material. Indeed, the place assigned in this syllabus to Spencer's work as a sociologist is determined by the judgment that he never entirely outgrew the habit ot treating social facts in statical categories imposed by the mind, instead of press- ing on to view them in the dynamic relations in which they actually occur. This judgment was reached after study of Spencer's system during a quarter-century."
Again he says:
"His method was to compare exhibits that societies display; not to detect the process through which they develop. It is a method which might permit a botanist to compare the parts of plants without thinking to en- quire about their vital connection with the soil. It is a method which would permit the zoologist to be content with descriptions of species, without bothering himself about the origin of species. It is a method essentially descriptive, rather than explanatory."
Speaking in the name of present-day sociology, Pro- fessor Small says:
spencer's structural sociology 65
"The problem that presents itself to sociolog^ists to- day cannot be expressed in terms that sufficed a gen- eration ago. Our present demand is for a way of ex- plaining- what is taking- place among people, with lit- eral values for the different terms which we find con- cerned in human experience. We want an explanation, not of men's crystalline formations, not of their ma- chineries, not of their institutional remains. We want an account of the intimate process of their lives, in terms that will assign their actual meaning and value to the chief and subordinate factors concerned in the process."
Lest all this should lead the student to an under- estimate of Spencer, we give the following apprecia- tion by Small :
*'Yet for a quarter-century the Spencerian program of sociology has probably appealed to more people than any other. As we have intimated above, this is proba- bly not altogether an accident. On the contrary, we may say not only that the Spencerian sociology has done good service as a medium between two historical stages in the development of the science, but that the method which it employs will prove to be a necessary medium between stages of development in the power of gener- alization in the individual mind. It is certain that we cannot think society as it is, without using structural forms as one factor in the composite picture. It may be that there are periods in our mental history when the best thinking which we can do about society will attach excessive importance to these structural concep- tions. At all events, some use of the Spencerian ver- sion of society is unavoidable at present. We treat it, therefore, not as a passing phase of social theory, but as a partial view which must be assimilated in our final rendering of the social process."
CHAPTER VII
HERBERT SPENCER — DATA OF SOCIOLOGY.
Of the ten volumes of Mr. Spencer's "Synthetic Phil- osophy," three are devoted to the principles of soci- ology. This is the greatest number of volumes de- voted to any one science, Mr. Spencer's attitude, criti- cised in the preceding chapter, of regarding sociology as a collection of sociological exhibits ; a sort of in- ventory of society's assets, determines the character of the second and third of these volumes.
Volume II is devoted to ceremonial institutions and political institutions; Volume III has for its contents the treatment of ecclesiastical institutions; professional institutions; industrial institutions. The descriptive method reaches back into the latter part of Volume I, which treats of domestic institutions. The most inter- esting and important part of the entire three volumes is the divisions in the first volume which are devoted respectively to "The Data of Sociology" and "The In- ductions of Sociology." All readers of Mr. Spencer who open the first volume for the first time, with no previous warning, and begin to read the first division — "The Data of Sociology" — are considerably surprised and not a little disappointed. It is by no means what the title would lead one to expect. What the reader does naturally expect is a treatment of the phenomena of modern societies and modern civilization. What Mr. Spencer gives, however, is a history of the genesis of religion. The bulk of this division says nothing of
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modern societies, not even anything of ancient socie- ties ; it goes back of all historical documents to a con- sideration of the ideas of primitive man. This is an echo of the method of those French philosophers of the eighteenth century who were constantly harking back to the state of nature and who illustrated their discussion of the problems of our own time by revert- ing to the notions of primitive ancestors.
This method has survived in Mr. Spencer, and the advocates of the single tax, who delight in illustrating their theories about the land by introducing the naked savage who catches fish by plunging his bare hand into the stream.
Disappointing as the first volume is in this respect, it is nevertheless a very brilliant achievem.ent and a work of permanent value. Here, for the first time, we have a real history of the origin and development of religion ; a history which traces religious phenomena back to its source in the character of the universe and the laws of thought. It entitles Mr. Spencer to be ranked with those great specialists in this field, Sir John Lubbock and Edward Tylor.
Mr. Spencer proceeds upon the assumption, for which there is much to be said, that sociological phe- nomena should first be studied in its earliest forms. According to Mr. Spencer, institutions are the result of ideas, and it is therefore necessary to understand primitive ideas.
As all primitive man's ideas are religious, there is no difficulty in understanding how Mr. Spencer's an- alysis of primitive ideas led him to the production of a treatise on relisfion.
68 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGT
Mr, Spencer's conclusions as to the origin of religion are of course in general agreement with those of Lubbock, Tylor, Grant Allen, and all the scientific men who have thoroughly probed the subject. Proba- bly the best definition of religion is that of Mr. Tylor, who holds that the one thing that is indispensable to the conception of religion is "the belief in spiritual beings." The problem of explaining religion there- fore becomes a question of why men believed in spirit- ual beings. This question, Mr. Spencer undertakes to answer. According to Mr. Spencer primitive man came to believe that he was the possessor of a spirit which had the power to separate itself from the body because he was incapable of understanding such natural phenomena about him as appeared to prove the existence of spirits.
One of these phenom.ena is that presented by shad- ows. Mr. Spencer says:
"The primitive man, left to himself, necessarily concludes a shadow to be an actual existence, which belongs to the person casting it. He simply accepts the facts. Whenever the sun or moon is visible, he sees this attendant thing which rudely resembles him in shape, which moves when he moves, which now goes before him, now keeps by his side, now follows him, which lengthens and shortens as the ground in- clines this way or that, and which distorts itself in strange ways as he passes by irregular surfaces. True, he cannot see it in cloudy weather; but, in the absence of a physical interpretation, this simply proves that his attendant comes out only on bright days and bright nights."
Again, the savage was deceived by echoes :
"No physical explanation of an echo can be framed
spencer's data of sociology 69
by the uncivilized man. What does he know about the reflection of sound waves? What, indeed, is known about the reflection of sound waves by the mass of our own people? Were it not that the spread of knowledge has modified the mode of thought through- out all classes, producing everywhere a readiness to accept what we call natural interpretations, and to assume that there are natural interpretations to occur- rences not comprehended ; there would even now be an explanation of echoes as caused by unseen beings."
Probably the chief source of our primitive beliefs in spiritual existences is to be found in the inability of the savage to understand his dreams. Under this head Mr. Spencer accumulated a fund of information, of which the following is typical :
"Schoolcraft tells us that the North American Indians in general, think 'there are duplicate souls, one which remains with the body, while the other is free to depart on excursions during sleep,' and, accord- ing to Crantz, the Greenlanders hold 'that the soul can forsake the body during the interval of sleep.' The theory in New Zealand is 'that during sleep the mind left the body, and that dreams are the objects seen during its wanderings;' and in Fiji 'it is believed that the spirit of a man who still lives will leave the body to trouble other people when asleep.' Similarly in Borneo. It is the conviction of the Dyaks that the soul during sleep goes on expeditions of its own, and 'sees, hears and talks.' Among Hill-tribes of India, such as the Karens, the same doctrine is held, their statement being that 'in sleep it (the La, spirit or ghost), wanders away to the ends of the earth, and our dreams are what the La sees and experiences in his perambulations."
There is no lack, of course, of superficial persons of
70 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
the orthodox type who never have given so much as ten minutes to the investigation of these questions, but who are willing to sweep aside with a jibe the monu- mental labors of anthropologists who have reached practically unanimous conclusions about the origin of religions. It is ridiculous and absurd, say these shallow pated gentlemen, to say that the savage knew so little and was deceived so easily. To this objection, Mr. Spencer had the following reply:
"That the primitive man's conception of dream- ing is natural, will now be obvious. As said at the outset, his notions may seem strange because, in think- ing about them, we carry with us the theory of Mind which civilization has slowly established. Mind, how- ever, as we conceive it, is unknown to the savage ; being neither disclosed by the senses, nor directly revealed as an internal entity."
Belief in the existence of gods is only one special form of belief in the existence of spirits, inasmuch as all gods are spirits. As to the origin of gods, Mr. Spencer propounds the theory which is steadily coming to be generally accepted as the scientific explanation. This theory is that the worship of the gods was in reality in the beginning the worship of the mighty dead. One of the things leading to this result was the inability of primitive men to distinguish between sleep and death. To vast numbers of them death was simply an unusually long sleep, and it was expected that at any time the corpse might be come reanimated by the return of the spirit which had probably undertaken a long journey. From the mass of evidence accumu- lated on this head by Mr. Spencer, we select the fol- lowing:
spencer's data of sociology 71
"That this confusion, naturally to be inferred, ac- tually exists, we have proof. Arbousset and Daumas quote the proverb of the Bushmen — 'Death is only a sleep.' Concerning- the Tasmanians, Bonwick writes: 'When one was asked the reason of the spear being stuck in the tomb, he replied, quietly, 'To fight with when he sleep.' Even so superior a race as the Dyaks have great difficulty in distinguishing sleep from death."
Mr. Spencer proceeds to relate how various tribes attempted by a variety of methods, including whip- ping, to cause the dead to wake from their sleep. Mr. Spencer believes, as the result of his researches, that the custom of setting food before the corpses, or bring- ing it to the bodies, was due to the belief that death was a long suspended animation. As to how lon^^ this suspension might continue, primitive man had no idea. He, therefore, took the safe course of con- tinually replenishing the supplies of food. "Resuscita- tion," says Mr. Spencer, "as originally conceived, could not take place unless there remained a body to be resuscitated. Expectation of a revival is often ac- companied by recognition of the need of preserving the corpse from injur}'." For this reason, the Abys- sinians seldom buried their criminals, but left the bodies in the fields, probably believing that when the bodies were devoured by beasts of prey, it would be impossible for the criminals ever to repeat their crimes. The Egyptian knew no more terrible punishment than the destruction of his corpse. The Demaras hold that if dead men are thrown away and the wolves eat them, they will never again bother anybody. This led to the most ingenious contrivances for the concealment
72 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGT
of corpses from destruction by their enemies. Tahi- tians would deposit prized bodies on the tops of the most inaccessible mountains. A Bechuana is buried in his cattle pen and all the cattle are driven for an hour or two around and over the grave, to destroy all traces of its location. We are told that when Alaric was buried, the river was diverted, and the body buried in the river bed, after which the stream was allowed to return to its natural course.
To those who wish to know the mountains of evi- dence that have been piled up on this and kindred subjects, all going to show the real origin of religious beliefs still current in our day, we commend the read- ing of the first part of Spencer's first volume of "Prin- ciples of Sociology," Edward Tylor's "Primitive Cul- ture," and Grant Allen's "Evolution of the Idea of God." Other phenomena which led to spiritual notions, not mentioned so far, are reflections in pools, insomnia, swoons, catelepsy, etc., all of which were explained by primitive men by the assumption of be- lief in spirits. If it is argued that this does not explain why religious ideas have persisted so far into modern times, it might well be answered that the human race lived in this condition of ignorance as to natural causes of natural phenomena for a vast period of time, while, comparatively speaking, science and its expla- nations are things of yesterday.
CHAPTER VIII
HERBERT SPEXCER — ANALOGICAL SOCIOLOGY
As we have already seen, Mr. Spencer earned his place among the very foremost of the world's philoso- phers by a number of achievements any one of which would have secured his fame.
He settled the territorial dispute between science and religion, and if the struggle between them still contin- ues it is only because his award has not been universally accepted. This award, it is practically certain, will ulti- mately prevail, not, of course, because he made it, but because the facts of the case render it inevitable.
Another lasting triumph, already referred to, is his welding together in a grand unity all the phenomena of the universe. This makes him a monist, and monism is the highest expression of philosophy, as monotheism is the highest reach of religion. Spencer finds the basis of his monism in the supremacy of force and while this may be regarded as a questionable position, it is a distinct advance on Comte's denial of the existence of force as a necessary relation of nature. It seems to me however that force is not the proper occupant of the throne of the universe but that matter is the true sover- eign. In the controversy now proceeding, in my opin- ion, the final victory will fall, not to the dynamist up- holders of force, but to the scientific materialist monists of the type of Ernest Haeckel and Lester F. Ward.
Mr. Spencer's two volumes, "The Principles of Biol- ogy," are a landmark of that science, his "Principles of
73
74 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
Psycholog-y" are a monument that will never crumble, though it will undoubtedly be surpassed as the science advances.
We now come to Spencer's most valuable service to the science of sociology. We have already noted sev- eral of his contributions in this field — his complete over- throw of the great man theory, and his origin and gen- esis of religion as revealed by the study of the ideas of primitive man.
His crowning contribution to sociology however lies in his analysis of society, in which analysis he contends that society is an organism.
This theory of Spencer's deserves the closest atten- tion of the student of sociology. Whatever may be its ultimate value there is no doubting its merit and its desirability at the time it was written. It supplied so- ciology's most urgent need. In harmony with Comte's theory of the progress of the sciences, biology had al- ready reached the positive or scientific stage, attained still earlier by the inorganic sciences. The emancipa- tion of sociology from the trammels of theology and metaphysics still lay in the future. The one thing which freed the organic sciences and confirmed forever the emancipation of the inorganic sciences, was the dis- covery and application of the theory of evolution.
The clearness of Mr. Spencer's thinking shines forth in his naming of things. The inanimate is, of course, the inorganic ; the living, is the organic, while social life is super-organic. Inasmuch, therefore, as inorganic evolution had banished theology and metaphysics forever from the field of the inorganic, and organic evolution
spfncer's analogical sociology 75
had done the same for the organic sciences, the science of society needed only for its release the establishment of super-organic evolution. And this is precisely what. Mr. Spencer did with his theory of: "The Social Organ- ism."
What is meant by super-organic evolution, Mr. Spen- cer makes quite clear in the opening pages of the first volume of "Principles of Sociology":
"Of the three broadly-distinguished kinds of Evolu- tion outlined in First Principles, we come now to the third. The first kind. Inorganic Evolution, w^hich, had it been dealt with, would have occupied two volumes, one dealing wdth Astrogeny and the other with Geogeny, \vas passed over because it seemed undesir- able to postpone the more important applications of the doctrine for the purpose of elaborating those less important applications w'hich logically precede them. The four volumes succeeding First Principles, have dealt with Organic Evolution : two of them with those physical phenomena presented by living aggregates, vegetal and animal, of all classes ; and the other two with those more special phenomena distinguished as psychical, which the most evolved organic aggregates display. We now enter on the remaining division — Super-organic Evolution."'
Astrogeny and Geogeny in the above paragraph are, of course, the equivalents of Astronomy and Geology. Mr. Spencer proceeds to show what super-organic evo- lution is by showing what it is not:
"While v^e are occupied with the facts displayed by an individual organism during its growth, maturity and decay, we are studying Organic Evolution. If we take into account, as we must, the actions and re- actions going on between this organism and organisms
76 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
of Other kinds which its life puts it in relations with, we still do not go beyond the limits of Organic Evo- lution. Nor need we consider that we exceed these limits on passing to the phenomena that accompany the rearing of offspring; though here, we see the germ of a new order of phenomena. While recognizing the fact that parental co-operation foreshadows processes of a class beyond the simply organic ; and while recog- nizing the fact that some of the products of parental co-operation, such as nests, foreshadow products of the super-organic class; we may fitly regard Super- organic Evolution as commencing only when there arises something more than the combined efforts of parents."
Mr. Spencer's something more is those various acts generally described as social activities, and the line be tween the organic and the super-organic is drawn be- tween the family and society.
He illustrates his theory by citing various insect so- cieties— ^bees, wasps, ants — and certain birds and gre- garious animals.
In dealing with these sub-human social groups, it is well worth noting that Mr. Spencer annihilates the ar- gument against socialism employed by Haeckel at the Munich Congress of Naturalists in 1877. The great German pathologist, Virchow, a bitter opponent of the entire evolution theory, sought to alarm the Darwinians with the taunt: "Darwinism leads directly to socialism." Haeckel, as the recognized chief of the Darwinians pres- ent, delivered a reply of which the following is a part:
"As a matter of fact, there is no scientific doctrine which proclaims more openly than the theory of descent, that the equality of individuals, toward which Socialism tends, is an impossibility, that this chimeri-
spencer's analogical sociology 77
cal equality is in absolute contradiction with the neces- sary and, in fact, universal inequality of individuals.
"Socialism demands for all citizens equal rights, equal duties, equal possessions and equal enjoyments; the theory of descent establishes, on the contrary, that the realization of these hopes is purely and simply impossible; that in human societies, as in animal socie- ties, neither the rights, nor the duties, nor the posses- sions, nor the enjoyments of all the members of a society are or ever can be equal."
Haeckel's introduction of animal societies in the above passage as an evidence of the impossibility of abolishing class divisions in human society is almost if not alto- gether unpardonable in a skilled naturalist. The im- plied parallel between animal societies and human so- ciety exists only in Haeckel's extremely careless and groundless assumption.
When Haeckel here says animal, he of course uses the word in its widest sense as equivalent to zoological, and he immediately conjures up in the minds of his hearers pictures of bees and ants who furnish the most notorious instances of sub-human social organization and practically the only examples of anything that can be compared to human class divisions.
We shall now see how Spencer completely overthrows Haeckel :
"Though social insects exhibit a kind of evolution much higher than the merely organic — though the aggregates they form simulate social aggregates in sundry ways ; yet they are not true social aggregates. For each of them is in reality a large family. It is not a union among like individuals independent of one another in parentage, and approximately equal in the capacities; but it is a union among the offspring of
78 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
one mother, carried on, in some cases for a single generation, and in some cases for more; and from this community of parentage arises the possibility of classes having unlike structures and consequent tinlike functions. Instead of being allied to the specializa- tion which arises in a society, properly so called, the specialization which arises in one of these large and complicated insect-families, is allied to that which arises between the sexes."
The italics are Mr. Spencer's. The "like structures" of men and women subject to social inequality and the "unlike structures" of bees and ants who are divided into classes by divisions that are not "social" in any sense, but purely biological, are altogether fatal to Haeckel's argument. For a full reply to Haeckel I must now refer the reader to the seventh chapter of my "Evolution, Social and Organic," from which I quote the following:
" 'Bee' society may be said to have class divisions, and it must be conceded that these classes cannot be abolished by an3'thing that could, by any stretch of the imagination, be called 'bee socialism.' But the reason for this is not far to seek and, when found, it makes any argument by analogy, against Socialism, impossible. Bee workers are 'physiologically' inca- pable of discharging any other function in bee society. They are females, incapable of maternity. As a result of this the queen bee is obliged to shoulder the whole burden of the reproduction of the species, and she is specialized in this direction to such an extent, that she could not possibly be a worker. The drone, as the male breeder, is in the same fix, and the popular notion that they are useless loafers, has its origin in the bee custom of applying the boot, or something worse, to all superfluous members of the drone class."
spencer's analogical sociology 79
And again :
"Class divisions in bee society are therefore 'biologi- cal' and not economic. But Haeckel's comparison ignores this vital distinction. Before this argument can be used against the Socialist advocacy of class abolition, it must be shown that a queen cannot wash clothes with starvation as an alternative, and that a pleb vv^oman could not wear a coronet, should her father invest in a busted duke."
In the last citation from Spencer, he plainly compares the divisions among "social insects to division between the sexes." As well might Haeckel have argued against what he calls "the absurd, equalitarian, Utopian notions of the socialists" on the ground that men can never bear children and women cannot grow beards.
We now come to Mr. Spencer's analysis of human society, which he holds, in common with present-day so- ciologists, is the only real form of society.
Says Spencer:
"We may henceforth restrict ourselves to that form of Super-organic Evolution which so immensely tran- scends all others in extent, in complication, in im- portance, as to make them relatively insignificant. T refer to the form of it which human societies exhibit in their growths, structures, functions, products. To the phenomena comprised in these, and grouped under the general title of Sociology, we now pass."
Spencer has two treatments of this subject. One is his essay on "The Social Organism ;" the seventh essay in the first volume of his "Essays, Scientific, Political and Speculative." This is best suited for popular read-
80 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
ing as the author probably intended. My own analy- sis of and comments upon this essay will be found in the eighth chapter of "Evolution, Social and Organic," which is devoted entirely to that purpose.
The second treatment of the subject by Spencer occupies the second book of the first volume of his Principles of Sociology, which is entitled, as before mentioned: "The Inductions of Sociology." For an ex- cellent condensation of this the reader is referred to the eighth chapter of Professor Small's "General Sociol- ogy." The student, however, will be well advised to read for himself "The Inductions of Sociology.'''
The title of the opening chapter consists of the ques- tion: "What is Society?" Spencer insists that this ques- tion must be asked and answered at the outset. Is it a thing — an entity? or, is it like a lecturer's audience which, by dispersing, proves itself not to be a thing but merely "a certain arrangement of persons?" Our au- thor decides that inasmuch as the members of a society do not disperse, but remain in permanent social rela- tions, society is a thing.
Having decided that society is a thing, Spencer con- tinues :
"But now, regarding a society as a thing, what kind of thing must we call it? It seems totally unlike every object with which our senses acquaint us. Any like- ness it may possibly have to other objects, cannot be manifest to perception, but can be discerned only by reason. If the constant relations among its parts make it an entity; the question arises whether these constant relations among its parts are akin to the constant relations among the parts of other entities. Between a society and anything else, the only con-
spencer's analogical sociology 81
ceivable resemblance must be one due to parallelism of principle in the arrangement of components.
"There are two great classes of aggregates with which the social aggregate may be compared — ^the inorganic and the organic. Are the attributes of a society in any way like those of a not-living body? or are they in any way like those of a living body? or are they unlike those of both?
The first of these questions needs only to be asked to be answered in the negative. A whole of which the parts are alive, cannot, in its general characters, be like lifeless wholes. The second question, not to be thus promptly answered, is to be answered in the affirmative. The reasons for asserting that the perma- nent relations among the parts of a society, are analo- gous to the permanent relations among the parts of a living body, we have now to consider."
Spencer is now ready to answer the question in the title of his first chapter, — "What is a Society?" — in the title of his second : "A Society is an Organism." A so- ciety is a "social aggregate," as an animal is an "organic aggregate," The question now is, what have these aggre- gates in common which justifies the analogy?
The first thing they have in common is growth. Growth "is the first trait by which societies ally them- selves with the organic world and substantially distin- guish themselves from the inorganic world."
"It is also a character of social bodies, as of living bodies, that while they increase in size they also in- crease in structure." Progress from a low animal to a high one is a multiplication and a differentiation of parts. A low animal is all stomach, all respiratory surface, all limb. Only by- the evolutionary multiplica- tion of parts and functions come lungs, legs, teeth, a
82 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
separate stomach nourishing all and saving- the rest th.e necessity of performing the stomach function for them- selves. The added parts are not like the original ones, but different. They do not do the same things, but dif- ferent things. Progress is by division of labor; by spe- cialization, each part of the communit> of parts per- forming its own task, which is a different task from the others — in scientific terminology, differentiation of parts and functions. Spencer proceeds to show, in language that needs no simplifying, that all this is equally true of society :
"While rudimentary, a society is all v^arrior, all hunter, all hut-builder, all tool-maker: every part fulfills for itself all needs. Progress to a stage char- acterized by a permanent army, can go on only as there arise arrangements for supplying that army with food, clothes, and munitions of war by the rest. If here the population occupies itself solely with agri- culture and there with mining — if these manufacture goods while those distribute them, it must be on condi- tion that in exchange for a special kind of service rendered by each part to other parts, these other parts severally give due proportions of their services.
"This division of labor, first dwelt on by political economists as a social phenomenon, and thereupon recognized by biologists as a phenomenon of living bodies, which they called the 'physiological division of labor,' is that which in the society, as in the animal, makes it a living wdiole. Scarcely can I emphasize enough the truth that in respect of this fundamental trait, a social organism and an individual organism are entirely alike. When we see that in a mammal, arresting the lungs quickly brings the heart to a stand ; that if the stomach fails absolutely in its office all other parts by-and-by cease to act; that paralysis
spencer's analogical sociology 83
of its limbs entails on the body at large death from want of food, or inability to escape; that loss of even such small organs as the eyes, deprives the rest of a service essential to their preservation; we cannot but admit that mutual dependence of parts is an essential characteristic. And when, in a society, we see that the workers in iron stop if the miners do not supply materials ; that makers of clothes cannot carry on their business in the absence of those who spin and weave textile fabrics; that the manufacturing com- munity will cease to act unless the food-producing and food-distributing agencies are acting; that the controlling powers, governments, bureau, judicial officers, police, must fail to keep order when the neces- saries of life are not supplied to them by the parts kept in order; we are obliged to say that this mutual dependence of parts is similarly rigorous. Unlike as the two kinds of aggregates otherwise are, they are unlike in respect of this fundamental character, and the characters implied by it."
But a society is a mass of individuals who have a good deal of independence and despite their dependence on society as a whole, yet live their individual lives. To those unacquainted with the revelations of biology the analogy here breaks down. But this is by no means the case. In fact, the opposite is the case. Every animal is composed of millions of cells, each cell having its ovv^n history and its own individual life. The blood cells, for example, move around freely, selecting their own food. The white corpuscles "may be fed with colored food which will then be seen to have accumulated in the in- terior,"' "and in some cases the colorless blood-corpus- cles have actually been seen to devour their more dimin- utive companions, the red ones." Spencer quotes Hux-
84 AN INTKODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
ley: "The sponge represents a kind of sub-aqueous city, where the people are arranged about the streets and roads, in such a manner, that each can easily appro- priate his food from the water as it passes along."' From these and many other facts and illustrations Spencer concludes: "On thus seeing that an ordinary living or- ganism may be regarded as a nation of units which live individually, and have many of them considerable de- grees of independence, we shall have the less difficulty in regarding a nation of human beings as an organism."
Another clear parallel is that "the life of the aggre- gate is far longer than the lives of the units." "The minute living elements composing a developed animal, severally evolve, play their parts, decay, and are re- placed, while the animal as a whole continues."
"Thus it is also with a society and its units. In- tegrity of the whole as of each large division is peren- nially maintained, notwithstanding the deaths of com- ponent citizens. The fabric of living persons which, in a manufacturing town, produces some commodity for national use, remains after a century as large a fabric, though all the masters and workers who a century ago composed it have long since disappeared. Even with minor parts of this industrial structure the like holds. A firm that dates from past generations, still carrying on business in the name of its founder, has had all its members and employes changed one by one, perhaps several times over; w^hile the firm has continued to occupy the same place and to maintain like relations with buyers and sellers. Throughout we find this. Governing bodies, general and local, ecclesiastical corporations, armies, institutions of all orders down to guilds, clubs, philanthropic associa-
spencer's analogical sociology 85
tions, etc., show us a continuity of life exceeding that of the persons constituting them. Nay, more. As part of the same law, we see that the existence of the society at large exceeds in duration that of some of these compound parts. Private unions, local public bodies, secondary national institutions, towns carry- ing on special industries, may decay; while the nation, maintaining its integrity, evolves in mass and struc- ture."
It is impossible in a work of this size to follow Spen- cer through all the details of his analogy between so- ciety and a biological organism, and the reader who desires to do so must turn to the pages of the author. The essay on "The Social Organism" contains some re- markably ingenious comparisons. Railways, carrying food to points of consumption, are compared to the blood carrying nutriment to the various parts of the body. Even the double track railroad is paralleled by arteries and veins carrying the blood in opposite directions. Blood, the grand essential of organic life, is compared to money in social life, and the comparison is carried to the point of recognizing a likeness between blood discs and coins. The nerves, carrying their instantan- eous messages to the brain, are likened to the telegraph. Even parliaments have their organic counterpart, though it is with evident reluctance that he is obliged to admit that the comparison of the despised legislative bodies must be compared to so important an organ as the brain. Only in government and governmental bodies could he find anything that served as a sort of social sensorium. As Huxley pointed out, this was a sad com- mentary on Spencer's rabid individualistic attacks on all things legislative.
86 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
We will now present Spencer's own summary of the general reasons "for regarding a society as an organism."
"It undergoes continuous growth. As it grows, its parts become unlike : it exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. These activities are not simply different, but their differences are so related as to make one an- other possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes mutual dependence of the parts. And the mutually- dependent parts, living by and for one another, form an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as is an individual organism. The analogy of a society to an organism becomes still clearer on learning that every organism of appreciable size is a society; and on further learning that in both, the lives of the units continue for some time if the life of the aggregate is suddenly arrested, while if the aggregate is not de- stroyed by violence, its life greatly exceeds in dura- tion the lives of its units. Though the two are con- trasted as respectively discrete and concrete and though there results a difiference in the ends subserved by the organization, there does not result a difference in the laws of the organization : the required mutual influences of the parts, not transmissible in a direct way, being, in a society, transmitted in an indirect way."
Spencer's analogical method has met with much criti- cism at the hands of his successors. Professor Giddings, in his "Principles of Sociology," while holding that Spencer's analogy is "not fanciful" but "real," contends that it has "limited scientific value." Giddings main- tains that while a society has much in common with an organism, it is in reality .something more, viz. : an or- ganization.
spencer's analogical sociology 87
Probably the best estimate is that of Lester F. Ward, in the first volume of "Dynamic Sociology" (page 209) :
"The chief service that has been done in pointing out these analogies so minutely has been that of demonstrating by means of them that society is an evolving aggregate. This was the truth that most needed demonstration, being the one commonly called in question. The denial of this proposition is fatal to all attempts to study sociology as a branch of science. No one doubts now that organisms may be legitimately so studied. When, therefore, it is shown that nearly all the phenomena which a living creature presents are directly comparable to exactly corres- ponding phenomena in society, the strongest proof that can be presented of the scientific character of social processes has been furnished. And when it is shown that society has passed through all the stages of evolution that living creatures have, and has been subject to all the laws, principles, and processes of evolution in general, the case seems to be pretty thoroughly made out. From a confused, chaotic, homo- geneous state, still represented by many low tribes, there have gone on both differentiation and integra- tion. From the several degrees of social differentia- tion shown by different races, a classification of socie- ties is made possible."
CHAPTER IX
TRANSITION FROM SPENCER TO RATZENHOFER
In philosophy Herbert Spencer was a great master ; in biology, a great organizer ; in psychology, a great founder and in sociology, a great pioneer. It is all very well to say that Spencer'"s sociology is out of date. That is only true in a little larger degree than would be the as- sertion that the astronomy of Copernicus, or the phys- ics of Galileo, are out of date. Spencer''s sociology is one of the rungs of the ladder by which his successors have been able to climb. As no science can be com- pletely mastered apart from its history, the student of sociology must thoroughly study the works of its two greatest fore-runners — Comte and Spencer.
Nothing more than a hint has been given as yet of Spencer's individualism and his adherence to the vicious and happily discarded doctrine of laisses faire — (let things go).
This policy of no policy is the most unfortunate ele- ment in Spencer's thinking and will militate against his fame all the more, as men realize its utter futility and move, as they are ever moving and have always really moved, toward the doctrine of faire marcher — (make things go). I have devoted a chapter to this aspect of Spencer's teaching in "Evolution, Social and Organic," and one to Max Stirner's allied theories, in "Ten Blind Leaders of the Blind/* We shall pass it here and treat it later when we deal with the purpose of sociology.
With the passage from Spencer to Ratzenhofer the
TRANSITION FROM SPENCER TO RATZENHOFER 89
whole concept of Sociology changes. For a clear ex- position of the nature of the change, the student is in- debted to Professor Small's invaluable book, before mentioned and quoted, "General Sociology." It is in- deed this transition which constitutes Small's chief theme, and its able and brilliant treatment gives Small's book a permanent place in th€ great books of the sci- ence. "Our thesis," says Small, in his preface, "is that the central line in the path of methodological progress, from Spencer to Ratzenhofer, is marked by gradual shifting of effort from analogical representation of so- cial structures to real analysis of social processes/'
The italics are Small's. Small approaches this change through the avenue of definitions. From a wide variety of definitions by a host of sociological writers, he selects the definition by Ward as "the most compact statement which can be made of the whole subject-matter which sociology finds it necessary to treat." That definition is : "Sociology is the science of society, or the science of social phenomena."
Small insists that ! variety of definitions do not imply any essential antagonism between the sociologists who give them, but rather are due to each writer focusing his attention on some different aspect of the science. It will have been observed by this time that in this expo- sition of modern sociology the method is, as far as pos- sible, to let the great thinkers speak for themselves. Small explains his idea in the following interesting and illuminating passage:
"In presence of the same body of facts about human experience, intellectual interest in organizing and inter- preting the facts concentrates in several distinct ways.
90 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
For instance, one variety of thinkers look out over hu- man associations, and they are moved to ask: 'How did men come to associate as they do now?* This is the typical question of those whose primary curiosity is about the genetic aspect of human experience. Think- ers of another variety survey the same facts, and they ask: 'How do men manage to preserve the statu qxiof This question voices the peculiar interest of the men who care more for insight into the present social situa- tion, for analysis of present social arrangements and the way they work, than for knowledge of how they came into existence. A third variety of thinkers are relatively indifferent to both these questions, and they ask rather: 'What are the visible indications abovit the ways in which men will associate in the future?' This is the question that rallies the men who are trying to make the things which are seen disclose those that are unseen. It is the question of the seer, the idealist, the construct- ive philosopher. To him past and present are nothing except as they contain and reveal the future. Still an- other variety of men take for granted all the answers to these questions that seem to them worth considering, and their question is : 'What is the thing to do here and now, in order to make the better future that is to be?' This is the query of the men who want to be more than mere scholars. They want to accomplish something. They want to organize rational movements for making life yield increasing proportions of its possibilities."'
After discussing at length four typical definitions, Small arrives at a fifth — "a still more accurate descrip- tion of sociology . . . more accurate and inclusive than any other single formula."
This definition has the merit of expressing the dom- inant note in Ratzenhofer's concept and with it Small closes his discussion of definitions — "Sociology is the science of the social process."
I
TRANSITION FROM SPENCER TO RATZENHOFER 91
Between Spencer and Ratzenhofer, Small places Schaffle. Schaffle is given one chapter in Small's book, which is probably more than he deserves. About all that Small claims for him is that he places rather less emphasis on structure and a little more on function, than Spencer, thus breaking the gap between Spencer and Ratzenhofer. This paragraph will be the only ref- erence to Schaffle in this book. I have analyzed the deluge of rubbish which floods the pages of his "Im- possibility of Social Democracy" and those who care to know my opinions of Schaffle are referred to my chap- ter on that book in "Ten Blind Leaders of the Blind."
We cannot, of course, give Ratzenhofer's system in detail. His own epitome of it is given by Small as the thirteenth chapter of "General Sociology." We shall note certain important elements.
Ratzenhofer recognizes that all social organizations have at their base two great biological necessities. The first, is the instinct of self-preservation which produces rivalry for food. The second, is the sexual instinct which perpetuates the species and results in the blood- bond. This blood-bond is the origin of all social inter- relation and, therefore, all primitive social structures are based on community of origin. The increase in num- bers among primitive groups leads some to feel the overcrowding and, wander forth to new lands, or if the stronger wish to remain, war breaks out and the weaker are driven forth. This spreads the human race over the planet, and the action of new physical environments leads to race differentiation. These differentiated races coming into contact leads to flight or battle. The con-
93 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
quered are robbed of food supply and abodes. They themselves are at first killed ; later the method is to make them prisoners of war. After being subjugated, they are enslaved. Thus rulers and ruled appear, and the rulers, in order to maintain their rule, create the state.
This account of the origin of the state is in essential harmony with the socialist philosophy which declares the state to be a class weapon from the beginning until now.
The rulers, having compelled the ruled to labor for the supplying of the wants of both, now have leisure, and culture arises. Culture promotes commerce, and "commerce tends to spread differentiation without limit over all social structures." "The differentiation and the blending of social structures is the practical content of the social process."
The two contending forces at work in the social pro- cess are differentiation, the result of the impulse to in- dividualism, and socialization, or "the impulse to form communities." "Differentiation has its boundaries in the number of individuals, that is to say, differentiation can go on up to the atomisation of society, because each in- dividual may regard his own interest as the content of a social structure. Socialization is bounded only by humanity, that is to say, 'humanity' may become a so- cial structure, if throughout that most inclusive range a unifying interest comes to be felt as a need."
Ratzenhofer undoubtedly penetrates to the real nature
of social order when he describes it as an "organizing
of the struggle for existence." This reason for the ex-
' istence of societies is purely Darwinian. Those men
who formed themselves into societies had an advantage
TRANSITION FROM SPENCER TO RATZENHOFER 93
in the struggle for existence over others who remained isolated or in small groups. We now know that the his- tory of the human race is the history of a long struggle. The struggle has been against other species of living creatures and the difficult living conditions presented by the universe itself. In this struggle against the uni- verse, man has employed a variety of weapons, but none that have proved nearly so successful as social or- ganization. For this reason, Lester F. Ward looks upon society as a human invention, somewhat similar to the invention of agriculture or the art of making a fire. The idea that the members of primitive societies con- sciously perceived the advantage of social organization is probably somewhat overdrawn. Darwin has shown that this conscious perception of advantage is not neces- sary to adoption. Birds, for example, build their nests and are great gainers thereby, but it is hardly likely that they themselves are conscious of the process and its resulting advantages. The reason all birds build nests is that such birds as once might have existed and did not build nests were weeded out in the struggle for existence, because they were at a disadvantage as against the nest builders.
The early struggles of men were not only against other creatures and against the universe, but also against other men. Those men who, beginning with the blood- bond, expanded their social organization thereby reaped advantages which enabled them to survive, while others, failing to follow their example or not following it ef- fectively, perished or were exterminated. The Gypsies of Europe and the Indians of North America are dis- appearing because they cannot adapt themselves to, or
94 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
hold their own with, modern social organization. It is highly probable that many primitive races of men be- came extinct because — for various reasons — they did not form societies.
We now come to another luminous concept of Rat- zenhofer's. This consists of what Ratzenhofer regarded as the political principles. These are two in number and are in contrast with each other ; one is called the stereotyping principle, the other^ the innovating princi- ple. The first tends to preserve the statu quo; the sec- ond, to introduce changes. Professor Small manifests an equal admiration for both principles and holds that *Tn a given society, the stereotyping factor might turn out to represent the program that in the end would be the best for society." This is all very well, of course, but it is none the less easy to see that there could be no social progress apart from the innovating principle. The chief argument against innovation — in fact the only ar- gument— is that changes might be made prematurely. For example, the exploited workers might try to seize and hold the tools of production before they had taken the precaution of capturing, or at least hopelessly cor- rupting, the armed forces of the State. Again, the same workers might seek to abolish the capitalist class before it has quite finished its historic task.
Another idea of Ratzenhofer's that well deserves to be noticed here is expressed as follows: "The social process is a perpetual readjustment of equilibrium be- tween forces that tend backward toward more struggle and those that tend forward toward more socialization."
TRANSITION FROM SPENCER TO RATZENHOFER 95
Thus in Ratzenhofer's estimation the struggle between man and man is not the most desirable condition, and the abolishing of all struggle in favor of fraternal co- operation is the chief element in social advance. This is a sad comment on those leading American politi- cians who would like to be regarded as statesmen, with- out ever having deserved the name, who seem to think that the elimination of competition is the chief disaster of modern times. The various plans of men of the Bryan, Cummins, La FoUette type for a return to com- petition is, in the language of Ratzenhofer, "an effort to go backw^ard toward more struggle" while all real states- men, understanding something of the social process, would seek to go forward toward more co-operation and socialization.
CHAPTER X
THE PLACE OF KARL MARX IN SOCIOLOGY
The reader who has traveled thus far will now realize that the greatest single achievement of the science of sociology is the concept of society, not as a collection of institutions, and sociology as an explanatory catalogue or inventory — after the fashion of Spencer, but as a process of development, and the science of sociology as the analysis and explanation of the process. This concept is identical with the "Pure Sociology" of Lester F. Ward. The only advance, to date, on this concept is the "Applied Sociology" of Ward. And be it clearly understood that the concept of applied sociology does not displace pure sociology in any sense, as for exam- ple, the sociology of process does, in a measure, displace the Spencerian sociology of structure.
The reader of Spencer will probably find in his work enough reference to the functions of social structures to raise a doubt as to the justice of speaking of struc- tural sociology as typical of Spencer. For the benefit lof such readers, let us once more call attention to the arrangement of his three volumes of "The Princi- ples of Sociology." That the inventory of society's assets in the form of social institutions was Spencer's domi- nant idea, will then stand clearly forth.
FIRST VOLUME
I. The Data of Sociology. II. The Inductions of Sociology. III. Domestic Institutions.
96
THE PLACE OF KARL MARX IN SOCIOLOGY 97
SECOND VOLUME
IV. Ceremonial Institutions.
V. Political Institutions.
THIRD VOLUME
VI. Ecclesiastical Institutions. VII. Professional Institutions. VIII. Industrial Institutions.
The above is the complete contents tables of Spencer's three volumes, except that it does not give the subdi- visions. Professor Small justly cites Spencer's use of the definite article "The" in "The Data of Sociology" as indicating the limitation of Spencer in assuming, his own hints to the contrary notwithstanding, that all the essentials of social phenomena could be found in the social structures and ideas of primitive men.
The progress of sociology from the limitations of Spencer to its present status, is due to the gen- eral consensus of the labors of a number of pro- found and brilliant thinkers. The histories of so- ciology, such as have been written, seek to allot to each of these a proper place in accordance with the value of his work. There is one name, how- ever, which should loom large in such records, which is usually passed over entirely or treated only to a passing reference. This is the name of Karl Marx. The two chapters on "The History of Sociology" in Small's "General Sociology" are a case in point. This altogether unjust treatment of the great German- Jew is about what might be expected from the sociolo- gists of the chair. These reasons have no weight with
98 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
US, and we shall endeavor to give Marx his place with- out going- to the opposite extreme of an over-empha- sizing partisanship.
Rash and ill-judged statements have no proper place in a book of this kind, and I believe I am guiltless under either charge when I assert that Alarx has been ignored or jeered at chiefly because of the moral cowardice of the men who have been his detractors. As we shall see in the next chapter, I hold this view in common with a leading university professor of sociology, except that the professor, whom v/e shall shortly quote at length, would not be so explicit in his choice of terms. All history is evidence that only the most courageous men have dared to fly in the face of conventionality. Most men not only lack the courage to do this but they are too pusillanimous to applaud their superiors who do. Marx not only had the genius of a Galileo or a Bruno, he also had their sublime courage and daring. While he lived late enough to escape the faggot and the stake, he endured long exiles from his country and lived dur- ing these periods of exile in the direst poverty. Some day history will do proper justice to his pigmy-minded, hare-hearted maligners, who sneered at a man whose shoes they were unfit to polish, and whose ideas were beyond their intellectual range.
Among the less discreditable reasons for ignoring the work of Marx in the field of sociology, are first, that Marx did not call himself a sociologist, and second, that he is popularly supposed to have worked only in a nar- row subdivision of the science.
Small tells of an eminent professor who began a course
THE PLACE OF KARL MARX IN SOCIOLOGY 99
of lectures on sociology with the definition: "Sociology is the science that deals with the labor problem." He very justly condemns this definition as comparing- with a definition of physics as "the science that deals with water wheels" or of chemistry as "the science that deals with sterilizing milk." Small very properly holds that while each proposition tells the truth, it "tells such a minute fraction of the truth that it is ridiculous." The only comment that suggests itself is that the "fraction" in the first case is not so "tiny" as in the two latter ones.
None of these three definitions are more ridiculous than the assumption (of which Small himself is not guilty) that the sociology of Marx is merely a sociology of the labor problem. It is equally ridiculous to assume such a limitation in Marx on the ground that certain of his conclusions have a great deal to do with the labor problem. If a sociologist is to be judged by his grasp of the social process and its laws, we have no hesitation in saying that as a sociologist, Marx has no superior in the entire range of the science. In one im- portant respect he vastly transcended Spencer. Instead of seeking his "data" among primitive savages, he ana- lyzed the social forms and process of the most highly developed country of his day — England. And this was no accident. Engels explains that Marx selected Eng- land because it presented the most complete development of that machine process which is the latest product of social progress.
Speaking for myself, I share Smalfs admiration of Ratzenhofer ; I regard Lester F. Ward as the greatest living sociologist; I consider "The Positive Philosophy"
100 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
an epoch-making book, despite its remarkable blunders;.! regard Spencer as one of the greatest geniuses of his own or any age, notwithstanding his characterizing of the form of society for which I most fervently hope as "The Coming Slavery;" I think that Small has ren- dered to sociolog}' service of the highest order; I recog- nize valuable ideas in the works of Professor Giddings, though I am astounded at his extremely high rating of Christian philanthropy and Christian missionaries as great social factors ; I can appreciate Gumplowicz, while rejecting totally his main idea of the uselessness of ef- fort; I read with pleasure the keenly analytical pages of Professor Ross ; and this list of brilliant laborers in the sociological field might flow on like a river, but I wish to say plainly that nowhere in the output of so- ciologists have I found a more keenly penetrating analy- sis of the social process, or a more philosophical and comprehensive grasp of the immanent laws of that pro- cess, than in the luminous and closely reasoned pages of the founder of scientific socialism.
In pursuance of this contention we shall now read two passages from the writings of Marx w^hich are ex- amples of his penetration to the very core of the social process. The first is from the preface of his earliest book "The Critique of Political Economy," and gives the substance of his conception of the social process as it unfolds itself in history:
"The general conclusion at w^hich I arrived and which, once reached, continued to serve as the leading thread in my studies, may be briefly summed up as follows: In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and inde-
THE PLACE OF KARL MARX IN SOCIOLOGY 101
pendent of their will ; these relations of production cor- respond to a definite stag-e of development of their ma- terial powers of production. The sum total of these re- lations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond defi-
Inite forms of social consciousness. The mode of pro-^ duction in material life determines the general charac-j ter of the social, political and spiritual processes of life.f It is not the consciousness of men that determines their- existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence de-l termines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in so- ciety come in conflict with the existing- relations of pro- duction, or — what is but a legal expression for the same thing — with the property relations within which they have been at w^ork before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly trans- formed. In considering such transformations the dis- tinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic — in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness ; on the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the exist- ing conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order ever dis- appears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it, have been developed ; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material
102 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore, mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve ; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always nnd that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of so- ciety. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production — antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagon- ism, but of one arising from conditions surrounding the life of individuals in society; at the same time the pro- ductive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois so- ciety create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society."
The second passage is of later date and deals with society as it is and is, like the first, prophetic of a so- ciety to come:
"As soon as the laborers are turned into proletarians, their means of production into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialization of labor and the further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private properties, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the laborer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many laborers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the
THE PLACE OF KARL MARX IN SOCIOLOGY 103
centralization of capital. One capitalist ahvays kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labor process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor only usable in common, the economizing of all means of pro- duction by their use as the means of production of com- bined, socialized labor, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this, the inter- national character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploita- tion; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of, the process of capitalist production itself. The monop- oly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of pro- duction, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integu- ment. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropria- tors are expropriated."
The current year has given us an example of plain speaking on an hitherto tabooed subject which may well be, in university circles, the beginning of better things. Professor Small's lecture on "Socialism in the Light of Social Science," delivered before the Chicago Woman's Club, and published in the INIay, 1912, number of The American Journal of Sociology, is so frank and refresh-
104 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
ing as to well deserve the widest possible circle of readers. As a contribution in this direction, we shall devote the next chapter to the reproduction of such parts of the lecture as ^bear most directly on the subject raised in this.
CHAPTER XI
small's estimate of MARX
The introduction to this chapter will be found on the closing- page of the preceding one. It is needless to say there is much in the following to which I do not subscribe, but where so many excellent things are said one does not feel disposed to "answer" the rest. We are not quoting the entire lecture but the quotation is continuous ; from the point of beginning to its close nothing is omitted. Not the least of its merits is the high source from whence it comes. Professor Small is Dean of the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago and Editor-in-Chief of "The American Jour- nal of Sociology" :
"Socialism Jias been the most zvholesome ferment in modern society. If we have no socialism in either of the senses just eliminated, what have we? Well, to begin with, we have merely a greater mass and more specific expressions of something that is as old as the human race. There have always been men who looked upon mooted questions from the standpoint of those who had arrived. There have always been other men who looked upon mooted questions from the standpoint of the larger number made up partly of those who had not arrived, partly of those who were arriving, and, most important of all, partly of those who hoped to arrive. The question of arrival has not necessarily determined choice between these standpoints. Something in occu- pation or in tone of feeling may have inverted manifest destiny in this regard, but if we boil down the ideas of men the world over and the ages through we find that
105
106 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
there has always been a more or less evident division of men into those who looked upon life with the eyes of those who had reached secure standing ground, and those who regarded things from the situation of those who were struggling for place. The former have al- ways been the minority. Their presumption has always been that things were about as well settled as they could be, and that all good citizens should be content with the established order. The latter have always been the vast majority, and as a rule the social influence of the two strata at a given moment has been, let us say it at a venture, something like the inverse of the cube of their numbers. Roughly speaking, the ability of the majority to voice its feelings has steadily increased throughout historic times. There have always been men who called themselves by some equivalent of the term democrat. They have had in common some variation of the pre- r supposition that the world belongs to the many, not to . ;the few. Beyond that they resembled each other chiefly in bringing each some peculiar charge or charges against the existing order, in pressing the claim that human af- fairs are not as they should be. So far as I can learn, none of these spokesmen of the majority thought to call themselves socialists until after 1845, when Leroux coined the word. Since 1776, however, the number of these men who thought and spoke for the many has increased. The conclusiveness of the things they had to say in be- half of the many may not have increased in equal pro- portion. The confidence of the prophets of the many in llie force of their message has certainly gained assur- ance, and the aggregate of these popular utterances has gathered volume. We have bad then, since the close of the eighteenth century, a rising tide of popular power and of corresponding popular self-assertion. Every- where social institutions which have been aristocratically ;;ocial institutions which have been aristocraticaHy\ «. ;o!\ ed encounter a unique challenge of democratic crit-
/
small's estimate of MARX 107
icism. The majority is taking a larger hand in its own affairs. To a great extent the participation of the ma- jority is vague, incoherent, jangHng, unorganized, but it has on the whole a lift and a thrust which is inevitable and irresistible.
"The most efficient theoretical factor in promoting the flow of this popular tide has been Marxian socialism. When I say that I am disposed to analyze the proposi- tion into the component parts, 90 per cent Karl Marx and 10 per cent his followers.
"Marx was one of the few really great thinkers in the history of social science. His repute thus far has been that of every challenger of tradition. All the con- ventional, the world over^ from the multitude of intel- lectual nonenties to thinkers whose failure to acknowl- edge in him more than a peer has seriously impeached , their candor, have implicitly conspired to smother his i influence by all the means known to obscuration. From outlawry to averted glances, every device of repression and misrepresentation has been employed against him. Up to the present time the appellate court of the world's sober second thought has not given him as fair a hear- ing as it has granted to Judas Iscariot. The little book entitled The Economic Interpretation of History, pub- lished by Professor Seligman of Columbia in 1902, re- mains conspicuous in its loneliness as an exception to the general rule. Men in dignified academic positions I still refrain in public from giving Marx his due. He is i worthy of the most respectful treatment which thinkers I can pay to another thinker whose argument has never been successfully answered. It is a Herculean tasTc to analyze a conventionalized world with unconventional results and to make out such a measure of probability for the results that the exhibit puzzles, if it does not convince, the conventional-minded. Marx certainly did this. No man has done more than he to strengthen the democratic suspicion that the presuppositions of our pres- ent social system are superficial and provisional. I do
108 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
not think that Marx added to social science a single for- mula which will be final in the terms in which he ex- pressed it. In spite of that, I confidently predict that in the ultimate judgment of history Marx will have a place in social science analogous with that of Galileo in physical science. He found a world organized, in its practice and its theory, around capital. He declared that the world will remain impossibly arbitrary until its the- ory and its practice center around labor. This was in substance by no means a novel utterance. Adam Smith had said it, but he was appalled by his own irreverence and promptly retracted it. Marx said it with the force, the detail, and the corroborating evidence of a revelation. He is still a voice in the wilderness, but for one I have no more doubt that he was essentially right, and that conventionality was essentially wrong, than I have that Galileo will hold his place to the end of time as one of the world's great discoverers.
"After what I have said, I shall not be expected to undertake a defense or even an interpretation of specific Marxian doctrines. As I have hinted, the precise con- tent of his theory, or the degree of its approach to cor- rectness, is of less permanent importance than, first, the negative fact that he impeached the entire theoretical basis of our capitalistic system, and second, the positive fact that he designated factors in the capitalistic system which were working badly in practice or were wrongly rated in theory or both. Accordingly he was a con- structive agent in the same sense in which the engineers were who bored into the floor of Hell Gate to prepare the way for the dynamite and the dredges. Many lead- ing thinkers, especially in Germany, were already pur- suing aims closely related to those of Marx, along lines which might be likened to attempts to develop more skilful pilots. Marx's program was to deepen and widen and straighten the channel.
"In other words, nobody since ■Martin Luther has done as much as Karl Marx to make the conventional-minded
small's estimate of MARX 109
fear that our theories of Hfe may need a thorough over- hauling. The longer that overhauling is postponed the greater will be the repute of Marx after the crisis is passed, and the more fatuous \vill the interests appear that are meanwhile repressing the inevitable.
"I will speak of five particulars in which Marx chal- lenged prevailing ideas. In the first place he alleged that the world must set itself right about the economic inter- pretation of history. What is this "economic interpreta- tion qf history"? The books and essays that have been written to prove that Marx did not say precisely, and that so far as he did say he was not correct, amount to a considerable library. And the writers of conventional books and essays and editorials have jeered and gloated and denounced, as though it were something immensely to Marx's discredit that he did not give society an in- fallibly complete new analysis of itself, and something immensely to their credit that they were glad of it. Good form in this connection has been very much like meet- ing the child that rushes into the parlor to report that the house is on fire with directions to retire and rehearse his company manners. Not to break into the contro- versy as to what Marx did or did not say about the economic interpretation of history, or how much more remains to be said, the gist of the whole matter is the homely fact that if there is anything insecure about a man's chances of getting tomorrow's dinner, or anything unjust about the ways in which he is forced to use the chances, there will be nothing quite right about the rest of his mental or emotional or moral life. Or, to express it in the social instead of the individual form, if there are crudities or injustices in our economic system, to that extent those of us who gain by the anomalies will be getting something for nothing, while those who lose by them will be deprived of a square deal. Marx said in substance that there is not a private business on earth that could exhibit inconsistencies as glaring as the in-
110 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
dustrial system of every modern nation presents, without being due for reorganization or the receiver. The only remarkable thing about this proposition it that there are still intelligent human beings of adult age who have not discovered that it is a commonplace.
"Second, Marx called attention to class conflict, as a primary factor in human history, and he tried to rouse the classes that have no resource but their labor to open their eyes to their own interests in the situation, to be- come 'class conscious,' and to pursue their own inter- ests as intelligently as the competing classes pursue theirs. Truly this is a most impertinent and inhuman per- versity ! What would the world come to if everyone should be as keen as we are for the main chance? What would happen to that smug old fiction of the 'industrial harmon- ies,' that Magna Charta of vested interest, that notice to the labor class that it must be content with what is left to it after privilege has been supplied? What social order would be left if the man who is down should ever become as class conscious in trying to get up as the classes who have arrived are in clinging to w'hat they have got?
"Accordingly, more crocodile's tears have been shed over Marx's recourse to class conflict than over any other mooted conception in the whole field of social sci- ence. The first type of deprecation has already been in- dicated. It is grieved and indignant denial that such a thing as class conflict exists in the world. We need not stop to parley with this inanity. No one gets through a primer of social science today without learning that class conflict is to the social process what friction is to me- chanics. It is one of the elemental reactions between human beings. Its accidents only have changed and are changing. Its essentials are apparently permanent. The original lineup on 'Schedule K' was between farmer Cain and shepherd Abel. There is not a philosopher or artist or poet or scientist who does not get his leverage
small's estimate of MARX 111
on life by struggle with men in his own and other classes who furnish reaction to his action. The fact of class struggle is as axiomatic today as the fact of gravi- tation.
"But both ingenuous and disingenuous men have de- cried Marx as a foment er of class struggle, and they have tried to distract attention from irrepressible issues between present classes by exposing the wickedness of stirring up industrial strife. There is truth on this side, too, but modern capitalists and their attorneys have no right to plead it. Who has taught our generation, by word and deed, that competition is war? The human process is at best no Quaker meeting. The struggle of interest with interest, which is merely an alternative way of saying 'human process,' has not yet reached the stage in which turning the other cheek is a frequent oc- currence. The only people who are generally under- stood or respected today are those who think they have rights and accordingly fight for them. The classes that have fought their way into the security of our property system show themselves either hypocritical or stupid when they blame the backward classes for declaring war for the same kind of conquest. No matter how firmly we believe in the ideals and methods of peace, we can •have nothing but contempt for the self-righteousness of classes already armed and entrenched when they try to dodge the issue by pointing to the sinfulness of their rivals' call to arms. The conventionalists have no better case against Marx and his followers on this score than Charles I had against John Hampden, or George III against John Adams, or Jefferson Davis against Wendell Phillips.
"Third, Marx put a new emphasis on the rudimentary economic fact of sxirplns value. Again I purposely avoid attempting to give Marx's particular version of the fact. The main thing is that he called for new attention to this vital element in the industrial situation. My own
112 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
judgment is that Marx was as one-sided in his ideas about 'surplus value' as capitalistic orthodoxy was. This is merely another way of saying that both were intellec- tually wrong. In human affairs, however, that party is always morally right which demands further investiga- tion of debatable questions. That party is always mor- ally wrong which demands that debatable questions shall be treated as res judicata. According to the traditional economic theory, land, labor, and capital are the factors in production. According to that same theory, the law of supply and demand assigns to each factor its fair share in the product. In fact, when a business is pros- perous, these three factors in the enterprise receive each its market rate of compensation, and yet there remains a surplus. What follows? Does the system presume that the three factors concerned in creating this surplus must be recognized in its distribution? By no means. The copartnership of land, labor, and capital was all well enough in production, and in the preliminary dis- tribution of the market rate of rent, wages, and interest. By some right which capitalism assumes, but does not account for, the partnership ceases and determines in the presence of the surplus. An unprejudiced observer would suppose that the three parties necessary to the production of that surplus would have equally valid claims to a share in distribution of the surplus. In what proportion they ought to share is a question by itself, and it should not confuse the fundamental issue. All the partners in production should presumably be part- ners, not merely in the preliminary rough-and-ready dis- tribution, but in the final distribution. Conventional theory repudiated this reasoning and claimed the whole of the surplus for capital, under the title profits or divi- dends. The precedents of business are mostly against Marx. The logic that appeals to the dispassionate ob- server is strongly on his side. The theory that accounts for three partners in the producing process, but loses
small's estimate of MARX 113
sight of all but one of them in the middle of the distrib- uting process may satisfy the one beautifully, but it will never permanently satisfy the other two nor their re- flecting neighbors. It fails to convince as ignominiously as the technique of the boy who took the clock apart and put it together again with one wheel left out!
"These three ideas, the economic interpretation of his- tory, class conflict, and surplus value, are the chief points of departure in Marx's attempt at a scientific survey of the modern social situation. If it were a pure topograph- ical problem, it is hardly conceivable that any compe- tent engineer would question the necessity of replotting the old survey. So many human passions and interests are stimulated by challenge of tradition, however, that thus far it has been possible to keep the Marxian im- pulse from the degree of social influence which it de- serves.
"Two other points in the Marxian outlook must be mentioned, viz., fourth, his assumption that the laboring class and the capitalistic class may be sharply distin- guished and precisely divided. For Marx the social campaigner this assumption was convenient and in a large degree correct. For Marx the scientific investi- gator it was the most fatal mistake. We had no sooner formulated the primary sociological generalization of the universality of social conflict than we made out the equally primary parallel generalization of the universal- ity of co-operation. For certain immediate purposes, human beings may and do form themselves into groups of friends for better or worse, to fight against other groups regarded as absolute enemies. In doing this the other processes of the group life are partially arrested in order that in certain particulars the antagonistic in- terests of the respective groups may measure strength. These differences having been adjusted, it soon appears that the groups cannot be permanently as exclusive and hostile as they made themselves provisionally. Ameri-
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cans and Spanish, Boers and British, Russians and Jap- anese, employers and employees, presently discover that in the long run it is the best policy for co-operation to control conflict. Thus it comes about that our last ren- dering of the social process today expresses it in terms of one stage farther along in its evolution than that which most impressed Marx. We assert the universal fact of class conflict as strongly as he did. We assert the universal fact of co-operation more strongly than he did. Then we find the center of the conflict which is the life of society, not in perpetual trial of strength between permanently defined classes, but we see the merging of these earlier alignments into incessant reassortment of classes in perpetual conflict for moral control of the terms of co-operation. Marx was right, as a social tac- tician, in believing that the class consciousness of wage- earners must be mobilized for a life-and-death struggle against the impersonal force of capital. As a philoso- pher, even through the smoke of battle, he could see victory perching on a prouder banner than either party carried into the fray. After all, however, it was to his view only a bigger labor-class banner, rather than the standard of a more splendid humanity. I do not feel like quarreling with Marx over this limitation. He fought gallantly for neglected phases of truth. We do ourselves no credit in blaming him for not seeing the whole of the truth. We shall do well if we see as far into the truth as he did, and if while avoiding some of his errors we add even a little to his wisdom.
"The fifth cardinal point in Marx's system was, so to speak, the keel of his proposed ship of state, viz., the socialisation of capital. In brief, all his visions of re- organized society centered about a state which should be the owner of all productive wealth, while the citizens should be the consumers each of his own share of the output of production.
"From the standpoint of social science it is extremely
small's estimate of MARX 115
naive to suppose that the form in which any construct- tive principle will be assimilated in a national economic system can be foreseen very far in advance. I must confess that Marx's ideal of economic society has never appealed to me as plausible, probable, desirable, or pos- sible. In essentials Marx was nearer to a correct diag"- nosis_ol the evils of our present property system than the wisdom of this world has yet been willing to admit, but his plan for correcting the evils is neither the only conceivable alternative nor the most convincing one. Indeed, from the standpoint of social science any plan at all for correcting the evils of capitalism is premature until the world has probed down much deeper into the evils themselves. Not until we thoroughly understand that our social order now rests on the basis of property, and that it will not be a thoroughly moral order until it is transferred to the basis of function, shall we be in a position intelligently to reflect on social reconstruc- tion. Therewithal I become esoteric, and it is a sign that I should stop/*
CHAPTER XII
SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
One of the most interesting and instructive chapters in the history of sociology is the controversy which nat- urally arose as to the relation of sociology to the special group of social sciences — economics, politics, jurispru- dence, etc. In the study of sociology, as in any other study, a safe rule is that we best understand what a thing is by learning how it became so. The student who comes to this aspect of the science of society, al- ready knowing the story of the development of biology, finds the task considerably simplified because the two developments have so much in common that they serve to explain and illustrate each other. At the risk, there- fore, of a seeming discursion from our proper theme, we shall first trace, briefly, the rise of "biology*' as a sci- entific name. This will have the additional value of introducing the reader, if not already acquainted, to Professor Thomas Henry Huxley. Huxley's "Collected Essays" occupy a place in the world of books parallel to the place of the "Kohinoor" in the world's collection of precious stones. The man who goes to the grave with- out having read them has missed one of the most en- during pleasures within the gift of modern civilization.
In the volume entitled "Science and Education'' there is a chapter, which was first delivered as a lecture, en- titled "On the Study of Biology." Here Huxley ex- plains how the term biology came into use and finally displaced the term "natural history" which had previ- ously served.
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Huxley begins by quoting the following passage from "The Leviathan" of Thomas Hobbes, the philosopher of Malmesbury:
"The register of knowledge of fact is called history. Whereof there be two sorts, one called natural history; which is the history of such facts or effects of nature as have no dependence on man's will ; such as are the histories of metals, plants, animals, regions, and the like. The other is civil history ; which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths."
After explaining certain changes of meaning which the term "Natural History" underwent, Huxley proceeds to give a piece of very valuable science history :
"But as science made the marvellous progress which it did make at the latter end of the last and the begin- ning of the present century, thinking men began to dis- cern that under this title of "Natural History" there were included very heterogeneous constituents — that, for example, geology and mineralogy were, in many re- spects, widely different from botany and zoology ; that a man might obtain an extensive knowledge of the struc- ture and functions of plants and animals without hav- ing need to enter upon the study of geology or miner- alogy, and vice versa ; and, further, as knowledge ad- vanced, it became clearer that there was a great anal- ogy, a very close alliance, between those two sciences, of botany and zoology which deal with living beings, while they are much more widely separated from all other studies. Therefore, it is not wonderful that, at the beginning of the present century, in two different countries, and so far as I know, without any intercom- munication, two famous men clearly conceived the no- tion of uniting the sciences which deal with living mat- ter into one whole, and of dealing with them as one dis- cipline. In fact, I may say there were three men to
118 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
whom this idea occurred contemporaneously, although there were but two who carried it into effect, and only one who worked it out completely. The persons to whom I refer were the eminent physiologist Bichat, and the great naturalist Lamarck in France ; and a distin- guished German, Treviranus, Bichat assumed the ex- istence of a spcial group of 'physiological' sciences. Lamarck, in a work published in 1801, for the first time made use of the name 'Biologic,' from the two Greek words which signify a discourse upon life and living things. About the same time it occurred to Treviranus, that all those sciences which deal with living matter are essentially and fundamentally one, and ought to be treated as a whole; and, in the year 1802, he published the first volume of what he also called 'Biologic.' Tre- viranus's great merit lies in this, that he worked out his idea and wrote the very remarkable book to which I refer. It consists of six volumes, and occupied its au- thor for twenty years— from 1803 to 1823."
We shall now pass to the consideration of the rise of sociology. The problem as to what position sociology should occupy in relation to the already established group of social sciences reached an acute stage when it was sought to introduce sociology into the universities and give it a chair of Its own. Many professors, hold- ing chairs in the social sciences, promptly rebelled. To them the new comer was a usurper and a pretender. They objected that the new professors would simply do the work they themselves were already engaged in, the only difference being that it would be done under a new name. Thus the discussion generated much ri- valry. There are universities we could nam.e where this feeling of trespass still exists between the professors of economics and the teachers of sociology. The claims of
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the sociologists to occupy larger, more general, and therefore more important ground has done nothing to allay the feeling. While this division has in some places amounted to a mild feud, it has never produced petty and disgraceful wrangles such as have divided the Christian church into some hundreds of narrow sects. There is something in the atmosphere of scientific re- search which raises its controversies to much higher planes than are possible to the shallow bigotry of the theological world. The shameful treatment of Lamarck by Cuvier, and the contemptible attitude of Owen to Huxley and Darwin, are the only exceptions we can re- call in the history of science for a hundred years.
"The sociologists," says Professor Small, "have broken into the goodly fellowship of the social scientists, and have thus far found themselves frankly unwelcome guests." Small begins the discussion of the right of sociology to a place among the sciences on the very first page of his "General Sociology:"
"Ever since Comte proposed the name 'sociology,' and parallel with all subsequent attempts to give the term a definite content, one mode of attack upon the proposed science has been denial that it could have a subject-mat- ter not already pre-empted by other sciences. This sort of attack has been encouraged by the seemingly hope- less disagreement arhong sociologists about the scien- tific task that they were tr}'ing to perform. If sociol- ogy has had anything to say about primitive peoples, for instance, it has been accused of violating the terri- tory of anthropology and ethnology. If it has dealt with evidence recorded by civilized races, it has been charged with invading the province of the historian. If
120 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
it has touched upon the relations of social classes in modern times, the political scientist or the economist has warned it to cease infringing upon his monoply. Thus sociology has seemed to workers in other sciences either a pseudo-science, attempting to get prestige in their own fields by exploiting quack methods, or a mere collector of the waste thrown aside by the more important sci- ences. Sociologists themselves have unintentionally done not a little to confirm this impression. As has been hinted above, their failure to agree upon a definition of their science, or upon precise description of their task, has seemed to afford ocular proof that their alleged sci- ence was merely a name with no corresponding content."
This dilemma has found its solution in the steady pro- gress of sociology until it has achieved a secure place in the scientific hierarchy. For the student, it is not now a question of, shall sociology be admitted as a sci- ence? It is rather a question of understanding why it has been admitted and what are its functions. The so- ciologists, in dealing with this question, invariably turn to the example of biology for illustration and justifica- tion of their position. It is pointed out that, as the vari- ous sciences and sub-sciences dealing with separate de- partments of organic life are united under the term biol- ogy, it is proper and desirable that the various sciences and sub-sciences dealing with the different forms of human activity should be united in sociology. It is also shown that biology is not merely a collection of sciences, but is a science in itself, separate and distinct from its subdivisions, having for its subject-matter the great general laws which unite all organic phenomena and which, in the nature of things, could not be properly treated by any science of a sectional character. Human
SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 121
society also is held to be a great whole, having general laws demanding the creation of a general science, which should have for its subject not any division of human activity, nor yet merely a collection of such divisions, but the study of the social process as a whole. The best development of this parallel is probably that of Pro- fessor Giddings where the professor is dealing with "The Province of Sociology" in his book entitled "The Principles of Sociology."
"General biology affords the most helpful analogy. The word 'biology,' first used by Lamarck, was adopted by Comte, who proposed 'sociology,' and he used both the one and the other for like reasons. He believed in a science of life as a whole, as in a science of society as a whole. But 'biology,* like 'sociology,' had no vogue until Mr. Spencer took it up. All but the young- est of our scientific men can remember when it began to creep into college and university catalogues. Neither the word nor the idea obtained recognition without a struggle. What was there in general biology, the ob- jectors said, that was not already taught as 'natural his- tory,' or as botany and zoology or as anatomy and physiology? The reply of the biologists was, that the essential phenomena of life — cellular structure, nutri- tions and waste, growth and reproduction, adaptation to environment, and natural selection — are common to animal and plant; that structure and function are unin- telligible apart from each other; and that the student will therefore get a false or distorted view of his sub- ject unless he is made to see the phenomena of life in their unity as well as in their special phases. He should study botany and zoology, of course, but he should first be grounded in general biology, the science of the essen- tial and universal phenomena of life under all its varied forms. This view of the matter won its
132 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
way by mere inherent truthfulness and j^ood sense. General biology became a working laboratory science, conceived and pursued as a ground work of more spe- cial biological sciences.
The question about sociology is precisely similar and must be answered in the same way. What aspect of social life is not already brought under scrutiny in one or more of the economic, political, or historical courses already provided in well organized universities? Per- haps none; yet, as the sociologist sees it, this is not the real question. Is society after all a whole? Is social activity continuous? Are there certain essential facts, causes, or laws in society, which are common to com- munities of all kinds, at all times, and which underlie and explain the more special social forms? If we must answer 'y^s,'' then these universal truths should be taught. To teach ethnology, the philosphy of history, political economy, and the theory of the state, to men who have not learned these first principles of sociology, is like teaching astronomy or thermodynamics to men who have not learned the Newtonian laws of motion. An analysis, then, of the general characteristics of social phenomena and a formulation of the general laws of social evolution should be made the basis of special study in all departments of social science."
Any struggle on the part of the social scientists against the admission of sociology to a place among them was destined to failure from the beginning. This failure was assured by the epoch-making labors of Comte and Spencer. The place of sociology was really established and made secure before this secondary dispute arose. When Comte and Spencer cast their comprehensive minds over the entire field of human knowledge, they saw that some great general science must of necessity deal with the origin and structure of human society, as
SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. 123
Other great general sciences must deal with the origin and processes of the universe and the phenomena of living matter. Thus, before sociology was born, the necessity for its existence was realized and thoroughly understood. Professor Small's classification of the great divisions of human knowledge makes this per- fectly clear:
"All the concrete and special knowledge that goes to make up our present sciences has been unified at last around some central conception of subject-matter and appropriate method. We may express the fact for our present purposes in the formula: Physics is the science of matter in its molar and molecular processes ; chem- istry is the science of matter in its atomic processes ; biology is the science of matter in its organic processes. In each case the comprehensive science has the task of organizing details which may already have been studied separately by several varities of scholars,
"The same logical methods which have arrived at these generalizations make irresistably toward the con- viction that coherence and unity of knowledge about hu- man experience demand a science of men in their asso- ciational processes.'^
The theory of evolution has done more than any other theory, not only to point out the place which sociology should occupy, but to establish it impregnably in that position. If evolutionary science had not appeared it is difficult to see how sociology could ever have been born. It was undoubtedly the realization of the neces- sity of applying to social phenomena the same scientific methods and theories that had produced such brilliant results in other fields that led to its creation. This is well and forcefully expressed by Professor Giddings :
"Since Comte, sociology has been developed mainly
124 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
by men who have felt the full force of an impulse that has revolutionized scientific thinking for all time to come. The evolutionist explanation of the natural world has made its way into every department of knowl- edge. The law of natural selection and the conception of life as a process of adjustment of the organism to its environment have become the core of the biology and the psychology of today. It was inevitable that the evolu- tionary philosophy should be extended to embrace the social phenomena of human life. The science that had traced life from protoplasm to man could not stop with explanations of his internal constitution. It must take cognizance 'of his manifold external relations, of the ethnical groups, of the natural societies of men, and of all the phenomena that they exhibit, and inquire whether these things also are not products of universal evolu- tion. Therefore, we find not only in the earlier writ- ings of Mr. Herbert Spencer, but also in those of Dar- win and Professor Haeckel, suggestions of an evolu- tionist account of social relations. These 'hints were not of themselves a sociology. For this, other factors, derived directly by induction from social phenomena, were needed. But such hints sufficed to show where some of the ground lines of the new science must lie; to reveal some of its fundamental conceptions ; and to demonstrate that the sociologist must be not only his- torian, economist, and statistician, but biologist and psychologist as well. On evolutional lines then, and through the labors of evolutionist thinkers, modern so- ciology has taken shape. It is an intepretation of hu- man society in terms of natural causation. It refuses to look upon humanity as outside the cosmic process, and as a law unto itself. Sociology is an attempt to ac- count for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psy- chical causes, working together in a process of evolu- tion."
CHAPTER XIII
SOCIOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
It is related that a farmer called at a certain univer- sity and asked a group of students for a professor by name. One of the students, volunteering the informa- tion, addressed the farmer thus :
"Crucify the quadrangle, ascend the scalae, execute a dextral vert, and you will find the professor peram.bulat- ing in his laboratory, or sitting near the fenestrum."
"What," gasped the open-mouthed farmer, "is the fenestrum ?"
"The fenestrum," replied his willing informant, "is the aperture through which the dome of the building is illuminated."
This story may or may not be true, but it illustrates one of the barriers between the masses of mankind and the great body of scientific truth wherein lies their only hope of social salvation.
A friend of mine, recently returned from Paris, in- forms me that one of his greatest surprises came when he attended the lecture halls of the universities and heard the foremost professors and scholars of Europe deliver great lectures upon great questions, open and free to the public, to audiences which in many cases, could have been easily accommodated in a small class-room. One of the reasons for this condition is that scientific men and philosophers tend to develop a world of their own, in which they speak a language which they alone understand. The mass of scientific books are written
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126 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
in that language, and to the average man, be he a wage- worker or engaged in business pursuits, they convey little or no meaning. Such a man will accidentally pick up a scientific book and discovering by a glance at its pages that such is its character, he lays it down, imme- diately realizing that it was never intended for his per- usal.
We are not overlooking the difficulty of expressing the great mass of scientific ideas and theories in com- mon language ; we are fully aware that writers of scien- tific books would be well able to present an excellent case in behalf of their usage of scientific terms, but the resulting inability of the general public to become ac- quainted with modern scientific knowledge is none the less deplorable.
There is every ground for believing that if the scien- tific knowledge already achieved could be made the com- mon property of the mass of men, it would amply suffice for the solution of the great majority of our social prob- lems and launch the human race in a society which would in some measure correspond to the millenial dreams of poets and prophets, who have had visions of the golden age and the brotherhood of man.
Scientific knowledge, "however, is of comparatively small value until it is put into operation, and our socie- ties are so constituted that this cannot be done except in response to a general and intelligent demand. The first requisite to this achievement is that scientific ideas shall find a lodgement in the general mind. The mass of men cannot move or be moved by ideas that are the exclusive property of a select few any more than one
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boiler could generate steam by a fire located under an- other boiler. We therefore believe that Lester F. Ward has given expression to the greatest need of our time in making the socialization of knowledge the supreme goal of his system of sociology.
On its practical side this program is met by a very serious dilemma. The moving force for social change must be looked for among those members of society who are the chief sufferers from the injustices and anomalies of our social system. These are undoubtedly the great mass of men and women who work for wages, and it is precisely these men and wom.en to whom scientific knowl- edge is the least accessible. The only chance for even the next generation lies in the public schools. But, un- fortunately, the class in society, which reaps where it has not sown, and is enriched by the labor of others, dominates our political system through a multitude of agencies and, among other things, dictates the policy of our school system. The result is that those particular scientific ideas and tendencies which would disturb their status to the advantage of the wage working class are rigorously suppressed, so that, on the one hand, there is practically no opportunity for the working class to be- come possessed of knowledge it most imperatively needs, and on the other the public school system cannot be transformed so as to make it effectively communicate the desired knowledge to its pupils until there is a suf- ficient demand on the part of the working class itself to carry the threat of a violent and successful revolution as the only alternative. And this demand cannot arise until the workers themselves realize the nature and im-
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portance of such knowledge, and, as we have already remarked, their only chance of acquiring this is through the medium of their children in the public schools. Thus we find ourselves in a vicious circle, from which there is no apparent escape.
The situation, however, is not so hopeless as this would indicate ; there are a variety of forces in opera- tion which tend to break the circle at a number of points. In this place we shall deal with only one of these, A number of scientific men, and their number is steadily increasing, have realized the desirability of reaching the general public with their teachings. Not only this, but there has arisen another body of men, and these also are increasing, who, while they are not scien- tific men themselves in the precise meaning of that term, have taken upon themselves the task of interpreters. These men are generally referred to as popularizers of science. In certain dignified quarters, occupied by men who, being extremely comfortable themselves, have no disposition to descend into the dust and struggle of the masses, it is fashionable to decry the popularizers of science as the "vulgarizers" of science.
Wherever scientific men have labored to produce sci- entific books within the intellectual grasp of the com- mon people, the results have more than justified their efforts. One of the most notable cases of this kind is to be found in the "Lectures for Working Men," deliv- ered in England by Professor Huxley to immense audi- ences of eager working men, and many workers v/ho never had the pleasure of listening to Huxley's voice have nevertheless found access to the world of scientific
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knowledge through the reading of those lectures in Hux- ley's "Collected Essays." The course of lectures on evo- lution, specially delivered for working men, have prob- ably done more for the advancement of evolutionary ideas in the English-speaking world than any other sin- gle publication, with the exception, of course, of Dar- win''s 'Origin of Species."
No man realized more clearly the tremendous value of scientific knowledge for the oppressed working class than Karl Marx. Wilhelm Liebknecht, in "Memoirs of Marx," tells us that during the period of their mutual exile in London, they religiously attended Huxley's "Lectures to Working Men." If the mass of scientific men had followed Huxley's method and possessed Hux- ley's ability to make it effective, the public school sys- tem would by this time be a vastly different institution, and there is no means of measuring the effect it would have had on the entire social process.
One of the most lamentable results of the almost im- passable barrier between the sciences and the people is that to the mass of men the methods of science are enshrouded in mystery. The clearing away of this de- lusion is the first step in the direction of better things, and no man has exposed it more completely than Hux- ley. The passage in which he does this deserves to be read with the closest attention. It is a demonstration of how difficult things can be rendered extremely simple:
"The method of scientific investigation is nothing but the expression of the necessary mode of working of the human mind. It is simply the mode at which all phe- nomena are reasoned about, rendered precise and exact. There is no more difference, but there is just the same
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kind of difference, between the mental operations of a man of science and those of an ordinary person, as there is between the operations and methods of a baker or of a butcher weighing out his goods in common scales, and the operations of a chemist in performing a diffi- cult and complex analysis by means of his balance and finely-graduated weights. It is not that the action of the scales in the one case, and the balance in the other, differ in the principles of their construction or manner of working; but the beam of one is set on an infinitely finer axis than the other, and of course turns by the ad- dition of a much smaller weight.
"You will understand this better, perhaps, if I give you some familiar example. You have all heard it re- peated, I dare say, that men of science work by means of Induction and Deduction, and that by the help of these operations, they, in a sort of sense, wring from Nature certain other things, which are called Natural Laws, and Causes, and that out of these, by some cun- ning skill of their own, they build up Hypothesis and Theories. And it is imagined by many, that the opera- tions of the common mind can be by no means com- pared with these processes, and that they have to be ac- quired by a sort of special apprenticeship to the craft. To hear all these large words, you would think that the mind of a man of science must be constituted differently from that of his fellow men; but if you will not be frightened by terms, you will discover that you are quite wrong, and that all these terrible apparatus are being used by yourselves every day and every hour of your lives.
"There is a well-known incident in one of Moliere's plays, where the author makes the hero express un- bounded delight on being told that he had been talking prose during the whole of his life. In the same way, I trust, that you will take comfort, and be delighted with yourselves on the discovery that you have been
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acting- on the principles of inductive and deductive phil- osophy during the same period. Probably there is not one here who has not in the course of the day had occa- sion to set in motion a complex train of reasoning of the very same kind, though differing of course in de- gree, as that which a scientific man goes through in tracing the causes of natural phenomena.
"A trivial circumstance will serve to exemplify this. Suppose you go into a fruiterer's shop, wanting an apple, — you take up one, and, on biting it, you find it is sour; you look at it and see that it is hard and green. You take up another, and that too is hard, green, and sour. The shopman offers you a third ; but, before bit- ing it, you examine it, and find that it is hard and green, and you immediately say that you will not have it, as it must be sour, like those that you have already tried.
"Nothing can be more simple than that, you think ; but if you will take the trouble to analyze and trace out into its logical elements what has been done by the mind, you will be greatly surprised. In the first place, you have performed the operation of Induction. You found that, in two experiences, hardness and greenness in apples go together with sourness. It was so in the first case, and it was confirmed by the second. True, it is a very small basis, but still it is enough to make an induction from ; you generalize the facts, and you expect to find sourness in apples where you get hardness and greenness. You found upon that a general law, that all hard and green apples are sour; and that, so far as it goes, is a perfect induction. Well, having got your nat- ural law in this way, when you are offered another apple which you find is hard and green, you say, 'All hard and green apples are sour; this apple is hard and green, therefore this apple is sour,' That train of reasoning is what logicians call a syllogism, and has all its various parts and terms, — its major premiss, its minor premiss, and its conclusion. And, by the help of further reason-
133 AN INTKODUCllON TO SOCIOLOGY
ing, which, if drawn cut, woula have to be exhibited in two or tliree other syllogisms, you arrive at your final determination. 'I will not have that apple.' So that, you see, you have, in the first place, established a law by Induction, and upon that you have founded a De- duction, and reasoned out the special conclusion of the particular case. Well now, suppose, having got your law, that at some time afterwards, you are discussing the qualities of apples with a friend: you will say to him, *It is a very curious thing, — but I find that all hard and green apples are sour!' Your friend says to you, 'But how do you know that?' You at once reply, 'Oh, because I have tried it over and over again, and have always found them to be so.' Well, if we were talking science instead of common sense, we should call that an Experimental Verification. And, if still opposed, you go further, and say, 'I have heard from the people in Somersetshire and Devonshire, where large number of apples are grown, that they have observed the same thing. It is also found to be the case in Normandy, and in North America. In short, I find it to be the universal experience of mankind wherever attention has been di- rected to the subject.' Whereupon, your friend, unless he is a very unreasonable man, agrees with you, and is convinced that you are quite right in the conclusion you have drawn. He believes, although perhaps he does not know he believes it, that the more extensive Verifica- tions are, — that the more frequently experiments have been made, and results of the same kind arrived at, — that the more varied the conditions under which the same results have been attained, the more certain is the ultimate conclusion, and he disputes the question no further. He sees that the experiment has been tried under all sorts of conditions, as to time, place, and peo- ple, with the same result; and he says with you, there- fore, that the law you have laid down must be a good one, and he must believe it.
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"In science we do the same thing-; — the philosopher exercises precisely the same faculties, though in a much more delicate manner. In scientific inquiry it becomes a matter of duty to expose a supposed