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WITH

NOTES.

BY

W. S. TYLER,

WILLISTON PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

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PROFESSOR FELTON,
OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

THIS EDITION OF THE APOLOGY AND CRITO
IS DEDICATED,

AS A MEMORIAL OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP,

AND AS A TOKEN OF HIGH REGARD

FOR HIS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES TO CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP,

AND HIS PHIL-HELENIC SPIRIT.
PREFACE.

The "Græca Majora," which was all the Greek read in college by many successive generations of American students, contained Plato's Crito and the narrative part of the Phædo; and among all the extracts in that admirable collection, none are cherished in fresher remembrance or with a more reverential love than these inimitable productions of the great spiritual philosopher of ancient Greece. The simple beauty of the style and the almost inspired truth and grandeur of the sentiments have graven these immortal compositions, as with the point of a diamond, on thousands of hearts, and entitle them to the high place which they have held among the select educational instruments of former generations. Many a scholar saw with regret Plato dropped for a time entirely out of the academic course, and accessible to American students only in the obsolete Græca Majora, or in the imported editions of foreign scholars. And, though their favorite classic author is now brought again within the reach
of American students, and restored in some measure to his proper place in college education, in President Woolsey's scholarly edition of the Gorgias, and Professor Lewis's profound Annotations on portions of the Laws, still many an older and many a younger scholar cannot but sigh to see the simpler and more Socratic Dialogues of Plato superseded, even by the more finished dramatic imitations of his middle life, or the more profound moral and political speculations of his riper years. It is to meet expressed regrets and felt wants of this kind, that the present edition of the Apology and Crito is given to the public.

While these pieces breathe in every part the moral purity, the poetic beauty, and the almost prophetic sublimity, which pervade all Plato's writings, and which have won for him the epithet "divine," they exhibit Socrates more adequately than he appears in any of the works of Xenophon, more truly and purely, just as he was, than he is seen in any of the other writings of Plato. They are therefore the connecting link between the two beloved disciples, and the clue to the interpretation of both. The Apology, especially, written shortly after the death of the Moral Philosopher, and under the full inspiration of his last words and last hours, gives us the very soul of Socrates speaking, as it were, with the very lips of Plato. Mr. Grote has
seen this and, with characteristic wisdom, has made the Apology the corner-stone of his admirable chapter on Socrates. How superior to the cold and barren defence which bears the name of Xenophon on the one hand, and on the other, how pure from the unpractical and impracticable speculations which Plato has interwoven in some of his later dialogues! It is doubtless a faithful representation of the defence, or rather justification, we might almost say, glorification, of his own life, character, and mission, which Socrates actually pronounced before his judges. At the same time, perhaps, it may be regarded as an exemplification of Plato's beau ideal of the true Orator, whose aim and office it is not to save the life of the accused by whatever means of falsehood, bribery, and seduction he can invent, but to set forth the claims of truth and justice in all their native right to command universal obedience. In this view the Apology may, perhaps, be considered as the counterpart of the exposure of rhetoric falsely so called in the Gorgias, and so take its place among the consecutive labors of Plato to realize the idea of all the arts and sciences; though it must be confessed, that the want of the introduction and the dialectic structure, which are so characteristic of the scientific dialogues, seems rather (not to set it aside, as Ast would set it aside, as un-Platonic, for it has all the palpable
and marked peculiarities of Plato's style), but to set it apart to the more specific and no less sacred purpose of a defence by a gifted and beloved disciple of his honored and revered master.

The exordium opens, if we may be allowed to go before the reader with a brief analysis of the piece, with an expression of the astonishment of Socrates at the misrepresentations of his accusers, who have represented nothing as it is, and a declaration of his purpose to speak the plain and simple truth, in the same plain and simple language which he has been accustomed to use in his every day conversations; and as this is his whole office as an orator speaking in his own defence, so it is their sole duty, as judges, to consider whether or not he speaks the truth. (17, 18, A.) This exordium, if it does not set forth Plato's beau ideal of true oratory, in contrast with the studied and false rhetoric of the forum and the schools, yet it no doubt exhibits the author's idea of the style and manner in which Socrates actually defended himself when on trial for his life. Accordingly, we shall find the Socrates of the Apology excluding all artificial rhetoric, all appeals to prejudice or passion, and declaring the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, with the simplicity and directness, the frankness and fearlessness of a phi-
losopher who values truth and justice far more than life. *

After this brief and plain exordium, Socrates asks leave to reply first to his first accusers, those less formal but more powerful and formidable accusers, to wit, who had been insinuating their slanders into the public mind during his life, and who had all the advantage of numbers and time, of a tribunal numerous and credulous, and of not being confronted with the accused; nay, of being personally unknown, except some one of them might chance to be a comic poet (18, v. c.), alluding especially to Aristophanes, whose name is mentioned further on, and his comedy of The Clouds distinctly pointed out. (19, c.) The charges thus informally brought against him were, that, “with a wicked and mischievous curiosity, he inquired into things in heaven above and things under the earth; that he made the worse appear the better reason; and that he taught others to do the same; in short, that he was a natural philosopher and a sophist.” (19, v. cf. 18, v.) Socrates utterly denies the truth of these charges; declares his entire ignorance of natural philosophy as then taught, as well as of the sophist’s art; offers to present witnesses in

* Cf. Valer. Max. VI., 4: Maluitque Socrates extingui, quam Lysias superesse—in allusion to the Oration which Lysias prepared for the use of Socrates, but which Socrates refused to deliver.
proof that he taught no such things to his disciples, and calls upon all present to testify against him, if they had ever heard from him any conversation, great or small, on such subjects. (19, c. d.) Moreover, he did not profess to be a teacher, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, Hippias the Elean, and Evenus the Parian, who drew away the young from the society of the wisest and best citizens (which they might enjoy gratuitously), to receive their instructions at a great price. He congratulated the possessors of such wisdom and power, and would doubtless be very proud if he possessed it himself. But truth obliges him to confess, that he has no part nor lot, great or small, in such knowledge. (19, e.; 20 c.) The modesty and irony which mark this passage, the short dialogue, into which he runs unconsciously, and which is given in the form and the words of the original conversation, and the unfavorable view which he takes of the vague and unprofitable speculations of the physical philosophers who preceded him, are all highly characteristic of the real Socrates, as he appears in the Memorabilia of Xenophon. (Cf. Mem. I., 1, 11, seqq.; I., 2, 3, seqq. et passim.)

"But what then is your business or profession? What have you said or done to raise all this hue and cry about you?" In answer to this question, Socrates admits that he bore the name of philoso-
pher, or wise man. But he pretended to merely human wisdom, such as man may properly aspire to, and such as pertains to the proper regulation of human life. (20, d. e.) This wisdom he did indeed possess. And in proof that he did, he would refer them to no less authority than the God at Delphi. (21, a.) He never supposed himself to be wise in any sense, till, in response to a question of his friend and the friend of the people (Chærephon), the Delphic Oracle declared, that there was none wiser than he. Not daring to discredit the Oracle, he then set himself to discover in what possible sense, if indeed in any sense, he was wiser than others. (21, b. c.) Accordingly he visited successively various classes of men in high repute for wisdom—politicians, poets, orators, philosophers, artisans, &c.; and he discovered to his surprise, that while they really understood pretty well their respective departments, they fancied they understood everything else (22, d.), though, in fact, with a partial exception in favor of the artisans, they did not understand the fundamental principles even of their own profession. (22, c.) And they all, without exception, thought they knew a great deal more than they did know, while he was conscious that he knew almost nothing. (21, d.) And when he came to inquire whether he would choose to be as he was, or to have their wisdom with their want
of self-knowledge, he was constrained to answer, that he would rather be as he was, and so to assent to the truth of the Oracle (22, B.) ; though he modestly adds, that the chief intent of the Oracle was doubtless to teach this general truth, that he was the wisest of men, who preferred that kind of wisdom which Socrates cultivated, viz., the moral and practical, and who, like Socrates, was conscious of the poverty of his acquirements in knowledge, and the comparative worthlessness of all the wisdom of men. (23, A. B.)

In the course of the investigation which he thus prosecuted, he offended all he visited, by showing them that they knew far less than they supposed. At the same time, his pupils (or rather his young friends and followers, for, as in Xenophon, so in Plato, Socrates never speaks of his disciples) delighted themselves in exposing, after his example, the ignorance of the many pretenders to superior knowledge. (23, c.) And they were angry, not with themselves, but with the innocent occasion of their humiliation. Accordingly they began to call him a most impious fellow, a corrupter of youth, and the like. When asked how; what he did; what he taught; having nothing else to say, they took up and turned against him the prejudice and calumny which the multitude were so ready to entertain against philosophers in general. (23, d.) They
confounded him with the very naturalists and sophists whom he had ever labored to confute, and thus sought to concentrate upon him the suspicion and indignation which they had incurred.

So much for the informal charges. And these prepared the way for the formal indictment for corrupting the youth and endeavoring to subvert the religion of his country. Of his three accusers, Socrates informs the judges that Meletus was angry with him for exposing, as above described, the poets, Anytus for the artisans and politicians, and Lycon for the orators. (23, r.) They were all actuated by selfish and revengeful feelings. Anytus, it should be added, was a rich leather-seller, and a man of influence in the democracy; and when Socrates seeing signs of intellectual capacity in his son, endeavored to dissuade the father from bringing up his son to his own trade, Anytus was personally offended (Apol. Xen. 29), and was able easily to turn the passions of the populace against the reputed master of the tyrant Critias and the now hated Alcibiades. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I., 2, 12.)

In defence of himself against the charge of corrupting the youth, Socrates enters into a very characteristic dialogue with Meletus, asking, who it is that corrupts the youth, and who makes them wiser and better; whether the judges, senators, and members of the Assembly also corrupt them, or
whether he is their only corrupter, and whether it is likely to be the single individual that corrupts, and the multitude that instruct and reform, or quite the contrary, just as it is in the training of horses and the lower animals; and if he is such a corrupter of the young, whether he does it voluntarily or involuntarily, of which alternatives the former is quite incredible, since he must know that he could not corrupt them without injuring himself, and in the latter alternative, he ought not to be impeached and punished, but to be instructed and made wiser. (24, b.; 26, a.) The conclusion of this very Socratic piece of extemporized dialectics is, that Socrates, if not too wise and good to corrupt the youth, must be too ignorant to deserve punishment for it; and that Meletus, with all his assumed superiority in wisdom and virtue, neither knows nor cares, how young men can be made either better or worse. The argument, by which Socrates exculpates himself, will probably strike most modern readers as more subtle than conclusive in its reasoning, and somewhat dangerous withal in its practical tendency, since, carried out to its legitimate result, it would seem to prove that all crimes must be involuntary, and all criminals proper objects of commiseration and instruction, rather than of punishment. And we see not how the objection can be answered. It lies, however, not only against
the argument here, but against the doctrine of Socrates, which, everywhere, in Xenophon and Plato alike, resolves all the virtues into knowledge, and, by consequence, all the vices into sins of ignorance.

Taking up the other point in the indictment, Socrates now asks, whether his accuser means to charge him only with denying the gods of the state, or with downright atheism; and on being distinctly charged with the latter, he shows that this is utterly inconsistent with the language of the indictment itself, which charges him with recognizing and teaching “other divine things,” and if there are “divine things,” then surely there must be divinities. Just as he who speaks of human affairs, must needs recognize the existence of human beings, so in teaching δαιμόνια, he must needs recognize δαιμόνες; and if δαιμόνες, then, according to the prevailing Greek idea, either gods or sons of gods; and if sons of gods, then of course gods. (26, β.; 27, ε.)

Having thus disposed of his principal accuser, Socrates boldly tells the Athenians, that he has to fear, not the indictment of Meletus, but the envy and jealousy of the multitude, which had destroyed many other good men, and would probably destroy him. “Why then persist in a course of conduct which you expect will occasion your death?”
"Because," such is the substance of the answer, "the great question for a man to ask, is not whether life or death will be the result of his conduct, but whether he is doing right or wrong, and acting the part of a good or bad man; as the heroes of the Trojan war, and all true heroes, have ever despised danger and death in the path of duty and glory." (28, b. c. d.) "I should behave strangely," he continues, "if when your commanders, Athenians, stationed me at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I kept my post at the peril of my life, but when the God sets me down in Athens to spend my life in the pursuit of philosophy and in the examination of myself and others, then I should leave my post through fear of death. In that case, I might well and truly be charged with not believing in the gods, since I disobeyed the Oracle and feared death, and thought myself wise when I was not. For to fear death is to think one's self wise, when he is not; for it is to think one knows what he does not know. None know death. They do not know but it is the greatest good; yet they fear it, as if they knew it was the greatest of evils. I will never flee from what may be the greatest good, viz., death, into such base and criminal acts as must be the greatest evils." (28, e.; 29, a. b.)

"If you were to assure me of my acquittal in case I would pledge myself to abandon this philo-
sophizing and questioning manner of life, my reply would be, I respect and love you, but I will obey the God rather than you. While I live and breathe, I will never cease to proclaim the superiority of wisdom and virtue and the well-being of the soul, to riches and honor and the welfare of the body, to young and old, to citizens and foreigners, but especially to you, my fellow-citizens, as you are most nearly related to me, and because it especially becomes the honored name of Athenians. For this is the divine command, and this is for your highest interest. (29, c.; 30, c.) And if you put me to death, be assured you will not injure me so much as yourselves. Me none of my accusers could injure in the least; for I do not think it lawful, or possible, in the nature of things, for a better man to be injured by a worse man. I am therefore now defending, not so much myself as you; that you may not put me to death and so reject the gift of God to you, for you will not soon find another such. (30, d. e.) That I am the gift of God to the city, you will see from this. Does it seem merely human, that I have neglected my own affairs so many years and attended to your interests, persuading you like a father or an elder brother, to cultivate virtue? And all this without any pecuniary compensation; for among all their false accusations, they have not dared to accuse me
of receiving pay for my instruction; and if they had, my poverty would have been a sufficient witness against them." (30, E; 31, c.)

If any were disposed to ask, why he went about and persuaded them privately and personally, instead of coming before the people and counselling them as a body, he had been kept back from the latter course by a certain divine monitor* which had attended him from his childhood—a sort of voice which always deterred him from doing what he should not do, and which had usually forbidden his participation in public affairs. And well it might, for if he had undertaken to act his part in public, he would have been put to death long ago, and that without having rendered any real service to them or to himself; for no man could be safe in publicly opposing the inclinations of the Athenian or any other popular assembly, and forbidding them to do wrong. (31.) In proof of this, he adverts to the imminent peril to which he was exposed in the only instance in which he had held an office, when, as senator and presiding officer in the popular assembly, he resisted the will of the demus, and defended the lives of the ten generals when they were intent on putting them to death by one sweeping and extra-judicial decree. (32, A. B.) He

* Touching the nature of this divine voice and monitor, see the discussion in the notes.
had also incurred a similar peril, and exhibited the same disregard for danger and death, in refusing to obey an unrighteous command of the oligarchy, when they possessed the government. (32, c. d.)

These were well-known facts, which might be proved by any number of witnesses. And such facts showed that he, or any one else who would contend strenuously for the right, must do it privately rather than politically, if he would preserve his life even for a short period. They proved also, that his influence over the young, by precept and especially by example, so far from corrupting, was suited to inspire them with an inflexible regard for justice. And if further proof was required, since his accusers had failed to bring forward the proper witnesses at the proper time, he would gladly yield the stand and let them bring forward now the fathers and elder brothers of the very young men who had been his most constant hearers and companions; for though the young men themselves might have some reason for withholding the truth, if he had corrupted them, certainly their fathers and elder brothers could have no such motive, and the judges ought to be put in possession of their testimony. (33, d. ; 34, b.)

Having thus finished his defence, Socrates proceeds to excuse himself from any attempt to enlist the sympathies and excite the compassion of the
judges in his behalf. This practice had indeed become very common in the courts of justice—so common, that it might seem strange and even arrogant for him not to do likewise. He had a wife and children, and friends whom he tenderly loved, and whose grief at his death would doubtless be very great. But such weakness, worthy only of women, was especially unworthy of Athenian men; and if seen in their great men, particularly in one who, like himself, was reputed, whether justly or unjustly, to be a man of extraordinary virtue, it was not only dishonorable to him, but it would reflect dishonor on the whole people. (35, A. B. C.) Besides, it was doing a great wrong to the judges, who needed not entreaties, but instruction and persuasion, and whose duty it was, not to sacrifice justice to personal feelings and interests, but simply to execute the laws. And not only justice but piety forbade the offering of any inducements to them to violate their oath of office; and if he should hold out any such inducements, he would thereby teach them that there were no gods, and so convict himself of atheism in the very act of defending himself against the charge. They must therefore excuse him from resorting to such methods of securing his acquittal, which he could not but regard as at once dishonorable, unholy, and unjust. (35, D.)
With these noble sentiments, asking no favor of his judges, he submits himself to their sense of justice. They condemn him by a majority of only six votes. Resuming his address, he declares that he is neither grieved nor surprised by the result. He is only surprised by the smallness of the majority by which he was condemned. (36, A.) Pronounced guilty by his judges, the next question was, what should be the penalty. His accusers said, Death. In naming a counter-proposition, as the laws allowed him to do, if he looked simply at the justice and fitness of the thing, he should propose that he be supported in the Prytaneum (State-House) at the public expense, that he might devote himself without interruption to the instruction of the people. This was a suitable return for his disinterested devotion to their highest good in time past, and this would be for their highest welfare in time to come. If this honor was justly conferred on the victor at the Olympic Games, who did not need it and who ministered only to their seeming happiness, much more was it due to him, who needed it, and who had spent his life in promoting their real good. (36, B. C. D.) And with longer time, he might perhaps be able to persuade them of his innocence. (37, A.) He deserved only good at their hands. If he should suffer death, that would perhaps prove a good. Why then
should he propose an alternative penalty, which would be a certain evil? Should he propose imprisonment? That were to subject himself to the power and caprice of the Eleven, whoever they might chance to be. (37, B. C.) Exile? His countrymen could not endure his instruction and reproof; much less would strangers. (37, B.) And for him to keep silence, though they would not believe it, were to disobey the God, and for that reason it were quite impossible. (37, E.) To live without examining himself and others were no life to him—were a life not worthy to be lived by any human being. (38, A.) Should he then propose a fine? If he had property he would part with it cheerfully, for loss of property was no evil. But he had not property enough. If indeed a mina (about $17) would suffice, perhaps he could pay a mina. He would therefore propose a fine of one mina. And since his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus bade him propose thirty minæ, he would adjudge himself to pay a fine of thirty minæ, and give these friends as his security. (38, B.)

This high-toned vindication of his character and deserts, together with his virtual refusal to name any alternative punishment, sealed his death. He doubtless expected it would, and intended it should. The last chapter of Xenophon's Memorabilia is devoted to a statement of the reasons, and those
for the most part assigned in a conversation by Socrates himself, why it was better, in his own view—better for his happiness and usefulness as well as for his fame—that he should die now, rather than live to a more advanced age. With this deliberate preference and in full view of the consequences, he made his defence so as almost to necessitate the desired result. By an increased majority he was condemned to death. And in resuming the thread of his discourse, he tells those who condemned him, that he did not regret the result—that death would have come soon in the course of nature, and he would much rather die uttering such a defence, than live by such ignoble means as many use. (38, c. d. e.) It is not difficult to escape death—he could readily have escaped it *—but the difficulty is to escape sin, which is a swifter runner than even death, and has already overtaken his accusers, younger and swifter though they be than himself. (39, a. b.) And, as men are sometimes inspired with something like prophetic vision in their last hours, he warns his judges, who voted for his condemnation, that speedy vengeance will overtake them in the reproofs of their own conscience and of the numerous friends of virtue who would come after him; and the only

escape was not by cutting off their reprovers, but by reforming their own character and life. (39, c. d.)

Then turning to the judges who had voted for his acquittal, and who alone deserved the sacred name of judges, he labors to console them touching the issue, which they so much deplore, by giving them the true interpretation of it. (39, e.) He could not but argue that it was meant for good. For the prophetic voice—the voice of the divinity—which had often and always warned him heretofore when he was going to do wrong even in the smallest matters, now when life was at stake and he was exposed to what are commonly regarded as the extremest of evils, had given him no warning in the whole course of his trial. Hence he inferred that death was not, as it was commonly supposed to be, an evil, but a good. (40, A. B.)

The presumption thus suggested by the divine Providence towards himself, might be justified and confirmed by the following considerations: Death is either annihilation, or, which is essentially the same thing, a state of entire unconsciousness; or else it is a departure of the soul from this world to another. On the former supposition, death would be a wonderful gain; for how few of our days and nights are so happy as the hours we pass in sound sleep, undisturbed by so much as a dream; and in that case, all time would seem no more than one
such dreamless night. (40, c. d. e.) But if, on the other hand, death is a departure from this world to another, where dwell all the dead, what greater good could there be than this? There, freed from the power of judges falsely so called, he would find judges that deserved the name, such as Minos and Rhadamanthus; there he would associate with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer; there he should meet with Palamedes, Ajax, and all who in past ages had fallen victims to perverted justice; and what was better than all the rest, there he should examine and put to the test Agamemnon, Ulysses, and a multitude of other men and other women, as he examined men here, to see if they were truly wise, or only supposed themselves to be so; and this would be immense happiness: nor would he be put to death there for the exercise of this prerogative, since besides their superior blessedness in other respects, the dwellers in that world are immortal. (41, a. b. c.) In conclusion, he assures his judges once more, that no evil can befall a good man in life or death, since the gods take care of his interests, and these events have not befallen him by chance, but have been ordered by a wise and kind Providence; tells them that he harbors no resentment against them, since, though they meant it for evil, they had done him good; entreats them to take vengeance on his sons, by inflicting on them
the same pains he had inflicted on his pleasure-loving countrymen, if they are ever seen caring more for riches or anything else than for virtue, or thinking more highly of themselves than they ought to think, for this, and this only, will be a just recompense for what he has done for the Athenian people; and then he takes leave of them, saying, Now it is time that we depart—I to die, you to live; and which of us is going to the better destiny is known only to the Deity.

Such, in substance, is the Defence of Socrates. So far from believing that we are indebted to the imagination of Plato for the lofty character of Socrates, as he appears in this Apology, we cannot but feel that we owe the elevation and eloquence of the Apology to the real greatness and heroism of its subject. The form and the words may be Plato's; but the substance and the spirit must be Socrates's; and we need only to have heard it from his lips to perfect the moral sublime. Profane literature has nowhere furnished a better delineation of the spiritual hero, rising superior to the fear and the favor of man in the strength of his own conscious integrity and of a serene trust in God. Faith in God, which had been the controlling principle of his life, was the power that sustained him in view of approaching death, inspired him with more than human fortitude in his last days, and in-
vested his dying words with a moral grandeur that "has less of earth in it than heaven." The consciousness of a divine mission was the leading trait in his character and the main secret of his power. This directed his conversations, shaped his philosophy, imbued his very person, and controlled his life. This determined the time and manner of his death. And this abiding conviction—this "ruling passion strong in death," is the very life and breath and all-pervading atmosphere of the Apology.

Nor is the religious element less pervading and controlling in the Crito, though there social duty and political principle are also made prominent. This piece presents Socrates to us in prison awaiting the execution of his unjust sentence. There Crito—the friend and benefactor of his youth, the companion of his middle-life, and the stay and staff of his advanced years—calls upon him at break of day, and, finding him in sound sleep, sits down by his side in silent admiration of his calmness on the very eve of death. Socrates awakes, and a dialogue ensues, beginning in the natural and easy manner so characteristic of Plato, leading on easily to the discussion of the topic which lies nearest Crito's heart, viz., the release of his friend, and ending, like the Apology, in a strain of rapt and inspired

eloquence, before which Crito himself stands convinced, silenced, and overawed, as in the presence of some superior being.

After inquiring the hour, how Crito gained admission so early, and why he had not awaked him sooner, which leads him to remark upon the absurdity of shrinking from death, especially at his advanced age, Socrates asks the errand of his friend at that early hour. Crito replies, that the sacred ship (during whose voyage no one could be put to death at Athens) was drawing near on its return from Delos—that it would probably arrive that day, and on the day following, Socrates must die. (43, A. B. C. D.) Socrates expresses his readiness to die whenever it pleases the gods, but adds his belief that the ship would not arrive till the next day, and his execution would take place on the third day, assigning as the reason for that opinion a dream and vision; which he had just seen in sleep, and which it was well that Crito had not disturbed. A beautiful woman, dressed in white, had appeared to him, calling him and repeating the words of Homer touching the return of Achilles to his native land: "On the third day, Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia," which he interpreted as a divine intimation, and therefore infallible proof, that on the third day he would reach his home in a better world. (44, A. B.) Beautiful fiction, if the dream
was the offspring of Plato's imagination! More beautiful fact, if the dream was real! And we know not why we should doubt it. What more natural, than that such a notorious dreamer, so familiar with all the poetry of his country, especially that of Homer, and meditating of his speedy departure with lively and joyful imaginings by day, should dream of it under so poetical and attractive a form by night!

Crito now proceeds to press him with various and urgent motives—justice to himself, duty to his wife and children, regard to the affection and reputation of his friends, and the like—to bribe his keepers, forfeit his bail, and make his escape, declaring that it can be done at a very small expense, and he and the other friends would gladly meet any losses or dangers which might befall them in such a course, rather than lose such a friend, and moreover, incur the disgrace with the multitude of sacrificing him to the love of money. (44, c.; 46.) "But why, my dear Crito, why should we so much regard the opinion of the multitude? For the best men, whose opinion is most worthy of consideration, will believe that these things are, as they are in reality, and that not you, but myself, am responsible for my death." "Nevertheless, you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude, for the present circumstances show that the
multitude can effect, not the smallest of evils only, but nearly the greatest, if one is calumniated among them." "I could wish, Crito, the multitude were able to effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good; for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise nor unwise." The same simple but sublime sentiment with which we have become familiar in the Apology: Character is the only thing pertaining to man that is of any account; and this his bitterest enemies cannot touch. "But they do just what they happen to do." (44, d. c.) That is, the conduct of the multitude, instead of being regulated by intelligent principle, is governed by blind chance; and such labors, however strenuous, are always fruitless. Accordingly, next to his great moral and religious mission, it was the perpetual study of Socrates's life to bring his countrymen, especially the young men of Athens, to a right understanding of themselves, their duties, and their pursuits, and thereby to an intelligent discharge of all the functions of proper manhood in the light of established rules and fixed principles.

The opinions of the multitude, he goes on to argue, are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; while the standard of rectitude is unchangeable and eternal. Our duty depends, not on the opinions of the multitude, nor does it change with the change
of our circumstances and interests. It has nothing to do with the consequences of our actions. Imprisonment, exile, death itself—these are bugbears to frighten children with, but they will not deter the true man from the performance of his duty, or swerve him in the least from adherence to principle. As to his escape from the prison without the consent of the rulers of the state, the great question, and the only question he can entertain is, whether it is right, since right reason is the only friend to whose solicitation he ever allowed himself to yield. The alacrity of his friends was very commendable, if rightly directed, but if not, the greater it was, by so much it was the more blameworthy. Against the dictates of reason and conscience, he could not be influenced in the least by a regard to the reputation of his friends or his own life. (46, b.; 47, a.)

A discussion ensues, in which Socrates proves to the conviction of Crito himself, that, in such a question, regard must be had, not to the opinions of the ignorant multitude, but of the truly wise, just as, in gymnastic exercises, the gymnast gives heed to the approbation or censure only of the physician or the master of the gymnasium (47, b. c. d.); that by acting unwisely and unjustly, the soul is corrupted and destroyed, which is a far greater evil than the disease or destruction of the body (47, b.; 48, b.); that it is not right to injure or retaliate an
injury in any case, least of all against one's country (49, A. seqq.) ; that the well-being of our coun-
try depends on the sacredness of the laws and the 
obedience of the citizens (50, B.), and our country 
should be obeyed and reverenced as a more sacred 
thing than father, or mother, or the dearest friends 
(51, A. B.); that a citizen by no means stands on an 
equal footing with his country, so as to have a right 
to treat her as she treats him, or to pronounce judg-
ment on her acts as she does on his (50, E.); that 
every citizen who remains in a free country, which 
allows the inhabitants full liberty to emigrate when 
and where they please (especially if, like Socrates, 
he has remained during a long life, and never gone 
abroad at all, and never complained of the laws), 
has virtually assented to the justice of the laws, 
and has entered into a tacit compact to obey them, 
as interpreted and executed by their appointed 
guardians, unless he can persuade them to alter 
their decisions (52, A.; 53, A.); and that by escap-
ing the penalty imposed upon him by the laws, he 
would convict himself of being a law-breaker, and 
make himself an object of suspicion as an enemy 
of law and justice, wherever he might go on earth, 
and even in Hades (53, B.; 54, B.). As the discus-
sion proceeds, the laws seem to rise in dignity and 
sacredness, till they are seen embodied in a form 
more than human and enthroned in unearthly
majesty; and they are heard, in meek yet authoritative tones, expostulating with Socrates on the injustice, folly, and pernicious tendency of the course which his friends are recommending. Socrates, too, catches the spirit of the laws, becomes instinct, as it were, with their life, and, like the Pythian priestess or an inspired corybant, deaf to every other voice, can do only as the voice of law (which is the voice of God) commands him: "The voice of these expostulations rings in my ears, and I am unable to hear other arguments. Be assured, if you urge any thing of a contrary tenor, you will labor in vain. This way God leads; and in this way let us follow."

The Crito, like the Apology and the other dialogues that were written soon after the death of Socrates, has a twofold object—the one practical and personal, the vindication of Socrates from the charge of impiety, and corrupting the youth—the other ideal and universal, to exhibit the true idea of the good citizen, or the good man in his relation to the state. And, it is not too much to say, it accomplishes both these objects perfectly. It is a triumphant vindication of the character of Socrates, setting his patriotism in the strongest light, and showing that he sacrificed his life to what most men would deem an overscrupulous regard for the constituted authorities, even in an unjust and unright-
eous exercise of the power intrusted to them. At
the same time, it sets forth a perfect pattern of
the patriotic and loyal citizen, submitting to an un-
righteous sentence (so long as it was according to
the form of law, and since it concerned only himself,
while no usurped authority of oligarchy or democ-
racy could force him to do wrong to others), and
with heroic, nay, religious devotion, laying him-
self a willing victim before the laws and on the
altar of his country.

As a work of art, the Crito ranks very high—
higher than the Apology; though, we think, the
latter is capable of full vindication in this light,
and stands on higher ground, simply as a work of
art, than is commonly supposed. But the Crito,
though the plot is exceedingly simple, and the moral
of the dialogue is every where conspicuous, yet it is
conformed to the most rigid rules of the drama.
The unities of time, place and impression, are per-
fectly preserved. The scene is laid wholly in the
prison—perhaps the same cell hewn out of the solid
rock, near the Pnyx and the Agora, which now bears
the name of "The Prison of Socrates." The hour
is the morn of his anticipated execution, when he is
awaked out of sound sleep by a visit of his most in-
timate personal friend, who comes, if possible, to
persuade him to escape, as he easily may, the exe-
cution of his unjust sentence. The characters are
of the highest dignity and interest in themselves, and most intimately related to each other—Athens' wisest and best philosopher, and one of her wealthiest and most deserving citizens. The subject of discussion, as stated in the traditionary caption of the dialogue, and in the dialogue itself, is τὸ πρᾶξις τῆς ὑπάρχουσας τῆς τῆς πόλεως, or, WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, involving the whole duty of the citizen to the laws of his country, and, more remotely, the fundamental theory of government and society. On the result hang the life of the philosopher, the reputation and happiness of his numerous friends, and the interests of good order and good government, not only in Athens, but wherever Athenian influence shall be felt to the end of time. The persons, the principles, the interests involved, all awaken the liveliest sympathy. The affectionate solicitations, the persuasive arguments, the pathetic appeals, the generous friendship and self-sacrificing devotion of Crito, go to our hearts. While he speaks, we are more than half inclined to think, that not the desirable and the expedient only, but the true and the right, are on his side. But Socrates, forgetting himself, overlooking his family and friends, and looking beyond the mere reputation of Athens, and even the right and wrong of the present case in itself considered, holds us sternly to the consideration of the great principles of law and order which it involves, and
compels the assent of our reason and conscience, though against all our inclinations, and against the first dictates of our understandings. The conflict enters the breast of the reader. His judgment is perplexed with doubts and difficulties. His heart alternately hopes and fears the success of either party in the argument. As he feels constrained to assent more and more to the reasoning of Socrates, he wishes he could have decided otherwise. In the felicitous language of Stallbaum: "Etenim generosa Critonis amicitia æque afficiat et commoveat legentium animos necesse est, atque Socratis in virtute, constantia et pia adversus leges publicas reverentia, ut velis idem et cum Socrate noluisse et cum Critone voluisse." And when, at the conclusion, Socrates, transported with veneration for the purity and dignity of the law, not of men only but of God also, and rapt with the vision of what awaited him beyond the grave, rises into something more than human, we sit looking on, by the side of his friend Crito and in the same state of mind, silenced, convinced against our will, no longer pitying, still less censuring, but admiring, envying, almost worshipping him, as he looks upward and longs to take his flight.

The Apology and the Crito bear unequivocal evidence of proceeding from the same author; and that author, Ast to the contrary notwithstanding, Plato, and Plato under the same hallowing and in
spiring influence, and in the same happy state of mind. The language, the style, the constructions, the idioms, are all Platonic. The sentiments and the spirit are those of Plato under the immediate inspiration of the life and death of Socrates. They are both dramatic, and this marks them both as of Platonic origin. True, the one is a monologue, and the other is a dialogue. But thus only could he act his proper part in the different circumstances in which he is placed. In the one, he pleads his cause in open court before his judges; in the other, he argues his case in prison with his friend. But in both, we see him, we hear him, we sit at his feet, we drink in his words, we catch his spirit. In the one, he stands before us the impersonation of the true orator; in the other, the model of the good citizen. But in both, the man rises far above his relations; the spirit overmasters the body and triumphs over all its outward circumstances. In both, we feel a spontaneous and irresistible conviction, that we see and hear the real Socrates uttering essentially his own sentiments, in essentially his own language, in two of the most real and most critical emergencies of his life. But in both we see him dramatized and idealized, at the same time that he is made real and represented as he is, with that inimitable skill and grace, which, together with his high spirituality, are the undisputed prerogatives of the divine Plato.
The present edition is, in the main, an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition, 1846. The few exceptions are specified in the notes, and the reasons given for the choice of a different reading. The notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent reading of the same author. Wherever I have consciously borrowed from him, I have given him credit in the notes. I have also had before me the editions of Bekker, Fischer, Forster, Heindorf, Ast, Schleiermacher, Buttmann, Nüsslin, Elberling, etc., together with versions in German, French, and English, too numerous to mention; and have used them whenever they could be of use, though most of them have been of very little service. In conclusion, I can hardly leave a better wish for the student of these pages than that, with far less labor than they have cost me, he may receive some small portion of the pleasure and profit which I have derived from them. He must be more or less than human, who can rise from the study of these immortal works of Plato, without higher ideas of the authority of law, the sacredness of duty, the power of faith, and the dignity of man's rational, moral, and immortal nature.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

17 ΣΑΡ. Ι. "Ο τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, πε- πόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὅλην ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθὲς γε, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, ούδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὃν ἐγεύσαντο, τότε, ἐν ὑ ἔλεγον, Β οὗ χρὴν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατη- θῆτε, ὡς δεινὸν ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀισχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθῆσονται ἔργα, ἐπειδὰν μηδὲ ὑποτειχων φαίνομαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτῳ μοι ἠδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀνασχυπτότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ὧρα δεινον καλοῦσιν ὅτι καὶ λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοντα, ὑμολογοῦν ἐν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ, οὔτοι μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὕτω ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ’ ἐμοῦ ἀκού- σεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀληθείαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δι’, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλωστημένους γε λόγον, ὡσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημέ- ονος, ἀλλ’ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχόσων ὀνόμασι· πιστεύον γὰρ δικαία εἶναι δ’ λέγον, καὶ μη- δεῖς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δῆτον
πρέποι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, τήδε τῇ ἥλικία, ὅσπερ μειρακίφ, πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσινέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούντε ὑμῶν ἀπολογουμένων, δι' ὅσπερ εἰῶδα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἀλλοί, μὴτε Ἱανμάζεως μὴτε Ὑφρυβεῖν τοῦτον ἔνεκα. Δ ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως. νῦν ἐγώ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐτή γεγονός πλεῖω εἴδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς ὑμῶν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνδάδε λέξεως. ὅσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὧτε ξένος ἐπήγγειλαν ἄν, ἔννεφισμός κατεβάζετε ἄντων ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἔκεινη τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐλεγον, ἐν ὅσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τούτῳ ὑμῶν ἀφοῦ δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐαυτὸν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ τι χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—ἀυτὸ δὲ τούτῳ σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τῶν νοῶν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγει, ἢ μὴ· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὐτή ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τάληθη λέγειν. Εἴη: Π

ΣΑΡ. ΠΙ. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμι ἀπολογησάσθαι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτὰ μου ψευδὴ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπείτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ υστερα καὶ τοὺς υστέρους. Ἕμοι γὰρ θ' πολλοὶ κατηγοροῦν γεγόνας πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἦδη ἔτη καὶ ὅμιλα ἄληθές λέγοντες· οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτοῦ, καὶ περὶ δυνατα καὶ τούτους δεινοὺς. ἀλλ', ἐκείνοι δεινοτέροι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παιδῶν παραλαμβάνοντες ἔτελεύτων τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ οὖδὲν ἄληθές, ὡς ἐστὶ τοῖς Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τα τε μετέωρα φροντιστής,
καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντα ἀνεξηκτηκῶς, καὶ τὸν ἦττων ὁ λόγον κρεῖττω ποιῶν. οὕτως, δὲ ἄνδρες ἌΘηναιοι, ταῦτὰ τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰςι μονοκατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκοῦοντες ἔχονται τοῖς ταύτα εὐτούντας οὕτως θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτὰ εἰςὶν οὕτως οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολίν χρόνων ἡ δ κατηγορηκότες, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ εἰ ταύτη τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παιδεῖς ὑμῖν, ἐνοι δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, ἀπολογομενένους ὑμεῖς. δὲ πάντων ἀλογότατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόματα ὑμῶν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν,

Πλὴν εἰ τις καμφροτοίς τυγχάνει ὁς. δοσε δὲ φθόνος καὶ διαβολή χρόμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειξαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸι πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείδοντες, οὕτως πάντως ἀπορωτατοι εἰσίν· οὕτως γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οὕτως τε ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἑναυτοὶ οὗτοι ἐλέγει οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογομεμένου τε καὶ ἐλέγχεις μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. Ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μοι τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἀρτὶ κατηγορήσαντας, Ἐὐτερους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω. καὶ οἶδεθε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνος πρῶτον μὲ ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνως πρῶτον ἴκουσατε κατηγοροῦντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τούτῳ τῶν ὑστεροί.

19 Ἐἰκεν ἀπολογητέον δή, δὲ ἄνδρες ἌΘηναιοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν, ἡν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχέτε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὄλγοις χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἰ τί ἄμενον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἕμοι, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι.
Ἀπολογούμενον· οίμαί δὲ αὐτῷ χαλεπῶν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ μὲ λαυδάνει αὐτὸν ἐστιν. ὡμοὶ τούτο μὲν ἢ τῆς τῷ Θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστεύω καὶ ἀπολογήτητέων. Εὐσ. —

ΚΑΠ. ΙΙΙ. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν εἴς ἄρχης, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, εἴς ἡς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γράφην ταύτην. Β Εἰπών. τί δὴ λέγουσι διέβαλλεν οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥστερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνώσαι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ξητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἤτοι λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλοις ταῦτα ταύτα διδάσκουν. Τοιαύτης τίς ἐστιν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔωρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κομφοδίας. Σωκράτης τῶν ἐκεὶ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας φλυαροῦσα· ὅπως εὖ οὐδὲν οὕτως μεγά οὕτως σμικρὸν πέρι ἑπατὼ, καὶ οὕτως ἢς ἀτμιάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τῆς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἔστι· μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαῦτας δίκας φίγομι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέσατοι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοῖς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἄξιώ ὑμῶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἰσί. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλως, εἰ πώποτε ἢ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα ήκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσθητε, ὅτε τοιαύτ' ἐστι καὶ ταλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἄρη οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

ΚΑΠ. ΙV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτως τούτων οὔδεν ἐστίν,
οὐδὲ ἦ' εἰ τίνος ἀκηκόατε, ὡς ἐγὼ παίδευειν ἐπιχειρῶ Εὐδρόπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τούτο ἄλλη- 
дейς. ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις 
οἶς τ' εἰπὶ παιδεύειν ἄνδρώπους, ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ 
Δεοτυίνος, καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος, καὶ Ἰππιάς ὁ Ἡλεῖος. 
τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστὸς, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἶος τ' ἐστὶν ἵδι εἰς 
ἐκάστην τῶν πολεων τοὺς νέους, οῖς ἔξεστι τῶν ἐαυ-
τῶν πολιτῶν προίκα ξυνεῖναι ὃ ἂν βούλωνται, τοῦ-
των πείδουσι τὰς ἐκεῖνων ἐννοοῦσι ἀπολυπόντας 
20 σφισι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσείδε-
ναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἄνηρ ἐστι Πάριος εὐδαίδε σοφός, 
ὅν ἐγὼ ἠεὐδόμην ἐπιθυμοῦντα· ἐντυχὼν γὰρ προσελλὼν 
ἀνδρὶ, ἰπτελεκε χρήματα σοφιστῶς πελεὼ ἢ ἤμι-
παιτε ὁ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἰππονίκου. τούτων οὖν 
ἀνηρόμην· ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο νιέε· ὁ Καλλίᾳ, 
ὅν ἐγὼ, εἰ μέν σου τῷ νιέε πώλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγε-
νέσθην, εἶχομεν ἂν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάτην λαβέων καὶ 
βμαθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ κακαλο 
ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ὃς ἔναν ὁρὸς ἢ 
toων ἱππικῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱσσωργικῶν· τῶν ἐπειδὴ 
ἀνθρώπων ἑστόν, τίς αὐτῶν ἐν νῳ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην 
λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε 
καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἑστίν; οίμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφ-
θαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νιέων κτῆσιν. ἔστε τις, ἐβην ἐγὼ, ἢ 
οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἂν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ ποδαπός; 
καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὖννος, ἐβη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, Πά-
ριος, πέντε μνών. Καὶ ἐγὼ τῶν Εὐννού ἐμακάρισα, εἰ 
ἥτις ἄλλῳ ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμε-
σθῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλινόμην τε καλ
ἡβρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταύτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἄθηναιοι.

Ὡς τοπολάβοι οὖν ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἵσως, Ἄλλῳ, ὁ Σάκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πράγμα; πῶσεν αἱ διαβο-

λαί σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δῆτον, σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου, ἔσεται
tοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τί ἐπραττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ. λέγε ὅντι ἦμων, τί ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ
ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζομεν. Ταυτὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ

δικαια λέγεων ὁ λέγων, κἂν ὑμῶν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖ-
ξαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τε ἄνομα
cαὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἱσως μὲν δόξω
τισὶν ὑμῶν παλξεῖν, εἰ μέντοι ἵστε, πάσαν ὑμῶν τὴν
ἀληθεῶν ἔρω. Ἄγω γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἄθηναιοι, δι'
ούδεν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ἄνομα ἔσχηκα.

πολλαν δὴ σοφιαν ταύτην; ἦπερ ἐστὶν ἵσως ἀνδροτικὴ

σοφία. τῷ δοτὶ γὰρ κινδυνεῦω ταύτην εἶναι σοφὸς·

οὔτοι δὲ τάχ' ἂν, οὐς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μεῖξω τινὰ ἢ κατ'
ἀνδροπον σοφιαν σοφοὶ ἔδινα, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω· οὐ ἔ

γὰρ δὴ ἐγώγοι αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰς φηοὶ σεϋ-

δεῖ τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολὴ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὁ

ἄνδρες Ἄθηναιοι, μὴ ἀκουσθῆτε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξῳ τι

ὑμῶι μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἑρῶ τὸν λόγον, ἀν ἂν

λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεον ὑμῶι τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω.

τής γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τις ἔστη σοφία καὶ οἶα, μάρτυρα

ὑμῶι παρέξωμαι τῶν Ἡθῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Ἡαιρε-21

φῶντα γὰρ ἵστε ποι. οὖτος ἐμὸς τε ἐταῖρος ἢν ἐκ νέον,

καὶ ὑμῶι τῷ πλήθει ἕταρος τε καὶ ξυσφυγή τὴν

φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶι κατήλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ,
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΙΣ.

οδος ἦν Χαρεφών, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἔφ᾽ ὦ τι ὁρμησειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἑτὸλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι,—καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ ἱορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες. ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τις ἐμοῦ εἰς σοφότερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφότερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἄδελφος ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ ὑποσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνος τετελεύτηκε.

Β  ΣΑΡ. VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὑν ἔνεκα ταύτα λέγω· μέλιλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολή γέγονε. ταύτα γὰρ ἔγω ἀκούσας ἐνεδυμούμην οὕτωσι. Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνήττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὕτε μέγα οὕτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὃν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτε θεότητα γε· οὐ γὰρ Θεός αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἦπορον, τί ποτε λέγει, ἐκεῖνα μόνος πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησω αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ

С των δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἰπερ ποιν, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι Οὕτως εἰμοῦ σοφότερος ἔστι, σὺ δὲ ἐμὲ ἐφησια. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—οὖματι γὰρ οὓδεν δέομαι λέγειν, ἢν δὲ τίς τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς τὸν θι σκοπῶν τοιοῦτον τὶ ἔπαθον, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι οὕτως ὁ ἄνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλος τὸ πολλὸς ἀνδρότητος καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ᾽ οὐ. κάπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύοι, δὲν καὶ ὑπεπείρωμην αὐτῷ δεικνύοι, δεν καὶ ὑπεπείρωμην αὐτῷ δεικνύοι, δεν καὶ ὑπεπείρωμην αὐτῷ δεικνύοι, δεν καὶ ὑπεπείρωμην αὐτῷ δεικνύοι, δεν καὶ ὑπεπείρωμην αὐτῷ δεικνύοι.
ἔμων οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλῶν καγαθῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὖν
tος μὲν οὐταὶ τε εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδός, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὦσπερ οὖν
οὐκ ὁδικία, οὐδὲ οἶκομαι. ἦσθα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ
tινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ὁ μή τι οἰκίας ὁδίκ
εἰδεναι. ἐντεύθεν ἐπὶ ἄλλου ἁμα τῶν ἐκείνου
dοκοῦντων σοφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταὐτά τοῦτα
ἐδοξε. καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινται καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχ
χώρην.

ΣΑΡ. VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἦδη ἐφεξῆς ἢ, αἰ-
σθανομένος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώκ, ὅτι ἀπρο-
χάνομη, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαίον ἐδοκεὶ εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ
περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι. ἢτέον οὖν, σκοτοῦντι τὸν
χρησμὸν τὸ λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τις δοκοῦνται
εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,—τεί 22
γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθη λέγειν—ἡ μὴ ἐγὼ ἐπαθόν τι
τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξάν μοι
ὅλην δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδειγμένος ἐςτοῦντε κατὰ
tὸν θεόν, ἀλλ' ὅποτε δοκοῦντες φαύλοτεροι ἐπεικέστεροι
eῖναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεί δὴ ὑμῖν
ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι, ὦσπερ πόνοις τινὰς πονοῦντος,
ἴμα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. Μετὰ γὰρ
τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἢ ἔπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τρα-
γῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διδασκάλων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς
ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ αὐτοφάρφῳ καταληψάμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμα-
θέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ
ποιήματα, ἡ μοι ἐδοκεὶ μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσαμαι
αὐτῶς, διηρόητων δὲ αὐτοὺς τὸ λέγοντες, ἢμα τι καὶ ἀναλθείμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν,
δὲ ἄνδρες, τάληθη· ὅμως δὲ ρήτεον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ
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εἰπεῖν, ὅλγου αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖς οἱ παρόντες ἀν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτὸι ἐπιποίηκεσαν. ἔγνωνο οὖν καὶ οὗ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅληγρο τούτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τυρι σε ἔνθουσιάζοντες, ὀστερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμονδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὑν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτον τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπουλήτες. καὶ ἀμα ἤσθοντον αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποιήσιν ὁιμένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, οὐκ ἤσαν. ἀπή τούτοις καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενοι περιγεγογενέαν ὀστερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

Cap. VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ὁ ζα· ἐμαντῷ γὰρ ξυνηδεῖν οὖν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γὰρ ήδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὖν ἐφευσοῦν, ἀλλὰ ἐπιστατόν ὃ ἐγὼ οὖν ἐπιστάμην καὶ μοι ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλὰ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξαζόν ἔχεων ἀμάρτημα, ὅτε καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ ἄγαθοι δημοφωροὶ· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἥξιον καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτή ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὡστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαντόν ἀνερωτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησιμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἀν οὗτοι ῥαπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφός ὃν τὴν ἐκείνην σοφίαν, μήτε ἀμαθή τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκριμάνην οὖν ἐμαντῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι νυστελοὶ ῥαπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

Cap. IX. Ἐκ ταυτῆς δὲ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὃ ἂν δρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαί μὲν ἀπέχεσθει μοι ἀγάπησι
καὶ ὁδιὰ χαλεπῶταταὶ καὶ βαρύταταϊ, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οὖνται γὰρ μὲ ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφῶν, ὡς ἀν ἄλλον ἔξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεῖν, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ δὲ ὁ δὲ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὡς ἂν ἄνθρωπην σοφία ὁλίγον τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς· καὶ φανέται τούτ’ οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιοῦμενος, ὡστερ ἀν εἰ εἰποῖ, ὅτι Οὐδός ὕμων, ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοι, σοφότατος ἐστιν, ὅτις ὡστερ Σωκράτης ἐγρακεν, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιών ξητῶ καὶ ἔρευνό κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἀν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἰναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοὶ μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκεῖων, ἀλλ’ εἰν θεία μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατερείαν. Ἐνωθ’ ὁ

ΣΑΡ. Χ. Πρὸς δὲ τούτους οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολοουθοῦντες, οὶ ὁμοίωτα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλοῦσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαλέπωταὶ ἐξετάζομεν τοὺς ἄνθρωπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μεμοῦνται, εἰτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· καὶ ὥστε, ὡσι, εὑρίσκουσιν πολλὰν ἀφθονίαν οἰκεῖον μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἄνθρωπον, εὖ δοκῆτε δὲ ὅλης ἡ οὐδέν. ἔντευξέν οὖν οἱ ὁπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξετάζομεν ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ’ οὕτως αὐτοῖς, καὶ λεγοῦσιν, ὡς Σωκράτης τῆς ἔστι μαραῶτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτοὶ
ερωτά, δι τι ποιών καὶ δι τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄγνοοσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα ταύτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοῦς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἴμαι, οὐκ ἄν ἑξελοῦν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γηγονοῦσι προστοιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. οὕτε οὖν, οἴμαι, φιλότιμοι ὦντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ Επολλοὶ, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πειθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν υἱὸν τὰ αὐτά καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. εἰκ τούτων καὶ Μελητῶς μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτός καὶ Δύκων, Μελητός μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄχρόμενος, Ἀνυτός δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Δύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥήτορῶν. ὦτε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δαυμάξομ' ἀν, εἰ οἰός τε ἔχην ἐγὼ υἱὸν τάυτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξέλεξαί εἰν οὐτως ὄλγη χρόνῳ, οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονὼς. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν υἱὸν, δ` ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῆ, καὶ υἱὰς οὕτε μέγα οὐτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ἰποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἴδα σχεδόν, ὅτι τοις αὐτοῖς ἀπεξέλαμοι. καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τάληθη λέγω καὶ ὅτι ἀυτή ἔστιν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἔμη καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα Β ἔστι. καὶ εάν τε νῦν εὰν τε αὕτης ξητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

ΣΑΡ. Χ. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁν οἱ πρῶτοι μου καθήγοροι καθηγόροιν αὐτή ἔστω ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ἑαυτός· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητο τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλότιμον, ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ἄστερους μετὰ ταύτα πειράζομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὕτης γὰρ δὴ, ὅπερ ἐτέρων τούτων.
δυτικα καθηγόρων, λάβομεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πῶς ὁδεῖ; Σωκράτη φησίν ἄδικεων τοὺς τε νέους διαφθειρόντα καὶ θεούς οὐσ ἢ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἑτερα δὲ δαμόνια καὶ ν. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιούτων ἔστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐὰν ἔκαστον ἑξετάσωμεν. Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἄδικεων μὲ διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ ἔχει, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄδικεων ψημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ, χαριετίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγώνας καθιστάς ἀνδρόπους, τὲρε πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζει καὶ κρίνεται, οὐν' οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμελήσετι, ὡς ὃς τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπιδεῖξαι.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙ. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὃς Μέλητε, εἶπέ, Ἀλλ' τι περὶ πόλλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ὡς βελτίστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ὃ έσονται; Ἕπειρη. Ἰδιν δὴ νόν εἶπὲ τούτως, ὁς αὐτῶς βελτίστος ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι οὐσθα, μέλιν' ἐς σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὃς φής, ἐμὲ εἰςἀγεις τοῦτοι καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίστους ποιοῦντα Ἰδι εἶπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς, τὶς ἐστὶν. ὅρας, ὃς Μέλητε, ὅτι συγκαὶ ὃς ὃνες ἐχεῖς εἰπεῖς; καίτοι ὃν αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμηρίουν οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἄλλη εἰπέ, ὃς ἴδε, τὶς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι, Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὃς βελτίστο, ἄλλα τὶς ἀνδρόπους, ὡς τρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὔτοι, ὃς Σωκρατες, οἱ δικασταὶ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὃς Μέλητε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοι τε εἰσι καὶ βελτίστους ποιεῖν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἄπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἀπαντησ. Εὐ γε νη τὴν Ἡραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τοὺν
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ἀφελούντων. τι δαλ δή, οὐδέ οἱ ἁκροαται βελτίων
25 ποιούσιν, ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὕτωι. Τι δαλ οἱ βουλευται; Καὶ
οἱ βουλευται. Ἄλλο ἀρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μή οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκ-
κλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταὶ, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους;
ἡ κάκεινοι βελτίων ποιούσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεινοι.
Πάντες ἀρα, ὡς ἔσκεν, Ἄθηναίοι καλοὺς κάγαλοὺς
ποιούσι πλὴν ἔμοι, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέ-
γεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγοι. Πολλὰν γ' ἐμοῦ
κατέγρωκας δυστυχώς, καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι: ἢ καὶ περὶ
Βίττυνωσι οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίων ποι-
ούτες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἁνδρωτοι εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τὸς ὁ
diафθείρων; ἢ τοῦναντίου τούτου πᾶν, εἰς μὲν τὸς ὁ
βελτίων οἶος τ' ὄν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνω ὄλγοι, οἱ ἐπτυκοί;
οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ εἶναντερ ἵππωσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, δια-
φθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵπ-
πων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαντῶν ξώων; πάντως δὴ ποι,
ἐὰν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φητε εάν τε φῆτε· πολλὴ
gάρ ἃν τὸς εὐθυμονία εἰπη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν
ὁ μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὁφελοῦσιν. ἄλλα
γάρ, ὁ Μέλητε, ικανῶς ἐτελεῖσθαι, διὸ οὐδεπώτερο
ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαν-
tοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὅν ἐμὲ
eἰςάγεις.

Ἐν. Χ. ΙΙΙ. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμὶν εἰπὲ, ὁ πρὸς Δίος Μέ-
λητε, πότερον ἐστην οἰκειὸν ἁμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρη-
στοίς, ἢ ποιηροῖς; δὲ τάν, ἀπόκριναι οὐδὲν γάρ τοι
χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν ποιηροὶ κακῶν τι ἐργα-
ζονται τοὺς οὐ ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἄγαθοι
τὸ ἄγαθον τί; Πάνυ γε. Ἐστην οὖν ὅτις βουλευται ὑπὸ
τῶν ἔνωντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὡφελεῖσθαι; ἂπόκριναι, δ’ ἵππες καὶ γαρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἄποκρίνεσθαι. ἐσοτερεῖσται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δήτα. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεύρω ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἀκοντα; Ἑκόντα ἔγορε. Τι δήτα, ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοὶ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόδε ὁν, ὡστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνοκας, ὡτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται ἄει τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐσωτέρως, οἱ δὲ Ἐ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄγνωσθεν, ὡτι, εἰάν τινα μοχιθηρὸν ποιήσῃ τῶν ἔνωντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκῶν ποιῶ, ὥς φής σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πειθομαι, δ’ Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον οὔδένα· ἅλλα ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ, εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ’ ἀμφότερα φεύνει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἄκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεύρω νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἅλλα ἰδία λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν. δῆλον γὰρ, ὡτι, εἰάν μάθω, παύσομαι δ’ ἔκ αἰ οὕτως· οὐ δὲ εὐγενεσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι εἴσυγες καὶ οὐκ ἡθέλεσαι, δεύρω δὲ εἰσάγεις, ὡς νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἅ̄λλο οὐ μαθήσεως.

ἡμ. X. Ἀλλά γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἦδη ἐστύν, δ’ ἐγώ ἠλεγού, ὡτι Μελήτω τού· Β των οὐτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμελήσεν. ὡμος δὲ δὴ λέγει ἡμῖν, πῶς με φής διαφθείρειν, ὁ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ δῆλον δὴ, ὡτι κατα τῆν γραφήν, ην ἐγράψω. οὐδ’ διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζεις ὡς ὡς πόλις
νομίζει, ἔτερα δὲ δαμόνια καίνα; οὐ ταύτα λέγεις ὅτι
didάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταύτα
λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὡς Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν
τούς, ὅν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἔστιν, εἰπὲ ἐτί σαφέστερον καὶ
ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοσι. ἐγὼ γάρ οὐ δύναμαι
ομάδειν, πότερον λέγεις didάσκειν με νομίζεις εἶναι
tinas τοὺς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρα νομίζω εἶναι τοὺς καὶ οὐκ
eἰμί τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀδικίᾳ, ὅποιον
μέντοι οὐσθερος γε ἡ πόλις, ἄλλα ἔτερους, καὶ τούτοις ἔστιν δὲ μοι
ἐγκαλεῖς, διότι ἔτερος ἡ παντάπασι μὲ φής οὐτε αὐτῶν
νομίζεις τοὺς τοὺς τῆς ἀλλοῦ παρὰ didάσκειν. Ταὐ-
tα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις τοὺς. Ὄ θαυ-
μάστε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταύτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἦλιον οὐδὲ
σελήνην ἄρα νομίζως Θεοὺς εἶναι, ὡσπερ οἱ ἂλλοι ἀν-
δροθεί; Ἔτι Δι', ὡς ἀνδρεῖς δικασταῖ, ἐπεί τῶν μὲν
ῆλιου Λέον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν, ὃν Ἀνα-
ξαγόρου οἰκὶ κατηγοροῖ, ὃ φίλε Μέλητε καὶ οὕτου
καταφρονεῖς τῶν καὶ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀπειροὺς γραμμα-
tων εἶναι, ὡστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βι-
βλία, τοῦ Κλαυμονείου, γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ
δῆ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταύτα παρ' ἐμοὶ μανθάνουσιν, δὲ ἐξεστώ
Εὐνίοτε, εἰ τάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας
πριμέναις Σωκράτοις καταγελάν, ἐὰν προστοίηται
ἐαυτῶν εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἀτυπα ὄντα, ἄλλῳ ὡς
πρὸς Διός, οὕτως οὐ ποιεῖ διὸ οὐδένα νομίζεις Θεοὺς εἶναι;
Οὐ μέντοι μᾶ Δι', οὐδὲ ὁποιοί τίνες. Ἄπιστος γ' εἶ, ὡς
Μέλητε, καὶ ταύτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαντιώ,
ἐμοὶ γαρ δοκεῖ οὕτως, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πάνυ εἶναι
ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφήν
ταύτην ἐβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολοςία καὶ νεοτητὶ, γράψα-
σαι. ἔσοικε γὰρ ὀστερ ἀυτηγμά ξυντι Digest διάπειρα-
ἱ μένην. Ἀρα γνωστεῖ Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἔμοι ἡ
χαριντιζομένου καὶ ἑναντὶ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξα-
πατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοὺς ἀκούοντας; ὡς-
τος γὰρ ἔμοι φαίνεται τὰ ἑναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυ-
τῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὀστερ ἄν εἰ εἴποι Ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης
ὅς οὐ νομίζων, ἅλλα Ἔσοι νομίζων. καίτοι τούτο
ἔστι παλαίως.

§ 15. Εὐνεπισκεψάσθε δὴ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, ἵ μοι
φαίνεται ταύτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἦμιν ἀπόκριναι, ὁ
Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἤμας παρηγορώ-
μην, μέμνησθε μοι μή δορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι
τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

"Εστιν ὅστις ἄνδρώπων, ὁ Μέλητε, ἄνδρώπων
μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἄνδρόπως δὲ ό νομίζει;
ἀπόκρινεῖ, ὃ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα δορυ-
βεῖτο. ἐσθ' ὅστις ὑπ' υὸς μὲν ό νομίζει εἶναι, ἅπτικα
δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν ό νομίζει, αὐλητικὰ
dὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἀριστε ἄνδρόν· εἰ μὴ σὺ
βούλει ἀπόκρινασθαί, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῦς ἄλλους
tοῦτοι. ἄλλα τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἐσθ'
ὅστις δαίμονια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας
δὲ ό νομίζει; οὐκ ἔστιν. Ἡς δὴνησα, ὃτι μόνης
ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τούτῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαίμο-
νια μὲν φής μὲ καὶ νομίζει καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ' οὖν
καὶ ἔτει παλαιά· ἄλλ' οὖν δαίμονια ἃ νομίζον κατὰ
tὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἄντυγρα-
φῇ. εἰ δὲ δαίμονια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας ὑπὸ τολλή
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ανάγκη νομίζειν μέ εστίν. οὐχ οὔτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ τίθεμι γάρ σε ὁμολογούντα, ἐπειδή οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται.

Δ τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς ηε ηγούμενα ἡ Θεών παιδας; φής ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοίν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἠγούμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν Θεόι τινές εἰσίν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη δ' ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριποτίζεσθαι, Θεοὺς οὐχ ἠγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὐ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήςερ γε δαίμονας ἠγούμαι· εἰ δ' αὐ οἱ δαίμονες Θεῶν παιδεῖς εἰσὶ νόθοι τινές ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὅν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τὸς αὐ ἀνδρῶπον Θεῶν μὲν παιδας ἠγούτο εἶναι, Θεοὺς δὲ μῆ; ὀμολογήσατ' ἄν ἄτοπον εἴη, ἀποπληρ. ἀν εἰ τις ἱππον ἐρέα, τοὺς θεοὺς ἡμών τοὺς ἡμίώνοις, ἱππονος δὲ καὶ ὅνους μῆ ἴγοοτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὁ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν γὰρ ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειράμενος ἡμῶν ἠγάπησ τὴν γραφὴν ταῦταν, ἢ ἄπορων ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοί ἄλλοις ἀδικημα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείδοις ἂν καὶ συκράν νοῦν ἠχοῦται ἀνδρῶτων, ὡς [οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ [ἀνδρός] ἔστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ Θεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὴ ἔτει δαίμονας μὴτε Θεοὺς μὴτε ἠρώας, οὐδεμια μηχανή 28 ἔστιν.

ὅρ. XVI. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὁ αὐτρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃς μὲν ἔγγῳ οὐκ ἀδικῶ καὶ τὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ' ἴκανα καὶ ταύτα· ὅ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὡς ἐμι πολλῆς μοι ἀπέκδει γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἐστε ὅτι ἄλλοις ἔστιν. καὶ τούτ' ἔστιν ὁ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνυπερ αἴρῃ, οὗ Μελήτος, οὐδὲ Ἀντωνος, άλλ' ὁ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆ τε καὶ φθόνος, ὁ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ
ἀγαθὸς ἀνδρας ἦρηκεν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· ὦδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ.

' Ipsum δὲ ἄν οὖν εἶποι τις, Εἰτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύεσας, εἴ οὖν κινδυνεύεις νυν ἀποδανεῖς; 'Εγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἄν ἰκαίον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι ὃ οὐκ καλῶς λέγεις, ὃ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δέιν κινδυνον ὑπολογίζεσαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὕφελος ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὔκ ἔκειν μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ τι, σῶτερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαίλοι γὰρ δὲ τῷ γε σφ λόγῳ εἶν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν, οὐ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θετόνοις νόμος, διησκόντο καὶ κατεφρύνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰχμὸν τι ὑπομείναι, ἔστε ἐπειδὴ εἴπεν ἢ μὴν πρὸς οὐνομαμένοις Ἄκτωρα ἀποκτείναι, θεός οὖσα, οὕτως πως, ὡς ἐγγαίμαι, Ὁ ταῖς, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρὸκλον τῷ ἔταρφ τῶν φύον καὶ Ἀκτώρα ἀποκτείνεις, αὐτὸς ἀποδανεῖ· αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φθηνὸς, μεθ' Ἄκτωρα πότμος ἐτοίμος· ὃ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν Ἰανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ἀθυγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δεῖσας τὸ ζῆν κακός ἢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φθηνὸς, τεθναίνην δικήν ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μην ἐκδῷβε μενῶ καταγέλαστος παρὰ νησικὸν κορωνίσιν, ἀνθρώπος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸς ὅπειρον πρότυποι Ἰανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀχιλλαῖοι, τῷ ἄληθείᾳ· οὐ ἀν τῷ Ἰανάτου τῷ ἐγγαίμονος βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ἣν' ἀρχοντος τὸ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιον ἐναι ἢ ἣν' ἀρχοντος τῷ ἔναι τῇ ὕποτεροι ἐναι τῇ ἐνατεί, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένουτα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενοι μὴ τοῦ Ἰανάτου μητε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.
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Χ. Β. Εὐγώ οὖν δεινὰ ἀν ἐγὼ εἰργασμένος, ἀρετᾶ ἐώς ἀνδρεῖς Ὀδηγοὶ, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔστετον, οὐς ὑμεῖς ἐλευθεροὺς ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαλᾷ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἔπει Δηλῷ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκεῖνοι ἔστετον ἐμενοῦ, ὡσπέρ καὶ ἀλλος τες, καὶ ἐκινδυνεύουν ἀποδοθεῖν, τοῦ δὲ Θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήμην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, ψυχοφοβοῦντα με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξεταίρων ἐμαυτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα θεοθελεὶς ή Ἰάνατον ἢ ἀλλο ὁτιοῦν πράγμα λίπομι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν μὲν ἀν εἰ, καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς τὸν ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγων τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω Θεοῦ εἶναι, ἀπειλῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιός Ἰάνατον καὶ οἵμουσ σοφὸς εἶναι, οὐκ ἄν, τὸ γὰρ τοῦ Ἰάνατον δεδιέναι, ὃ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστίν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι, μὴ ὅταν· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστίν ἢ οὐκ οἴδεν. οἴδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τῶν Ἰάνατον οὐδεὶς τοῖς ἀνδρῶτοι πάντων μέγιστον ὃς τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασε δ' ὅς εὖ εἰδότες, ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν καὶ τοῦτο πώς Β οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστίν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονειδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰκεῖαν εἰδέναι ἢ οὐκ οἴδεν; ἡγὼ δὲ, ὃ ἄνδρες, τοῦτο καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἵσσως διαφέρον τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἶ δὴ τρὶς σοφότερος τοῦ φαινείν εἶναι, τοῦτο ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἴδοσ ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἐλευθέρω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι. τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ θελτίουν, καὶ δεδιός ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ οἴδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν, ἢ μη οἴδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὑπατὶ τυγχάνει, οὐδὲντε πορευήσομαι οὐδὲ σφεύξομαι. ὅστε οὖν εἰ μὲ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἁφίετε, Ἀνύτω ἀποστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἡ τὴν ἄρχην οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύο.
εἰσελθείων, ἢ, ἔπειτ' εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶον τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείναι με, λέγον πρὸς ὕμᾶς, ὡς, εἰ διαφευγόμην, ἥδη ἄν ὕμων οἱ νυεῖς ἐπιτηδεύουτε ἡ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθάσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς τάκτα ἐπουτε, Ἡ Σωκράτης, γνῶν μὲν Ἰνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφλεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ὅτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· εάν δὲ ἄλος ἐτι τούτῳ πρᾶττον, ἀποδανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἴποι, ἐπὶ τούτως ἀψίντε, εἴπομ' ἃν ὑμῶν, ὃτι Ἠγώ ὑμᾶς, ὃ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίοι, ἀστάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐστιπέρ ἄν ἐμπνεύσει καὶ οἶος τε ὃς, οὐ μὴ παύτωμει φιλοσοφοῦν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακληεῦμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὃτι ἰο ἐντυγχάνον ὑμῶν, λέγων οἰστε εἰσώθα, ὅτι, Ἡ Ἀριστε ἄνδρον, Ἀθηναίοις ὃν, πόλεως τῆς μεγάλης καὶ εὐδοκιμοτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελεύμενος, ὅποιοι σοὶ ἐσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ Ε καὶ ἄλλης ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅποιοι ὡς βελτίστη ἐσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖς οὐδὲ φροντίζεις· καὶ εὰν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφιβολήσῃ καὶ φη ἐπιμελείσθαι, οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄφησον αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἀπειμέ, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἄρετήν, φάναι δὲ, ὅνειδιω, ὅτι τὰ πλείστον ἢξια περὶ ἑλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα 19 καὶ νεωτέροι καὶ πρεσβυτέροι, ὅτω ἄν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀστή, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοίς, δοσὶ μου ἐγγυτερῷ ἐστε γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὑ ἴστε. καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον
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ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ Δεφ ὑπηρεσίᾳν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πρῶτον ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ περιβυτέρους μὴτε συμμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ θεότοι σφόδρα, ὡς τὴς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ἦσαν ἄριστη ἐσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλα ἄγαθα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσία. εἴ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγουν διαφθέρω τούς νέους, ταῦτ’ ἄν εἰς βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδέν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίνω ἂν, ὃ άνδρες Ἰθναίοι, ἢ πειθεῖσθαι Ἀνύτω, ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε, ἢ μή ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοὶ οὖκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ’ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τε-σεῖναι.

ΣΑΡ. XVIII. Μὴ δορυφείτε, ὃ άνδρες Ἰθναίοι, ἀλλ’ ἐμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδείξατε ὑμῶν, μὴ δορυφεῖν ἐφ’ οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ’ ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ σοίμα, ὄνησασθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἀττα ὑμῖν ἔρειν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ’ οἷς ἰσως βοήσασθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τούτο. Ἐν γὰρ ἰστε, ἐάν ἐμε ἀποκτενίσης τοιούτων ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμε μείξω βλάψετε ἡ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς. ἐμε μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄν βλάψειν οὗτε Μέλητος οὗτε Ἀνυτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναςτο· οὐ γὰρ ὁ οἶκος θείματον εἶναι ἀμείνοις ἄνδρι ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνεις μέντ’ ἂν ἰσως, ἢ ἐξελάσειν, ἢ ἀτιμάσειν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὕτως μὲν ἰσως οἴεται καὶ ἀλλος τῆς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ’ οὐκ οἶκοι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλλον ποιεῖν ὃ οὕτως νυν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἄδικος ἑπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνουν. νῦν οὖν, ὃ άνδρες Ἰθναίοι,
πολλοὶ δὲν ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογείσθαι, ὡς τις ἀν ὁλοίτοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοὶ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἦν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐρ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιαύτων εὑρήσετε, ἀπεκρίνως, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκελθοῦν τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡσπερ ὑπερ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναλῷ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νομεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μνώτος τινος· οἶνον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθείκειν, τοιούτων τινα, δὲ ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ οὐείδους ἕνα ἐκαστῶς οὐδὲν παύματι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχός προσκαλεῖ· ἢν. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐρ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὡς ἀνδρές, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσσεσθε μου. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἤσως τάχι ἄν ἁχθόμενοι, ὡστερ οἱ υποτάξοντες ἐγείρομενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνώτος, ῥαδίως ἀποκτείναντε, εἰτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῦσ᾽ ἀν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ Θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτέμψειε θηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ τυχήκαμον ὑπὸ τοιοῦτος, ὅσον ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι ἐν Ἰένδε ἄν κατανοήσατε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπινο οὐκεῖκε τοῦ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἁμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνεχεσθαί τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσάτα ἥδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἄει, ἵδια ἐκάστῳ προσώπῳ, ὡστερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελείσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπελκανον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελεύμην, εἰχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὅρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι, τάλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τούτο γε οὖχ οἷοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντή-
Ο σαί, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὥσ ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινα ἢ ἐπρα-ξάμην μισθόν ἢ ἤτησα. ἰκανον γάρ, οἴμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχο-μαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

Cap. XIX. Ἡσυχ ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἀτοπον εἰμαί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἴδια μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιοῦν καὶ πολυ-πραγμονό, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαινον εἰς τὸ ἀλήθειον τὸ ὑμετέρου ξυμβουλευένι τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αἰτίων ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῖ πολλὰς ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοὶ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι Ἱσόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον

D γύρνεται [φωνῇ], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἑπικο-μοφὸς Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτ’ ἐστίν ἐκ παῖδος ἀρξάμενον, φωνῆ τῆς γηγεμονίας, ἥ δεν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου, ὅ ἄν μελλὼ πράττειν, προ-τρέπει δὲ οὕτως. τούτ’ ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἑναντιοῦται τὰ πολεμικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἑναντι-οὐσαθαῖ. ἐν γὰρ ἔστε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχειρήσα τὸ πράγμα τὰ πολεμικὰ πράγματα,

Επάλαι ἄν ἀπολῶλη καὶ οὔτ’ ἄν ὑμᾶς ὀφελήγη ὦδεν οὔτ’ ἄν ἐμαυτὸν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθή· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ὡσὶς ἀνήρπτων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλω πλήθων οὐδενὶ ἡγησίως ἑναντιοῦμεν καὶ διακολουθόν πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει

32 γύρνεσθαι, ἄλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι τὸν τῷ δυτὶ μαχού-μενον ύπερ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μελλει ὅλγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἄλλα μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

Cap. XX. Μεγάλα δ’ ἐγὼ γε ύμῖν τεκμηρία παρέ-ξομαι τούτων, οὗ λόγους, ἄλλ’ ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μοι τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν’ εἰδήτε, ὅτι οὔτ’ ἂν ἐν ὑπεκάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας Σάνα-
τον, μὴ ὑπελκών δὲ ἢμα καὶ ἢμ' ἄν ἀπολογηθῇ. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικαίως, ἀληθῶς δὲ. Ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀδρινώιοι, ἀλλὰς μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πῶς τὸν ἢμα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δὲ· καὶ ἔστηκεν ἤμων ἡ φυλή Ἀντιοχίς πρωτανεύουσα, οτα ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνέλομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλευσα ἀδρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πάσιν ὑμῖν ἐδοξέ. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρωτανευόντων ἡματιώδης ὑμῖν μὴ δεί τρείη σαρά τούς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐςηφισάμην· καὶ ἐτοιμῶν δυτῶν ἐνδείκνυσθαι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευστῶν καὶ βοῶντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὑμῖν μὰλλον με δεῖ τινα Δικαίων, ὑμᾶς ὑμῶν οὖ γενέσθαι μὴ δικαια πολεμοῦσαν, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἡ Δάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἐτι δημοκρατομένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὅλη ἱεραρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκονται αὐτὲς μεταπεμψάμενοι με πέμπτον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Ἀδελφόν προσέταξαν ἄγγελες ἐν Σαλαμίνος Δεόντα τὸν Σαλαμίνον, ἦν ἀπολαίποι· οὐδὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοις πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι δὲς πλείστους ἀναπλήρωσι αὐτῶν. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὔ λόγοι, ἄλλοι ἐργαί αὐτὲς ἐνεδείξαμεν, ὅτα ἔμοι Δανάτον μὲν μέλει, εἰ δὲ Ἑλλάδι ἀγροκότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδέν οἰκεῖν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδὲ ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. Ἐμε γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρά οὔσα, ὡστε ἄδικον τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἄλλη ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Ἀδελφῆς ζήλωμεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρται φίλοντες εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἡγαγον Δεόντα, ἔγω δὲ φίλοντες ἀποφαίνετεν, καὶ ἱστος ἀν διὰ ταύτη ἀπέδανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχή
Ε διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη, καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΙ. Ἄρι οὖν ἂν με οἰσθῆς τοσάδε ἔτη δια-γενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττον ἄξιως ἀνδρὸς ἀγάλματι ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὡσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι· οὐδέ γαρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνδρῶπων οὐ-

83 δεῖς. ἄλλος ἐγώ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία τε εἰ ποῦ τι ἐπραξα, τοιούτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἵδια ὦ αὐτὸς οὕτως, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐπειδή ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἄνθρωπος εἰδοποιήσας οὐδέν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὐτε ἄλλο οὐτε τούτων οὐδενὶ, οὐς οἱ διαβάλλοντες μὲ φασιν ἐμοῦς μαθητας εἰναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τὸν μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιδυμεῖ ἰκουεῖν, εἰτε νεότε-

ρος εἰτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐφόνησα. οὐδὲ ἐκρήμαται μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὖ, ἄλλη ὁμοίως καὶ πλούσιος καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ εἶν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἰκουεῖν ὅν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τοῦτον ἐγώ, εἰτε τις χρηστος γγνε-

ται εἰτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αὐτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὅν μὴν ὑπενχόμην μηδεὶς μηδεὶς πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξαι· εἰ δὲ τὸν φησὶ παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ πώποτε τα μαθεῖν ἢ ἰκουεῖ νυίδια ὦ τι μή καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εἰ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνὶ ἱερᾷ λέγει. ἐκ

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΙΙ. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτὲ μετ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐχθροῦντι τινες πολὺν χρόνου διατίβοντες; Ἀκηκό-

ατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι· πάσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἁλλησειαν ἐγὼ εἰπον, ὅτι ἰκουεῖται ἐχθροῦντι ἐξεταζόμενος τοῖς οἰκιμένοις μὲν εἰναι σοφοῖς, οὐδεὶ δ' οὕτω· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ
ἀνδέσι. ἔμοι δὲ τούτο, ὡς ἑγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντεῖων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὃπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θελα μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταύτα, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἄληθῆ ἔστι καὶ εὐθελεγμενα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγγορε τῶν νέων τούς μὲν διαφθείρω, τούς δὲ Ν ὑπέφθαρκα, χρήν δήποτε, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγενοσκαν, ὡς νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν τῶποτε τι ἐξεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοὶ καθηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοί ἣδε- λον, τῶν οἰκείων τινῶς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ἵππον ἀν ἐμοὶ τι κακὸν ἐπετύχεσαν αὐτῶν ὁ οἰκειός, νῦν μεμνημέναι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταῦ- θαί, οὖς ἐγώ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κριτων οὔτοσι, ἐμὸς ἣλικιώτης καὶ ἡμιότης, Κατοβούλου τοῦτε πατήρ· ἐπεί ταῦτα Ἀυγανία μός Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦτε πατήρ· Ε ἐτι 'Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισινεύς οὔτοσι, 'Ἐπυγένους πατήρ. ἄλλοι τοιῶν οὔτοι, ἄν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατρι- βῇ γεγονασι, Ἡμιόστρατος, ὁ Θεοδοτῖδιον, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὡστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνος γε αὐτοῦ καταδεθείη—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὐ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφὸς· ὅδε τε 84 Ἀδελμαντός, ὁ Ἀριστωνος, οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὔτοσι Πλά- των, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὐ 'Απόλλοδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἔγω ἐχὼ ὑμῖν εἰπείς, ὡς των ἐχρήν μᾶλστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάβετο, νῦν παρα- σχέσθαι, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦ-
ιον. ἄλλα τούτων πάν τούναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἔτολμοι τῇ διαφθειροῦτε, τῷ κακῷ ἐργαζόμενῳ τοὺς οἰκεῖους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασί Μέθητος καὶ Ἁνωτοὶ. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχι διὸ λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἢδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὦτι ἐξωσάσασι Μεθήτωρ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἐλημένοιτε; 

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΙΠ. Ἐπεν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· οἱ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχωμι ἢ ἀπολογεῖται, σχεδὸν ἐστι ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἵσως τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσεις ἀναμνῄσκεις ὑμᾶς, δὲν μὲν καὶ ἑλάττω τοιοῦτον τοῦ ἀγώνος ἀγώνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδείξῃ τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβασάμενος, ἵνα δ' τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταύτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἀν δόξαμε, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. ἦτα δ' ἂν οὖν τις ταύτα ἐνοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίηση, καὶ ὀργισθείς αὐτοῖς τούτους Θείοτον ἂν μετ' ὀργήσῃ τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δ' τις ὑμῶν ὁ ὅτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἀξίω μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιτεική ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτων λέγειν λέγων, ὦτι Ἐμοι, δό άριστε, ἐισὶ μὲν τοὺς τίνες καὶ οἰκείους. καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρας πέφυκα, ἀλλ' εἴπ τέρπιτον, ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰς καὶ νικεῖς ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρές, εἰς μὲν μετράκιον ἢδη, δῶν δὲ παιδία. ἀλλ' ὁμως οὐδέν αὐτῶν δεύτερο ἀναβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψή-
πισαρία. Τῇ δὲ οὖν οὐδὲν τότεν ποιήσω; Οὐκ
αἰτιαδιδόμενος, ὃ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι, οὖδ᾽ ἤμας
ἀνιμάζουν. ἄλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἅρμαλεὼς ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς Ἀράτων ἢ Εὐ
μή, ἄλλος λόγος. πρὸς δ᾽ οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἔμοι καὶ ὑμῖν
καὶ δόξῃ τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων
οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλοκόνδε ὄντα καὶ τούτῳ τούτῳ
ἔχοντα, εἶτ᾽ οὖν ἀληθεῖς εἶτ᾽ οὖν ψεύδοις. ἄλλ᾽ οὖν
dεδογμένου γέ ἔστε τῶν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν
πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν ὑπε
εἶτε σοφία εἶτε ἀνδρεία εἶτε ἀληθῆ ἡττιοῦν ἄρετῆ τοῦ
οὕτω εἴσονται, αἰσχρῶν ἂν εἴη, οἰονίστερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις
ἔφρακτα τινάς, ὅταν κράνωνται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι ἐναι,
δαιμόσεια δὲ ἐργαζόμενος, ὡς δεινὸν τι οἰομένους
πείσιςθαι, εἰ ἄπολαλονται, οὕτε ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων,
ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οὐ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν-
σιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὡστ᾽ ἄν τινα καὶ
tῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν, ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίοι
εἰς ἄρετήν, οὐς αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς
ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνοντι, οὐτοὶ γυναῖκων οὐδὲν
dιαφέροντι. ταύτα γὰρ, ὃ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι, οὐτε
ἡμᾶς χρή ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὑμῖν εἶναι, οὐτε
ἄν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ἡμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἄλλα τούτο αὐτὸ
ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψυχεῖον τοῦ
τα ἔλεεινα ταύτα δράματα εἰςάγοντο καὶ καταγέ-
λαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἥσυχαίν ἅγωνος.

Cap. XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὃ ἀνδρὲς, οὐδὲ
dίκαιον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑισῄα τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲν
δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἄλλα διδάσκειν καὶ πεῖθεῖν. οὐ
γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστὴς, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρι-
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ξεσθαί. τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμολος ὁ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρῆ οὕτε ἡμᾶς ἐδίξειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιρκεῖν, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἐδίξεσθαι· οὐδέτερον γάρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὑσεβοῖν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτε με, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοιαῦτα δείν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλά εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἀλλος τε πάντως νὰ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοιουτώ· σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμυ ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δείσθαι βιαζόμενον ὁμωμοκότας, Ἰεοὺς ἄν διδάσκωμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς Ἰεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὲν οὐτωσ ἤχειν· νομίζω τε γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ Ἰεῶ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπη μέλλει εἰμὶ τε ἀριστά εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

Ε ΣΑΡ. ΧΧV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες ὁ Ἀθηναίοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψυχούσατο, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλιπτον μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρω τῶν ψήφων τῶν γεγονότα ἀριθμοῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἄμην ἔγνωκε οὕτω παρ' ὅλων ἐσθαί, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ. νῦν δὲ, όσοι εἰ μοῦ μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγῃ ἂν. Μέ λητον μὲν οὖν, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα. καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δήλου τούτῳ γέ, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Δύκων κατηγορήσοντες Β ἐμοὶ, κἂν ὁμιλείας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβῶν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.
CAP. XXVI. Τιμάται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνήρ ἦματον. Ἐλευ. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δὴ δολον, ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἤγγον ἀλλ’ ἀμεληθές ἄντερ οἱ πολλοὶ, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ ὀικονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνομοσίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γεγομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ἄντε ἐπιμελέστερον εἶναι ἢ ἀφεῖς εἰς ταύτ’ ἑνν’ σωζεῖσαι, ἑνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἦτα, οἱ ἐλληνὶς μῆτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὅφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἰδίῳ ἕκαστον ὑπὸ εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργείαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἑνταῦθα ἦτα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστὸν ὑμῖν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἐαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσαι, πρὶν ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεθῆσθι, ὡς ὡς βελτιστός καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἐσούτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος πα- 

θεῖν τοιοῦτος ὅν; ἀγαθὸν τι, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ 

δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσαι, καὶ 

ταῦτά γε ἀγαθῶν τοιούτων, ὃ τι ἂν πρέπει ἐμοὶ. 

τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πέντετε εὐεργέτη, δεομένῳ ἄγειν 

σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ἑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει, οὐκ ἐσῶ 

τι μᾶλλον, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει σοιτεῖσαι, 

ὅ τι τοιοῦτον ἄρα ἐν προτεινῷ στεῖον, πολὺ 

τοι μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν ὑππο ή ἤνωρίδι ἢ ἤνέγει 

νεώτερον ὁλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εἰδαλ-

μονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς ἐ 

οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δείμαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ
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δικαίων τής ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν
37 πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

CAP. XXVII. "Ἰσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων
παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ
τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπαυγαδιδόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,
ὅ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἄλλα τοιόῦτο μᾶλλον.
πεπεισμαί ἐγώ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἄδικως ἁνθρώπων,
ἄλλα ὑμᾶς τούτο οὐ πείθω· ὅλγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλή-
λοις διειλέγμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγώμαι, εἰ ὃν ὑμῖν νόμος,
ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἁνθρώποις, περὶ θεατοῦ μὴ μελαι
Β ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἄλλα πολλὰς, ἐπεισδητε ἄν·
νῦν δἐ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐν χρόνῳ ὅλγον μεγάλας διαβολὰς
ἀπολύεις. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἄδικων
πολλῶν δὲν ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ’ ἑμαυτὸν
ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς, ὡς ἄξιος εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ τιμῆσθαι
tοιοῦτον τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δὲλος; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο,
οὐ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται, ὡς φημὶ οὖκ εἰδέναι οὔτ’ εἰ
ἀγαθὸν οὔτ’ εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἐλεομαῖ
ὡν εἰ οὐδ’ ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; τό-
οτερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεί ζην ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δου-
λεύοντα τῇ ἄει καδισταμένη ἄρχῇ, τοῖς ἐνδέκα; ἄλλα
χρημάτων, καὶ δεδεσθαῖ έιως ἃν ἐκτίσω; ἄλλα ταῦτα,
μοι ἔστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐξεγον· οὐ γάρ ἔστι μοι χρή-
ματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. Ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμῆσομαι;
Ἰσως γάρ ἃν μοι τούτου τιμῆσαιτε. πολλὴ μέντ’ ἃν
με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ σκέως
ἀλογιστός εἰμι, ὡςτε μὴ ὑπαρξθαί λογίζομαι, ἢτι
ὕμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολέμαι μοι οὐχ οἰον τε ἐγένεσθε ἐν.
Ω γεγείν τὰς ἐμαὶς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἄλλ’ ἡμῖν
παρότεραι γεγονασι καὶ ἐπιφθανότεραι, ὡστε ζητείτε αυτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγήναι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ράδιος. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰ ἐξελθώντι τηλικῷ δὲ ἀνδρότωρ ἄλλῳν εἶ ἄλλῃς πόλεως ἀμείβομενῷ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ἦν. εὐ γὰρ οἴδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλαθο, λέγοντος ἐμοὶ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὃςπερ ἐνθάδε. καὶ μὲν τούτων ἀπελαῦω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτὸν ἐξελάσθη, πειθόντες τοὺς προσβυτέρους· εάν δὲ μη ἀπελαῦνο, οἱ τούτων πατέ-Ε ῥες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΒ. Ἰσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι, Συνών δὲ καὶ ἤσυχίαν ἄγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐσεὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ἦν; Τούτῳ δὴ ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινας ὑμῶν. εὰν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὁτι τῷ ἄγω ἄπει-θείων τούτι ἐστι καὶ διὰ τούτι ἀδύνατον ἧσυχίαν ἂγειν, οὐ πείσεωθεὶ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· εάν τ' αὖ λέγω, ὁτ' ἢ καὶ τυχχάνει μέγιστον ἁγαθόν ὃν ἀνδρότωρ τούτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἄρετής τους λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν άλλων, περὶ ἄν ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ ἀκούστε διαλεγο-μένου καὶ ἐμαυτόν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὃ δὲ ἀνεξε-ταστος βίος οὐ βιωτός ἀνδρότωρ, ταῦτα δ' ἐτι ἢττον πείσεωθεὶ μοι λέγοντι. τά δ' ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὡ ἀνδρές, πείδευν δὲ οὐ ράδιον. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἄμ' οὐκ εἴδωσιμαι ἐμαυτόν ἀξίον κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἀν χρημάτων ὅσα ἐμελ-θυν εκτίσεων. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν, εἰ μη ἄρα ὃσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσα τοσοῦτον βουλεύσθε ἦν μετήσαι. Ἰσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτί- σαι ὑμῖν μνὰν ἄργυρίον· τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμώμαι.
Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὃς ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσι με τριάκοντα μνών τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον ἐγγυηταλ δὲ ὑμᾶν ἐσονται τοῦ ἄργυρου οὕτω ἀξιόχρεως.

0 ΤΟΥ ΧΩΝΥΟΥ Η΄ ἔνεκα χρόνου, οὐ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὅμως ἔσεστε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιποῖς, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφῶν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλομένοι μὴν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὅλον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἄν ὑμῖν τούτῳ ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡμικίαν, ὅτι πόρρῳ ἦδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, Ἐπάνω δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τούτῳ οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοί.

0 ΤΟΥ ΧΩΝΥΟΥ Η΄ ἔνεκα χρόνου, οὐ πολλοὶ γὰρ ἔστιν. χρόνος, οὐ πολλοὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.  "Τοιοῦτοι ὑμεῖς, οὗ ἄλλος, ἀπορία λόγων ἐστε ἐλαλοῦσιν τοιοῦτον, οἷς ἄν ὑμᾶς ἐπείσα, εἰ ὡμοὶ δὲν ἀπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὡστε ἀποφυγέων τὴν ἀδικίαν. πολλοὶ γε δὲ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐλαλούσα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀνασχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐσθελει λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαύτα, οὐ ἄν ὑμῖν μὲν ἔδοξαν ἢν ἀκούειν, ἡμηνυότος τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου ἦκαλλα ποιοῦντο καὶ λέγοντο πολλα καὶ ἀνάξια ἔμοι, ὡς ἐθέων καὶ οὐ καὶ εἰθεογεγένεις τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τοτέ ὡς ἐθέων δὲν ἐνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὖν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε οὖν μοι μεταμέλεις οὕτως ἀπολογηθεμένος, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ σαφῆς ἀπολογηθεμένος τετυνθαὶ ἢ ἐκείνος χὶν οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκη οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἔλλον
οὐδένα δὲ τὸ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ἐθ
ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δὴ-
λον γίγνεται, ὅτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγωι καὶ
ὀπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετεῖαν τραπόμενοι τῶν διωκό-
tων· καὶ ἄλλα μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσὶν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς
κινδύνοις, ὡστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εἶν' τις τολμᾶ
πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἄλλα μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂ χαλεπόν,
ὁ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἄλλα πολὺ χαλεπώτερον
πονηρλαν. θάνατον γὰρ θανάτου δεῖ· καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν
ἀπε βραδὺς ὅν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου Β
ἐᾶλων, οἷ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἀτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὄξεις ὄντες
ὑπὸ τοῦ θάνατον, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπειμί
ὑφ' ὑμῶν θάνατον δίκην ὁφλων, οὕτως δ' ὑπὸ τῆς
ἀληθείας ὀφληκὸτες μοχθηρὰν καὶ ἀδικλαν. καὶ ἔγωγε
τῷ τιμῆματι ἐμμένα, καὶ οὗτοι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ποι
ἔως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχείν, καὶ οἵματι αὐτὰ μετρῶσ
ἔχειν.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΧΧ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιδυμὸν ὑμῖν
χρησμοθῆσαι, ὡς καταγγείςομενοὶ μοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ ὁ
ἐκάστη ἐντάξια, ἐν δ' ἡμέρων ἀνθρώπων χρησμοθῆσον,
ὅταν μέλλοσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. ἡμὶ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἴ
ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρλαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τοῦ
ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νη Δι' ὁ οἷον ἐμὲ
ἀπεκτόνατε. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασθείη ὅποιον ἄπαλλά-
ξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεήσων τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ
ἀναπτύλων ἀποβῆσθαι, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ. πλεῖον ἔσονται
ὑμᾶς οἱ ἔλεγχοι, οὐς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχων, ὑμεῖς δὲ
οὐκ ἡγεῖσθαι· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσι νεότε-
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΟΚΡΑΤΙΣ.

Σε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνδρῶτοις ἐπισχήσεις τοῦ ὅνειδεὶς τινὰ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ὁρῶς ζήτε, οὐκ ὁρῶς διανοεῖς· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν αὐτή ἡ ἀπαλλαγή οὔτε πάνυ δυνατή οὔτε καλή, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ βέλτιστη, μὴ τούς ἄλλους κολούεις, ἀλλὰ ἔαυτὸν παρασκευάζεις, ὅπως ἑσται ὡς βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τῶν καταψηφισμένων μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι. Ἐν Ἐν

Ε ΚΑΡ. ΧΧΧΙ. Τοὺς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένους ἡδῶς ἀν διαλεγόμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος, ἐν δὲ ὅι ἀρχοντες ἀσχολοῦσιν ἁγονου καὶ ὕπω ἐρχομαι οἰ ἑλθόντα με δετεινάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, δὲ ἄνδρες, παραμέληται τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὔδεν γὰρ κωλύει διαμορφοῦσαι προς ἄλληλους, ἐως ἐξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλους οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐδέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκός τί ποτε νοεῖ. Ἔμοι γὰρ, δὲ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶς ὁρῶς ἄν καλοῖν—αὐτάμασιν τι γέγονεν. ἥ γὰρ εἰσινιά μοι μαντική ἡ τοῦ δαμολίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνῇ ἄει ἢν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροὺς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὁρῶς πράξεως νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβεβηκές μοι, ἀπερ ὅρατε καὶ αὐτὸι, ταύτη, ἥ γε δὴ εἰσέλθη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντει ἐσθήνει δικαστεῖν ὕπολιαν θεοῦ.

Β. Ἱεροὺς ἡναπτικώς τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὕτε ἡνικα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταύθα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τί ἐρεῖν· καὶ τοιού ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε ἐμέγους μεταξῆς. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ τούτων τοῦ πράξεως οὔτ' ἐν ἐργῳ οὔδενι οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡναπτικώς μοι. τὰ οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρώτησει κινδυνεύεις γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκός.
κόσ τούτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἶομεδὰ κακὸν εἶναι τὸ θετικόναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπὸς οὖν ἡμαντικὴ ἂν μοι τὸ εἰσαχθὼς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἁγαθὸν πράξειν.

Σαρ. XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆς, ὡς πολλῇ ἀπὸσ ἔστω ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι· Διόσκ. γὰρ Θάτερον ἔστι τὸ τετράγωνον· ἡ γὰρ ὅπου μὴν εἶναι μὴν αἰσθήσεως μὴν ὡς ἔχειν τὸν τετράγωνον, ἡ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τῆς τυχούσας ὑπάρχει καὶ μετάλλησις τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθεώδες εἰς ἀλλὸν τόπον. καὶ εἰτέ δὴ μὴν ἀνακήρυκτος ἔστω, ἄλλοι οἴον ὑπόσ, ἐπειδὴ δὰν τὴς καθεύδουν μὴν ὑπάρχηος ὑπάρχηος, ἦσει τῶν κέρδος ἐν εἰς τὸ ἡμεροτ. ἕστω γὰρ ἄν οἴομαι, εἰ τίνα ἐκλεξαμένον δέοι ταυτίσει τὴν νύκτα, εἰ ἐν ὑπώτως κατεύρησον, οὕτως μὴν ὑπὸς ιδεῖν, καὶ τᾶς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ημέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνυπαραδέντα ταύτη τῆς νυκτὸς δέοι σκέψαμεν εἰρείνα, πόσα ἄρμεναι καὶ ἤδειον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταυτίσεις τῆς νυκτὸς βεβλικεῖν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βιῷ, οἴομαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαρχιμήτος ἄν εἰρείναι αὐτῶν ταύταις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας· εἰ δὲ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ ἡμεροτ. ἔστι, κέρδος ἔχων λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλεοῦν πῶς χρόνος φανερεῖν οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἄρα νῦν· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀποδημήσας ἔστιν ὁ ἡμεροτ. ἐνθεώδες εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀλληγ. ἢ ἔστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἢκεί εἰσιν ἀπάντες οἱ τετελεῖτες, τι μεῖξον ἁγαθὸν τούτου εἶν ἄν, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ δὲ τούς ἀφικόμονοι εἰς ῎Αιδον, ἀπαλλαγεῖσ τοῦτων.
τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εἰρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἶτερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικαζέων, Μίνους τε καὶ 'Ραδάμανθις καὶ Διακός καὶ Τρυπτόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιδέων δίκαιοι ἔγενοντο ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἂν εἶν ἡ ἀποδήμια; ἡ αὖ Ὁρφεὶ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μονσάλφ καὶ 'Ησιόδοφ καὶ Ὄμήρος ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαι ἂν ὑμᾶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἔδειλε τεξάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔρωσε καὶ αὐτῷ Σαμωάτῃ ἂν εἶν ἡ διατριβή Βαύτώς, ὅπως ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Διάντι τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ᾠδικὸν τέθηκεν· ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνων, ὡς ἔγω οἴμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἄρδες εἶν. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἑξετάζοντα καὶ ἑρευνῶντα ὅσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγεων, τις αὐτῶν σοφὸς ἐστι καὶ τις οἴεται μὲν, ἐστὶ δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταῖ, δέξατο ἑξετάζαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τρολαν ἄγαγόντα τὴν πολλήν στρατιών, ἡ Ὀδυσσεία, ἡ Σίλβον, οὗ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τὶς εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διάλεγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἑξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἰς εὐδαιμονίας πάντως. οὔ δήποτε τούτο γε ἔνεκα οἴ εἰκεὶ ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονεστέροι εἰσίν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀδάνατον εἰσίν, εἰπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστιν.

ἈΡ. ΨΨΨΠ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ύμᾶς χρῆ, ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταῖ, εὐθελπίδαις εἶναι πρὸς τῶν Ἁγάτων, καὶ ἐν τῷ Δῦτότω διανοοεῖαι ἀληθέις, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄνδρὶ ἀγαθῇ κακῶν οὐδὲν οὕτε ἑόρτι οὕτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἁμα-
λέται ύπο θεών τά τοῦτον πράγματα· ουδὲ τά ἐμὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δὴλον ἐστὶν τοῦτο, ὡτι ἤδη τεινώναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιοι ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδάμου ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγογε τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὗ πάνυ χαλεπάνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόροιν, ἀλλ’ οἰόμενοι βλάπτεις· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἁξίουν μέμφεσθαι. 

Τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς νιεῖς μου, ἐπειδὴ ἡ θύσιος, τιμωρήσασθε, ὃ ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἀπέρ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύσων, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἄρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι εἰναι μηδὲν δυντε, ὑπειδίκετε αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται δι’ δεῖ, καὶ οὐνταὶ τι εἰναι δυντε οὐδενὸς ἁξίου. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιήτε, δικαία πεποιθώς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι ὑφ’ ὑμῶν αὐτοῖς τε καὶ οἱ νιεῖς.

'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἢδη ὡρα ἄπιεναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀπωθανοῦμεν, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένους, ὅποτεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἐχρονται ἐπὶ ἁμείνου πράγμα, ἄδηλου παντὶ πλήν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

42 ΣΔΡ. Ἡ τηνικάδε ἄφησαί, ὁ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῆ ἔτι ἐστίν; ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα; ΚΡ. Ὁρδρος βαμύ. ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω, ὅτως ἡξέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι. ΚΡ. Ἔννοήσης ἦδη μοι ἔστιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις διέρο φοιτάν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ. ΣΩ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι; ΚΡ. Ἐπεικὸς ἐν πάλαι. ΣΩ. Εἴτε πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειρὰς με, ἄλλα συγχρημάτων γελοῦσαι; ΚΡ. Οὐ μᾶ ὁν Ἀὶ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτὸς ἡξέλολ έν τοσαύτη τε ἄγρινη καὶ λύπη εἶναι. ἄλλα καὶ σοῦ πάλαι Θαυμάζω ἀισθανόμενος, ὅσ ἡξέλος καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπιτίθεσα σε οὖκ ἠγείρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδίστα διάγησ. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμονία τοῦ τρόπου, πολυ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ πάρεστώσῃ ξυμφορά, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾶσος φέρεις. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Κρίτων, πλημμελές εἴη ἄγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὑπ’ αὐτα, οὐ δεὶ ἡδη τελευτᾶται. ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλληκοῦται, ἄλλοι οὕτως ἄλλοις ἐπιλύεσται ἡ ἡλικία τῷ μὴ οὖχι ἄγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ. ΣΩ. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα. ἄλλα
τί δὴ οὗτῳ πρὸ ἀφύξαι; ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φέρον χαλεπὴν, οὐ σοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πάσι καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ Βαρείαν, ἢν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι ἀν ἐνέγκαμι. ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεὶ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡ. Οὐ τοίνυν δὴ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον εἰς ὅν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἱκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ κατα- λιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων, ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὐτοῖς ἔσται, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

ΚΑΡ. Π. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὁ Κρίτων, τόχη ἀγάλη. εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλουν, ταύτη ἐστώ. οὐ μέντοι οίμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον. ΚΡ. Πάντων τούτο τεκμαίρει; ΣΩ. ἐγὼ σοι ἐρώτησις γὰρ που ὑπεραλήθη δεῖ με ἀπὸ ἀνὴρ ἥξησκείν ἢ ἢ ἄν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον. ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι. ΣΩ. Οὐ τούλιν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἴμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινὸς ἐνυπνίου, ὁ ἐώρακα ὅλγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς; καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ των οὐκ ἔγειραί με. ΚΡ. ἢν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνυπνίου; ΣΩ. Εἰδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσέλθοντας καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλῶσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν, ΩΣ Σῷ-Βκρατεῖς, ἡματία κεῖν τριτάτη φίλην ἐρίξωλον ἴκανον. ΚΡ. Ὁς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνυπνίου, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

ΚΑΡ. ΙΙΙ. ΚΡ. Διὰν γε, ὡς οὖκ ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὁ δαιμόνιον Σῴκρατες, ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σῶθηρι, ὥς ἐμοὶ, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποδάνης, οὐ μὴν εὐμφαρά ἔστιν,
CRITO. 79

ἀλλὰ χωρίς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερημοῦ τοιούτου ἐπιτηθείσου, ὦν ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτὲ εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοὶ ὁ δόξω, οἴ δὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφές ἵσασιν, ὅσι ὢς τ’ ἔχω σε σῶζειν, εἰ ἰδέαν ἀναλίκης χρῆματα, ἀμελήσαι· κάνοι τὰς ἀν αἰσχρῶν ἐν ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν χρῆματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πεισοῦται οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἤδειπνός ἄπληνα ἐνδένδε, ἢμῶν προσώμομένων. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τι ἡμῖν, ὃ μακάρις Κρίτων, οὐτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλες; οὐ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἄξιοι φροντίζειν, ἡγεῖσται αὐτὰ οὐτοὶ πεπράξθαι, ὡσπερ ἀν πραξῆ. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ’ ὅρας δὴ, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλεως. αὐτά δὲ δήλα τὰ παρόντα νυν ὃ ὅ τι εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ή. ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὄψειν, ὃ Κρίτων, οἴοι τε εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἔξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἴοι τε ἔσαν μη καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἦν εἰχε. νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἴοι τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρον δυνατὸ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο, δὲ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.
σε κινδυνεύειν τούτον τὸν κινδυνον καὶ, ἐὰν δέῃ, ἐτὶ τούτων μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείδου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ. ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. ΚΡ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὖνδε πολὺ τάργυριῶν ἐστὶν, ὃ ἥλουσι λαβὸντες τωνς σώσαι σε καὶ ἔχαγαγείν ἐνθέν. ἕπειτα οὖχ ὅρας τούτως τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὖνδεν ἂν δεῖν ἔτι αὐτοῦς πολλὸν ἀργυρὸν; σοι δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἑμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ, ικανά· ἕπειτα καὶ εἰ τι ἐμοὺ κηδόμενος οὐκ οὐκ ἔτι δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμα, ξένου οὔτω ἐνιάδε ἐτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ κεκόμικεν ἔτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργυρίου ικανόν, ΣΥΜΜΙΛΑΣ ὁ ΘΈΒΑΙΟΣ· ἐτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὡστε, ὅπερ ἔλεγο, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενοι ἀποκάμης σαυτόν σῶσαι, μήτε δὲ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενεὰντω, ὅτι οὖκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χρῶς σαυτῷ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσ ὅτι άν ἀφίη ἄγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλη εἰς Θετταλίαν ἴναι, εἰσὶν ὁ ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οὔ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσουται καὶ ἀσφαλεῖαν σοι παρέξουται, ὡστε σε μηδενα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

ΚΑΡ. V. Ἔτι δὲ, ὁ ΣΩκράτης, οὖδὲ δικαῖον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθήναι· καὶ τοιαύτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσαις, ἀπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιες τε καὶ ἔστευσαν σε διαφθείρας βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτως καὶ τοὺς νεῖς τοὺς σαυτὸν ἔμονες δοκεῖς προδοῦναι, οὐς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκδρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεύεις οἴχησεις ὁ καταληπτών, καὶ τὸ σοῦ μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τούτο
πράξονταί τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων, οἴσαρ
εἰσέθε γύρεσσαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφα-
νούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παιδας, ἢ ξυνδιαταλαι-
πορείν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς
τὰ ραβμότατα αἰρέσθαι. χρὴ δέ, ἀπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ
ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἑλοῦτο, ταῦτα αἰρέσθαι, φα-
σκοῦντα γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖ-
Εσθαί. ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν
ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ
περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ
ἐξοδὸς τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς εἰσῆλθες, ἐξὸν
μὴ εἰσῆλθείν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγνω τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο,
καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τούτῃ, ὡσπερ κατάγελως τῆς
πράξεως, κακλα τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπε-

46 φευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὕτως σε οὐχὶ ἑσώσαμεν, οὐδὲ
σὺ σαυτόν, οἷς τε ὁι καὶ δυνατον, εἰ τι καὶ συμκρόν
ἡμῶν ὀφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅρα, μὴ ἄμα
τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἃ σοὶ τε καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλεύ-
σον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύσοντας ἐτὶ ὁρὰ, ἀλλὰ βεβου-
λεύσοι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσῃς νυκτὸς
ταῦτα πάντα δὲ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δὲ τι περιμενοῦμεν,
ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ
Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμός ἄλλως πολεῖ. Εὐδο-

Β Οἱ ἡμεῖς ἡμείς Κρίτων, ἡ προσμυλὰ σοι
πολλὸν ἀξία ἐν μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εὑρ., εἰ δὲ μὴ,
ὅσον μελετῇς τοσοῦτον χαλεπώτερα. σκοπέεσθαι οὖν
χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἰτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἰτε μὴ· ὡς ἐγὼ οὖ
μόνον νῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν τοιοῦτος, ὅσον τῶν ἐμῶν µη
δειλὶ άλλοι πείθεσθαι ἡ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅσ ἂν μοι λογισμὲ-

934-941.
νη βελτιστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οἳς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἐμφανίσθη μοι ἡ τύχη ἡ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὁμοιος φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτούς προσβείον καὶ τιμῶ, οὐδ' ὁ περ καὶ πρότερον. ὅπερ δὲν μὴ βελτιω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ Ιαδι, ὅτι οὗ μὴ σοι ἐνυγχωρίσω, οὔτε ἐν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ἄσπερ παῖδας ἢ μᾶς μορφολύττηται, δεσμοῖς καὶ Ἀνάτοις ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἄφαιρέσεις.

Πῶς οὖν ἄν μετριώτατα σκοπολέμησα αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβομεν, οὐ σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλὸς ἔλεγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δὲ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὕ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν εἰμὲ δεῖν ἀποδήσεις καλὸς ἔλεγε· διὸ, γιὰτ' ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἐνεκα λόγῳ ἔλεγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιά καὶ φιλαρια ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἐγώ γε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὁ Κρίτων, κοῦρ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τι μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὁδὲ ἔγω, ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς, καὶ ἐσάμεν χαίρειν, ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἔλεγετο δὲ πως, ὃς ἐγώμαι, ἐκάστοτε δὲν ὑπὸ τῶν οἰσμένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ὃς οἱ ἀνδρώποι δοξάζουσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν ἐν περὶ πολλῶν ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μη· τοῦτο πρὸς δεῖν, ὁ Κρίτων, οὗ δοκεῖ καλὸς σοι λέγεσθαι; [εὖ γὰρ, διὸ γε ταύτῳ σπειρίτους ἐπὶ τοῦ μελλέων ἀποδήσεις αὐτῷ ὀρου, καὶ οὕκ ἄν σε παρακρούσῃ παροῦσα ἑξιμφορά] σκόπει δὴ· οὐχ ἵκανοις δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρή τὰς δοξας τῶν ἀνδρῶπων τιμῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὖ· οὔδε πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ'
καὶ τί φής; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται; ΚΡ. Καλῶς. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μῆ; ΚΡ. Ναὶ. ΣΩ. Χρησταλ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηρὰ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων; ΚΡ. Πῶς ὦ; Εὖν.

ΚΑΡ. VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, τῶς αὗ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔλε- 

βιγατο; γυμναζόμενος àνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον 

παντὸς ἁνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψύχῳ καὶ δόξῃ τῶν νοῶν 

προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκεῖνου, ὥς ἂν τυχαῖναι ἰατρὸς 

ἡ παιδοτρίβης ὄν; ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου. ΣΩ. Οὕκοιν 

φοβείσθαι χρῆ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς 

ἐπαινοῦσ τοὺς τοῦ ἐνός ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλα μὴ τοὺς τῶν 

πολλῶν. ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή. ΣΩ. Τάτη ἀρὰ αὐτῷ πρα- 

κτέων καὶ γυμναστεόν καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν 

τῷ ἐνί δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίνοιτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ 

ξύμπαστο τῶς ἄλλως. ΚΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Εἶεν.

Ο ἀπειθήςας δὲ τῷ ἐνι καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν 

καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ 

μηδὲν ἐπαινότων ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται; ΚΡ. 

Πῶς ὅρπ οὗ; ΣΩ. Τί δέ έστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ 

ποὶ τέινει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦστος; ΚΡ. Δῆ-

λον, ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλυσων. ΣΩ. Κα-

λῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰλλα, ὁ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα 

μὴ πάντα διώμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ 

ἄδικων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κα-

κῶν, περὶ ὅν νῦν ἡ βουλὴ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, πότερον τῷ τῶν 

κολλῶν δόξῃ δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαι ταῦταν, 

ἡ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαίνω, τὸν δὲ καὶ αἰσχύνε-

σθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ξύμπαστα τοὺς ἀλ-

нологούσαν.
λον; ὃ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθερούμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ἃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγνωμετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτο; ΚΡ. Οὐ μαί ἔγωγε, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΚΑΡ. Β. Σ. Ω. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑμενοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γνωμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώσου δὲ διαφθερόμενον διολέσομεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἑπατ' ὁντων δέξη, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἦμιν ἐστιν, διεσφαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἐστὶ δὲ ποι τούτο τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὐχὶ; ΚΡ. ΝΑΛ. Σ. Ω. Ἀρ' ὅπων βιωτὸν ἦμιν ἐστι μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεσφαρμένου σῶματος; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Σ. Ω. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκεῖνου ἄρα ἦμιν βιωτὸν διεσφαρμένου, ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λοβᾶταί, τὸ δὲ δικαίον ὄνῃσιν; ἢ φαιλότερον ἱγούμεθα εἰναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνο, ὡ τι (2, Ν). πῶτ' ἐστι τῶν ἑμετέρων, περὶ δ' ἢ τε ἄδικα καὶ ἢ δι-ἐξακολούθησιν ἑστιν; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. Σ. Ω. Ἀλλὰ τιμωτερὸν; ΚΡ. Πολύ γε. Σ. Ω. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὥ βέλτιστο, πάνυ ἦμιν οὔτω φροντιστέον, τί ἑροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἠμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ἐπαθῶν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἄδικων, ὃ εἰς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὡστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτην οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσήγητε, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δειν ἦμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἃν τις, οἰοὶ τ' εἰσὶν ἠμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτισσόμεθα. Α. ΚΡ. Ἀδήλα δὴ καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατες. Β Σ. Ω. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὁ θαυμάστη, οὕτως τε ὁ λόγος, διὰ διελθήσαμεν, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐτι ἰδοὺς εἰναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὐτὸς κατέφερε, εἰ ἐτι μένει ἦμιν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ξῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ
τὸ εὖ ἔσθι. ΚΡ. Ἄλλα μένει. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ
cαλὸς καὶ δικαῖος ὅτι ταῦτά τοῦ ἔστι, μένει, ἢ οὐ μένει; ΚΡ. Μένει.
ΕΝΔ.
ΣΑΡ. ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Ὅντοιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέων, πότερον δικαίων ἐμὲ ἐνδεύνε ὑπερά.
οσθαί ἔξεναι, μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιων,
cαλ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιων, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μη
ἐώμεν, δὲ δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλο-
σεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παιδῶν τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὃ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ραδιών
ἀποκτινων καὶ ἀναβυσσοκομένων ὃ ἄν, εἰ οἶοι τε
ἡσαυ, οὐδὲν ἔσθιν νῦ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἢμῖν δ',
ἐπειδὴ ὃ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεί, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέων ἢ
ἡ ὁπερ νῦν ὑπὸ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ
χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτων τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνδεύνε ἐξάζουσι
καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτῶν ἐξώγοντες τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσουμεν ταῦτα πάντα προοίμως: καὶ
φαίνωμεθα ἀδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὲν ὑπολο-
γίζεσθαι οὕτ' εἰ ἀποδηνήσεως δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ
ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο οὕτων πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ
ἀδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Καλὸς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὃ Σώ-
κρατει, ὃ δὲ τί δρώμεν. ἜΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὃ ἰγαθέ,
κοινῆ, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγεις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντί-
Εὔγει, καὶ σοι πείσομαι: εἰ δὲ μὴ, παῦσαι ἢδη, ὃ μα-
κάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγου τοῦ αὐτῶν λόγου, ὅς κρῆ
ἐνδεέ ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπαίνει. ὃς ἐγὼ περὶ
πολλοῦ ποιούμαι πείσαι σε ταῦτα πράττεις, ἄλλα μὴ
ἀκούστω. ὃ δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, εάν σοι
ἰκανὸς λέγηται, καὶ πειρὼ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρω-
τάμενον, ἢ ἀν μᾶλιστα οὗ. ΚΡ. Ἀλλα πειρά-49
σομαι.

Οὐδεὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικη-
tέον εἰναι, ἢ τιν μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὖ; ὡς
οὐδαμὸς τὸ γα ἄδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλὸν, ὡς
πολλὰς ἡμῶν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὀμολογή-
ὴ; ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. ἡ πᾶσαι ἡμῶν ἐκεῖναι αἱ
πρόσθεν ὀμολογοῖα ἐν ταῖς ταῖς ὀλγαῖς ἡμέραις
ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσὶν, καὶ πάλαι, ὁ Κρίτων, ἀρα τηλικοῖδε
γέροντες άνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι
ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πάλαιν οὔτεν διαφέροντες; ἢ Β
παντὸς μᾶλλον οὔτως ἔχει, ὡς τοῦτο ἐλέγετο ἡμῶν;
εἶτε φαύν οἱ πολλοὶ εἶτε μή, καὶ εἶτε δεῖ ημᾶς ἐτὶ
tῶν χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἶτε καὶ πράστερα, ὅμως
tὸ γα ἄδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν
tυγχάνει δὲν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν, ἢ οὖ; ΚΡ. Φαμὲν.
ΣΩ. Οὐδαμὸς ἀρα δεῖ ἄδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ δήτα. ΣΩ.
Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἀρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἶον-
ται, ἐπειδὴ γας οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἄδικεῖν. ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνε-
tαι. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων, ἢ οὖ;
ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δή που, ὁ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Τὶ δὲ; ἀντι-
κακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φαμεῖ,
δίκαιον, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ
που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἄδικεῖν οὐδὲν δια-
φέρει. ΚΡ. Ἀληθῶς λέγεις. ΣΩ. Οὕτε ἄρα ἀνταδι-
κεῖν δὲν οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὔτ' ἂν
ὅτι οὐκ πάσχῃ ἵπτ' αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁρᾷ, ὁ Κρίτων, ταῦτα
καθομολογοῦν, ὡς μὴ παρὰ διόταν ὀμολογῆς. οἶδα
γὰρ, ὅτι ὀλγαῖς τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δοξεῖ. οἷς
οδὼν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ ο isize μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ
βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν,
ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ
οὐ εὐ μᾶλα, πότερον κοινονεῖ καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι· καὶ
ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλεύομενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὅρθως
ἐχοντος οὕτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὕτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὕτε
κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδράντων κακῶς· ἡ
ἀφιστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινονεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐνοὶ μὲν γὰρ
ὅταν πᾶλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ δοκεῖ, σοι δ' εἰ πη ἀλλη
δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρό-
σεχεῖν, τὸ μετὰ τούτο ἀκοῦε. ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε
καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε. ΣΩ. Δέγω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ
μετὰ τούτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον δ' ἂν τις ὁμο-
λογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ δικτα τοιοῦτον ἢ ἔξαπαττήτευν; ΚΡ.
Ποιητέων. Ἐνδ

ΟΔΡ. XI. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρευ. ἀπιῶντες ἐν-
50 Θένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πελεσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς
τινας ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οἷς ἡμιστα δεῖ, ἡ οὗ; καὶ
ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δικαίως οὐσιν, ἡ οὗ;
ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὅτε σκόπεις. εἰ
μελλονυς ἡμῖν ἐνΘένδε εἶτε ἀποδιδάσκειν, εἰδ' ὅτις
dεῖ ἀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν,
tῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔρουντο· Εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Σωκρά-
τες, τί ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἀλλ' τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ,
φ' ἐπεπειρεῖς, διανοεῖς τοὺς τὸ νόμον ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι
Β' καὶ ξύμπασαι τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; δὴ δοκεῖ σοι
οἷον τε ἐτὶ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετρά-
φθαι, ἐν ἂν αἱ ἐγενόμεναι δικαί μηδὲν ἴσχυσιν,
ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἴδιωτῶν ἄκυροι τε γέγονονται καὶ διαφθέρονται; τί ἔρούμεν, ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦτο τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὅσ τὰς δίκαια πόλεως ἄρκος ἐξέτασε κυρίας εἶναι. ἦ ἔρούμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ ὅπερ ὅρθος τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἦ τί ἔροϋμεν; ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῦν Ἀλ', ὁ Σώκρατες.

Cap. XII. Σ.Ω. Τί οὖν, ἄν εἰπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένεις ταῖς δίκαιαι αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν ἰαμάξομεν λεγόντων, ἐσός ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μὴ ἴαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκρίνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰσέχεις χρήσθαι τῷ ἑρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ὁ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσε σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τούς γάμους μέμφει τι ὦς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσι; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνῃ ἄν. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἂν καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύεις; ή οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἰ ἐπὶ τούτως τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλουτε τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μονοιχιᾷ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; Καλῶς, φαίνῃ ἄν. Ἐἰπτ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένοντε τοι ἐκ 
ἐξετάρφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύεις, ἔχους ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς οὐκ ἡμέτερος ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐκγόνος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχει,
Ἀρ' ἐξ ἦν οἷεὶ εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἄττ' ἄν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σὺ ταύτα ἀντι-ποιεῖν οἷεὶ δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πα-τέρα ὡς ἐξ ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἰ σοὶ δὲν ἐτύχῃσθαι, ὥστε, ἀπερ πᾶσχοι, ταύτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, ὡστε κακῶς ἀκοῦστα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τὺ-51 πτόμενου ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς ὃν δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔξεσται σοι, ὥστε, εάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμε-νοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὴ ἡμῶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ δὸν δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀντιπολύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταύτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἁρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφὸς, ὥστε λέληξε σε, ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρός καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμώτερόν ἐστιν πατρίς καὶ σεμνό-βτερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοιρᾷ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἄνδραποι τοὺς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβε-σθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέλευσι καὶ ἀνεπέλευσι πατρίδα χαλεπαλύουσαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθεων, ἡ ποιεῖν ἃ ἀν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάρχειν, εάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυ-χίαν ἀγοντα, εάν τε τύπτεσθαι εάν τις δείσθαι, εάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἀγγελωθήσομεν ἢ ἀποδαιμονεῖν, ποιητέον ταύτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ξέει, καὶ οὐκ ὑπεκτέον, οὐδὲ ἀναχρηστεῖν, οὐδὲ λειτέειν τὴν τά-ξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἀν κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις καὶ ἡ πα-οτρίς, ἡ πείθεων αὐτήν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι δ' οὖν ὡσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολλ' δὲ τού-
τῶν ἦτον τὴν πατρίδα. Τι φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡς Κρῖτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους, ἢ οὔ; ΚΡ. "Ἐμονε γε δοκεῖ.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙΓ. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες, φαίειν ἃν ἵσως οἳ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῇ λέγομεν, ὅτι ὅσα δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκδρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ἄν οἴοι τ' ἦμεν καλῶν σοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσιν πολίταις, ὡμος προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἔξουσίᾳ πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἑπεν- δαν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἑγί τὰ ἐν τῇ πολεί πρόγνωμα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμείς, ἔξεινα λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι τοίνυν καὶ οὗτος ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἔμποδῶν ἐστον οὐδ' ἀπαγο- ρεύσει, εάν τέ τις βουληται ἡμῶν εἰς ἄποικοιαν ἴέναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἀλλοσέ ποι ἐλεόν, ἴέναι ἐκεῖνη, ὅποι τοῖς βουληται, ἐχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὅς δ' ἂν ἡμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὅριν ὅ εἰ τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας δικαζόμεν καὶ ταῦτα τὴν πόλεων διοικοῦμεν, ἢ ὡς φάμεν τούτον ὁμολογήκης ἔργῃ ἡμῶν ἢ καὶ ἡμεῖς κελεύσαμεν ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τρίχῃ φαμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννή- ταις οὐκ ἡμῶν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ἥτις τροφεῦσε, καὶ οὗτο ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴ πείθεται οὔτε πεί- θεί ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τα ποιοῦμεν, προτείνοντον ἡμῶν, ὅτα καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἑπιταττόντων ποιεῖς καὶ τῶν κελεύσαν, ἄλλα ἐφεσύντων δυνεῖν ἑαυτα, ὅ πείθειν ἡμᾶς, ἢ ποιεῖς, τούτων οὐδέτερα τοιέσ. ΖΤΕΝ

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙΕ. Ταῦταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σὲ, ὡς Σώκρα-
τες, ταίς αὐτίας ἐνέξεσθαι, εἰπὲρ ποιήσεις ἀ ἐπινοεῖς,
καὶ οὐχ ἤκοιτα 'Ἀθηναίων σὲ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλητα.
Εἰ οὖν ἔγω εἴποιμι, διὰ τί δή; ἵςως ἀν μου δικαίως
καθάπτοιτο, λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλητα 'Ἀθη-
ναίων ἔγω αυτῶς ὀμολογηκὼς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν
ὀμολογίαν. φαίνει γὰρ ἂν ὅτι Ὁ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα
Βῆμαν τούτων τεκμηριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡρε-
σικομεν καὶ ἡ πόλεις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ
σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὗτ' ἐπὶ Θεορίαν πώποτε
ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὥς τι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἰσρήλων,
οὔτε ἄλλοσσα σιδαμόσσε, εἰ μὴ ποιο στρατευόμενος,
οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημηλαν ἐποίησον πώποτε, ὅσπερ οἱ ἄλ-
λοι ἀνδρωποι, οὔτ' ἐπεδήμησεν σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὔτ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ικανοὶ
Ὁμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλεις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἦροι,
καὶ ὀμολογεῖς καὶ ἣμασ πολιτεύεσθαι, τὰ τε ἄλλα
καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησον, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς
πόλεως. ἔτι τοιοῦν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἤξι ποιήσασθαι εἰ ἔθυλου, καὶ ὅσπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πό-
λεως ἑπιχειρεῖς, τὸτε ἐκούσῃς ποιήσα, σὺ δὲ τὸτε μὲν
ἐκαλλωπίζων ὡς οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθύλλας σε,
ἄλλ' ἦροι, ὥς ἔφησα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς Ἀνατοῦν· νῦν
δὲ οὗτ' ἐκεῖνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν
νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἑπιχειρῶν διαφθείρας, πράττεις τε
Δάπερ ἀν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράζειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειων ἀναγ
ἑπιχειρών παρὰ τὰς ξυνήκες τε καὶ τὰς ὀμολογίας,
καὶ ὅσ ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτοι μὲν οὖν
ἡμῶν τούτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῇ λέγομεν, φάσκον-
τές σε ὠμολογηκέναι πολυτεύεσθαι καὶ ήμᾶς ἔργα, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγο, ἦ ὦν ἀληθῆ. Τι φώμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀλλ' τι ή ὠμολογόμεν; ΚΡ. Ἄναγκη, ὦ Σῶκρατες. Σ.Ο. Ἀλλ' τι οὖν ἂν φαίην ἢ εὐνῳχίας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὠμολογίας παραβιάσεις, οὐχ ἐν' ἀνάγκης ὠμολογήσας, οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεῖς, οὐδὲ ἐν ὁλιγῷ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐξομήκομα, εὗτε ἐξήν δια τούτοις, εἰ μὴ ἤρεσκόμεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δικαίων ἐφαίνοντο σοι αἱ ὠμολογίαι εἶναι. σοὶ δὲ οὔτε Δακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὲ ἐκάστοτε φής εὑρωμέναι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμιᾶν τῶν Ἐλληνιδῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλάρχου ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπτυκροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον σοὶ· τίνι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενείς τοῖς ὠμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γάρ πείθῃ, ὦ Σῶκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγελαστῶς γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθὼν.

Σ.Ο. Σκόπεις γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαρατῶν τι τούτων τι ἁγάθον ἐργάζεσθαι σαυτῶν, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτῶν. οὕτοι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύον—Β σουσί γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτηδεῖοι καὶ αὐτὸι φεύγειν καὶ στερθῆναι τῆς πόλεως, ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπόλεσαι, σχέδου τοῖς δῆλοις· αὐτοὶ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν έναν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτετά των πόλεων ἔλθης, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μεγάραδε,—εὖνομονται γὰρ ἀμφότεροι—πολέμους ἦξεις, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τῆς τούτων πολιτείας, καὶ ὅσοιπερ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψαμεν σε διαφθορά ἡγούμενοι·
νοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τῆς Ὀδόξου, ὡστε δοκεῖν ὧρθας τῆς δίκης δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθοραίς ἔστι, σφόδρα που δόξην ἄν νέων ὑπὲρ καὶ ἄνοιξην ἄνθρωπον διαφθοράς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεῦξε τάς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπος τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τούτο ποιοῦντι ἀρα ἀξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἡ δὲ εἰς τούτοις καὶ ἀναίσχυντήτες διαλεγόμενοι· τίνας λόγους, ὁ Σωκράτης; ἡ δέ εὑρίσκων ἐκθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιου τούς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ νόμμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οὐκ ἀσχημονὸν ἵνα φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Δ. Ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τῶν τῶν τούτων ἀπαρείς, ἢ δὲ εἰς Ἡθηταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἕκει γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἄταξία καὶ ἀκολούθα, καὶ ἵσως ἂν ἠδέως σοι ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοως ἐκ τοῦ διασωμητηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες, σκευὴν τέ τινα περιδέμανος· ἡ δὲ διδασκαλεῖ ἀληθῶς ἡ ἀλλα οἰα δὴ εἰώθαις ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτῶ ἐμακάμασ. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἄνηρ Ἐσμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιπῷ δυντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτὸςμεθας οὖν γηλύχρως ἐπιδύμειν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβᾶς, οἷδες δὲ ἑρεῖ; ἵσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπής· εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἀκούσει, ὁ Σωκράτης, πόλλα καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἄνθρωπος καὶ δουλείας—τό ποιών ἡ εὐωχομένος ἐν Θεταλία, ὡστερ ἐπὶ δεύπον ἀποδεδημηκὸς εἰς Θεταλία; λόγοι δὲ ἑκείνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ 51 τῆς ἀλλής ἁρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσται τε; Ἀλλ' δὴ τῶν παρθένων ἐνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἢν αὐτοὺς ἐκηρέψης καὶ
παιδεύσης; τι διὰ; εἰς Θέτταλαν αὐτοῦς ἀγαγῶν ἡμέρας τέ καὶ παιδεύσης, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τούτῳ σου ἅπαντα ἁρετησόων; ἡ τούτῳ μὲν οὖ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζωίτος βέλτιον ἠρέσθων καὶ παιδεύσῃται, μὴ ξυνόντως σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἵ σοι ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θέτταλαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἑιδοῦ ἀποδημήσης, οὐκ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἰπερ γε τὶ ὁφελὸς αὐτῶν ἔστι τῶν σοὶ φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἷος τὰς Β τὴν χρή.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΝ. ἈΛΛ', ὁ Σάκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς προφετεύσει μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖ μήτε τὸ ξύν μήτε ἄλλο μαθῶν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἐνθανθι τῷς καὶ τοῦτο πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοὺς ἐκεὶ ἄρχοντας· οὗτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοὶ φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντες ἁμισον τὸν νόμον ἐναὶ τῶν σών σωθεῖν, οὗτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένου ἁμισον ἔσται. ἄλλα νῦν μὲν ἡδικημένος ἄπει, εὰν ἀπίθης, οὐχ ὡς οἱ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἄλλ' ὡς ἀνθρώπων· εὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὗτος αἰσχρός ἀνταδημήσεσθαι τοῦ καὶ ἀντικακουμνήσεσθαι, τὰς σαντοῦ ὁμολογίας ταὶ καὶ ἔνανθήσεις τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβᾶς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους, οὐς ήκιστα ἔδει, σαντὸν τὲ καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ἤγγει, καὶ ἐκεὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἄδελφοι οἱ ἐν Ἐιδοῦ νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες, ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἄλλα μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖς ὁ λέγει μᾶλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

ΣΑΡ. ΧΝ. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἐταίρε Κρίτων, εὖ
Ισδι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιώντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τοῦτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἄλλα ίσδι, ὅτα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐάν τι λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἑρεῖς. διὸς μέντοι εἴ τι οἷς πλέον ποιήσεις, λέγε. ΚΡ. Ἄλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. Σ.Ο. Ἔα τοῖνυν, ὁ Κρί- Ετων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα ὁ Θεὸς υφριγεῖται.
NOTES.
NOTES.

APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

A. "О τι... κατηγορών. In what manner you have been affected by my accusers, i.e. by their harangues, which had immediately preceded the defence of Socrates. Since πεπόνθητε denotes the receiving of an action, it is followed by ὑπά, as if it were a passive verb. C. 556; K. 249, 3; Mt. 490, 3. So ὑπ’ αὐτῶν just below; and in like manner ad in Latin. The accusers or prosecutors of Socrates were three, Anytus, 18 B., Meletus, 19 B., and Lycon, 23 E.—ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The trial of Socrates took place before the Heliaea, the most numerous and popular, and, at that time, by far the most important court at Athens, which consisting in all of 6,000 Athenian citizens (though they usually administered justice in sections of 500 each), and being also often thronged by spectators from the populace, its members might well be addressed by the same honorable title as the members of the popular assembly, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, instead of the more distinctive title ὡς ἄνδρες δικασταὶ. The 6,000 Heliaets were a majority of the adult citizens of Athens. Cf. Wachsmuth's His. Ant. Soc. 47. On the constitution of this court see, besides Wachsmuth, Meier's Attic Process, Smith's Dict. of Antiquq, and

* C. stands for Crosby's Grammar; K. for Kühner's Middle Grammar; and Mt. for Matthiæ's, second edition.
Grote's Hist. of Greece, vol. iv. chap. 31. On the compliment implied in the title Ἀρραῖος, cf. 29 D.—σ’ οὖν. But then, however that may be.—οὖν, sc. εἰς, literally, to want little = almost. C. 622; Mt. 355, obs. 2. Cf. οὖν δειν, 22, A.—ημι-αυτοῦ ἵππασόμην, forgot myself, i.e. my true character.—οἷς εἰς εἰς εἰς limits οὖν εἰς εἰς εἰς, and is designed to qualify, or apologize for, that otherwise absolute negation of all truth in his accusers: they have said, so to speak, nothing that is true at least. Cf. Stallbaum in loc., and Gorg. 450 B, also Woolsey, ibid.—αὐτῶν ἐν ἤσαμασα, etc. One thing of theirs I most wondered at of the many falsehoods which they stated, viz. this. αὐτῶν relates to persons and is the gen. of the possessor, while ρῶν πολλῶν is the partitive gen. after the same word ἐν. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.

B. χρῆν. Al. χρῆ. But the imperf. ind. implies the non-performance of the duty: you ought to have been on your guard, as you have not been. Mt. 505, obs.; K. 260, R. 3. —ἐγκαταγῆνε. The subj. follows the past tense of the ind. (χρῆν) to denote that the danger of being deceived still continued: you ought to have been on your guard, and ought still to be, lest you be deceived. C. 602; K. 345, 5; Mt. 518, 1. —μή ἀλεξυνεθναῖ. μή rather than οὗ regularly accompanies the inf., because the inf., from its very nature, usually denotes a mere conception: that they should not be ashamed. C. 647; K. 318, 4; Mt. 608, 5.—ὅτι = because.—ἵππε, by the fact, the actual trial.—μήν ὁμοστιόν. Observe the emphasis: not even in any way whatever.—αὐτῶν, of them, or in them. —μή ἄρα = nisi forte, unless perchance. Often used ironically: unless forsooth. K. 324, a.—λέγων depends on δεινόν = powerful (literally, terrible) to speak.—εἰ . . . λέγων may be rendered, if they mean this.—οὐ καθ' ῥοῦνον, not after their example. He would acknowledge, that he was an orator according to that definition, but not according to their exempli-
fication of it, since they, as he proceeds to say, had spoken little or nothing that was true.—ὡς ἐγὼ εἰδὼ = little or nothing, next to nothing. Mt. 487, 8.—πάσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 9: τὴν δίκην ἀληθεύτερα εἰπὼν.—οὐ μὴν ἂν μᾶ Δί, κ.τ.λ. Not, however, by any means, Athenians, speeches rhetorically decked out as theirs were in choice words and phrases, nor carefully arranged in ornate periods, but you shall hear facts, stated without premeditation in the words which chance to occur to me.—δισερ οἱ τοῦτοι, sc. λόγοι ήσαν. In such comparative clauses, the noun may take the case of the preceding noun, or may be put in the nominative. λόγος is the object of ἀκούωςε, which is expressed in the last instead of the first clause, in order to declare emphatically and affirmatively what they shall hear. According to Stallbaum, ὁνόματα = singula nomina, ῥήματα = nomina una cum predicato. In the technical language of Greek grammar, ὁνόματα = nouns, ῥήματα = verbs.

C. πιστῶ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. in this connection implies, that just sentiments do not need rhetorical ornaments.—δὴ δὲν, as usual, is somewhat playful = methinks, to be sure.—τῷ δὲ τῷ ἡλικία, est: mihi homini id est—verbum abstractum loco verbi concreti positum. Stallb. Socrates was 70 years old at the time of his trial. Cf. D.—κλαττομεν takes the gender of μετασχεσθαι, and usually implies more or less of fictitious and false ornament.—εἰς ἑαυτα εἰσελθα, to come into your presence, your dicastery, or your assembly.—παρεμαν. Ruhnken, as cited and approved by Stallbaum, says: παρῆμα = admitto, παρεμαν = ad me admittis velo, i. e. precor, deprecor.—Kal εν ἀγορα, κ.τ.λ. Both in the agora at the counters, and elsewhere. Cf. Mat. 21, 12: τις τραπεζας τῶν κολλυβιστῶν.

D. ἡχει γὰρ οὕτως. For the fact is thus, sc. as follows. Then follows the explanatory clause, which, as usual, is without any connective (asynedeton).—ἀναθέσθηκα, sc. the βήμα, or stand of the accused. The accuser also had his βήμα or elevat-
ed stand in the court.—τῆς ἐνδιάδε λέγεως. The language of judicial proceedings. For the gen. see Mt. 337; K. 274, 3; C. 395.—δοσπερ οὐν ἄν. This ἄν belongs to the apodosis with συνεγινώσκετε, where it is repeated (δηποῦ ἄν). It stands with δοσπερ to intimate at the outset (by way of anticipation), that the example is a mere supposition, and then, after the intervening protasis with εἰ, it is repeated with the verb or some other important word of the apodosis. K. 261, 3. Cf. Gorg. 447, D, and other examples cited by Stallb. in loc.—τῇ ἁρμὶ = in fact. So very often, especially in Plato.—ξινος, not an Athenian but still a Greek, who might be understood in the Athenian courts, but would speak in the dialect, tone, and manner of his native country. Compare Schleiermacher's note ad loc.—συνπερ. O. 446; K. 242, γ; Mt. 441, 2, a.

18 A. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, and indeed now also. The construction is irregular. We should expect οὗτος καὶ νῦν, so also now, answering to συνπερ.—δικαιων, being just, i.e. a reasonable request. It is in apposition with τοῦτο, which is further explained by the infinitives ἐὰν and σκοπεῖν, the demonstrative preparing the way for the infinitives and calling attention to them. Mt. 472, b; K. 304, 2.—ἐς...ἐκν, as it appears to me at least; literally, as I appear. The Greeks are fond of changing the impersonal construction into the personal. K. 307, R. 6 and 7; ο. 551; Mt. 264, 5.—τραθ νῦν...ἐκν. It is difficult to see in this harmless parenthesis the un-Platonic self-praise which Ast finds in it.—αὑρ τοῦτο, this very thing, i.e. this single point, viz. whether I speak what is just or not. Here the demonstrative (enforced by the intensive, of which combination Plato is particularly fond) prepares the way for a clause, as it does above for an infinitive. K. 304, 2; Mt. 472, c.—ἀρετὴ = the virtue, being in the predicate, omits the article in Greek, but requires it in English. K. 244, R. 1; O. 487, 4; Mt. 264, 5.—σιμαξις εἰμι instead of σιμαξιν ἐστι with the acc. and inf.;
another example of the personal for the impersonal construction. Cf. note on δοκῶ, above. It is treated as a species of attraction by Mt. 297, and C. 551. —τὰ πρῶτα μου ψευδῆ κατγυρημένα, those things which have been first falsely charged upon me, or charged upon me being false. Cf. δίκαιος, above.

B. πολλὰ ἡ ἡτη ἐξειλαῖ which is altogether indefinite: for some time, many years now.—τοὺς ἄμφι Ἀντών. Anytus and his associates, sc. Meletus and Lycon. Anytus is named, as being the most popular and at the same time the most hostile of the three prosecutors of Socrates. He was a man of large fortune but loose principles. He gained the favor of the people as a leader of the exiles at Phyle in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, and having taken offence at Socrates partly on personal and partly on professional grounds (cf. 23, E), induced Meletus and Lycon to join with him in a prosecution. According to Diogenes Laertius (2, 38, 39), the Athenians repented of their condemnation of Socrates and put Meletus to death, and sent Anytus and Lycon into banishment. Grote disbelieves and denies this. His. of Gr. Vol. 8, ch. 68. Cf. Stallb. and Smith’s Dict. of Biog. and Mythol., Anytus.—οἱ ... παραλαμβάνοντες, who taking the mass of you from your boyhood, sc. as it were, under their instruction.—ὡς ἦστι, κ.τ.λ., saying, there is one Socrates, etc. The introductory particle appropriate to an indirect quotation is here, and often in Greek, followed by a direct quotation, and must be omitted in English. C. 609; K. 329, R. 3.—σοφὸς ἀνήρ, a philosopher. Compare the Latin sapiens. σοφός, as well as σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος, was more or less a term of reproach with the ignorant multitude. Cf. Grote, His. Gr. Vol. viii. pp. 479–485, Eng. ed.—τὰ τε μετίωρα φροντιστής. φροντιστής governs the acc. as retaining the active force of φρονίζων. Mt. 422; C. 424.—τὸν ἢττῳ ... πολύν, making the weaker the stronger argument, or, as it is often expressed, making the worse appear
the better reason. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8: docere quemadmodum causa inferior dicendo fieri superior possit. Schleiermacher renders, making wrong right, and cites Aristotle as saying (Rhet. 2, 24) that it was done by bringing up against the truth, in some one view perhaps improbable, an opposite probability or apparent truth. The Sophists were open to this charge, as the physical philosophers were to that of inquiring into every thing in the heavens above and in the earth beneath; and the art of the enemies of Socrates consisted in arraying against him the prejudices which the public mind already cherished, with greater or less reason, against them—in short, in confounding him with them, though he was, in fact, diametrically opposed to them both in faith and in philosophy. Cf. below, 23, D: τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πράξεια ταῦτα λίγοντως.

C. Κατασκεύασεις denotes the manner or means of their power and formidableness; hence it is without the article.—οὐδὲ θεὰς νομίζειν, do not even believe in the existence of the gods. This, it is well known, was one point in the indictment against Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. I, I, 1; also below, 24 B. The physical philosophers of the age afforded a plausible, not to say just, occasion for this charge, since they, for the most part, dispensed with all efficient causes, and either failed to recognize the Deity, or else confounded him with his works. The systems, if not the men, were chargeable with atheism or pantheism. Cicero ascribes to Anaxagoras the first distinct recognition of the divine existence and agency, as an intelligent cause, in the universe.—ἐπειπάρτι...ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ = then...still further also; or in the second place...in the third place also.—ταῦτα γὰρ ἠλικία. Explained by παῖδες ἄνετες, κ. τ. λ.—ἀν...ἐπιστεύσατε. Observe the peculiar force of the past tense of the ind. with ἀν: you would have believed, sc. had it been possible, as it was not. C. 603 and 604; K. 339, l. 6, cf. 340
1. —ιρήμη κατηγοροῦντες, accusing me in my absence. The form of expression (ιρήμη, sc. δίκη) is derived from a suit at law, in which one of the parties does not appear.—ἀτέχνως = altogether. Previous to Forster's, the editions connected ἀτέχνως with μειράνων. But as Schleiermacher well says, ἀτέχνως almost always connects itself with what follows, and it would not properly attach to μειράνων, since μειράνων, youths, are older than παῖδες, small boys.—εἰ ... τωρχάνει ἄν, implies no uncertainty: εἰ = in case, or when. The allusion is particularly to Aristophanes, who is named below, 19, C; though Cratinus, Ἀμίπσιας, Εὐπολις, and other comic poets, ridiculed Socrates. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. φζόρος καὶ διαβολὴ χρώμενα = φζόροντες καὶ διαβαλ-λομενες, in the spirit of envy and calumny.—οἱ δὲ introduces another class of persuaders, as if οἱ μὲν had preceded with φζό-ρο ... χρώμενον, the one being the envious and calumnious, the other those who were really persuaded in their own minds of the guilt of Socrates.—ἀποτάρανοι, most inaccessible (ἄι and πόροι), most difficult to approach and convince. Cf. Lysis, 223, B: ἄποροι προσφέρεσαν.—ἀναβόθασασαν ... ἐν ταύτῃ, to make ... come up hither, i.e. summon him to appear in court. Observe the force of the middle voice: for my benefit, cf. ἑξελέγα, 19, A.—αὐθών is partitive genitive = any of them.—ἀπερ ... ἀποκριμομένου, to fight with shadows, as it were, in defending myself, and also to convict while no one replies. The participle and the infinitive in each part form a complex idea, and then the two parts or ideas are connected together by τε καὶ. Thus is the apparent confusion of participles and infinitives explained by Fischer. See his note ad loc.

E. Ἄγισωσθε = existimate. So rendered by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c.—ἐκεῖνος, those, sc. earlier and more remote accusers. ἐκεῖνος refers to the more remote idea, though, as in this instance, it be to the latter word or clause.
A. *Εἰςν. Well, be it so. Schleiermacher: *wohl*. It marks the establishment and completion of what goes before and the transition to another topic.—*ἐξειδίσας*. Cf. note on ἀναβάσασας, 18, D.—*τὴν διαβολὴν . . . χρόνῳ*. The calum-
ny (misconception produced by calumny) which you have enter-
tained a long time, this to eradicate in so short a time.—
τούτο σού γενίσας, sc. the eradication of false impres-
sions from the minds of his judges. It is still further explained by
καὶ πλέον . . . ἀπολογούμενον, and to accomplish something by
my defence. On πλέον τι ποιεῖν = prosequere aliquid, to get on or
forward with a thing, to gain something by it, see Lexicon.
—*εἰ τι ἀμείνον, κ.τ.λ.*. The sequel shows, that he not only
doubted whether it was best for him to be acquitted, but that
he did not desire to live by any such means as were likely
to influence his judges to acquit him. He makes his defence
rather as a matter of form in obedience to the laws, than with
the expectation or desire of success.—Ἀναλάβωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
*Let us take up anew, from the beginning.* He has adverted to
the charge in general terms before (18, B); but here he would
resume its examination from the first, as if he had not before
mentioned it.—*ἡ ἐμὶ διαβολὴ, the false opinion of me.* Cf.
εἰνοικ τῇ σῷ, good will to you, Gorg. 486, A; C. 503; K. 302,
R. 2; Mt. 466, 2.—με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφήν ταύτην. For the
force of the middle voice, see C. 559, d; K. 250, R. 2; Mt. 492,
c. For the double acc. (of the cognate signification γράφην, and
the direct object με), see C. 435; K. 280, 1. Render: *has pre-
ferred against me this indictment.* γραφή is a public indict-
ment for a criminal offence; δίκη is applicable either to public
or private causes, but when used in contradistinction to γραφή,
it denotes a private suit.

B. ἀπειρ ὅν, κ.τ.λ. *Therefore just as it is customary to*
*read the bill of indictment presented by formal accusers, so*
*must we read theirs.* ἀντωμοσία is primarily the oath of a
party at law, and then the bill or form of indictment.—νεραγούζεται, is over-busy, excessively curious.

C. τουαίρη τις, something like this. He does not profess to give it exactly. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1.—ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνειος κομωσία. The Clouds, perhaps the master-piece of Aristophanes, in which he introduces Socrates, as the principal character, sitting in a basket in the air (as the gods were represented in the machinery of the Attic drama), and uttering declamations as windy as his position. Very different explanations are given of the motives which induced the poet to treat the moral philosopher with such palpable injustice. Some have supposed that he was influenced by personal hostility, and further instigated and suborned by the enemies of Socrates. But this supposition does not accord either with the comparatively respectful tone in which Aristophanes elsewhere alludes to Socrates (cf. Birds, 1280, 1554; Frogs, 1487), or with the mild and even complimentary terms in which Plato speaks of Aristophanes here and elsewhere. Had Plato regarded Aristophanes as a bitter personal enemy of Socrates, or as having occasioned his master’s death, he never would have introduced the poet and the philosopher conversing on such friendly terms as in the Symposium, still less furnished for the poet’s tomb such an epitaph as the following: “Jupiter, wishing to find an asylum for all the graces, found the soul of Aristophanes.” Others have thought that Aristophanes really mistook the true character of Socrates, confounded his teachings with those of the Sophists, whom he opposed, and so in sober earnest visited upon his head the storm of indignation which was merited by the class, and by him as its leader and ablest representative. But, to say nothing of the want of discernment which is thus imputed to Aristophanes, the matter was not viewed in so serious a light either by Plato (as the considerations just mentioned suffice to show), or by Soc-
rates, who was present when the piece was performed, and stood forth before the audience that he might be recognized as "a host who furnished a large company an agreeable entertainment." There was enough of general resemblance between him and them in their talkative habits, the subjects on which they conversed, and the manner in which they reasoned (especially as he often met the Sophists on their own ground, and refuted them with their own weapons), to give plausibility to the representation of him as an arch-sophist. Doubtless also the ultra-conservative poet viewed the speculating and revolutionizing spirit of the Socratic philosophy with not a little of the same fear and aversion with which he regarded the demoralizing instructions of the Sophists. Moreover, Socrates stood in the most friendly relations to Alcibiades and Euripides, both of whom, as arch-innovators though in different spheres, were subjects of unsparing ridicule and reproach in the comedies of Aristophanes. So much of objective reality we may suppose lay at the basis of the representation which is made of Socrates in the Clouds. The rest is comic exaggeration and extravagance got up purposely, but not maliciously, for the amusement of the πολυγιλοι Ἄριστοι. And surely never was comedian furnished with a more fruitful theme for inextinguishable laughter than the grotesque person, outlandish dress, and singular gait of Socrates, with which friend and foe, Athenian and stranger, all had become familiar as he stood and stared or started and ran through the streets, or fascinated some and bored and vexed others, in the shops and the market-places. The intent of the piece and its author may have been misunderstood by some, and it may have had some effect in preparing the way for the prosecution, which it suggests. But it is referred to in the Apology as an illustration of popular prejudices of long standing, rather than as a cause of the present indictment. And the utter failure of the Clouds to
make any serious impression on the popular mind against Socrates is seen, not only in its want of success at the time (for it gained no favor and won no prize), but also in the fact that a period of twenty-four years intervened between its exhibition and the condemnation of the Moral Philosopher. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.; Smith's Dict. of Biog.—περιφερόμενον, sc. in a basket (κρεμάστρα), cf. the Clouds, 225 seq.—ἀποβατεῖν. When asked what he is doing, Socrates replies in the play: ἀποβατῶ καὶ περιφέρον τὸν ἡμῶν. Cf. the Clouds, ibid.—διό... πίπτε ἔταιω. Observe the anastrophe and the position of πίπτε, as in English: which I know nothing about.—λέγω, sc. the foregoing = I say this. ἅμαξαυν governs ἐπιστήμην. The Socratic irony is manifest in this clause, and in the following, which is parenthetical: let me not, by any means, be prosecuted by Meletus on so weighty a charge! sc. as undervaluing this kind of knowledge.—αλλὰ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. But I must speak, for &c.

D. αὐτῶς ἰμαῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς. The greater part of yourselves.—ἐκ τοῦτων, Al. τούτω. The Greeks very often employ the plural of the demonstrative in reference to a foregoing clause or single idea, where we should use the singular. Render: from this. Cf. K. 241, R. 3; Mt. 472, 5.—περὶ ἵμαυ is placed before ἐν for emphasis = which the many say about me. —τούτων, the charges in the foregoing context—inquiring into things above, making the worse the better reason, &c.—οὐδὲ γε, κ.τ.λ. We should expect οὔτε answering to the οὔτε in the previous clause, but οὐδὲ γε is more emphatic and therefore more appropriate to introduce a new topic of special importance. It is made still more emphatic by being repeated before τούτῳ ἀληθείας.—χρήματα πράττομαι. This charge also confounded Socrates with the Sophists, who amassed large sums of money for tuition. It is denied also by Xenophon, Mem. 1, 2, 60.
E. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. The Attics use ἐπεὶ often like γάρ = for, and sometimes, like quam in Latin, it may be well rendered although. Socrates treats this charge, just as he did the other, ironically, representing it as a very beautiful and honorable thing, if one were only wise and capable of doing it; and yet he feels constrained to deny it simply because it is not true.—Ὑπήγας τε ὁ Δεοντίνος, κ.τ.λ. He enumerates several of the most popular Sophists and rhetoricians who had enriched themselves by teaching the sons of the wealthy at Athens. They were all foreigners. For Gorgias of Leontini, a city of Sicily, cf. Diog. Laer. 9, 52; Cic. de Orat. 1, 22; Brut. 8; Plat. Gorg., Hip., and Protag. For Prodicus of Ceos, one of the Cyclades Islands, cf. Cic. Brut. 8; Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 21 seqq.; Plat. Protag. and Cratyl. For Hippias of Elié, a city of the Peloponnesus, cf. Cic. de Orat. 32, Brut. 8; Plat. Hip. and Minos. See also Smith’s Dict. Biog. and Mythol., and Grote’s Hist. Gr. vol. 8, chap. 67. Grote defends the Sophists as a class with great learning and eloquence. Doubtless they have been condemned too much in the gross—with too indiscriminate severity. But though there were doubtless wise and good men among them, it can hardly be doubted that, for the most part, their influence was hostile to morals and religion, and they deserved the censure which Plato everywhere attaches to them.—τῶν νόμων would regularly be the object of πειθέον, depending on οἷς τῆς τινος; instead of which, however, by a singular anacoluthon, we have πειθοῦν. It should be observed, that Plato abounds in such irregular constructions and unexpected changes, doubtless to keep up the appearance of a colloquial style appropriate to the dialogue, and which is no less appropriate to the plain talk which Socrates promises to hold with his judges in this Apology.—πολίτῶν is partitive genitive after καί: who have the opportunity to associate gratuitously with whomsoever they please of their fellow-citizens.—
νποσενίναι: and besides (paying them money) to feel under obligation to them.

A. ἵναι = γὰρ, for, cf. note, 19, E. Schleiermacher renders it by the German ja.—δὲν...ἐπιθυμοῦτα, of whose sojourning here I lately became aware. The reference is to Eunus, the poet and Sophist, as appears below, B. He was a native of the island Paros. He is mentioned in the Phædo, 60, D, and Phædrus, 267, A. Callias, the son of Hippponicus, who informed Socrates of Eunus’s stay in the city, was proverbially rich (ὁ πλουσιος, Plutarch), and his lavish expenditure upon the Sophists is often referred to. Protag. 314, B, C; Xen. Symp. 1, 5; Aristoph. Birds, 285. See also Boeckh’s Pub. Econ. Athens, vol. 2, p. 242.

B. ἀπετήν. Acc. of specification: in the virtue (or excellence) becoming them. So, in a similar illustration, Xenophon makes Socrates use the word δικαος of a horse and an ox, that is obedient to his proper law and trained for his appropriate work. Socrates used such illustrations, drawn from the lower animals and the common affairs of life, till they were threadbare and almost offensive, at least to those who could not but feel their force as directed against themselves. The “Great Teacher” abounded in this method of instruction.—ἡν δὲ ἀν ὀδις. And this (overseer) would have been, etc. The past tense of the indicative with ἀν is appropriate to a conclusion preceded by a supposition contrary to fact. C. 603; K. 329, 6; Mt. 508, b.—τὴν ἄνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικής, that which is appropriate to man and also to the state.—πέντε μνῶν = some §83. This was a small sum in comparison with the tuition fees which Protagoras, Gorgias, and some others exacted, who received 100 minæ. With the Greek μνῶ compare the Latin mina and our word money.—ἱμμελῶν, according to Stallbaum, has a double application to the style of teaching and to the price of tuition = so proper (literally, in tune),
so excellently in both respects. He says, there is great urbani-
ty in the expression. If Socrates had said, οὗτος εἶτελῶς, he
would have too clearly ridiculed Evæus and so Callias. He
used therefore a word, by which, while he seemed to praise
Evæus, he yet severely censured both his levity and the ava-
rice of the other Sophists. Forster renders it by concinna,
Ast, commode, Schleiermacher, vortrefflich, Cousin, a bon
marché. It is used of a moderate or reasonable price in the
Laws, 776, B, 760, A.

C. διλ' οὖ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. The ellipsis is obvious: but I can-
not thus pride myself, for etc. γὰρ in such connection may
be rendered really, certainly: but I really do not know. Cf.
K. 324, R. 1; C. 661, 2.—ὑπολέξου. Compare our take up.
—τὸ σοῦ τί ἔστι πρᾶγμα, your business, what is it? The
emphasis is on your: you deny any acquaintance with the pro-
fession of the naturalist who inquires into the secrets of the
universe, or of the Sophist who teaches, and is well paid for
teaching, the art of persuasion; what then, Socrates, is your
business, profession, or pursuit?—οὐδὲν περιττότερον, nothing
more or other, nihil aliud. Cousin: rien de plus ou autre-
ment. Schleiermacher: nichts besonders. Stallbaum renders:
nihil curiosius.—ἰθεία, then, in that case, I suppose so much
talk and discussion would not have arisen, as has arisen. γίγο-
νεν stands where ἂν ἔγινειρ would regularly have been used, to
denote that this bruit has actually arisen. The next clause,
el μὴ τε ἔπραττε, κ.τ.λ., is a repetition of the condition already
expressed in the first clause, σοῦ γε οὐδὲν...πραγματευομένου,
for the sake of greater clearness and emphasis. The style is
manifestly colloquial.

D. τί πορ', quid tandem. In questions, por, like tandem,
dicates surprise, wonder, impatience, or some other lively
emotion. It is here retained in the indirect question, just as it
would have been used in the direct, as expressive of the won
der of the inquirer.—τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν, both the name, sc. of a wise man, and the calumny connected with it.

—εἶ μὴν τις ἐστε, Κ.π.λ. Be assured, however, I will tell you the whole truth. Observe the omission of ὅτι. So in Crit. 54, D, ἀλλὰ ἀνθινῷ, ὅτα γε, Κ.π.λ., and elsewhere after εἴ τις ἐστε.—ἀλλ' ἦ.

It has been usual in the grammars to explain this combination of particles (which occurs after a preceding negative or after a question implying a negative), as equivalent to ἀλλ' ἦ, with the accent changed (ἀλλ' ἦ) and then lost (ἀλλ' ἦ). Cf. C. 671, 2; K. 322, R. 10. But no sufficient reason is given for the change of the accent. Besides it is often preceded by ἀλλ' ἦ, cf. infra, 54, B: τίνα ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχουσι λόγου ... ἀλλ' ἦ, Κ.π.λ. Perhaps it is better to adopt the explanation of Stallbaum, Phædr. 81, B, viz., that it is a combination of two different constructions into one. It being allowable to say either οὐδὲν ἂλλο ἄλλα, or οὐδὲν ἂλλο ἦ, these two constructions are combined in this, οὐδὲν ἂλλο ἄλλα ἦ.—ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταῦτην, pray what sort of wisdom this. The clause takes the construction of σοφίαν in the preceding (acc. after διὰ). The omission of the preposition is especially frequent in the questions and answers of the dialogue, cf. C. 651, E; K. 300, C.—ἡπερ ἵστυν ἵσως, Κ.π.λ. Just that, perhaps, which is, etc.—τῷ ὅτι, in reality, ταῦτην, in this, acc. of specification. So σοφίαν in the next clause.

Ε. ἦ καὶ ὡς ὃς, than pertains to man, quam pro homine, cf. Mt. 449.—ἡ ὄντι ἔχω, τι λέγω, or else I know not what to call it—certainly it is not human wisdom—it is not any such wisdom as I possess. The irony of the passage is evident.

—ἐπὶ διαμαθὴς τῆς ἔμνη, for the sake of calumniating me. For this sense of ἓπι, cf. K. 296, p. c.; Mt. 585. For τῆς ἔμνη, instead of the objective gen., ἔμνῃ, cf. note, 19, Δ.—μὴ ἄπορβησῃς. Do not raise a tumult against me, or as a speaker would say to a modern assembly, do not kiss me = ne ostrepatis. The
reader will remember the popular constitution of the court, cf. note, 17, \( \Lambda \). For the aor. subj. in prohibitions with \( \mu \eta \) and its compounds, cf. C. 598; K. 259, \( \delta \); Mt. 511, \( \beta \).—\( \mu \eta \delta \epsilon \alpha \nu \), not even \( \epsilon \zeta \).—\( \alpha \xi \omega \chi \rho \epsilon \omega \nu \), responsible, primarily in regard to money, secondarily in regard to testimony. Cf. 38, \( \beta \).—\( \mu \gamma \alpha \lambda \epsilon \gamma \epsilon \nu \), properly denotes boasting, as \( \mu \gamma \alpha \phi \rho \nu \epsilon \nu \) does pride. In the later Greek, it meant to say something marvelous. But it was the seeming pride and arrogance of what he said, which, he feared, would give offence, and which did actually give offence to the judges. Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. as cited below, 21, \( \Lambda \); also Xen. Apol. Soc. 1, where he speaks of the \( \mu \gamma \alpha \lambda \gamma \gamma \alpha \pi \alpha \), which all the Apologies ascribe to Socrates in his defence.—\( \tau \eta \gamma \zeta \alpha \rho \epsilon \mu \eta \), \( \epsilon \zeta \delta \tau \) \( \tau \iota \sigma \iota \ \sigma \phi \iota \alpha \varepsilon \) \( \kappa \alpha \iota \alpha \iota \alpha \), for of my wisdom, whether now I have any, and of what sort it is, &c. By a somewhat peculiar attraction, \( \sigma \phi \iota \alpha \) is drawn from the principal into the subordinate clause.

21 \( \alpha \). \( \pi \nu \alpha = I \) suppose.——\( \epsilon \mu \sigma \iota \alpha \iota \rho \sigma \). Hence often attacked by Aristophanes in the Clouds and elsewhere.—\( \xi \nu \nu \rho \iota \iota \gamma \nu \iota \epsilon \) ... \( \kappa \alpha \iota \gamma \lambda \varepsilon \), he went with you in your recent exile and with you returned. The allusion is to the exile of the principal men of the Athenian democracy under the Thirty Tyrants, which having taken place quite recently, is called \( \tau \eta \nu \phi \nu \epsilon \gamma \eta \tau \alpha \iota \eta \nu \). This allusion was calculated to recommend Chærophon to popular favor. Words compounded with \( \kappa \alpha \iota \alpha \) (\( \kappa \alpha \iota \iota \varepsilon \alpha \), \( \kappa \alpha \iota \rho \chi \kappa \varepsilon \varepsilon \alpha \), &c.) often denote a return home to one's country, town, harbor, as words compounded with \( \alpha \nu \alpha \) signify the departure from such a resting place. Away from home is \( \upsilon \), return is \( \downarrow \).—\( \delta \nu \ \sigma \phi \iota \delta \rho \sigma \). Cf. Aristoph. Clouds, 104, 501, seq., Birds, 1570; Xen. Mem. 2, 3; Plat. Gorg., Charm., &c. pass.—\( \kappa \alpha \), \( \delta \nu \eta \ \lambda \epsilon \gamma \omega \), \( \mu \eta \ \sigma \rho \omicron \upsilon \beta \omicron \eta \iota \epsilon \tau \), and, I repeat it, do not be raising a tumult. It will be observed, that the aor. subj. is used in the first request (\( \mu \eta \ \sigma \rho \omicron \upsilon \beta \omicron \eta \iota \epsilon \tau \e above), but in the repetition the pres. imp. The former is a general request
not to do it at all; the latter is more definite, and means: don't be doing it, as you are doing and will be very liable to do while I proceed, especially with this to you most surprising and perhaps offensive part of my narrative. C. 570, seq.; K. 257, 1; Mt. 501. The Apology, which bears the name of Xenophon, declares expressly, that this part of Socrates' Defence did call forth repeated expressions of displeasure from the judges. Xen. Apol. Soc. 15.—hiftio γὰρ δὴ. The Greeks use the particles, γὰρ, δὴ, οὖν, in resuming a sentence after a parenthesis, where we use I say. Mt. 615, 616.—ἀνείλευ, responded, literally, took up, sc. her response. This famous response is worded differently in different authorities. Cf. Xen. Apol. Socr. 14; Diog. Laert. 2, 37; Schol. Aristoph. Clouds, 144.—ὁ δὲλφός, sc. Chærecreates, Xen. Mem. ii. 3. —οἵτως ... ἔκεινος. Cf. note, 18, E.

B. τι ποτε, what in the world. Cf. note, 20, D.—ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς δὲν. After ξύνοιδα, συγγυώσκω, &c., the particle expresses that of which one is conscious, and may either agree with the subject of the verb in the nom. or with the reflexive which follows the verb and refers to the same person, in the dativo. Here we have the former construction; below, 22, D, we have the other: ἐμαυτῷ ξυνήδειν οἶδεν ἐπισταμένω. C. 614, 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 548, 2. μέγα and σμικρὸν are adverbial accusatives. C. 440, 441; K. 278, R. 1; Mt. 425, 1. —τι οὖν ποτε λέγει, what in the world then, I say, does he mean? οὖν is resumptive like γὰρ, above, 21, A; and λέγει is best rendered, as it often is, by the English mean. Below the same form of expression follows ἐπισταμεν, instead of the oratio obliqua, ὅ τι ... λέγει. C. 610; 345, 5; Mt. 529, 5.—ἐπειτα ... ἐπισταμένω, but at length, with much labor, I betook myself to an examination of it (sc. the oracle or the meaning of the god, τι ποτε λέγει) somewhat as follows. τοιοῦτοι usually refers to the foregoing, τοιόσοδε to the following (cf. note, 37, A).
but not always. C. 513, 516. Cf. τωληθι τις, 19, C, and note; ibid.— δαζων stands without a connective, because this clause is in apposition as it were with the preceding, being a fuller and more exact statement of the examination there mentioned. Cf. 17, D, and note, ibid. The reader will observe that all such clauses or sentences are asyndetic; while, with the exception of such, each clause and sentence of connected discourse in Greek begins with some connective particle, δι, καλ, γαρ, ουν, &c.

C. ὡς... ἐλεγξων, supposing, that there, if anywhere, I should confute, etc. C. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.—ὁτι οὐτοι. Cf. note on ὡς οτι, 18, B.—οὐ δι ἐμι ἐφηωσα, but you (sc. the oracle) said I (sc. was wiser).—προς ὅν... επαζων, in looking to whom I met with such an experience.—καλ διελεγξων. Καλ connects διελεγξων to διασκορπιων (the intervening clause being parenthetical), and the participle belonging to the principal subject of the discourse (Socrates) is in the nominative, though, to agree with what follows, it should be in the dative with μοι. It is a species of anacoluthon. C. 344; Mt. 311.

D. ἐντειςεν is both temporal and causal = from that time and for that reason.—προς ειμαντιν... ἐλογιζομην, I reasoned with myself.—τοιου μιν του ἀνρπανου. The μιν implies, that something else may be said or found to be true in reference to some other man. It has no δι or other particle correlative to it, but prepares the mind for the further examinations which follow. The μιν after καθυπενει is correlative to ἀλλ', after which follows again the more usual correlative οτος μιν... ἐγώ δι. After δοκερ ουν ουκ οτια, ονςες is understood. —ον δε not denotes an inference but a correspondence with what he has before said of the ignorance of himself and others: while I, just as in fact, and as I have already said, I do not know, so I do not even suppose that I know.—συμκριν δε-
notes the degree, and αὐτῷ τοῦτῷ the respect in which he is wiser. C. 418, 3, 419; K. 285, 3; Mt. 400, 6, 8. The tyro will observe the difference between μη and οὐδὲ, the contingent and the absolute negative, well illustrated in the clause α μή σιδα, κ.τ.λ.: what I chance not to know, I do not even suppose that I know.

E. οὕτως ἀπηκαθόμην. These words connect with each of the preceding participles, but in the different relations of the fact and the cause—with αἰτήσαμενος, οὕτως would strictly require to be rendered that; with λυπόμενος and δεδώσας, because.

—τὸ τοῦ ζεόν. C. 477; Mt. 284.—ιδέων οὖν, σκοποῦντι. Socrates here passes suddenly from the indirect to the direct narration, and gives us the very language of his heart at the time when he made this examination: I must go then (thought I), in investigating the oracle what it means, to all, etc. σκοποῦντι agrees with μοι implied as the dative of the agent after ιδέων. For χρησάμεν, put as the object of σκοποῦντι instead of the subject of λέγει, see C. 425, 4.

A. μὴ τῶν κυνά. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 460, B; 482, B, and Prof. Woolsey’s notes, ibid. In the last cited passage, Socrates adds: τῶν Ἀγνωστῶν ζεόν, which perhaps shows that the oath was of Egyptian origin. See Mitchell’s note, D, App. to Aristoph. Wasps. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, Cousin, &c., refers the origin of such oaths to Rhadamanthus, who is said, in order to avoid swearing always by the gods, to have invented several other formulae as substitutes, such as by the dog, by the oak, by the goose, &c. In Xenophon, as well as Plato, Socrates is represented as swearing (somewhat singularly) by Juno, infra, 24, E; Gorg. 449, D; Hip. Maj. 291, 9; Xen. Mem. 1, 5, 5. iii. 10; 9. iv 2, 9, et al.—οἱ μὲν μακάρια, κ.τ.λ. An explanatory clause, hence without a connective. Cf. notes, 17, D; 21, B.—διῆγον δειν. Cf. note 17, A.—τοῦ πλείστου is governed by
The reader will observe the juxtaposition of the two contrasted words, φαυλότεροι and ἐπιεικέστεροι.—πλάνη, wandering, sc. to visit and examine the reputed wise men.—πονοῦς agrees with μου implied in ἵμην.—πόνος alludes to labors like those of Hercules.—ἐνα ... γένοιτο: that after all the oracle might in the end prove irrefutable, i.e. in addition to all his labors, also (καὶ) to bring about a result the opposite of what he set out to accomplish, which was to show that the oracle must be false. Such seems to be the true interpretation of this much disputed passage. Cf. Fischer's Defence of Platonic Passages against the Amendments of Stephens; also the notes of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum ad loc.

B. ὁ ... καταληψόμενος. Cf. note 21, C. εἰπ' αὐτοφόρος καταληψόμενος contains an allusion to the detection of a criminal in the very act.—μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσα: to have been most carefully composed.—διερώτων ἄν. The imperfect with ἄν denotes repetition according to the circumstances in each case: I would ask them in each instance, what they meant to say. C. 594; K. 260, B; Mt. 599, a. So below, ἄν βελτίον ἔλεγον: almost all who were present would speak better (i.e. give a better account) than they (the poets) of the poems which they themselves had composed. Wolf renders οἱ παράβους, qui hic adsumunt, sc. the judges of Socrates! and Smith, with a total misapprehension of Stallbaum, whom he professes to translate, renders ἄν βελτίον ἔλεγον, used to think best of those poems which they themselves had composed!

C. οὐ σοφία, κ.τ.λ. So in Ion 533, E, Socrates says, that poets and musicians, like prophets and soothsayers, compose their productions, not by art, but by an inspiration which displaces reason. The fundamental difference between real science or art, as based on established rules and understood reasons, and mere unintelligent knack, or unconscious instinct or inspira
tion, is an idea, on which Socrates often and earnestly insists. Cf. Gorgias pass.; Grote’s Hist. Gr. vol. viii. p. 579, Eng. ed.—οἰομένων. C. 633; K. 310; Mt. 549, 4.—έιναι ἄφροτων. C. 627, a; K. 307, 5; Mt. 536.—Δ, like its antecedent τῆλα, is acc. of specification, and σοφωτάτως is understood in the predicate after ἦσαν: in which they were not, sc. the wisest.—τὸ αὐτὸ οἰομένου περιεγγονία: supposing that I surpassed them in the same respect in which I surpassed also the politicians. Cf. 21, D.

D. τελευτῶν, lastly. C. 632; 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.—ἐλαυτό... ἐπισταμένος. Cf. note, 21, B.—ος ἐπος εἴτειν. Cf. note, 17, A.—τοῦτον: in respect to this. C. 395; K. 273, R. 20; Mt. 336.—δημοσίους is subject of ἄδοξαν. Besides its emphatic position, it is also made emphatic by καὶ, which is likewise repeated before the other subject of comparison οἱ ποιηταῖς, where it is superfluous in English, though very often so used in Greek. See above, C: καὶ ἐνεῖσεν... δεσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.—τῆλα τὰ μέγατα, e. g. the administration of the government, to which, as understood by Forster, Stallbaum, and others, Socrates particularly refers.—ἀνερωτάν, to ask again, as in the case of the poets and the politicians.—ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων: nomine oraculi. Stallb.

E. δεξαίμην, in the sense of prefer, is very frequent in Plato. Cf. Gorg. 468, E; 471, C, et passim.—ἄμφισερα is neuter, though it refers to the feminine nouns σοφίαν and ἀμασίαν = both the things. C. 450; K. 241, 2; Mt. 437.

A. σοφὸς εἴναι explains σῶμα τοῦτο = called this name, sc. 23 to be wise. To be is superfluous in English, but εἴναι often follows verbs of calling. C. 434, N; K. 269, R. 1; 420, 1. σοφὸς is nom. instead of acc. because in the mind of the speaker, himself is the main subject of the sentence, as having become odious—as if he had said ἄρεξῖς γέγονα instead of ἄρεξῖσαι μοι γέγονα. On the popular prejudice against this name, see note 18, B, and Grote as there cited.—Δ τῶν διὰ λοιπὸν ἐξελέγξω:
in which I may chance to confute another, or in whatever I may confute another. The ἄν makes the expression indefinite and general, and may be expressed either in connection with the relative (whatever), which it usually follows, and with which it often combines, or in connection with the verb (may chance). Cf. C. 606; K. 260, c; Mt. 527.—τὸ δὲ: but as to the matter of fact. It is strengthened by τῷ δὲī that in reality. The article with δὲ indicates that which is so opposed to something else, that it ought to be regarded as true. So Ast ad Pol. 368, and approved by Stallbaum. The fuller formula, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς, is often used in the same way. See examples in Stallbaum.—ὁλγον τινὰ ... καὶ οἴδειν: a little and indeed nothing. So often μικρὰ καὶ οἴδειν = little or nothing. So atque in Latin sometimes adds a clause, which corrects, and at the same time increases the force of, the foregoing. For the force of τινὰ, cf. ἦ τι ἦ οἴδει, 17, B, and note ibid.—καὶ φαίνεια ... Ἑσακράτης: and he seems to say this (sc. that he is wise) not of Socrates. Instead of τοῦτον oū, most of the early editions have τοῦτον. For two acc. after a verb of saying, cf. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.—προσκεκχρήσαμαι. made use of my name besides, i.e. incidentally, for another purpose.

B. δοσπερ ἄν εἶναι: as if he would say. There is an ellipsis of ποιεῖν or some such verb, constituting an implied apodosis, with which the ἄν belongs. Cf. note, 17, D δοσπερ οὐν ἄν. —καὶ τῶν θεῶν: according to the god, i.e. in accordance with his oracle, or out of regard to his authority. So in Rom. viii. 27, and elsewhere in the New Testament.—καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξιων, κ.τ.λ.: both of the citizens and of the foreigners if I suppose any to be wise. Partitive gen. after τινά. —τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως. Socrates apologizes elsewhere in Plato (e.g. below, 31, 32) and in Xenophon (e.g. Mem. i. 6, 15) for not participating in the affairs of the state. His was a higher mission, viz., to educate the individual citizens.
via μυπία: the greatest poverty. πεπία = paupertas, poverty; πτωχεία = egestas, destitution. The former is the usual condition of the poorer and laboring classes; the latter, of mendicants. As to the pecuniary circumstances of Socrates, cf. Xen. Οἰκ. 2, 3, where it appears he was commonly called πημή, and where it is said his house and all his property were worth five minæ; cf. also 38, B.

C. οἱ τῶν πλουσιοτάτων. This is no unimportant circumstance to show how the prejudices and passions of the multitude were awakened against him.—εἶρα instead of καὶ εἶρα, as we often use then for and then between two verbs.

D. ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτοῖς, but not with themselves, as they might well be angry with themselves for their own ignorance, instead of being angry with him who exposed it. Al. αὐτοῖς, sc. the young men, but this would require ἐκεῖνοι.—τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων, κ.τ.λ. Cf. notes, 18, B.—ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα, κ.τ.λ., sc. διαφθείρει τῶν νίους διδάσκων; that he corrupts the young by teaching things in heaven and things under the earth, and not to believe in the gods, &c.

E. Μῆλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν. Al. Μῆλητος. This man is ridiculed by Aristophanes as well as Plato for his person, his character, and his bad tragic poetry. We learn from the Euthyphron (2, B, C), that his share in the prosecution of Socrates was to bring the indictment before the Archon Basileus, at which time he is described as still young and obscure, but vain and conceited. Besides his professional resentment in common with his brother poets, he had a personal grudge against Socrates for having refused to participate in, and severely animadverted upon, the arrest and “rendition” of Leon of Salamis by Meletus and three others at the command of the Thirty Tyrants. Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 3; Andoc. De Myster.—Αὐτοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν δημουργῶν. He was a leather dresser, and, besides sharing with other “mechanics” in the resentment
provoked by Socrates's exposure of their ignorance as above described, he had, very likely, taken offence at his constant reference to shoemakers and other mechanics in the familiar illustration of his sentiments. He was also a popular demagogue, and had received the highest honors of the Athenian democracy. Hence in the text, ὑπὲρ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See note, 18, B. In Plato's Men. (91, A–C), we find him warning Socrates against a too free use of his tongue, lest he should get himself into trouble.—Δίκην ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥήγωρων. Lycon was an orator and demagogue, probably the same who is held up as a drunken brawler by Aristophanes, Wasps, 1301. It was his part to prepare the accusation against Socrates. On all these accusers, see further in Stallbaum ad loc., and Smith's Dict. Ant.

24 A. ἄρχόμενος. C. 632; K. 312, R. 3; Mt. 557.—ταύτῃ ἐστιν ὑμῖν...τὰλησθῇ. This is the truth for you, sc. which I promised to tell you, cf. 17, B.—τῶς ὀφειλεῖ ἄρεις ἀπεχθάνομαι. I incur hatred by the same, sc. τὰλησθῇ. On the sentiments of this and the following clause, cf. John viii. 46, v. 43; Gal. iv. 16.

B. τῶν ἀγνῶν τε καὶ φιλόσολων. These epithets are applied in accordance with polite usage, and yet not without irony. φιλόσολος differs from φιλόποτρις, according to Stallb., as friend of Athens from friend of Greece.—ἀλλὰ γὰρ δὴ...λέβομεν αὖ: for now again let us take up on the other hand. The language implies some formality and gravity in the examination of this, as also of the former accusation.—διόπερ ἐπειρῶν τούτων δυνὴν κατίχορων: inasmuch as these are different accusers, i.e. another class, a second, in contradistinction to the first, whom he has just disposed of.—ἀντωμορίαν. Cf. note, 19, B.—ποιεῖ δὲ, nearly as follows. Cf. τοιαύτη τις, 19, C, and note ibid. The order of the points in the indictment is inverted, as it is given by Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 1. Diogenes Laertius gives
NOTES.

It on the authority of Phavorinus, as still existing in due form
in the second century, in these words: "Socrates is guilty in
not recognizing the gods that the state recognizes, but intro-
ducing other new divinities; and he is guilty also of corrupting
the youth. Penalty death."

C. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, but I for my part. The γε is omitted in the
earlier editions, but inserted by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, &c.,
on the authority of the best MSS.—σονοῦδ' χαμενιζεται,
serio ludit; literally, jokes in earnest. It is an example of the
figure called oxymoron. It is explained by the following par-
ticipial clauses. Meletus seemed as if he must be merely joke-
ing, playing a part, when he pretended to feel so much concern
about matters (such as the education of the youth and the
worship of the gods) on which he never had bestowed an anxious
thought; and yet he made a serious business of it when he
rashly (βαδιως) brought men to trial (εἰς ἄγανας καζιστὰς ἄν-
ζῶμος).

D. δεύς, hither, δις being understood, or instead of ζιχρου.
So in Iliad and Odyssey sometimes, and elsewhere in Plato.
The law allowed the parties in a suit to question each other,
and obliged the party questioned to answer. Cf. below, note,
25, D. Few probably ever turned the law to so good account,
as Socrates knew how to use it by his method of question and
answer.—αλλα τι. This formula, or the fuller, ἀλλα τι ἃ, is
often used, especially in Plato's Dialogues, simply to ask a ques-
tion, implying an affirmative answer, like οὐκοῦν, or nonne, only
with perhaps still stronger affirmative implication. C. 541, N;
K. 344, 5, g; Mt. 487, 9. Render: do you not, etc.—διως
... ισωναι. διως, with the fut. ind., denotes more continu-
ance as well as more certainty than διως with the aor. subj.
Here the object is to express a permanent state of excellence
among the youth. Cf. C. 601; K. 330, 6; Mt. 519, 7.—μιλον
γι ου, especially (γε) since it so concerns you. The part. agrees
with the foregoing question understood, with which it forms an
acc. absolute. C. 638; K. 312, 5; Matthiae calls it nom. abs. 564.
—τὸν . . . διαφθείρων, him who is corrupting them.—εἰσά-
γεις, literally, bring in, sc. to court, cf. 29, A: εἰσάγοι . . . εἰς
dικαστήριον. Here, however, it is followed by a dative of the
persons, before whom he is brought, sc. the judges (τουρκοι).
Either the magistrate or the prosecutor might be said εἰσάγεις.
It may usually be rendered impeach, or prosecute.

E. νη την Ἡραν. Cf. note, 22, A.—τι δαί δη. δαι, a
lengthened form of δη, expresses surprise, astonishment, and is
used only in questions with τι and πῶς. K. 316, 7; Mt. 603.
—ἀκροαταί. The spectators, at trials of any interest before
the Heliaea, were very numerous, thus bringing that court still
more under popular influence.

25 A. οἱ βουλευταί. The members of the βουλή, or senate,
of which there were two, the Senate of the Areopagus and the
Senate of Five Hundred. Both kinds of senators are perhaps
here intended.—Ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. But then, Meletus, may
not perchance those in the assembly, the assemblymen, corrupt
the young? The μὴ implies some fear or anxiety, lest it may
be so.

B. οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦσας αὐτοὺς, sc. δοκοῦσι, supplied
from the preceding clause, of which this is explanatory, and
therefore without a connective.—τοῦναντίον τοῦτον πῶς. Ad-
verbial acc. = all the reverse of this.—πάντας δὴ νοῦ, alto-
gether so no doubt, whether you and Anytus deny it or not.
οὐ, instead of μὴ, follows the conditional particle (τὰν), because
it unites with φησί to convey one idea, οⲧ φησί = deny. K.
313, 2, h; Mt. 608, 1.—εἰ . . . διαφθείρει. The use of the
ind. pres. implies a kind of ironical assent to the truth of the
supposition: ἢ (really, as you affirm) only one corrupts them.
C. 603, ζ; K. 339, 3, a; Mt. 524, 1.—οἱ ἄλλοι, the rest, all
others.
C. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, but it is not so, for; or but really, cf. note, 20, C.—ὁ Μέλητε ... ἀμέλειαν ... μεμέληκε. A play upon the name: O Careful One, you show your want of care, that you have never cared, &c.—εἰσάγετι, cf. note, 24, D.—ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε. The πρὸς Δίως seems to be placed between ὁ and Μέλητε to carry out the play on the name in the foregoing sentence: O thou before Jupiter Careful One.—τῶς ἄεί ... ᾧνας. ἄεί, preceded by the art. and followed by a part. means, in every case, i.e. in each instance, in which the supposition holds.

D. ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The very words of the law are cited by Demosthenes in his Second Oration against Stephanus: Νόμος. Τοῖν ἀντιδίκου ἐπάνοικες εἶναι ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλὰς τὸ ἐρωτόμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ.—τηλικοῖτον, at thy time of life, sc. so old, i.e. 70, cf. 17, D. τηλικόσως, at your time of life, sc. so young, cf. note, 23, E. The words both mean the same, viz., either so old or so young, according to the connection.

E. ταῦτα, acc. of the respect.—οἶμαι ... οὐδένα, sc. πείσοσθαι σοι. C. 661, 1. So in the next clause, there is an ellipsis of διαφείρω with ἄκον, and still further on of ποίων with πάσομαι. Throughout this passage, Socrates manifestly takes the ground, that virtue is coextensive with knowledge. It is impossible for any man to injure others without injuring himself; and no man who really knows this, will wrong another any sooner than he would injure himself, which no one ever does intentionally. Such is his argument here. So in Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 5, he reasons, that no man who knows temperance, justice, and moral excellence, would prefer any thing else to these virtues. These virtues, therefore, are all resolvable into knowledge or wisdom. Every man does what seems to him best, and if he knows what is best, he will do it, and therefore do right. See also Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 20; Arist. Ethic. Eudem.
1, 5; Protag. 345; Gorg. 460, and Prof. Woolsey's remarks upon it in his Introduction.

26 B. ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἢν ἐγράψας, sc. με φήσῃ διαφθείρειν τοὺς προστέρους, repeated from above.—οὖ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ. ταῦτα is the obj. of διδάσκαλον placed where it is for emphasis.—ὅν \[v] ὁ λόγος ἵστιν, of whom our discussion now is. \[v] is objective genitive.

C. Καὶ αὐτὸς ἡμι, and I myself accordingly.—οὖ μὲν \[c] κ.τ.λ., not however the same as the city indeed recognizes, but others, and this is what you accuse me of, that (I teach them to believe that there are) others; or do you say that I both do not believe in any gods at all myself, and that I teach others this doctrine. Observe the correlation of \[c]οτε—, in the last member of this somewhat complicated and irregular sentence. \[c]ετοὺς usually omits the article after \[c]νομίζειν, ἦγεισθα, &c. = believe in gods.

D. ἵνα τί. C. 539, 2, a; K. 344, R. 6.—οὐδὲ ... οὐδὲ, not simply correlative, like \[c]οτε ... \[c]οτε = neither ... nor, but emphatic = not even ... nor yet. Cf. note, 18, C. The language implies that it was quite incredible, that Socrates should not believe even in gods so universally recognized as the sun and the moon. For the omission of the article with ἡλιον and σελήνην, cf. C. 485, a; K. 244, R. 3, c; Mt. 264, 5. \[c]ά \[c]ά, sc. oὐ νομίζει, which is understood from the foregoing question. \[c]ά is not of itself negative; hence it may be used with either \[c]να or oὐ; but when preceded by neither of these particles, a negative clause precedes or follows, or it is clear from the context and from an accompanying adversative particle, that the sentence is to be understood as negative. Cf. K. 316, 4, and Stallbaum ad loc.—Ἀναξαγόρου. Anaxagoras of Clazomene taught (according to Diog. Laert. 2, 8) that the sun was a mass of hot iron, as some understand it, or stone, as Socrates takes it here and Xen. Mem. 4, 7, 7, and the moon an
earthy body, like our own planet. There was the more plausibility in imputing to Socrates the doctrines of Anaxagoras, since Socrates was a disciple of Archelaus Physicus, who was a disciple of Anaxagoras.—οὐκ εἰδέναι. For οὐκ, instead of μή, see note on οὗ φησί, 25, B.

E. Καὶ δὴ καὶ, and moreover also. The sentence which follows is ironical; δὴ is the object of πριμίνοις.—εἰ πάνυ πολλοὶ, δραχμῆς, for a drachma at the very highest. πολλοὶ, like δραχμῆς, is gen. of price. This was the highest price which the managers could lawfully demand for a seat in the theatre. The common price was two oboli (Dem. pro Cor. 28), which was paid out of the treasury. Cf. Boeckh’s Pub. Econ. Ath. 2, 13; Beck. Char. Ex. Sc. 10; and Smith’s Dict. Antiq. The doctrines of the philosophers were brought upon the stage, partly to be commended, as by Euripides in his tragedies, partly to be ridiculed, as by Aristophanes in his comedies. Some have thought that the allusion is not to the performances on the stage, but to the sale of the books of Anaxagoras at the orchestra. Cf. Schleiermacher ad loc. But as Forster well remarks, we never read of book sales there.—ἄλλως τε καὶ, κ.τ.λ., especially when they are so absurd; literally, for other reasons and also (in particular) they being so absurd.—οὖνως, thus entirely and absolutely.—’Απιστῶς γ’ εἰ... δοκεῖς. Cf. note on δικαίος εἰμι, 18, A.

A. ἕως... διαπειράματος, for he seems like one having 27 composed (i. e. he seems to have composed) as it were an enigma, testing the question, Whether will Socrates, the wise man forsooth, know, etc. In the earlier editions καὶ is inserted between the two participles. But Plato often uses two or more participles without a connective, especially when, as here, the action expressed by one participle is preliminary to that expressed by the other—he seems to have composed as it were an enigma in order to test. Cf. Gorg.: τίραχα έαυτήν διαπείρασα,
ýpôdôsa, k.t.l. — having divided herself into four parts and thus put on, or in order to put on, &c. For the use of the part. after òoukr, cf. C. 615; K. 310, R. 2; Mt. 555, obs. 2. Compare also the note on ξύνοια with the part. 21, B.—emuí χαιρετιζομένου. γυνάκω, though usually followed by the acc., sometimes takes the gen. in common with other verbs denoting mental state. Mt. 349, 1.—δοστίρ αν. Cf. note, 17, D.—ἐ... λέγειν, in what manner he seems to me to speak these contradictions.

B. ἐν τῷ εἰσοδῆι τρόπῳ, in my usual method, sc. of question and answer.—ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα, one after another, again and again.

C. δαμόνα μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἰναι. δαμόνα is here constructed as an adjective. So Cicero translates τὸ δαμόνον by diecum quiddam, de Div. 1, 54. Schleiermacher and Stallbaum (see their notes ad loc.) argue, that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle understood it to be used in this sense in the indictment. Certainly if he could have taken it as a noun (meaning divinities, instead of an adjective meaning divine things), it would have been far easier for Socrates to show the glaring inconsistency of his accuser, and he might have spared all his argumentation and illustration drawn from ἰστικά πράγματα, ἀνδρώπεια πράγματα, &c. The expression in the indictment had reference to those divine voices or monitions which Socrates professed to hear and obey as the guide of his life (cf. 31, D, and notes ibid.), and which would more properly be called divine things, than divinities.—ὅς δὴν ἡμος: what a service you have rendered—how obliging you are—que tu m'obliges. Cousin. Al. ἡμος.—μόγις = tandem aliquando, Stalb.
—ἄλλοι δὲν δαμόνα γε νομίζο, but then I believe in divine things at all events, sc. whether they be old or new, i.e. though they be new ones as charged in the indictment.—ἀντιγραφὴ = ἀντωμοσία, cf. note, 19, B, and Fischer's note ad loc.
D. ἡγαῖς γε ἤγοιμεν ἣ ζεῶν παιδας. The word ὀμο- 

nes, in Homer and the early Greek poets, is synonymous 

with ζεόν; in Plato and other writers of his day it denotes 

more especially the inferior deities constituting an intermediate 

and connecting link between the superior gods and men; and 

in Plutarch and some of the latest Greek classics, it sometimes 

signifies bad as well as good beings of a superhuman order, 

thus approaching to the New Testament sense of demons or 

evil spirits.—τοῖς... χαριστέοντα, this would be wherein 

I say (27, A), that you speak riddles and joke, to say that I 

who do not believe in gods, on the other hand do again believe 

in gods, since at all events I believe in demons. The last clause 

repeats the premise (already laid down at the beginning of 

the sentence) in closer connection with the main point in the con- 

clusion—a practice not unfrequent with Plato, and one of many 

by which his style is made to resemble the language of conver-

sation.—δι' ἤ καὶ λέγοντα, from whom forsooth they are 

said to be. The preposition (ἐκ) is often omitted before the 

relative after having been inserted before the antecedent. C. 

651, e; K. 300, b; Mt. 595, 4.—ὦ καὶ ὅνων. Forsterus de- 

lendam censebat hanc particulam (/popper); sine causa idonea; nam 


That is, mules may have horses or also asses for their male 

parents, for the case to be illustrated limits the comparison to 

male parents.

Ε. οὐχὶ limits ἐγράψω; ἀποτειρώμενος denotes the end in 

view = for the purpose of testing me, and ἀπορῶν the cause = 

because you were at a loss.—ὅπερ δὲ σὺ, κ.τ.λ. But that you 

should persuade any man possessed of the least understanding, 

that it is the part of the same man to believe in things pertain- 

ing both to demons and to gods, and the same man not to believe 

either in demons or gods or heroes, is beyond the scope of human 

ingenuity. I have enclosed οὐ in brackets, because, though
found in most of the MSS., and therefore inserted by Becker and Stallbaum, neither they nor any other editor has been able to explain or translate it, and it is omitted by Forster, Fischer, Ast, Schleiermacher, and Cousin.

28 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ. Cf. note, 25, C. Socrates here brings the direct defence to a close, saying that it does not require much argument, since what he has to fear is not the indictment or the prosecutors, but the multitude—not the evidence or the argument, but popular prejudice and passion. What follows is intended, not so much to avert the sentence which he anticipates from the judges or even to deprecate the displeasure of the people, as to vindicate his character, assert his mission, and bear witness to the truth, that more impartial judges may appreciate his merits—that a better age may honor him, as a missionary and a martyr.—καὶ τοῦτο... αἰρή, and this is which will convict me, if indeed it should lead to my conviction.—δὲ... φανος. This clause is an emphatic repetition and explanation of the τοῦτο at the beginning. Such colloquial repetitions (cf. note, 27, D) are especially frequent in antithetic clauses.—οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ, and there is no reason to fear lest it should (that it will) stop with me, i.e. that I shall be the last victim.

B. Ἐκ' ὁπλὶ ἀλγχύνει. Ἐκα in questions implies astonishment or indignation, as ποτὲ does surprise and wonder, cf. note, 20, D.—τοῦ εἰν ἐν τευμάναι are taken together as a limiting gen. with κυνδυνών, literally, the danger of living or dying, i.e. the prospect of life or death.—ἄνδρα, a man emphatically, not merely a human being, ἄνδροντο. It is the subject of ὑπολογίζοντες—ἐντὸν... ὁμολόγου ἵστον, who is of any use, however little. ὁμολόγος more frequently takes the person to whom it belongs, or of whom it is predicated, in the genitive. See examples in the Lexicon. With the sentiment of this passage, compare Crito, 48.
C. \(\text{oì te ἄλλοι καὶ = especially;}\) literally, both the others and (in particular) the son of Thetis. For ἄλλως \(\text{te kai = especially, cf. note, 26, E.}\) The allusion is to Achilles, Hom. Il. 18, 90-125.—\(\text{παρὰ τὸ αἰχμὸν τί ὑπομείνα, in comparison with (properly, alongside of) submitting to any thing dishonorable.}\—τιμωρήσεις. This verb takes after it a dative of the person avenged, together with an accusative of the person on whom, or the thing for which vengeance is taken = if you shall avenge Patroclus your friend for his murder; or, as we say avenge the murder of Patroclus your friend.—\(\text{αὐτικά γάρ τοι, κ.τ.λ.}\) the very words of Thetis to her son, Il. 18, 96. This quotation interrupts the sentence, and instead of a clause depending on \(\text{ὅτε}\) which should regularly have followed, it goes on with an independent clause connected by \(\text{δὲ.}\)

D. \(\text{Κακὸς ὄν denotes the state in which to live were to be dreaded more than death: to live being a bad man, that is, an unfaithful friend and a cowardly soldier.}\—\(\text{Αὐτικά τεῖναι... ἀχοῦς ὑπομείν.}\) Parts of two Homeric verses (Il. 18, 98 and 104) brought together.—\(\text{μη... οἷς, you do not suppose, do you, implies a wish, that you should not suppose.}\—\(\text{οὐτω γὰρ ἤχει.}\) Cf. note, 17, D.—\(\text{οὐ ἄν, wherever, cf. note, 23, A.}\)—\(\text{ἡ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχεῖά.}\) Anacoluthon for \(\text{ἡ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχεῖά, which would correspond with ἡ ἡγούμενος βίλτινον; instead of which we have ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχεῖά, corresponding to ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν, as if the first ἡ had preceded τάξιν, instead of ἡγούμενος.—πρὸ τοῦ ἄρχοντος, before, i. e. more than the dishonorable.}\)

E. \(\text{eiν eἰργασμένος.}\) Heindorf makes eἰργάζομαι here, as ho says it often is, equivalent to ποιεῖν. But Stallbaum, with good reason, renders eἰν eἰργασμένος, I should have perpetrated (not merely done).—\(\text{ἐλ, ὅτε μὲν μὲ... τὸτε μὲν οὖ... τοῦ δὲ ἔσοῦ... ἐτραύζα δὲ, if, when on the one hand the commanders... then on the one hand I... but when on the other hand...}
the god... then on the other hand I, &c. On this peculiarly emphatic doubling of μὲν and δὲ, cf. K. 322, R. 1; Mt. 622, 5.
—ἐμενον (past tense of the ind.) denotes an historical fact; λίπομαι (contingent) implies a mere supposition. The bravery and physical endurance of Socrates, as a soldier, were a prodigy and a proverb in that already somewhat degenerate age. In the battle at Delium, the Athenian general Laches declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as he, the Boeotians would have erected no trophies. It will be observed, that the preposition ἐν is used to denote the locality of this battle, while ἐν is used with Ποιεῖν and Ἀμφίπολει. Whenever this battle is referred to, it is thus designated ἐνὶ Δηλίῳ (cf. Xen. Mem. 3, 5, 4, and Robbins’s note ibid.), whereas in other battles ἐν is the usual preposition. The reason seems to be, that Delium was properly the name of the temple of Apollo, and, though the city received the same designation, the old association forbade its extension so as to embrace the surrounding country, where the battle was fought.

29  A. δεινὸν μεντ' ἐν εἴη, a strange thing indeed it would be. It is a repetition or resumption of δεινὰ ἐν εἴη εἰρημένον at the beginning of the section.—ὅς δὶλησῶς. ὅς gives emphasis to some adverbs and adjectives besides superlatives. There is an ellipsis of a corresponding demonstrative (οὗτως), and also of an appropriate verb: εἰσάγοις οὗτως ὡς δὶλησῶς εἰσάγοις.—εἰσάγως εἰς δικαστήριον. Cf. note, 24, D.—τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, to man, i. e. mankind. C. 470, A, 1; K. 244, 2.

B. ἴπτερον, κ.τ.λ., and this, how is not this ignorance which is to be censured, that of supposing that one knows what he does not know.—τοτέρῳ καὶ ἵπτερα, in this respect and here, emphatic repetition in order to limit the superiority strictly to this single point.—τῷ, in any thing, dat. of the respect.—τοτέρῳ ἰπτερῷ, καὶ φαινεῖν εἴναι, I should say that it was (i. e. that I was wiser) in this.—οὗτῳ καὶ εἰσάγει corresponds
to οὐκ εἰδῆς, which is equivalent to διὸν εἰκὸν εἰδα.—τῇ βελτίων, καὶ ἕνος καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, the better, whether god or man.—
πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ζῶ, κ.τ.λ., in preference therefore to the evils which I know to be evils, I will never fear nor flee those which I know not if perchance they are good, that is, I will never shun the latter more than the former—the uncertain more than the certain. Cf. πρὸ τοῦ ἀλχρον, 28, D.

C. ἀπειθῶσαντες = ἀπειθησαντες, which Stephens substituted for it in his edition = disobeying, disregarding. τὴν ἀρχὴν with a negative means, not in the first instance, i. e. not at all.
—ἐις ἐκεῖνην for εἰς ἐκείνην, to be brought in either for trial.
—ἀποκτείναι, to put me to death, i. e. condemn me to death.
So Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 5.—ἀν...ἐπιγονεῦσαι...διαφανὴσονται.
On the use of ἂν with the fut. ind. which is rare in the Attic Greek and entirely denied by some, see K. 260, 2, (1); Mt. 599, d; and Stallb. ad loc. Stallbaum is inclined here to connect ἂν with ἐπιγονεῦσαι only = ἂν...ἐπιγονεῦσαι...καὶ...διαφανήσονται. But it is more natural to suppose, that ἂν gives a contingent sense to διαφανήσονται also.—ἐπὶ τούτῳ μικρὸς, ἕφ᾽ ἑστε, on this condition, however, that you no longer, &c. ἕφ᾽ ἑστε is equivalent to ἔστε, and is accordingly followed by the inf. C. 530; K. 341, R. 5; Mt. 479, a.

D. εἰ οὖν...ἀφιοίρε. οὖν is here resumptive = I say. It will be observed, that the same protasis is resumed twice—that is, the sentence is commenced with essentially the same condition, varied only in form, three times (εἰ μὲ τὸν ὑμείς ἀφιοίρε...
εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιοίρε...εἰ οὖν μὲ, ὅπερ ἐπίορε, ἕπὶ τούτου ἀφιοίρε), before the apodosis is subjoined. In the first instance, the ind. (ἀφιοίρε) is used, implying some probability of his release; in the other instances, the same condition is expressed as a mere contingency by the use of the opt. (ἐπιοίρε, ἀφιοίρε), corresponding to which we have the opt. with ἂν (ἐπιοίρε, ἂν ὑμῖν) in the apodosis.—ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ. Ὄσπο
NOTES.

ξεαμα est aliquem salutare ita ut cum amplexarit; φιλειν
salutare aliquem ita, ut cum osculeris. Hoc loco significant
haec verba: grato laetosque animo vestram humanitatem et cle-
mentiam amplexor atque veneror. Stallbaum.—σεσωμα
μᾶλλον τῷ σεφ ἡ ἑμῖν. Cf. Acts v. 29.—οὐ μή παράσωμα. οὐ
μή, with the subj. instead of the fut., is used in strong denial.
Cr. 595, 5; K. 318, 7; Mt. 517.—dei, continually, from time
to time.—σεσωμ, strength of mind, intellectual and moral
power, particularly fortitude and the kindred masculine virtues,
as appears from what follows.

Ε. Ætæma. The present of εἰμι and its compounds is gen-
erally used by the Attics in a future sense. So in English, I
go or am going = I shall or will go.—φάναι δι', but to say
that he does. In Laches, 187–8, Nicias gives a very similar
though more minute account of the manner in which Socrates
would hold every one he conversed with to the work of self-
examination: “You do not seem to know, that whoever is
nearest to Socrates in reasoning, just as in relationship, and
whoever approaches him in conversation, even though he
should begin to converse at first on some other subject, he
will, with infallible certainty, be brought round in the discus-
sion, till he is obliged to give an account of himself, in what
manner he is now living, and how he has lived his past life;
and once caught in it, Socrates will not let him go, till he has
well and beautifully put all these things to the test ... and I
almost knew, long ago, that our discussion now, being in the
presence of Socrates, would not be about the young men, but
about ourselves.”

30 Α. ἄνωτέρω καὶ πρεσβυτέρω. Cf. καὶ σεφ καὶ ἀνάργυρος,
29, C, and note ibid. Verbs of doing and saying more com-
monly take the indirect as well as the direct object in the acc.
K. 230, 2, R. 2; Mt. 415, obs. 1.—ἐσω, by as much as. The
full construction would require a corresponding demonstrative
(τοσούτῳ) with μᾶλλον, denoting the degree of difference. C. 419; K. 285, (3), c; Mt. 400, 8.—ἐγγυτέρω may be followed either by a gen. or a dat. denoting that to which there is a nearness. C. 394, cf. 399; K. 273, R. 9, cf. 284, 3, (2); Mt. 339, cf. 386, 6. That in which, or in respect to which, the nearness exists, may also be either gen. or dat. C. 395, cf. 418; K. 274, 8, cf. 285, 3, b; Mt. 337, cf. 400, 6. But it is not according to usage to put both in the gen. or both in the dat. See Stallbaum’s note on the proper reading of this passage, and compare ad rem, as well as ad verba, the passage above cited from Laches: δὲ ἂν ἐγγυτάτῳ Σοκράτους ὃς λάγῳ δόσπερ γίνετ. —ἡν ἐμὸν τῷ ζευ ὑπηρεσίαν, my service to the god. The dat. to or for can follow substantives. C. 409; Mt. 390.—μηδὲ οὐτοί σφόδρα, no, nor so zealously, cf. note on μηδ' ὀπωσισθοῖν, 17, B.

B. λέγων ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. Observe the sentiment, that the higher good includes the lower, as the greater does the less.—εἰ... διαφζεῖρω. Cf. note, 25, B.—ταῦτ' ἂν εἰσ θεαθέρα, these instructions and persuasions must be injurious. Compare the argument of Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 8: how then could such a man corrupt the young, unless the cultivation of virtue is corrupting.—οὐδὲν λέγει, he says nothing, that is, he is utterly mistaken. Cf. Laches, 195, B; N. 1: ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὃ Σοκράτες, Δάχης ἐπιτιμεῖν κάμὲ φανήκαι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτο τοιοῦτος τις ἐφάνη. ΛΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὃ Νικία, καὶ πειράσσομαι γε ἁποφήμαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεις. So τι λέγειν is to say something, i. e. to speak well and truly, cf. Crit. 46, D; Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 12.—πρὸς ταῦτα, wherefore, literally, in reference to these things, in view of them.—ἡ πείθεσθε... ἡ μῆ, that is, unconditionally—don’t propose any conditional acquittal, like that suggested 29, C; since I would not on any condition (as refers to an implied condition) do differently, not even if I must die (strictly and emphatically be dead) many times over.
C. Ἐχοῦσαι τε. Cf. note, 21, A. Socrates here enters upon another topic, and discourses upon it with such freedom and boldness, such a consciousness of his own innocence not merely, but such an assurance of his divine mission, and such compassion not for himself but for them if they should reject his instructions and condemn him to death, that they must either recognize his superior wisdom or take offence at his arrogance. Some modern critics even, Ast for example, regard the self-complacency of this and some other parts of the Apology as quite insufferable, quite un-Socratic. But is there not the Socratic irony here? Is there not at the same time Socratic truthfulness, fearlessness, and earnestness. It should be remembered that he presents himself throughout as vindicating, not so much himself as truth and justice, philosophy and religion, and God.—ἐμείναι μοι οὐς ἐδεύην ὑμῶν, persevere for me in what I asked of you, i. e. continue to extend to me the favor which I requested of you.—μὴλα ὡρ ὦν, for I am about now (οὖν, accordingly, in accordance with that request) to say also some other things (besides those already said) at which perhaps you will cry out. This clause is connected by γὰρ οὖν (more closely than it would be by γὰρ alone), not to the clause which immediately precedes, but to the previous one, (ἐμείναι, κ.τ.λ.)—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δίναυρο, for he would not even be able, sc. if he wished. ἂν referring to an implied condition. C. 604, N. a.; K. 260, 4, a; Mt. 515, obs.

D. οὐ ... σεμρόν = nefas, not in accordance with the law of nature and of God, and therefore not possible in the nature of things. Schleiermacher: nicht in der Ordnung. Cousin: pas ... au pouvoir. Stallbaum: neque legibus divina sapientia respondere.—ἄμεινον ἄνδρι, for a better man to be injured by a worse, instead of ἄμεινον ἄνδρα, that a better man, &c., the design being to link it more closely with οὐ ... σεμρόν εἶναι. This famous saying of Socrates has been widely
quoted and commented on from the earliest times. Cf. Epic. Encheir. 52; Max. Tyr. Diss. 18, 8; Plut. de Tranq. 17; and not only by philosophers but by the Christian Fathers, as Origen, Theodoret, &c. The reason for the assertion, as explained by Plutarch, and illustrated by Crito, 45, D, is, that bad men, however numerous and powerful, cannot make the good man bad or the wise man a fool, and that is the only real evil which can befall a man.—ἀποκτείνειν. Cf. note, 29, C. Here the word not only refers to the condemnation rather than the execution of the sentence, but, like the two verbs which follow, it has a causative sense = procure my condemnation to death, to exile, or to disfranchisement.—ἀποκτέσειν denotes not dishonor in general, as some have understood it, but deprivation of civil rights. Cf. Forster ad loc.—καλά ταῦτα, Κ. τ. λ., but these this man (viz., the prosecutor) probably supposed, and many another man perchance, to be great evils. το here gives an indefinite extension and application to διάλογος, like many a in English.—καλά πολὺ μᾶλλον, intellig. ὁδώρω μὲν γὰρ κακόν. Stallb. —πολλοῦ δὲ ἔγω ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογείσθαι, I am very far from making a defence for my own sake. Observe the emphatic insertion and juxtaposition of ἔγω with ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ = I for myself. C. 672, note; K. 348, 10.—ὑμιν, dat. after δόνων. Cf. note, 30, A. Socrates means that he was given or sent to the Athenians by Apollo to be their monitor and reprover.

E. ἀπευθυν... προσκείμενον, really, though the comparison may be too ridiculous, attached to, &c. προσκείμενον, besides the passive sense of being attached to, involves also the active signification of pressing upon or following up, as a gadfly does a horse, to suit which the word was chosen.—μισητὸς may mean a ἄρω τ or a gadfly. Ficinus, Schleiermacher, Ast, Cousin, and some others, take it here in the former sense. But the epithets προσκείμενον, προστεθεικέναι, and προσκειμένον
apply better to a gadfly. Moreover this makes the comparison more ridiculous (γελοιοτερον), and is more in the spirit of the Socratic irony. Out of regard to these reasons and to the life and point of the whole passage, I incline to agree with Forster, Stallbaum, Carey, &c., in taking μικρος in its original and proper sense of a gadfly. —οιον, as afterwards modified by τουχτων ῥω α signifies something of this sort. τουχτων ῥω is placed where it is, to introduce more easily the following clause.

31 Α. ισως is often strengthened by ταχειαν and is equivalent to mayhap.—αχιδομενοι ... πεισονειοι. The reader will observe the singular succession of participles. Some of them may be rendered into English by verbs; αυ gives a potential sense to the participle (κροουσατες), C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 598, 6: but you mayhap being offended, just like sleepers when they are roused out of sleep, would (or will) strike at me, and harkening to Anytus, rashly put me to death.—κροουσατες still keeps up the allusion to the gadfly. So does ευνισμεν, send upon you.—στι δ' εγω τυγχανω, κτλ., but that I now am just (τυγχανω δω) such a person, as to have been given by the god to the city, you might discern from this fact. The thing to be proved is that his character is such, that he might well be supposed to have a divine mission; and the proof is his self-forget fulness and disinterested devotedness to the highest good of others, which, he argues, is something more than human (ει γαρ ανθρωπινη τοιχε). Compare Cousin’s translation and Stallbaum’s note ad loc.

B. ανικεσαι των οικεων αμελομενων, to suffer my private affairs to be neglected, literally, to hold myself up over them being neglected. ανικεσαι denotes superiority, and hence takes a genitive usually with a participle. K. 275, 1; Mt. 358. It will be seen, that both ανικεσαι and παρατενι express continued past action, in other words, they are imperfects.—
eiçov èv τινα λόγον, I should have had some reason, i.e. my conduct would have been explicable on ordinary grounds without supposing a divine mission.——τοῦτο ... ἀπαναγχυνήσαι, to reach this (such a) pitch of shamelessness.

C. ἡ ἐπαφάμυν ... ἡ ἤρπα, that I ever either exacted or asked pay of any one. πιάττεσσαi = exigere (ex-agere), ausmachen, make money.——ἰκανόν ... περίαν, for sufficient, I think, is the witness (observe the article τῶν μάρτυρα) I bring forward, that I speak the truth, viz., my (well-known) poverty. Cf. note, 23, B.

D. γλυκερα [φωνή]. The suggestion first made in Forster's edition and adopted by most editions since, is certainly probable, that φωνή, though found in all the copies, has crept in from the margin, since it is needless here, has no influence on the structure of the sentence (being followed by the neuter pronouns ὦς and τοῦτο), and is not only repeated in the next clause, but is there accompanied by τις, as it hardly could be if it had already been used just before.——ζειόν τι καὶ δαίμονον, someth ing divine and demoniacal, if we may be allowed to use the word demoniacal in its etymological sense of superhuman, or proceeding from δαίμονες. Cf. note, 27, D.——ἐπικομισών, calumniating or satirizing after the manner of the ancient comedy. Cf. Fischer ad loc. The reference is to the ἐτηρα δαίμονα καὶ τῆς of the indictment, 24, B.——δεί ἀπορέπετε ... προφέρετε δι' ὀπωρο. Ast makes this statement an argument against the Platonic authorship of the Apology, as being inconsistent with what Xenophon (Mem. 4, 8, 5) and others say of the positive as well as negative character of the divine influence. But the same declaration is made almost in the same words in the Theages, 128, D. So Cicero likewise understood it, de Div. 1, 54: nunquam impellenti, ssepe revocanti. And though Xenophon, and Plato himself in other passages (e.g. Phaed. 242, B, C; Theæt. 151, A), appear to ascribe to the
voice a persuasive as well as dissuasive influence, that is only a general statement of the fact, whereas here we have a more definite and precise explanation of the manner; for, after all, the discrepancy is more apparent than real, since a dissuasive from all that he should not do, involved instruction in all that he should do. Cf. 40, A, B, C; also Schleiermacher’s note ad hunc loc., and Appendix to Robbins’s Memorabilia. As to the nature of this voice, or sign or oracle, as he elsewhere calls it (ἡ μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμόνιον . . . τὸ τοῦ ζεύγος σημεῖον, 40, A), there has always been much discussion, and the question may still perhaps be said to be sub judice. Some have supposed that Socrates believed himself to be under the guidance of a particular δαιμόνιον, guardian genius or tutelar divinity, whose special, if not sole office, was to lead and protect him. But no such idea would be gathered from this, nor indeed from any other passage in Plato or Xenophon, where this subject is mentioned. Others have gone to the opposite extreme and have come to the conclusion, that the δαιμόνιον of Socrates was nothing more than the voice of reason, considered as the voice of God, in his own soul. But this falls as far below the demands of the passage before us—of the appropriate significance of the language of Socrates—as the other goes beyond and superadds to it. After a diligent comparison of the language of Plato and Xenophon, together with such light as Plutarch, Cicero and subsequent writers have shed on the subject, I find scarcely any room left for doubt, that Socrates meant by his φωνή, and ζεύς τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, very nearly that same divine teaching and guidance which good men in every age have believed to be communicated to themselves, and to all who seek it by prayer and in the use of proper means—partly within the soul, and yet not from within but from above—partly by outward signs, omens, oracles, dreams and visions. Cf. below 33, C; ἐκ μαντεῖων καὶ ἐκ ἐνυπνίων, κ. τ. λ. Certainly the Apology gives us no intimation of a
tutelary divinity peculiar to himself, and in the Memorabilia, Socrates explicitly declares, that the same divine teaching is within the reach of all men. Cf. below, 40, A, B, C; Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 3, 4; 1, 4, 15, 18; iv. 3, 13; iv. 8, 1. See also an interesting discussion of this question in Plutarch, Do Genio Socratis.

E. ἀπολόω.. ὧφελήκη. This form of the pluperfect is common in Plato, though not to the exclusion of the common form, cf. ξυνήδειν... ὑδειν, 22, D. Observe the repetition of ἄν in each disjunctive clause (πάλαι ἄν... ὁφρ ἄν ὑμᾶς... ὁφρ ἄν ἑμαυτόν) and compare the examples in Stallb. here and at Gorg. 475, E.

E. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν... οὔτε ἄλλας πλήξει οὐδεν... ἐναντιωμένος. Socrates shows himself no demagogue or even democrat. In this, he had the company and sympathy of most of the literary men and philosophers of Athens, who, as a class, cherished little respect or affection—and had little reason in their personal relations to it, to cherish respect or affection—for the Athenian democracy. But more than this, the unbending integrity and firmness of Socrates placed him often in the attitude of "opposition" to the existing government, whether democratic or aristocratic, insomuch that he was deemed quite an impracticable. Compare his resistance to the popular assembly as described below, 20, B, with his refusal to obey the thirty tyrants in the arrest and "rendition" of a fugitive from oppression, 20, C; Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2, 3.

A. Καὶ έί μέλλειν. Καί έί, even if, is to be distinguished 32 from έί καί, although. καί εί concedes what is not true, or what is true only to a limited degree (the limit here being marked by ὄλγον χρόνον); εί καί concedes what is true, simply and without degrees. Cf. Hermann ad Viger. 832; Stallb. ad loc.; and K. 340, 7.—μὴ δημοσιεύειν. In Xen. Mem. 1, 6, 15, Socrates gives as a reason for not engaging in public affairs, that
he could do more to control and benefit the state by educating as many others as possible to be good citizens and able statesmen, than he could by undertaking the affairs of state in his own person.—οὐδέν ἐν ἑνὶ ἵππεικάζωμι, I would not yield in the least to any one whatever. οὐδὲ... ἑνὶ is more emphatic than οὐδενὶ; and ἵππεικάζωμι is an intensive form instead of the common ἵππεικομε, verbs ending in ἀσείν, νείσιν, &c., being intensives. This strengthened form is regarded by some as an aorist, cf. C. 299. But they are not accented as aorists (the inf. is εἰκασείν, not εἰκάσειν), nor are they found to have the force of aorists. Cf. Hermann Progr. de Verbis Graecorum in ἀσείν, εσείν, and νείσιν exequibus; Stallb. ad loc.; Woolsey ad Gorg. 483, A; ad Antig. 1096; K. 162. In the next clause, we have ἵππεικων, because there no emphasis is required.—μὴ ἵππεικων δὲ, κ.τ.λ., and as soon as I did not yield, just so soon I should perish. The first ἀμα belongs with ἵππεικων, the second, strengthened by καὶ, with ἀπολοίμην. Cf. Fischer ad loc.—φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά, displeasing and wearisome indeed. δικανικά has reference primarily to pleadings in the courts of law, which are apt to be tedious minute and circumstantial. Some take it here in the sense of boastful.

B. ἄλλην μὲν ... ἡμώνευσα δὲ, I never held any other office, but I was a member of the θουλή, or council of five hundred. See the same fact, and θουλεῖεσι used in the same sense, Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.—ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή Ἀντιοχίς, the tribe to which Socrates belonged, viz., Antiochis.—πρυτανεύουσα, presiding, i.e. furnishing the prytanes, who acted as presidents both of the council and of the popular assembly. Each of the ten tribes chose by lot fifty representatives in the council, and these representatives, or the tribe through them, presided during about one tenth of the lunar year, or thirty-five days. Moreover, these fifty representatives of the tribe were subdivided into five bodies, of ten men each, each of which presid—
ed during a fifth part of the presidency of the tribe, i.e. during one week. Out of these ten proedri (as they were called) for the week, an ἐπιστάτης or chief president was chosen by lot, who presided as chairman in the council and also in the assembly for one day. Socrates was ἐπιστάτης on that day when the fate of the ten generals was to be decided, and refused to put the illegal proposition to vote in the assembly. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 2: ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος.—τοὺς δίκα στρατηγούς. The Athenians chose ten generals, one for each tribe, at the commencement of a war. Sometimes they were all in the field together. More frequently, however, only three were sent out to carry on the war, while the others took charge of the war department at home. In the case before us, the battle at Arginusae, only eight were actually present. For the details, see Xen. Hellen. B.I. C. 7.—τούς οίκου ἐκλογούς, who did not bring away for burial the bodies of the slain. They were victorious in the battle (over the Lacedemonians at Arginusae), and in order to pursue the enemy, they left the care of the dead to some of the inferior officers, instead of attending to it in person. For this they were accused before the assembly, and, in spite of the intervention of Socrates, condemned, and six of them actually put to death. The fact illustrates in a striking manner the sacred interest and importance which the Greeks attached to the rite of burial. Though they had gained the victory, the generals had not done their duty or finished their work, till the dead were buried. So the Iliad was not deemed complete till the burial rites of the heroes, Achilles and Hector, were narrated in the 23d and 24th Books; and the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles are prolonged to considerable extent beyond the catastrophe for the same purpose—to put the minds of Grecian hearers and readers at rest from that pious horror, which they entertained of remaining unburied. Had certain critics of the Homeric poems considered this matter duly, they
would not have found in the last two books an argument against the unity of the Iliad. — τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας. Cf. C. 659, a; K. 300, 4; Mt. 596, a.— διὰρ οὖν, together, by one vote, cf. μᾶν ψῆφον, Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 18.—παρανόμως. The law required that the vote should be taken separately, cf. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 37: κρίνεσθαι διὰ ἑκατόν. — ὡς ... ἔδωκε. Xenophon says (Hel. 1, 7, 39), they soon repented of it and punished the authors of the measure as deceivers of the people.— ἵνα μόνος, κ. τ. λ. The Prytanes all opposed at first, but when threatened with the vengeance of the people, they all gave in except Socrates the son of Sophroniscus. Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 15.— μηθεῖν ποιεῖν. C. 665; K. 318, 8.— ἐνδεικνύει καὶ ἀπόγειω, to indict me and lead me away to punishment.— βοῶντων. See in Xen. Hel. 1, 7, 13, 14, the tumult and uproar of the meeting.

C. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀλιγαρχία ... οἱ τριάκοντα. There was always an oligarchic faction at Athens, who were aided and sustained by Lacedemonian influence; and when at the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedemonians triumphed, they placed thirty of this faction in the supreme power, who were after known as the thirty, or the thirty tyrants.— μὲ πέμπτον ἄρων, myself and four others. C. 511, 5; K. 303, R. 4, e; Mt. 469, 9.— Δύοντα τῶν Σαλαμίνων. A native of Salamis, but a citizen of Athens, who had withdrawn to Salamis to escape the power of the tyrants.— ἀναπληγόντας αἰτίῶν, to complicate with their own crimes.

D. εἰ μὴ ἀγροκόρετον, ἢ if it were not too rude (rustic) an expression, is an apology for the use of οὐδ' ἢτοιον in such a connection as would probably offend the polite ears of the Athenians.— τοῦτον δὲ τὸ πᾶν μιλεῖ, for this, I say, I care every thing. τὸ πᾶν is an adversial or synecdochial acc. the exact opposite of οὐδ' ἢτοιον.— ἵνα γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀρχὴ, κ. τ. λ., for me (emphatic both in form and position) that government (of the
thirty), strong as it then was, did not so terrify. — ἦγαγον Λέωνα. He was put to death. Xen. Hcl. ii. 3, 39. — φιλήμην ἀπιών οἰκάδε, went immediately home. — διὰ ταχέων = ταχέως.

The government of the Thirty Tyrants lasted only four years.

E. τοσάδε ἐτη, so many years as I have lived. — ἐπιπληθεῖται.

The imperf. denotes continued action. — τοῖς δικαίοις, the things that are just = justice. — διόπερ χρή, as one ought always to do—this is implied in the present. — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν ἄλλος αὐτῶν ὑπέκειται, sc. διεγέτεον, would have lived so many years.

A. τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, shall be found (on examination) such as a man, sc. one who has never fallen in with any one in any thing contrary to justice, as explained by the following clause. — ἐμὸς μακράς εἶναι. Socrates was charged by his enemies with the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades, the one the prince of demagogues and the other the leader of the Thirty Tyrants. They had indeed listened to his conversations; but neither they nor indeed any other man (he proceeds to say) were his disciples, for he had no disciples, and never professed to be a teacher. Hence he never called his hearers μακράται, but οἱ συνώντες. See this whole topic discussed at length, Xen. Mem. 1, 2. — τὰ ἐμαυτόν, my proper business, my appointed mission, already described as assigned him by Apollo.

B. μὴ λαμβάνων &c οὐ, sc. διαλέγομαι, but in case I not receivce pay, not converse. — παρίξω ... ἐρωτάν, I give liberty to question me to rich and poor alike, and to every one who may wish, ἵνα τις = παρί ὁσίς ἄν. Stallb. — τὴν αἰρίαν ἰνίχομι, bear the responsibility. — ἀποκρύψοινος, answering, has reference to the Socratic method of question and answer, and is equivalent to entering into conversation. — τοῦτων ... ἐν ... μὴν. Of (in respect to) these (alleged disciples) I should not justly bear the responsibility, to no one of whom I ever promised, etc.

C. ὅτι ἄκοψοντες χαίρουσιν, κ.τ.λ. This clause may depend
directly on ἐποιεῖ, or may constitute the answer to the question διὰ τι, κ.τ.λ. — they do it, because they are pleased. Most editions prefer the former, Stallbaum the latter reading. I have adopted the former because of its greater ease and naturalness. The same words are used above, 23, C. There, however, the participle ἀκούοντες stands last, and is followed by its proper case, the genitive, ἔγερσομένων, κ.τ.λ., while here the verb χαίροντων follows the participle and is followed by its appropriate case, the dative, viz., ἔγερσομένων, κ.τ.λ.—τῦτο, sc. to examine those who suppose that they are wise but are not.—πρῶτη πρόπυρ. Among these ways, Xenophon (Mem. 1, 1, 3) specifies οἰωνίων, συναγόμενος, φήμης, συμβολος.—εὐλεγγείτα, strictly, easy to be confuted; but here, easy to be tested and proved.

D. εἰ γὰρ δὴ, for ἐὰν really.—χρῆι δὴποιεῖ, they ought surely. The imperf. implies that they had not done it.—εἰτε τινές αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ... νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.; both if any of them, after having become older, became conscious that when they were young, etc. Instead of εἰτε the correlative member of the sentence begins with the more emphatic εἰ δὲ. So below, 40, D, E, εἰτε δὲ μηδεμία αὐτῶν ... εἰ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀποδημῆσαι. So δὲ is sometimes antithetic to τέ, and ὅστε to ὅπερ.—αὐτοί, themselves, in contradistinction from their relatives.

So αὐτοῖς in the previous clause.—μεμνημόσαν depends on χρῆι in the antithetic member of the sentence, the force of which still continues.—ἐνταῦθα. Cf. Cr. 659, γ; K. 300, 4, R. 8.—Κρίτων αὐτοῖς, this Crito here. His name has become identified with that of Socrates, as his friend and patron, and is perpetuated in the Platonic dialogue, or rather monologue, called Crito. He was a wealthy Athenian, of the same dēmē (δημότης) or ward as Socrates, viz., Aléce, and now, it seems, like him, far advanced in life. The son Critobulus seems to have done little credit either to his father or his teacher. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 3, 8 seqq.; Athen. 220, A.
E. Aυρανίας. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 60.—δ Σφήννος, of the
deme Sphettus. It was customary at Athens to add by way,
of distinction to the name of the individual the ward to which
he belonged, and often also the name of his father. The same
object was accomplished at Rome, as it also is in modern
times, by several names.—Διαχίνυ, usually called the Socrat-
ic, to distinguish him from the orator of the same name. He
established no school of philosophy, but taught the doctrines
of his master for money, and wrote Socratic dialogues. The
extant dialogues, however, which bear his name, and which
have been edited by Fischer, are not genuine.—δ Κηφισίων, of
the deme Cephesia. This Antiphon is to be distinguished
from the orator and from several others of the same name.
The son, Epigenes, is mentioned by Xenophon (Mem. iii. 12),
as well as by Plato in his Phædo, 59.—τοίνυ, moreover, is
not inferential but transitional, as it often is in the orators as
well as the philosophers. Cf. Stallb. ad loc., also Schaefer ad
Demosth. Several of the names which follow are found only
here, e.g. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Αἰαντόδορος.
Touching Demodocus, see Theag. 127, E; Adimantus, de Repub.
III. 11, 17. Apollodorus was a most devoted follower of Socrates.
Theaegus and Plato also were favorite disciples.—καρα-
δηνεΐη = Latin, deprecari, sensus est: non potest Theodotus
Nicostratum fratrem rogare, ne me accuset et contra me test-
tetur. Stallb.

A. μάλιστα μὲν is correlative to εἴ δὲ τότε. The best time 34
for Meletus to call some of these witnesses—the time when he
ought especially to have called them—was in the course of his
argument before the court; but if he forgot it then, &c.—
παραχώρα, give way, yield him the floor as we say, or in the
technical language of the Greek bar, let him speak or testify
during my water (the measure of time by the clepsydra).
B. ἃν λόγον ἔχουν βοηθοῦντες, might have a reason for helping me, i.e. for defending me, right or wrong.—ἀλλ’ ἢ. Cf. note, 20, D.—ξύνισαι Μελήτω, κ.τ.λ. Comp. note, 21, B.—Εἶν. Cf. note, 19, Α. Socrates here concludes his direct defence, ἣ μὲν . . . ἀπολογεῖσαι . . . τουαῖτα, and proceeds to justify himself in not resorting to the ordinary means of moving the compassion of his judges and so saving his life.—Τάχυ δ’ ἂν, κ.τ.λ. Such means of acquittal were expressly prohibited by law. Cf. Demos. adv. Timocr.; Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 4. But the law was disregarded, and it was the prevailing practice to bring in the wives and children of the accused, and to resort to all possible ways of exciting the compassion of the judges, as is manifest from many passages of the orators and of Aristophanes, e.g. Vesp. 568 sqq.; Demost. in Mid. 99; Isoc. de Perm. 31. Ast thinks the Apology here a manifest imitation of Isocrates in the passage last cited, and therefore not genuine; but with how little reason, see Schleiermacher ad loc.—ιγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., while I, as ought to have been expected (ἄρα), will do none of these things.—καὶ ταῦτα, and that, τού, when incurring, &c.

D. οὖν ἄξιον μὲν γὰρ ἡγεῖτε, οἷον, for I for my part do not expect it, but if, I say, any one of you is in such a state of mind. For ἄξιον, cf. 19, D; for οὖν, 21, Α.—καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ τού Ὀμήρου, and well I may have, for in the very language of Homer. Acc. in apposition with a sentence, C. 324, 8; K. 266, R. 2; Mt. 410. So quotations, especially proverbs, are often introduced. The quotation is from Od. 19, 163, where Ulysses, in the guise of a beggar, is thus addressed by Penelope. The expression is proverbial, and denotes that the person to whom it is applied is a man among men, sprung from men and related to them.—υἱεῖς γε . . . τρεῖς, and sons even, men of Athens, three of them, cf. Crit. 47, B, note.—μεγάλου, a young man, sc. Lamprocles, who is called μέγας in Phædr. 65,
and is introduced in Xen. Mem. ii. 2, holding a conversation with his father touching his filial duty to his termagant mother. —παύδια, small children, sc. Sophroniscus and Menexenus, cf. Phæd. 3, where they are called σμικροί. Seneca (Epis. 104) says that the sons of Socrates resembled their mother rather than their father.

B. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ., but whether I can meet death with confidence or not is another question. He barely hints at this as one reason for his course, but dismisses it as not exactly pertinent on the present occasion.—πρὸς δὲν δόξαν, however that may be, in regard to reputation both mine and yours, &c. Cf. note, 17, A. So just below, ἀλλ' εὖν διδογμένον, but whatever may be the fact, it is at least supposed.—γηλικώνις, sc. seventy, cf. 17, D.—τοῦτο τοῦτομα, sc. σοφός, cf. 23, A. —ψευδός, the subs. is often associated with the adj. ἀληθές, as shown by Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum.

A. τι εἶναι. C. 518, β; Mt. 487, 5.—ζυσπερ . . . ἐσομέ- 35 νον. C. 640; K. 312, R. 13; Mt. 568, 2.—καλ ὁτιϊν εἶναι, to be even any thing whatever, i. e. to have any weight of character, however inconsiderable.

C. χρωίς δὲ τῆς δόξης, but irrespective of the reputation, sc. which attaches to me and of which we have been speaking. Observe the force of the article. The emphatic negative οὐδὲ should also be noticed; it appears to me that it is not even right. The second οὐδὲ is not merely correlative to the first, but emphatic = ἀν ὁρ, or ὅρ ἐν ὁρ.—καταχαρίζεσαι τὰ δίκαια is to pervert justice for the sake of pleasing.—ταύτα, sc. τὰ δίκαια = justice.—ἀμώμωκεν. The oath of office taken by the δικασταὶ, and the security it afforded, are very often adverted to, particularly by the Attic orators, e. g. Demos. de Cor. 2 and 6. The substance of the oath was that they would administer justice according to the laws so far as there were laws, and where no laws existed, according to their own best
judgment of what was right. Cf. Poll. Onom. 8, 122; Demos. adv. Lept. 118.

D. ἄλλως τε πάντως ... μᾶλιστα μέντοι καὶ, both every other way, to be sure, especially, however, when accused of impiety, &c., cf. note on ἄλλως τε καὶ, 26, E.—σαφῆς γὰρ ἂν, cf. note, ὅσπερ οὖν ἄν, 17, D.—ζεοῦς ... εἶναι. Observe the emphatic position of these words, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of the clause: I should teach you not to believe in the existence of the gods.—νομιζω τε γὰρ, sc. Ζεοῦς, for I both believe in them.—ὁ οἶδαι = more than any.—καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιπρέποι καὶ τῷ Ζεῷ κρίναι, and I commit it to you and the god to decide. This clause is to be closely connected with its correlative clause (νομιζω τε ... καὶ ... ἐπιπρέποι), and in that connection it implies, that he shows his belief in the gods practically by his calm reliance on the providence of God in this trial for his life. It will be observed, that Socrates here uses the singular τῷ Ζεῷ, though he has been using the plural just before. He may refer to the god at Delphi, of whom he has often before spoken particularly, and in the singular number (cf. τῶν Ζεῶν τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς, 20, E, sqq.), and who, having indirectly, by means of the oracle, involved him in difficulty, would now provide for the best result; or he may refer to the supreme God, whom he often, as represented in the writings both of Plato and Xenophon, singles out and distinguishes from the inferior deities (cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 3, 13).

With the above words of pious resignation and confidence, Socrates concludes the first and principal part of his defence and submits the question of guilty or not guilty to his judges. They pronounce him guilty by a small majority of votes. The question still remained, what punishment should be inflicted. In all those cases, where the laws do not prescribe the penalty (δίκαιος δυνητοί),—and charges of impiety were of this sort, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 702, 5—it was customary for the accuser to
propose what he deemed a suitable penalty (τιμάσσαι), and the accused, if he chose, to propose some other punishment (ἀντι-
τιμάσσαι or ὑποτιμάσσαι), and then the judges decided between
these two, no third proposition being admissible. Cf. Grote, vol.
viii. chap. 68; also Boeckh, Meier and Schömann, and Smith’s
Dic. Antiqq.: Ἀγώνες ἀμητοὶ καὶ τιμητοί. The accusers of
Socrates pronounced him worthy of death. Had Socrates
chosen to propose banishment, for instance, instead of death,
he might doubtless have escaped the extreme penalty, cf. 37, C;
Crit. 52, C. But when he disdained to acknowledge guilt by
proposing any counter-assessment, and even claimed reward in-
stead of punishment as his due, the judges took offence and
sentenced him to death. His remarks on what he thought the
proper sentence constitute the second part of the Apology,
capp. 25–29.

Ἀ. τὸ μὲν μη ἄγανακτεῖν depends on ἀγαβόλλεται. The arti-
cle simply marks the infinitive a little more distinctly as the
object of the main action; otherwise we should expect the in-
finitive alone. Mt. 543; C. 622. The μὲν is correlative to δὲ
at the commencement of the next chapter: Τιμάσσαι δ' αὖν.—
ἀλλὰ τὲ ... καί, both many other things conspire to cause, and
especially, it has happened to me not unexpected, cf. note on
ἀλλοι τὲ καί, 28, C. The full and regular construction would
have been καί δὴ καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ὅτι ἄνθιστον, κ.τ.λ. ἐπίσι and
its derivatives are used with reference to objects of fear as well
as hope. So spes and sperare in Latin, cf. Virg. At sperate
Deos memorae fandi atque nefandi. — παρ’ ὅλιγον ... παρὰ
πολὺ. παρὰ implies comparison, for I, for my part, did not
suppose it would be thus by little, but by much, sc. that the
votes against me would exceed those in my favor. Cf. K.
297, iii. (2); Mt. 588, c.—εἰ τρεῖς μόναι, κ.τ.λ. We have
here taken the liberty to depart from the reading of Stall-
baum, since he has departed (as we think without sufficient
reason) from the reading of most of the MSS. and all the
standard editions. His reading is τριάκοντα. If that were the
true reading, the majority against Socrates must have been
twice that number, viz., sixty; and a majority of sixty could
hardly have seemed to Socrates surprisingly small, nor would
he have added μόναι to so large a number as thirty. The diffi-
culty is created by a passage of Diog. Laert. 2, 41, in which he
says, that Socrates was condemned by a majority of 281 votes,
i.e., as the passage is usually interpreted, there were 281 votes
against him. If a change of 3 votes would have secured his
acquittal, there must have been 275 in his favor, and the whole
number of votes must have been 556. But for such a number
of dikasts, it is argued by Stallbaum, there is no authority,
since the Heliasts usually sat in sections of 500, 1000, 1500,
or some such multiple of a single section. See note, 17, A,
and authorities there cited touching the constitution of the
Heliæa. But examples are not wanting of such fractional sec-
tions, as 200, 400, 700, &c. Neither can we be sure, that all
the jurors that were impannelled were present or voted in every
trial. There does not, therefore, seem to be a sufficient reason
for departing from the commonly received and most obvious
reading and explanation of the passage.—μετέπεσεν, fallen
over, sc. into the other urn, which received the votes for ac-
quittal.—ἀπονεφεύγη. For this form of the plup. see note
31, E.—ἀνεβην, &c. Upon the βῆμα to aid Meletus in the
advocacy of his cause, cf. note, 18, B.—χιλιας δραχμάς.
The prosecutor, unless he received a fifth part of the votes,
was liable to a fine of a thousand drachmas and also a forfeit-
ure (ἀμβύα) of the right to appear as prosecutor in future—a
very useful and very necessary check on the virulence of pub-
lc prosecutions in the Athenian courts. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 103;
in Mid. 23; Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Ath. chap. 9, 11. Socrates ar-
gues, that Meletus (not being the most popular or influential
of the three accusers), if he had been the sole prosecutor, would not have carried more than a third as many votes as were actually gained by the joint influence of the three, and consequently would not have received a fifth part of all the votes. Cf. Schleierm. ad loc.—

τὸ πρῶτον μὲρος. Observe the force of the article, the required fifth according to the well-known law. Demosthenes (de Cor. 103) uses simply τὸ μὲρος in the same way, the required portion.

B. ὁ ἄνδρος, sc. the accuser, of whom he had just been speaking in the foregoing chapter.—

τιμᾶται is middle voice. The usage in regard to assessment and counter-assessment (τιμᾶσθαι and ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι) has been explained above.—

ἡ δήλων, or is it needless to ask—is it evident, etc.—

μαζίν refers to corporal punishment, ἀνθρώπου to a pecuniary penalty. The question is asked in the words of a judicial formula, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 105.—

ὅ τι μαζών differs from τι μαζών only in being relative and indirect. It may be rendered because, but further indicates surprise or censure. This implication can be expressed in English only by a parenthesis: because I did not keep quiet (and what had I taken into my head, literally, learned, that I did not). Cf. Mt. 567; C. 631; K. 344, R. 5. See also Schleierm. and Stallb. ad loc.—

ἐντέρος εἰ πολλοί, sc. ἐπεμηλοῦνται, not caring for those things which the mass care for. Cf. Mt. 634, 3. —

τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων, not the other magistrates, for the specifications which precede are not all magistrates, but the rest, sc. the magistrates. So Gorg. 473, C: πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴσων = the citizens and the rest, viz., the strangers. So εἰ ἄλλοι is often used.—

ἐννομοσκοίτοι καὶ στάσεων. Conspiracies and factions abounded at Athens in the age of Socrates. —

ἐπιεύμενον ... σώξεται, too upright a man to be safe if I went into these things.

U. ἐνράθε, for ἐνραθώσκι, as we often use there for thither. C. 659, 3; K. 300, R. 7. Below ἐνράθεa is equivalent to }
to go and confer on each individually the greatest benefit, to this (literally, there) I went.—τῶν τε ἄλλων ... ἐπιμελεῖσαι, that is, on the principle that the man is more than his property, the state more than its possessions, and in general persons or things more than their adjuncts. The same great principle is often inculcated by our Lord in the gospels, cf. Mat. vi. 25, 33.

D. τιμᾶσαι here also is mid. = to amerce myself. Compare E, below: εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσαι. —τοιοῦτον ἦ τι, instead of τοιοῦτον οὖν, to make it more indefinite; such a good of whatever kind it may be, as, etc. Below we have a still more singular mixing of correlativeis: μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς, where we should expect μᾶλλον ... ἢ or οὕτως ὡς, but find both forms brought together. A similar construction occurs at 30, A: πρῶτερον μηδὲ οὖτω σφόδρα ὡς, except that there μηδὲ is interposed between πρῶτερον and οὐτω, and makes the construction somewhat less concise and abrupt. —πείνῃ. Cf. note, 23, B.—εὐεργετής, a public benefactor, a term of honor, which the Athenians conferred by formal vote on those who had deserved well of the state, and which foreigners, and even foreign kings and princes, were ambitious to receive. So in Egypt, Ptolemy Euergetes.—ἐν τῇ ὡμερίᾳ παρακλησι, for your admonition, i. e. to instruct you, the adj. taking the place of the objective gen.—ἐν πρυτανείῳ συντειχισαί. The Prytanenum was a sort of city hall or state house, where the laws and public archives were kept, where the Prytanes and some other magistrates had their meals, and entertained, at the public expense, not only ambassadors from foreign states, but citizens who had deserved well of the state. To be thus entertained was the highest honor. Socrates claims it as a εὐεργέτης who has rendered the most useful services to the state, and also as affording him the requisite leisure, that he might devote himself
wholly to the instruction of the citizens.—πολὺ γε μᾶλλον.
Victors in the public games were honored with entertainment
at the Prytaneum. Socrates claims the honor as due to him-
self much more at least than to such.—ἵππῳ, a race horse
under a rider; ἕυνωρίδα, a two horse chariot; ἕιγε, a general
term for carriage, here denotes especially a chariot drawn by
more than two horses, and may be rendered four horse chariot.
—Ολυμπιάδω, at the Olympic games. The acc. (Ολυμπιάδα
or Ὀλυμπία) more frequently follows μιάν. See Lex. under
νικάω.—δοκεῖν εἶναι ... εἶναι. Socrates was an uncompro-
mising enemy of all seeming, and often exposes the folly, as well
as the baseness of it, since the best way to seem to be good (in
whatever excellence), is to be good. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 7, 1.
—ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δίομαι, sc. because he is
rich, as the victor in a chariot must be, while I am poor. He
here has respect to the πίνητι above, as in the preceding clause
he refers to the ἐνεργητή. He is a real benefactor, and he is
really poor. He both deserves and needs to be provided for
in the Prytaneum.

A. παραπλησίως ... δοσπέρ περὶ τοῦ οίκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιμόλη-37
σεως. The reference is to chap. 23, where he scorns to resort
to supplications or appeals to compassion, and yet denies that he
does this αἰνάδεξιόμενος, from arrogance. Here he employs the
rare word ἀντιμόλησις instead of the usual ἰκτεία.—τοιοῦτων
ἄλλα τοιῶν, not such as that, but such as this; not such as you
suppose, but such as I proceed to explain (cf. note, 21, B), i.e.
it is not arrogance but truth and duty that impels me.—ἴκως
εἶναι is stronger than ἴκων alone. It means, so far as depends
on my will. C. 623, N.; K. 306, R. 8; Mt. 543.—πείζω
sometimes takes two acc.—διειλήμμενα. The perf. has re-
spect to this apology, which he regards as virtually finished—
it was finished so far as the question of guilt or innocence was
concerned.—δοσπέρ καὶ ἄλλως ἀνθρώπους. He probably has
particular reference to the Lacedemonians, whose laws Socrates, in common with most of the philosophers, highly reverence? and who, as Thucydides and Plutarch inform us, never decided capital trials hastily, but extended them over several days.

B. τὸν κακὸν, some evil, i.e. any punishment. So τοιούτου τινος, any thing of this sort. It is gen. of price or penalty, and is accompanied with the dat. of the person (ἴμαυτῷ) on whom the penalty is assessed. The same construction is seen in ὁ μόλητος μοι τιμᾶται, et passim. Ad rem, cf. note, 38, B. —ἡ μὴ πάσῳ. Ἡ is interrogative: shall I do it through fear that I may suffer death, when I am so ignorant of death that I do not know whether it is a good or an evil?—ἐλωμαί, subj. aor. in a deliberative question. It is to be rendered by the future. It is followed by a partitive genitive: shall I choose or those things which I know to be evil, sc. imprisonment, banishment, &c. We have in this sentence another example of that usage which occurs so often in Plato—two constructions condensed into one. The author might have said: ἔλωμαι τι τοιούτων ἢ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἑστών, or ἔλωμαι τι τῶν, εὖ οἶδα, κακῶν ἑστῶν. But instead of either we have parts of both. Cf. Stahlb. ad loc.

C. τῇ δὲ κατοστάμενη ἀρχῇ, the ever shifting government. The Eleven who had charge of the prisons, executions, &c., were chosen annually (one from each of the ten tribes, with a secretary). Socrates implies that it were hardly worth while to live subject to the caprice of such a succession of petty tyrants as might chance to be established from time to time (such is the exact force of δὲ κατοστάμενη) over the public prisons. Cf. note on δὲ, 25, C.—ἂν ταῖτων ἢ τελεφην, sc. perpetual imprisonment, because he had no money and therefore would never be released.—τιμήσομαι ... τιμήσας. Observe the change of voice. The middle voice is used of the accuser and the accused, and the active of the judges.
D. ἀναπεραί, too burdensome.—ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., while others, however (or forsooth), will bear them easily. Cf. note, 34, C.—καὶ μὲν τοίνυν ἀπελαίωσα, κ.τ.λ., and if on the one hand I do repulse them, they will themselves drive me out of the city.—ἐξέλθωσι is Attic fut. C. 200; K. 117, 1; Mt. 181, 2.

E. ἡμίν, for us, in respect to us, is inserted simply to make the discourse more emphatic and subjective. C. 410, Note; K. 284, 10, d; Mt. 387.—ἐξελθὼν, sc. into exile.—ὡς εἰρωνευομένη, supposing that I spoke ironically.

A. ὁ δὲ ἀνεκίστατος, κ.τ.λ., and that a life without investigation is not worth living, literally, not to be lived. This clause depends on λέγω δὲ, and ἀνεκίστατος, contrary to the prevailing usage, is to be taken in an active sense.—ταῦτα δ', this on the other hand. δὲ emphasizes the apodosis in the latter of the two supposed cases. Cf. Mt. 616, 3.

B. ὅσα ἐμελλόν ἐκβίσειν, as much as I was about to pay, i.e. as much as I should be likely to be able to pay.—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν ἐβλάβην implies that he would have considered the loss of property, if he had it, no real loss. This accords with what he had said above (37, B), that he would not amerce himself to the amount of any evil, for he did not deserve it.—νῦν δὲ — οὗ γὰρ, but now I cannot amerce myself in a sum of money, for I have not got it.—αὐτοὶ δ' ἔγγυσαμαι. Intell. favi, quod continentur praeecessi verbo κελεύονται. Stallb.—ἀξιόχρεως. Cf. note, 20, E. The comparatively small fine in which Socrates here proposes to amerce himself (only half a talent, or about $500), and the whole strain of his remarks on the subject, prove that he was not in earnest. Accordingly the Apology ascribed to Xenophon denies that he proposed a counter and lower assessment. He was not really desirous to preserve his life. He must have foreseen, that his judges would not accept such a substitute for the death penalty.
which the accusers had named in their indictment. He must also have known, that his freedom of speech, his playful irony, and especially his assumption of entire innocence which merited reward instead of punishment, would provoke the hostility of those judges at least who had already pronounced him guilty, and, as they had to choose between the penalties proposed by the parties, they would certainly choose that of the accusers and put him to death. According to Diogenes Laertius, eighty who had voted for his acquittal, now passed over to the majority and voted for his death. Cf. Cic. Orat. 1, 54: Socratis responso sic judices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

Here ends the second part of the Defence. The vote is now taken touching the penalty. Socrates is condemned to death by a majority of 83 votes. He then concludes his speech in a tone of conscious innocence and moral heroism, in which, as Cicero says, he appears, not so much in the attitude of a culprit or a supplicant before his judges, as of their master and lord.

C. ὦ πολλοῦ ... χρόνον. The remainder of the life of Socrates (now 70 years of age) was so short, that it was hardly worth their while to incur so much dishonor for the sake of extinguishing what would soon have terminated in the course of nature.—δυνάμει ἡστήκε καὶ αἰτίᾳ, you will have the name and blame, both here in a bad sense, though often in a good one. For ἡστήκε, cf. note, 17, A.

D. τολμησ καὶ ἀναισχυντις, i. e. what Socrates would consider audacity and shamelessness, viz., daring to say and do such things, whether true or false, noble or ignoble, as would disgrace him, while persuading them. Cf. ἢν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν, below, 39, A.

E. τότε, sc. while making my defence, before sentence was pronounced.—ἐκεῖνος, sc. ἀπολογησάμενος, having defended myself in that way.
B. ἐστὶ...ἂν, as...being = inasmuch as I am.—δὲνοι 89 is the opposite of πρεμυθης, and δέννοις of βραδός. The swifter pursuer, viz., vice, is represented as overtaking the swifter party, viz., the judges who condemned Socrates; while Socrates himself, tardy with years, is seized upon by the more tardy pursuer, viz., death.—Ζαυνάου δίκην διθων, having incurred sentence of death.—ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας, sc. as judge. Compare Maximus Tyrius (Diss. 9), where he says: Socrates was, indeed, put to death, but the Athenians were condemned, and God and truth was their judge.—ἄφαρκοτες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν = having been convicted of wickedness and injustice.—μετρίως ἐξει, to be suitable, i.e. well.

C. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, the after this, i.e. the sequel, or consequence.—χρησμοδοτοῖς, διὰν μέλλωσιν ἀπολαυεῖσαι. This idea, that the soul, when about to leave the body, shows its divine nature and prophetic power, was widely prevalent among the ancients. Thus Patroclus predicts the death of Hector (II. 16, 851 sqq.), and Hector prophesies the death of Achilles (II. 22, 358 sqq.); cf. also Phaed. 84, E; Xen. Apol. 30; Cic. de Div. 1, 30; Sex. Empir. Math. 9, 20.—οἱον ἤμε ἀπεκτόνωσε. For the double acc. cf. C. 435; K. 280, 1; Mt. 421, obs. 4.—τοῦ διδόμενος ἐλεγχον τοῦ βλου, from giving proof of your life, i.e. from the necessity of letting your manner of life be put to the proof.

D. ἀποκτάνωσεν ἀνάρπων, by putting men to death.

E. ἐν δὲ οἱ ἀρχοντες ἀρχολίαν ἐγιοντι, while the magistrates are busy, and I do not yet come, whether when I have come, I must be put to death, i.e. before the Eleven (cf. note, 37, C) get ready to lead me away to prison.

A. τι ποτε νοεῖ, what in the world it means, or what can 40 be its meaning. Cf. note, 20, D.—ἀνδρὲς δικαιότατος. He has habitually addressed the court hitherto as ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖος. The change here is intentional, since that portion of the court
whom he now addresses were judges indeed, that is, administrators of justice.—ὅ γάρ εἰσήνια μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαμοσίου, for the customary prophetic voice of the divinity. Cf. 31, D, note ibid. Schleiermacher considers ἡ τοῦ δαμοσίου as a gloss, because Plato elsewhere calls the voice itself τὸ δαμόνιον, and where a genitive of source is added to μαντική, φωνή, &c., it is not τοῦ δαμοσίου, but τοῦ ζεοῦ. Stallbaum admits that the combination here is unusual, but does not, for that reason, feel at liberty to depart from the established reading.—καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς, even on very trifling occasions. πάνυ is often placed thus before the preposition for the sake of emphasis. —ἄ γε δὴ οἰσκεῖθα ἄν τις καὶ νομιζέται, which one might certainly suppose to be, and are in fact usually considered. The relative is the object of the first verb and the subject of the second. The former verb is optative, to denote what any one might naturally suppose; the other is indicative, to denote what is in fact the prevailing sentiment. The reader will observe the difference between οἴσκει and νομίζω here implied and habitually observed.

B. τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονόντα. In a conversation with Hermogenes, recorded by Xenophon (Mem. iv. 8), Socrates assigns several reasons why, aside from his hopes for another world, he deemed it better for his happiness in this life, and better for his reputation, that he should die then rather than live to a more advanced age. Add to these the considerations touching a future life, which follow in the next chapter of the Apology, and we have the most complete demonstration of his deliberate preference to be condemned rather than to be acquitted, and thus a justification of the otherwise inexplicable manner and spirit of his defence.

C. Few passages in the Greek classics have been oftener cited, translated and commented upon in ancient or modern times, than the chapter on which we now enter. Cf. Plut.
Cons. ad Apol.; Xen. Cyrop. viii. 7, 18 sqq.; Cic. Tusc. Quest. 1, 41; also the Christian Fathers, Eusebius, Theodoret, &c., &c.—δοῦν γὰρ ζάτερον. Stallbaum remarks, that here we doubtless have the true Socratic doctrine of a future state, whereas the Phædo and other Dialogues exhibit Plato's views on the subject. Accordingly Xenophon in his Cyropædia, as above cited, makes Cyrus on his death-bed discourse in exact accordance with the passage before us.—οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι, of such a nature as to be nothing, i. e. to be annihilated. So below, D: οἷον ὑπνος, and E: οἷον ἀναδημησα—καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα, according to what is said, i. e. the common opinion.—τῇ ὑπ' ἡμῖν, dat. for the gen. C. 411; Mt. 389, 3.—τοῦ τῶν. The gen. of the place from which, without a preposition, may follow a verbal noun as well as a verb.—τοῦ ἐνζεῖν, for τοῦ ἐνταξα, because of the motion expressed by μετοίκησις.—ἐστὶ δὴ μηδείμια. This ἐστι has its correlative in εἰ ἢ ἀλα below, E, which is only more emphatic than another ἐστι. Compare ἐστι...οὐδὲ γε, 19, E, and note ibid.

D. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄν οἷοι introduces a long and involved sentence. The force of the ἄν falls on οἵπερ several lines below, where it is repeated (cf. notes, 17, D, and 23, B). οἷοι itself and δῖοι are also repeated.—μὴ δὲ οἰκίστη, not only a private individual. C. 671, 12; K. 321, 3. The reader need not be informed, that by the great king the Greeks mean the king of Persia, the richest and most powerful sovereign with whom they had to do in all their early history. The comparison of death to night and sleep has always been, as it is now, common especially with the poets. Cf. Hom. Il. 14, 231; 16, 672; Od. 13, 80; Catul. 5, 5; Hor. Od. 1, 28, 15.

A. εἰς “Ἄδου, to Pluto’s, sc. house or realm. So we omit 41 the word house after the owner’s name, and the word church after the name it bears.—Μίνως τε καὶ ’Ραδάμαντες, nom. by attraction to the relative οἵπερ. Minos and Rhadamanthus
were brothers (hence closely connected by τέ καὶ), both sons of Jove, and celebrated kings, judges and lawgivers, the former in Crete and the latter in the islands of the Ægean. Æacus, who reigned in Ægina, was also a son of Jupiter, and the father of Peleus and Telamon. Triptolemus was the favorite of Demeter the inventor of the plough and agriculture, and the great hero in the Eleusinian Mysteries. We find Minos represented as performing the office of judge in the lower regions in the Homeric poems (Od. 11, 568 sqq.); Rhadamanthus in Pindar (Olymp. 2, 137 sqq.); when Æacus was first added to the number, we do not know. In the Gorgias (523, E), these three are represented as administering justice at the entrances to Tartarus and to the Isles of the Blessed: Rhadamanthus to souls from Asia, Æacus to those from Europe, and Minos, as president judge, to decide in doubtful cases. Triptolemus is assigned that office only in this passage, though in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (153), he sits in judgment on earth; and as others, whose names are not mentioned, are here said to be judges in the lower world, we may perhaps suppose that the common opinion ascribed to Triptolemus and others the same office and occupation there, which they held on earth. The conception is, however, limited here to those early and just judges and lawgivers, whom the imagination of the Greeks had invested with the dignity of demigods (σὰν τῶν ἡμίζων δίκαιων ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ θαυμάτῳ βίῳ).—ἐνὶ πόσῳ ἐν τοῖς δίκαιοις ἐν υἱῶν; Quanti tandem aestimatis. So Cicero renders it. Tusc. Quæst. 1, 41, 98.—ἐνὶ ἐμοὶ γέ, κ.τ.λ., for to myself also the converse there would be delightful, where I might converse with Palamedes and Ajax the son of Telamon. Both these Grecian heroes had come to a tragical end, the former at the hands of the army, the other by his own hands, in consequence of unjust decisions brought about by the wiles of Ulysses. The story
of Ajax is found in Homer (Od. 11, 541 sqq.); that of Palamedes in the Tragic Poets, especially Euripides.

B. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι...οὐκ ἂν ἀνήδες εἰη. This clause is explanatory of the foregoing, hence it is without a connective, and hence also the participle in the dative answering to ἴμωγε. —τὸ μέγιστον is in apposition with the following proposition. In this proposition, the participle ἐξετάζοντα is in the accusative agreeing with the subject of διάγειν, with which οὐκ ἂν ἀνήδες εἰη is again understood. —τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγγιοντα, sc. Agamemnon, to see whether he was really as great, and Ulysses as wise, and Sisyphus as crafty, as the Poet represents them to have been. Hom. II. 3, 178; Od. 9, 19; II. 6, 153.

C. ἀμήχανον ἂν εἰ ἐιδαμονίας, would be an immense sum of happiness. The genitive is partitive. Or it can be, as Ast supposes, a genitive of specification = in respect to happiness. —τούτου γε ἐσεκα, sc. for conversing with men and examining them—they do not, methinks, for this put men to death there, as they do here.—ἐν τι τοῦτο = one thing, viz., this. The τι first states it indefinitely; then τοῦτο is added to define it. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. ἀπειλάξαυν πραγμάτων, to be set free from the business and troubles of life.

E. ταυτὰ ταυτα λυποῦντες ἀπερ ἐγώ ὑμᾶς ἐλύσων, i.e. besiege them with warnings and expostulations. λυπεῖν here takes a double accusative, as a verb of doing ill. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.—ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδέν δόντες, if they think they are something when they are nothing. The same idea is expressed in the same words by Paul, Gal. vi. 3.
CRITO.

43 A. τηρικάδε, at this time of day, that is, at so early an hour. τηρικά and its corresponding relative and demonstrative words, together with their derivatives, have respect, in Attic usage, not to time in general, but to the hour of the day.— ἢ οὐ πρᾶ ἐστι ἵστιν, or is it not still early in the morning? Buttman writes πρᾶ (without the iota subscript); Fischer πρᾶ; the earlier editions πρῶ, which Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum shorten into πρῶ after the authority of the poets and the old grammarians.—πάνυ μὲν οὖν, certainly it is, is the most common expression of full assent in Plato's Dialogues. Sometimes it stands in construction with a verb, as in Apol. 26, B, but more frequently by itself, as here. πάνυ γε is also frequent in affirmative answers, cf. Apol. 25, C. The πάνυ expresses assent, the μὲν and γε restriction, and οὖν accordance = certainly so far (it is) as you say.—τηρικά μᾶλλον, what time of day about. μᾶλλον, with words of number, denotes uncertainty, or indefiniteness.—"Ορῶρος βαύς, very early dawn. πρᾶ is simply morning; ὠρῶρος is the dawn or rising of the day. βαύς adds emphasis, very early. We speak of midnight deep, deep night, &c. The Greeks extend the same figure to morning and evening—the former in its earliest, and the latter in its latest stages.—ὑπακούσα, to hearken and hence open the door for admittance. ὤρωσ gives emphasis to the expression of surprise: I wonder how it happened that he was willing to admit you, sc. at so very early an hour, as he was not accus.
tomed to open the prison gate very early, cf. Phaedo, 59, D.
—τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. I have said in the Preface, perhaps the
same cell, hewn out of the solid rock, near the old Agora, which
now bears the name of "the Prison of Socrates." Professor
Felton says: "undoubtedly; I read the Phaedo there, and when
I came to the passage where Crito says, the sun is yet upon
the mountains, I stepped to the entrance of the cell, and lo!
the shadows covered the valley's, but the sun still lingered on
Mars' Hill, the Acropolis, and Lycabettus."—καὶ τι καὶ εὐερ-
γίτην, and he has also been somewhat obliged by me. For the
omission of the augment. in εὐεργίτην, see C. 118, N.; K. 126,
R. 1; Mt. 167, 6.—Ἐπιεκώς πᾶλα, a considerable time since.

B. εἰτα πῶς, then how did it happen, that, &c., expressive
of surprise.—οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἠξελοῦ, I should not have myself
preferred to be in so much sleeplessness and sorrow, sc. if I had
been at liberty to choose simply for myself; but for your sake
I felt constrained not to disturb your quiet slumbers. This
reason is implied here and more fully expressed below: ἐνίθι-
δες σε ὠκ ἡγερν, ἵνα ὅσ ἡδιστα διάγης.—ἐν τοσαίη, sc. so
much as I have suffered, while I have been watching your
peaceful slumbers. τε preceding ἄγρυπνία shows that τοσαίη
belongs not only to ἄγρυπνία, but also to λύπη = so much both
sleeplessness and sorrow.—ὅσ ἡδίως = ὅτι αὖτω ἡδίως. So
below, ὅσ πράξεως = ὅτι αὖτω πράξεως. Stallb.—διάγης. The
subjunctive after a past tense denotes continuance to the pre-
cent time.—τρόπον, turn of mind, or manner of life, hence =
character, Lat. mores. For the gen., see C. 372; K. 274, f;
Mt. 366, 5. As to the sentiment, compare Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 2.
—τηλικούτον δύτα, a man of my age, sc. 70, Apol. 17, D.

C. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῦς ἐπιλύσατα, κ.τ.λ., but not at all does
their age set them free from grieving at their present fortune,
literally, as to not grieving, or so as not to grieve. τὸ ἄγρυ-
παρτίς is acc. of specification, and does not differ essentially from
ὅστε ἄγανακτεῖν. μὴ σὺχθεὶ = ne non, or quo minus. Instead of αὐτοὺς, αὐτοῖς was the reading previous to Bekker.—ὡς εἰμι δοκῶ. Cf. note, 18, A.—ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι. This is one of several ways in which the superlative is strengthened by the Greeks. The origin of the formula is variously explained. In such passages as this, it may be analyzed as Stallbaum does viz. = ἐν τοῖς βαρέως φίλουσιν ἐγώ βαρύτατος ἐν ἐνέγκαιμι. In other passages, τοῖς seems to be neuter, and to be used like a pronoun, i.e. ἐν τοῖς = ἐν τοίς τοῖς. Cf. C. 462, β; K. 239, R. 2; Mt. 290.—τίνα ταύτην, ἐκ. φέρεις = τίς ἔστω αὐτή ἢ ἄγελθι, ἢν φέρεις.—ἡ τὸ πλοῖον, κ.τ.λ., or has the vessel arrived, &c. The ἢ in such interrogative sentences is restrictive of a more general question, or corrective of the foregoing context = but why do I ask? The vessel here mentioned is that in which Theseus returned from Crete, bringing back in safety the seven young men and seven maidens, whom the Athenians were obliged to send every year as a tribute to Minos, the Cretan king. Ever after this unexpected deliverance, the same vessel (patched and repaired till its identity became a vexed question for the speculative philosophers) was sent every year in sacred procession to the island of Delos, as a thank offering to Apollo. And from the moment when the sacred stern was crowned with garlands till its return, it was unlawful to defile the purified city with any public execution. It so happened, that the vessel set sail for Delos the very day before the condemnation of Socrates. He thus gained a respite of some thirty days, which he spent in prison, but in free conversation with his friends. See the whole thing explained in full, Phædo, 58. Cf. also Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 2; Plut. Vit. Thes., &c.

D. δόκεις μὲν. μὲν is not unfrequently used, especially after δόκει, οἴμαι, and the like verbs, without the corresponding δέ expressed, but implying some such clause as σαφῶς δοκοῦσα oïda. Here, however, δόκεις μὲν is employed with that Attic
urbanity, which avoids positive assertions, even when no doubt is intended, for just below he says: δῆλον οὖν, οτι ἥξει τῆμερον. Sunium was the south-eastern promontory of Attica.

—τύχη ἀγαθή. A formula of prayer or well-wishing, often used by the Greeks in entering upon any enterprise or at the mention of any anticipated event, equivalent to the Latin, quod bene vertat. The use of it by Socrates in this connection is a striking illustration of his cheerfulness and hopefulness in view of death.

A. ποι, I suppose, ni fallor.—τυχή ὑστεραία ἡ ἡ ἀν ἔλεγ - 44 the next day after the ship may arrive. ὑστεραία is followed by ἡ because it involves a comparative.—Φασί γε τοι δή, so say, at least, to be sure, those who have the disposal of these things, sc. the Eleven. φασί is emphatic, they say so to be sure, though Crito would fain doubt it and show them to be mistaken, if he can but persuade Socrates. The restrictive particles, γε τοι = so much at all events cannot be denied, viz., that they say so. δή then positively affirms the same thing: they certainly say so. Cf. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 191, 192, and Hermann ad Viger, p. 790.—τῆς ἐποίουσας ἡμέρας, the coming day, i. e. the day about to dawn = to-day.—τῆς ἑτέρας, the second day = to-morrow. Socrates means of course the same days which Crito above calls τῆμερον and αὔριον.—δλίγον πρότερον, a little while ago, of course after midnight; dreams before midnight the ancients deemed false.—κυδυνεύεις = δοκεῖσ in Attic writers. How it came to have that meaning, see explained in Stallb. ad loc., and in the Lexicons.—ἐν καιρῷ τιν, quite opportune.

B. ἡμαρι κεν τριτάτω, κ.τ.λ. These are the words of Achilles declaring to Agamemnon his intention to return home to Phthia, and his expectation to arrive there on the third day. Hom. Il. 9, 363. Socrates finds in them a beautiful accommodation to his own departure to his heavenly home. This dream
is not to be set down as a mere fiction of Plato. Besides the
general truthfulness and trustworthiness of this dialogue,
Socrates was a notorious dreamer of dreams or seer of visions,
and a full believer in their divine significance. Moreover, he
was a great reader and admirer of Homer. What, then, could
be more natural or probable, than that his approaching de-
parture to another world, which he talked of by day and meditated
on by night, should present itself before him in his
dreams and clothe itself in the familiar language of the Homeric
Poems.—ἐισαγγέλεσται, clear, i.e. easy to be understood.—μὲν
οὐ = imo vero, nay but. Arn. Gr. Pr. Comp. 373.—δαυ-
μῶνε is used as a form of address, in itself respectful, and in its
own proper signification only respectful, yet sometimes applied
in such a connection, and spoken in such a tone of irony or
severity, that some lexicographers have erroneously concluded
that it was in its nature a term of reproach, as well as of
honor. Compare ἡ μακάριες Κρίτων below, and our My dear
sir, My excellent fellow.—ἐὰν καὶ νῦν, yet even now, implies
that Crito had previously plied Socrates with unsavilling argu-
ments of the same kind.—οὐ μία, not one merely. Al. oide
μία.—χωρὶς μὲν . . . ἐὰν δὲ, besides in the first place sustaining
the loss of an invaluable friend, I shall in the second place incur
the reproach of many. The unusual concurrence of μὲν and δὲ
in the same proposition, sets forth strongly the twofold evil.
The correction of Wolf, τοῦ ἐστηρήσωσα for σοῦ ἐστηρήσωσα of
the MSS. is with good reason adopted in all the recent editions.
—οὐδένα μὴ ποτὲ. This combination has the same emphasis
of negation as οὐ μὴ = such as there is no reason to expect that
I shall ever find.—ὁς οἶχος τὰς αὐτὰς σι αὐτῶν. The ὁς
belongs with the participle ἄν, not, as Buttmann and some others have
taken it, with the infinitive ἀμελήσας, and performs here the
office which it usually performs with a participle, viz., of de-
noting the ground or supposition on which Crito would appear
to many to have neglected the preservation of the life of Socrates: as if I was able, i.e. supposing that I was able to save you—a supposition which, in this case, was contrary to the fact, since the inflexible will of Socrates rendered it impossible for Crito to save him. Cf. O. 640; K. 312, 6; Mt. 568.

C. τίς δὲν αἰσχίων εἰν ταύτης δόξα, ἥ δοκεῖν, what reputation could be more dishonorable than this—than to be reputed. Here the comparative is first followed by a genitive, and then by an explanatory clause with ἥ. C. 461, 3; K. 323, R. 5; Mt. 450. It will be observed, that δόξα and δοκεῖν have the same root.—ὡσπερ δὲν πράχθη, just as they were done, however that may be. δὲν denotes contingency, and may be expressed with ὡσπερ—in whatever manner, or with the verb = however that may be.

D. αὐτὰ ἐδε δῆλα τὰ παρόντα. Al. δῆλοι by conjecture. But the emendation is not necessary. The passage is explained by Stallbaum, Jacobs, and others, as an example of anacoluthon: Nam Crito quum additus esset haec: δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐξειργασμένα ἐστίν, constructione repente mutata, rem multo gravius eloquitur, dicens: δὴ δολεί τε εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ. Stallb.—ἐι γὰρ ἄφελον. C. 599, N; K. 259, R. 6; Mt. 513, obs. 3.—ἡνὰ ... ἣσαν. The past tense of the indicative here implies, that they are not able. C. 601, 6; K. 330, 5; Mt. 519.—οὕτε γὰρ φρονεῖν, κ.τ.λ. The noble sentiment is here implied, that so long as the multitude cannot alter a man's character for better or worse, all else is of no account. The concluding clause in this chapter, ποίοντο ... τέχνην, means, that the multitude are governed by mere chance and caprice instead of fixed principle.

E. ἐχά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεύει, do you not at least feel some solicitude for me, &c. The particles imply a fear that he does.

—οὶ συνοφάντα. The word is well explained in the Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, and the class of men in Smith's Dictionary.
of Antiquities. — πράγματα παρέχωσιν, make trouble. — ἡ καὶ πᾶσαν, κ.τ.λ., either to lose even all our property, or at least large sums of money, or even to suffer some additional heavier penalty, such as imprisonment, exile, or death, cf. below, 53, B. — ξανόν αὐτὸ χαίρειν, bid it farewell, that is, dismiss the fear.

45 A. ἡμεῖς γὰρ ποὺ δίκαιοι ἐσμέν, cf. C. 551; K. 307, R. 6. For ὅλος, cf. note, 44, A. — μὴ τοῖνυ φοβοῦ. The sentence, interrupted by a long explanation, is resumed in μὴ ταῦτα φοβοῦμεν, below, B, and is there followed by the correlative clause, μὴ δὲ ἔλεγε. — τούτους is contemptuous, like the Latin iste, cf. below, 48, C: τούτων τῶν πολλῶν, and Demosthenes, passim.—δὲ εἰσελθεὶς, sc. εἰσιν, how easily they can be bought. Crito knew this from his own experience, cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 9, 1.— εἰς αὐτῶν, for them, sc. to bribe them.

B. ὑπάρχει, is ready for your use. ἰκανὰ is added to express the idea, that his property alone is, in his opinion (ὡς ἰκανὰ), sufficient. Crito was wealthy, cf. note, 33, D.— εἰσὶν. Simmias and Cebes were Thebans, cf. Phaed. 59, C.— ἀποκάμῃ, desist from the effort. Crito takes for granted that, in itself considered, irrespective of the danger to his friends, Socrates must desire, and make effort, to save himself. ἀποκάμω is more frequently followed by a participle, though sometimes, as here, by an infinitive. Cf. C. 633; K. 310. — δὲ ἔλεγεν εἶν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, cf. Apol. 37, C, D.— δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ σαυρᾶ, what to do with yourself. Cf. C. 432; K. 278, 4; Mt. 409, 6.— ἄλλοις, by attraction for ἄλλαξοι. C. 527, R. • K. 332, R. 13; Mt. 474.

C. οὐδὲ δίκαιον. οὐδὲ is emphatic, not even right.— σπεύσατεν τε καὶ ἴπτευσαν. See the same combination of the opt. with the ind.— of the probable with the actual—Apol. 40, A: οἶνος ἐν τις καὶ νομίζεται.

D. οἰκήσει καταλιπών. C. 637; K. 310, 4, 1; Mt. 559, c.
It is an emphatic form, as if Socrates were in haste to leave his children orphans. Observe the force of the ἐκ in ἐκφυαί and ἐκπαιδεύσας, to bring up and educate completely. — τὸ σὸν μέρος, so far as you are concerned. Orphans at Athens were provided for by the state, and intrusted to the care of the Archon Eponymus. Still they must of course be subjected to many inconveniences (cf. Hom. II. 22, 490); and so far as Socrates was concerned, his children would be left to do well or ill, just as they might chance to do. — ἀρη. ἄλ. χρή. — μὴ ἑυ-μόσαν is the opposite of ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρεῖος.

Ε. Καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης, κ.τ.λ., both the coming in of the case into court, cf. Demos. adv. Phorm.: μελητοὺς τῆς δίκης εἰσείναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. — ἔσον μὴ εἰσελθείν. He could have avoided coming to trial, either by flight and voluntary exile, or by inducing, as he might easily have done, the accusers to withdraw the charges before the trial had commenced. — αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων, κ.τ.λ. Socrates did not employ advocates, or resort to any of the ordinary means of influencing the judges. — κατάγελος. Cornar, with the approval of Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and others, suggests that there is an allusion in this word to the absurd and ridiculous conclusion of a comedy, which has its three parts, the πράσινις, ἐπίτασις, and καταστροφή, corresponding with the εἰσόδος, ἄγων, and κατάγελος of the Socratic drama, as it is here represented. — δισεφευρέων ἤμας δοκεῖν is epexegetical of τὸ τελευταίον τοιοῦτο: and finally this almost farcical conclusion of the matter, that it should seem to have escaped us through some sloth and unmanliness of ours.

A. ἐὰν... ἄφέλος ἦν. Cf. note, Apol. 28, B. The force ἄν of the perfect is seen not only in βιβλεύσας, but also in πεπάχθας = to have consulted, to have been done. — ἀδύνατον, κ.τ.λ., impossible and no longer practicable.

B. ἡ προσνομία, κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the copula
(ἰστὶν), cf. C. 547; K. 238, R. 8; Mt. 306. For the sentiment compare the words of Paul to the Galatians, iv. 17: καλὸν δὲ γῆλυσαί ἐν καλῷ.—τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείσεσαι ἡ τρὶς λόγῳ. The strongest argument, in other words, the truth, as it appears to his mind, after careful consideration, is here beautifully represented by Socrates as his best friend, and the only one to whom he yields a controlling influence.

C. πλεῖστι limits μορμολύττητα, as it is construed by Stallbaum; not ἐπισείμουσα, as it is construed by Buttmann.—δεσμοὺς καὶ Ζανάτους. Observe the force of the plural, and compare Paul's emphatic enumeration of his sufferings, 2 Cor. xi. 23: ἐν κόποις, ἐν πληγαῖς, ἐν φυλακαῖς, ἐν Ζανάτοις.—μετριώτατα σκοτούμεζα. Cf. note, Apol. 39, B. This question, in many editions, is put into the mouth of Crito. But it seems more appropriate to Socrates, who, in the next sentence, answers himself, as he often does.—ἀναλάβομεν, resumé for further consideration.—ἐκαστοτε, in every instance, sc. when we were discussing the subject.

D. Κατάδηλος is for κατάδηλον, being attracted by λόγος. C. 551; K. 329, R. 4; Mt. 297.—ἀρα = forsooth, as it seems. Cf. K. 344, 3, and note, Apol. 34, B.—ἀλλαξ = temere, without reason.—δὲς ἢ ἔχω, sc. in danger of losing my life.—τι λέγεω, to say something, sc. to some purpose, of some importance, cf. Xen. Mem. π. 1, 12.

47 A. ὅσα γε τὰνάρποσεω, in all human probability.—ἰκανὸς is explained below by καλὸς.

B. τοῦτο πράττων, practising this, making a business of it. So πρακτίων, below. We see here Socrates's fondness for illustrations drawn from the common pursuits of life.—καὶ ἰδεστίων γε, yes, and eat and drink. γε = yes. So καὶ νῦς γε, Apol. 34, D, might be rendered, yes, and some. The eating and drinking here come within the province of the ἱαρός, as the gymnastic exercises come under the direction of the παυλορίβης.
D. αἰσχύνεσαι καὶ φοβεῖσαι. These verbs are often followed, as they are here, by an accusative of the person before whom one must be ashamed and afraid, especially to do anything dishonorable or wrong.—ἐγινετο...ἀπάλλυτο. The imperfect has reference to what was said in former discussions, cf. at the beginning of the chapter: πῶς αὖ τα τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο.

E. πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίδευσων δόξῃ, by obeying not the opinion of the wise; but of the unwise, is implied in the antithesis by the position of μη. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 6: καὶ μη δ ἀληθὲς δοξάζειν—not what he knows, but what he does not know.—§...λαβόταν, which the unjust injures. The editions before Bekker changed § to ἅ. But the MSS. all have §, and λαβοταν may be followed either by the accusative or the dative.—φαυλότερον = cheaper, less valuable, the opposite of τιμώτερον, below.

A. τί...ἡμᾶς. τί for ὃ τί, cf. Cr. 535; K. 344, R. 1; 43 Mt. 488, 1. For the two acc. cf. C. 435; K. 280, 2; Mt. 415.

B. οὖν τι ὁ λόγος, κ.τ.λ., is correlative to καὶ τάδε αὖ σκόπει. To the suggestion, that the multitude have power to put him to death, Socrates has a twofold answer: in the first place, that does not invalidate the argument which we have gone through with nor make it any less conclusive, or in any way different from what it was, before his life was endangered; and in the second place, he says, consider also, whether this doctrine, once admitted by us, abides or not, that we must not set the highest value on mere living, but on living well.—τὸ δὲ εὖ, κ.τ.λ. And does it still remain true that to live well is the same thing as to live honorably and justly, or does it not remain true?

C. ἀναλογος ἁρματων, 44, E, seqq.; δόξα, 45, B, seqq.; παιδων τρόφης, 45, C, D.—μη, sc. ὢν. C. 602, 3. ὢν is expressed below, 49 D.—ῥαδιως, lightly, rashly.—καὶ ἀναθεωροῦμεν γ ἂν, yes, and would restore them to life again.
For the force of ἂν with the participle, cf. C. 615, 2; K. 260, 5; Mt. 597, 1.—τοῦτων τῶν πολλῶν is added to express contempt, and, in connection with οὐ δείκνυε ἔὰν ὑπὲρ, it implies, that it is characteristic of the multitude to act thus without reason.—ὁ λόγος αὑρίζει, the argument so establishes the point. This use of ἀυρίζει arises from its use to express a victory at the games, or a conviction in a court of justice. Cf. ratio vincit, Hor. Sat. 1, 3, 115, et al.—καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες ... καὶ χάριτας. Zeugma, τελοῦντες being strictly applicable only to χρήματα, and ἄγουντες being required with χάριτας.—καὶ αὐτοῖ, κ.τ.λ., and whether we shall do right ourselves both in leading out of prison, and in being led out.

D. ἡ ὅῃ ὁ ὑπεί, κ.τ.λ., we must not consider the question, whether we must die, if we remain in prison and keep quiet, nor whether we must suffer any thing else, however dreadful, rather than do wrong, i.e. we must not take the consequences into the account at all, but only the question of right and wrong. Before ἡ ὅῃ, there is an ellipsis of a verb of seeing, or fearing, and the meaning is, I fear, that we must not take into account, etc. Cf. C. 602, 2, 3; K. 318, R. 6; Mt. 517, obs. 4.

E. ὥς ἐγὼ πρεπεῖ πολλοῦ, κ.τ.λ., as I esteem it of great importance to persuade you to do this, but not to do it against your will, i.e. I am exceedingly desirous to pursue the course I am pursuing with your consent (persuaso te, so Ficinus and Bekker), and not against your will. Schleiermacher, Stalling, Elberling, and the majority of commentators, make σα the subject of πείσασθαι and understand ἐγὼ as its object, and ἤμιθα with ἀκούσα. But besides the improbability of πείσασθαι being followed by its subject, and omitting its object, it does not accord with the sentiments and character of Socrates that he should say, I deem it of great importance that you should persuade me to leave the prison, which would then be the meaning of the passage.—σα ἥ�καῦστς, to your satisfaction.
A. ἐκόντας ἀδικητέων εἶναι ὁ παντὸς μᾶλλον, or rather.—ὁμοιο, i.e. whatever may be the consequences. The general sentiment of antiquity not only justified but required retaliation, as just and manly, cf. Mem. Cap. i. a. αὐτή ἐστιν ἄνδρος ἀρετή, ἵκανόν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐκαθορίζει κακῶς. Eurip. Fragm. ἐκαθορίζει κακῶς δράν ἄνδρος ἡγούμαι μέρος. But Socrates in the Gorgias, 469, A, insists that it is far better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.

B. οὐ φαίνεται, it seems not, that is, it seems that we must in no case do an injury. The premise or first principle of the argument, so that it is never right to do an injury, &c. To τῆς ἀρχῆς, as the premise, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο stands opposed as the conclusion.

This clause is to be connected, not only with ποιοῦμεν, but also with ἐμμινοῦμεν, whether in going out hence...we abide by what we have admitted to be right. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, the commonwealth. So Cic. in Verr. ii. 46, 114; communi Siciliæ. ἔλλα τι ἢ = nonne, do you not.

B. ἀνατεράφοι, be immediately subverted. For this force of the perfect, cf. C. 584; K. 255, R. 7; Mt. 500.—ai γενόμεναι δικαί, the judgments that have been rendered.

C. ὥστε Ηδίκεις γὰρ ἡμᾶς. The ὥστε in direct quotations is pleonastic. The γὰρ refers to an implied clause: we do right to escape, for the state did us an injustice, &c. when it pronounced sentence against us. ὑπὸ ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεται. The reader will recognize here an allusion to the well-known
method of discussion, which was so characteristic of Socrates as to be called "the Socratic method."

D. πρώτον μὲν. The second question, which answers to this as the first, is found in ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν, κ.π.λ., and is introduced with ἀλλὰ instead of ἔπειτα, in consequence of the intervening question, μέμφει τι, κ.π.λ.—ἐλάμβανε, imperfect to denote the process through which the wife was obtained. The editions previous to Buttmann had ἔλαβε.—ἐν μονωσίᾳ καὶ γυμναστικῇ, i. e. in physical and mental education, cf. Repub. 376, E: ἡ μὲν [παιδεία] ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστικῇ, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσικῇ. The former comprehended the whole exercise and training of the body, in which the Greeks so excelled; the latter the entire discipline and culture of the mind, or, as the word denotes, the department of the mind. The prominence which the Greeks gave to the cultivation of the taste and the emotions, helps to explain the name by which they called this department of education. Some writers add a third department, viz., γράμματα, letters, or primary education. Cf. Smith's Dic. of Antiq., Gymnasiwm. Aristotle, in his Politics, viii. 2, makes four departments, adding to letters, gymnastics, and music, the department of drawing and painting, γραφικῇ.

E. δοῦλος. Cf. Cic. pro Cluentio, 53: Legum omnes servī sumus, ut liberi esse possimur.—καὶ σὺ ταῦτα, κ.π.λ. Al. καὶ σοι. Both readings have good MS. authority. But the regular construction would be σὲ...δίκαιον εἶναι, and the σὲ is changed to σοῦ by attraction to σοι.——ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τοῦ πατέρα. The unusual position of σοι (hyperbaton) is explained by the fondness of the Greeks for bringing contrasted words into juxtaposition. σοι is dat. after ἐξ ἵμων.

51 A. ἄρα. Cf. note, 46, D.—καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, κ.π.λ., is an emphatic repetition of πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, &c., above.—ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἐφετῆς ἐπιμελομένος is added in bitter irony.—
παρής, one’s country, indefinite, and hence without the article.
So μητρός and πατρός above. Cicero (de Off. i. 17, 57) has a
similar sentiment: cari sunt parentes, etc. Sed omnes omnium
caritas patria una complexa est.

C. πείσεων depends on δέ, implied in ποιητέον.

D. τὸ ἔξουσιαν πεποιηκέναι, by having given liberty.—
δοκιμάσας, when he has been examined and approved, i. e. ad-
mitted to the rank of a citizen, al. δοκιμάση.—ἐξείναι depends
on προσγροφεῖον.

Ε. ὡμολογηκέναι ἐργῳ denotes a “tacit compact,” but one
of a very different kind from that fiction, in which some politi-
cal philosophers of modern times find the origin of society and
government.—ἐ μήν, of a surety. These particles are used
especially in confirmation of an oath or promise, cf. Hom. Il. 1.
77; Xen. Anab. 2, 3, 27. Al. ἡμῖν. The present, πείσεσαί,
denotes obedience in general, or as a habit. Al. πείσεσαί.

A. προτειέντων ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ., sets forth the peculiar rights 32
and privileges of an Athenian citizen in canvassing laws when
they are proposed, and moving for their repeal afterwards, if
they are found to be oppressive. προτειέντων is better taken
with πείσει, and ἔφειντον with ποιεῖ, a new clause commencing
with ἀλλά. The style is intentionally repetitious in imitation
of the style of conversation.—ἐνέξεσαί = will be implicated
in, or obnoxious to. So ἔνοχος = obnoxious, cf. Xen. Mem. i.
1, 64: πώς ὁν ἔνοχος ἄν εἰς τῇ γραφῇ.—ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.
Cf. note, 43, C: ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι.

B. διαφερόντως, preeminently above.—ζεωρίαν, a specta-
cle, such as the games and religious festivals. As these were
attended by the leading men from all Greece, the non-attend-
ance of Socrates, with the single exception of going once to the
Isthmian games, might well be remarked as an indication of
singular satisfaction with Athens.—στρατευσόμενος. Cf. ἐν
Ποτидеίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, Apol. 28, E, and note
ibid.—ἐπισυνία first governs πόλεως and νόμων in the gen., and then is followed by the infin. εἰδίνα, with which is to be understood a pronoun in the acc. referring to those genitives, a desire of another city or other laws—to know them.

C. τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ, besides all the rest, sc. of your acts, which prove your preference for Athens. Cf. note on ἄλλα τε ... καὶ, Apol. 36, A.—φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι. Cf. note, Apol. 31, D.—αἰσχύνει, respect, lit., feel ashamed before.—ἐντρέπει, regard, lit., turn yourself towards.—“Ἀλλο με όν τον φαίνει ἤ, do you not then, they would say, violate, &c., lit., do you do anything else than violate. The ἄν would regularly follow φαίνει; but when two clauses are incorporated in one (especially with φαίν or φαίνει), the particle is often attracted out of its place, cf. Hermann on the particle ἄν.

E. ἐν ἐτσιν ἐβδομήκοντα. Cf. Apol. 17, D.—οὗτε Λακεδαιμόνων ... οὗτε Κρήτην. These states were often cited as models of law and order by Plato and other political philosophers of the day, cf. Repub. 544, C; Legg. 634.—δὴ = scilicet. ἐκάστοτε = quotiescunque de iis loqueris. Stallb.


B. τῷ τοὺτων πολιτεία, to the polity of these men, instead of these states, as if πολίτων, instead of πόλεων, had preceded. Examples of this figure (synesis) are frequent in Plato.—βεβαιώσει τοῖς δικασταῖς, κ.τ.λ., that is, will confirm others in an opinion favorable to the judges, so that they will be regarded as having decided the case right.—τάς τε εἰνομομένας ... τοῖς κοσμικῶτας, the cities that have good laws, and the men who have the most regard for law and order.—τινας λόγους, what discourses, Socrates? such forsooth as you utter here, that, &c. ἤ is strictly or, and ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος is understood after it.—ἄν φανεῖσαν. Cf. note on ἄν ... διαφαρήσονται, Apol. 29, C.

D. ἄπαρεῖς, you will depart, lit., carry away, remove.—
The Thessalians were infamous for their vices. Cf. Demos. Ol. i. 22: ταύτα γὰρ (tà tōn Θεσσαλῶν) ἔπιστα μὲν ἦν δήποτε φύσις καὶ άεὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπους; and Athenaeus, vi. 260, B: ἀκολαστοὶ καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσελγεῖς, and many other passages from different authors.—ακεφήν, a cloak or wrapper sufficient to cover the whole body, as is implied in περικείμενος. The word is often used of robes or costumes for the stage.—Δυψέρα is a dress of skins, worn by rusticus, and hence peculiarly fit for a disguise.—Σχήμα is also referred to the dress by Stallbaum, but it is better to take it in the more general sense of gait, or personal appearance, as the Latin habitus also is often used.

E. ἵσως, ἄν μή, κ.τ.λ., perhaps not, if you do not offend any one; but if otherwise, i. e. if you do offend any one, you will hear, &c.—ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιότει, κ.τ.λ., so you will pass your life in fawning upon everybody and being their humble servant—doing what, but feasting in Thessaly, having gone abroad for an entertainment, forsooth, into Thessaly. The irony, which runs through the whole, is made more pungent by the contemptuous repetition of Thessaly.—ποῦ ἴσως ἴσως; what will become of them—where shall we find them?

A. Ἄλλα δὴ = at enim, at inquies. Stallb.—τί δαί; why, pray?—ἀπολαυσώσων is, of course, ironical, as it often is taken in a bad sense.—ἡ τούτο μὲν οὖ, or not this indeed, &c. ποιήσεις, i. e. you will not take your sons to Thessaly.—ἀνόι ἄρια, in Athens.

B. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ... οὔτε ἐκεῖστε, neither here in this life ... nor when you come thither, into another world. These two clauses beginning with οὔτε are correlative to each other, while those beginning with οὔνδε are only emphatic additions to the former.

D. οἱ κορυβαντιώντες, those who celebrate the rites of the Corybantes in the worship of Cybele in Phrygia. As these
rites were accompanied with noisy music and wild dancing, the Corybantes were an expressive figure of persons so inspired and possessed with certain ideas or feelings, as to be incapable of seeing or hearing any thing else. In the case of Socrates, it is the voice of the Laws, in other words, the voice of the God, that so rings in his ear and possesses his soul. The passage is one of singular beauty. The Laws stand before him personified, embodied, clothed with more than human authority. They reason with him. They expostulate with him on the folly and wickedness of the course which his friends are pressing upon him. They draw nearer and nearer to him, and speak in more earnest and commanding tones, till at length he can see and hear nothing else, and puts an end to the fruitless arguments and entreaties of his friends in those words of humble yet sublime piety: It is the voice of God—let us obey.

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