POLYBIUS (born c. 208 B.C.) of Megalopolis in the Peloponnese (Morea), son of Lycortas, served the Achaean League in arms and diplomacy for many years, favouring alliance with Rome. From 168 to 151 he was hostage in Rome where he became a friend of Aemilius Paulus and his two sons, especially adopted Scipio Aemilianus whose campaigns he attended later. In late life he was trusted mediator between Greece and the Romans whom he admired; helped in the discussions which preceded the final war with Carthage; and, after 146 B.C., was entrusted by the Romans with details of administration in Greece. He died at the age of 82 after a fall from his horse. The main part of his famous historical work covers the years 264-146 B.C. With two introductory books, it described the rise of Rome to the destruction of Carthage and the domination of Greece by Rome. It is a great work; accurate, thoughtful, largely impartial, based on research, full of insight into customs, institutions, geography, causes of events and character of people; it is a vital and most interesting achievement of first rate importance, despite the incomplete state in which all but the first five of the forty books have reached us. Polybius’ overall theme is how and why the Romans spread their power as they did.
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POLYBIUS

II

137
POLYBIUS

THE HISTORIES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

W. R. PATON

IN SIX VOLUMES

II

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THE HISTORIES OF
POLYBIUS
ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ
ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΤΡΙΤΗ

1 Ὅτι μὲν ἄρχας ὑποτιθέμεθα τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας τὸν τε συμμαχικὸν καὶ τὸν Ἀννιβακόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτους τὸν περὶ Κολῆς Συρίας πόλεμον, ἑν τῇ πρώτῃ μὲν τῆς ὅλης συντάξεως, τρίτῃ δὲ ταύτῃ
2 ἀνώτερον βιβλίῳ διδηλώκαμεν· ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας, δι’ ἃς ἀναδραμόντες τοὺς χρόνους πρὸ τοῦτων τῶν καρών συνεταξάμεθα τὰς πρὸ ταύτης
3 βιβλίους, ἐν αὐτῇ 'κείνῃ διεσαφήσαμεν. νῦν δὲ πειρασόμεθα τοὺς προειρημένους πολέμους, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξ ὧν ἐγένοντο καὶ δι’ ἃς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἴδρυθησαν, μετ’ ἀποδείξεως ξαναγγέλλειν, βραχέα προεπόντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας.
4 Ὅντος γὰρ ἐν ὑπὸ ἔργου καὶ θεάματος ἔνδο τοῦ σύμπαντος, ὑπὲρ οὗ γράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, τοῦ πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ διὰ τί πάντα τὰ γνωριζόμενα μέρη τῆς οἰκουμένης ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαιῶν δυναστείαν
5 ἐγένετο, τούτου δ’ ἔχοντος καὶ τῆς ἄρχῆς γνωριζό-
μένην καὶ τὸν χρόνον ὑρισμένον καὶ τὴν συντελειαν ὀμολογουμένην, χρήσιμον ἡγούμεθ’ εἶναι καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῶν μερῶν, ὡσα μεταξὺ κεῖται τῆς ἄρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους, κεφαλαίως
6 ἐπιμνησθῆναι καὶ προεκθέσθαι. μᾶλιστα γὰρ οὕτως
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK III

1. In my first Book, the third, that is, from this counting backwards, I explained that I fixed as the starting-points of my work, the Social war, the Hannibalic war, and the war for Coele-Syria. I likewise set forth in the same place the reasons why I wrote the two preceding Books dealing with events of an earlier date. I will now attempt to give a well attested account of the above wars, their first causes and the reasons why they attained such magnitude; but in the first place I have a few words to say regarding my work as a whole.

The subject I have undertaken to treat, the how, when, and wherefore of the subjection of the known parts of the world to the dominion of Rome, should be viewed as a single whole, with a recognized beginning, a fixed duration, and an end which is not a matter of dispute; and I think it will be advantageous to give a brief prefatory survey of the chief parts of this whole from the beginning to the end.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

7 ἵκαν ἐννοιαν τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ προλαμβανοῦσα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶν ὅλων πρὸς τὴν κατὰ μέρος τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσιν, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιστήμην, ἀρίστην ἥγουμενοι τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπίστασαν καὶ θέαν, ἀκόλουθον τοῖς εἰρημένοις ποιησόμεθα τὴν προεύκεισιν.

8 τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας. τὴν μὲν οὖν καθόλου τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐμφασίζει καὶ τὴν περιγράφην ἥδη δεδηλώ-

9 καμεν. τῶν δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἐν αὐτῇ γεγονότων ἀρχὰς μὲν εἰναὶ συμβαίνει τοὺς προεχθείνους πολέμους, καταστροφήν δὲ καὶ συντελεῖαν τῆς κατάλυσιν τῆς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλείας, χρόνον δὲ τῶν μεταξὺ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους ἑτῆ πεντήκοντα.

10 τρία, περίεχεσθαι δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ τηλικάς καὶ τουάτας πράξεις, ὅσα οὔτε τῶν προγεγονότων καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ ἐνέκατοτήθη καὶ τετταρακοστῆς θλυμπιάδος ἀρξάμενοι τοιάντε τινα ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἐφοδον τῆς ἐξηγήσεως.

2 'Ὑποδείξαντες γὰρ τὰς αὐτίας, δι᾽ ἂς ὁ προδεδηλω-

2 'Ἰταλίαν ἐμβαλόντες Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ καταλύσαντες τῇ ἐν Ὀλυμπιάδος δυναστείαν ἐις μέγαν μὲν φόβον ἐκεῖνους ἔγγαν περὶ ὅφειν καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους, μεγάλας δὲ ἔσχον αὐτοῖ καὶ παραδόξους ἑλπίδας, ὡς καὶ τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἐξ ἐφοδον.

3 κρατήσσαντες. ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις πειρασόμεθα διασα-

3 κατὰ τούς αὐτούς καρπούς Φίλιππος μὲν ὁ Μακεδών διαπολεμήσας Ἀϊτωλοῖς καὶ μετὰ ταύτα συντησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, ἐπεβάλετο.
For I believe this will be the best means of giving students an adequate idea of my whole plan. Since a previous general view is of great assistance to the mind in acquiring a knowledge of details, and at the same time a previous notion of the details helps us to knowledge of the whole, I regard a preliminary survey based on both as best and will draw up these prefatory remarks to my history on this principle. I have already indicated the general scope and limits of this history. The particular events comprised in it begin with the above-mentioned wars and culminate and end in the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Between the beginning and end lies a space of fifty-three years, comprising a greater number of grave and momentous events than any period of equal length in the past. Starting from the 140th Olympiad I shall adopt the following order in my exposition of them.

2. First I shall indicate the causes of the above war between Rome and Carthage, known as the Hannibalic war, and tell how the Carthaginians invaded Italy, broke up the dominion of Rome, and cast the Romans into great fear for their safety and even for their native soil, while great was their own hope, such as they had never dared to entertain, of capturing Rome itself. Next I shall attempt to describe how at the same period Philip of Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians and settling the affairs of Greece, conceived the project of an
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4 κοινωνείν Καρχηδονίοις τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων, Ἀντίοχος δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἡμιφυσή- τουν, τέλος δ᾽ ἔπολεμησαν ὑπὲρ Κοίλης Συρίας πρὸς
5 ἀλλήλους, 'Ρόδιοι δὲ καὶ Προυσίας ἀναλαβόντες πρὸς Βυζαντίους πόλεμον ἡνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς ἀπο- στήναι τοῦ παραγωγίας τῶν πλέουσας εἰς τὸν
6 Πόντον. στήσαντες δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτων τὴν διήγησιν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας συντησόμεθα λόγον, ὥς κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὑποδείξομεν ὅτι μέγιστα συνεβάλετ' αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἱδιότης πρὸς τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀνακτήσασθαι τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ Σικελιωτῶν δυναστείαν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν Ἰβηρῶν προσλα- βεῖν καὶ Κελτῶν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρατήσαντας τῷ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίων ἐννοιαν
7 σχεῖν τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολῆς. ᾧ μὲ τούτους κατὰ παρέκβασιν δηλώσομεν τὴν κατάλυσιν τῆς Ἰέρωνος
8 τοῦ Συρακοσίου δυναστείας. οἷς ἐπισυνάψομεν τὰς περὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ταραχὰς καὶ τίνα τρόπον Πτο- λεμαίου τοῦ βασιλέως μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον συμ- 
φρονήσαντες Ἀντίοχος καὶ Φιλίππος ἐπὶ διαρέσει τῆς τοῦ καταλελειμμένου παιδὸς ἀρχῆς ἥρξαντο κα- 
kopραγμονεῖν καὶ τὰς χείρας ἐπιβάλλειν Φιλίππος 
μὲν τοῖς κατ' Ἀἴγαιον καὶ Καρίαν καὶ Σάμουν, Ἀν- 
tίοχος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ Κοίλην Συρίαν καὶ Φοινίκην.
3 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συγκεφαλαιώσαμεν τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ 
καὶ Λιβύῃ καὶ Σικελίᾳ πράξεις Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρ- 
χηδονίων μεταβιβάσομεν τὴν διήγησιν ὀλοσχερῶς 
eῖς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἐλλάδα τόπους ἀμα ταῖς τῶν
2 πραγμάτων μεταβολαῖς. ἔξηγησάμενοι δὲ τὰς Ἀτ- 
tάλου καὶ Ἱοδίων ναυμαχίας πρὸς Φιλίππον, ἔτι δὲ 
tὸν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Φιλίππου πόλεμον, ὃς ἐπράξῃ 
3 καὶ διὰ τίνων καὶ τῷ τὸ τέλος ἐσχε, τούτω συν-
alliance with Carthage; how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled and at length went to war with each other for the possession of Coele-Syria, and how the Rhodians and Prusias, declaring war on the Byzantines, compelled them to stop levying toil on ships bound for the Euxine. Interrupting my narrative at this point, I shall draw up my account of the Roman Constitution, as a sequel to which I shall point out how the peculiar qualities of the Constitution conduced very largely not only to their subjection of the Italians and Sicilians, and subsequently of the Spaniards and Celts, but finally to their victory over Carthage and their conceiving the project of universal empire. Simultaneously in a digression I shall narrate how the dominion of Hiero of Syracuse fell and after this I shall deal with the troubles in Egypt, and tell how, o.1 the death of Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip, conspiring to partition the dominions of his son, a helpless infant, began to be guilty of acts of unjust aggression, Philip laying hands on the islands of the Aegean, and on Caria and Samos, while Antiochus seized on Coele-Syria and Phoenicia.

3. Next, after summing up the doings of the Roman and Carthaginians in Spain, Africa, and Sicily I shall shift the scene of my story definitely, as the scene of action shifted, to Greece and its neighbourhood. I shall describe the sea-battles in which Attalus and the Rhodians met Philip, and after this deal with the war between the Romans and Philip, its course, its reason, and its result. Following on this I shall
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4. Extending 1 his story, this author says that at the time of the Athenian expedition against the Persians, the Athenians, who were at the height of their power, thought they could 2 easily conquer the Persians, and sent their fleet against the Persian coast. The Persians, however, were well prepared for the attack, and met the Athenian fleet in the 3 Hellespont. The Athenians, contrary to their expectations, were defeated and forced to 4 return home with their fleet in ruins.

5. The Athenians who were defeated in the battle of the Hellespont were sent to their cities, and the leaders of the expedition were punished. The Athenians, 5 however, did not forget the defeat, and continued to build up their fleet, which was 6 ready to face the Persians again. The Persians, on the other hand, were not satisfied 7 with their victory, and continued to build up their own fleet. The Athenians, therefore, 8 were not able to stop the Persians from building up their fleet, and the Persians 9 continued to attack the Athenians in the battle of Marathon.

9. The Athenians, who were defeated in the battle of Marathon, were not able to 10 stop the Persians from building up their fleet, and the Persians continued to attack 11 the Athenians in the battle of Plataea. The Athenians, however, were able to 12 stop the Persians from building up their fleet, and the Persians continued to attack 13 the Athenians in the battle of Thermon.
make mention of the angry spirit of the Aetolians yielding to which they invited Antiochus over, and thus set ablaze the war from Asia against the Achaeans and Romans. After narrating the causes of this war, and how Antiochus crossed to Europe, I shall describe in the first place how he fled from Greece; secondly how on his defeat after this he abandoned all Asia up to the Taurus; and thirdly, how the Romans, suppressing the insolence of the Galatian Gauls, established their undisputed supremacy in Asia and freed its inhabitants on this side of the Taurus from the fear of barbarians and the lawless violence of these Gauls. Next I shall bring before the reader's eyes the misfortune that befell the Aetolians and Cephalenians, and then make mention of the war of Eumenes with Prusias and the Gauls and of that between Ariarathes and Pharnaces. Subsequently, after some notice of the unification and pacification of the Peloponnese and of the growth of the Rhodian State, I shall bring the whole narrative of events to a conclusion, narrating finally the expedition of Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt, the war with Perseus, and the abolition of the Macedonian monarchy. All the above events will enable us to perceive how the Romans dealt with each contingency and thus subjected the whole world to their rule.

4. Now if from their success or failure alone we could form an adequate judgement of how far states and individuals are worthy of praise or blame, I could here lay down my pen, bringing my narrative and this whole work to a close with the last-mentioned
2 πράξεις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. ὦ τε γὰρ χρόνος ὁ πεντηκοντακατστητὴς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐλήγεν ἦ τ' αὐξῆσις καὶ προκοπὴ τῆς Ρωμαίων δυναστείας

3 ἔτετελείωτο· πρὸς δὲ τούτους ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐδόκει τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ κατηγοριαμένον ἀπασιν ὅτι λοιπὸν ἐστὶ Ρωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτους πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγγελλομένων. ἔπει δ' οὐκ αὐτοτελεῖς εἰσὶν οὕτε περὶ τῶν κρατησάντων οὕτε περὶ τῶν ἐλαττωθέντων αἱ ψυλῆς εξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀγωνισμάτων δια-

5 λήψεις, διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς μὲν τὰ μέγιστα δοκοῦντ' εἶναι τῶν κατορθωμάτων, ὅταν μὴ δεόντως αὐτοῖς χρῆσονται, τὰς μεγίστας ἐπεννοοῦνει συμφοράς, οὐκ ὀλίγοις δὲ τὰς ἐκπληκτικωτάτας περιπετείας, ὅταν εὐγενῶς αὐτὰς ἀναδείξαμεν, πολλάκις εἰς τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος περιπετεικέναι μερίδα, προσθετέον ἃν εἴ θα λήψεις πρόερημέναις πράξεις τὴν τε τῶν κρατούντων άνεσιν, ποίᾳ τις ἢν μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ πώς προετάτει τῶν ὅλων, τάς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδοχάς καὶ διαλήψεις, πόσαι καὶ τίνες ὑπήρχον περὶ τῶν ἠγουμένων, πρὸς δὲ τούτους τὰς ὄρμας καὶ τοὺς ζήλους ἔξηγητέον, τίνες παρ’ ἐκάστοις ἑπεκράτουν καὶ κατάχυνον περὶ τε τοὺς κατ’ ἵδαι μίους καὶ τὰς κοινὰς πολιτείας. δῆλον γὰρ ὅσ' ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἔσται τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὖσι πότερα φευκτὴν ἢ τοῦνατιν αἴρετὴν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ἱπραίων δυναστείαν, τοῖς δ' ἐπιγενομένοις πότερον ἑπανετήθη καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομοστέον τὴν ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. τὸ γὰρ ὠφελημὸν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας πρὸς τε τὸ παρόν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐν τούτῳ πλείστον κείσεται τῷ μέρει. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτ' εἶναι τέλος ὑποληπτέον ἐν πράγμασιν οὔτε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις οὔτε τοῖς ἀποφανομένοις ὑπὲρ τούτων, τὸ νῦν.
events, as was my original intention. For the period of fifty-three years finished here, and the growth and advance of Roman power was now complete. Besides which it was now universally accepted as a necessary fact that henceforth all must submit to the Romans and obey their orders. But since judgements regarding either the conquerors or the conquered based purely on performance are by no means final—what is thought to be the greatest success having brought the greatest calamities on many, if they do not make proper use of it, and the most dreadful catastrophes often turning out to the advantage of those who support them bravely—I must append to the history of the above period an account of the subsequent policy of the conquerors and their method of universal rule, as well as of the various opinions and appreciations of their rulers entertained by the subjects, and finally I must describe what were the prevailing and dominant tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples in their private and public life. For it is evident that contemporaries will thus be able to see clearly whether the Roman rule is acceptable or the reverse, and future generations whether their government should be considered to have been worthy of praise and admiration or rather of blame. And indeed it is just in this that the chief usefulness of this work for the present and the future will lie. For neither rulers themselves nor their critics should regard the end of action as being merely conquest.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

10 κήσαι καὶ ποιήσασθαι πάντας υφ’ ἐαυτοὺς. οὔτε γὰρ πολεμεῖ τοῖς πέλας οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ καταγωγῶσαθαι τοὺς ἀντιταττομένους, οὔτε πλεῖ τὰ πελάγη χάριν τοῦ περαιωθῆναι μόνον, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας αὐτῆς

11 ἕνεκα τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀναλαμβάνει· πάντες δὲ πράττοι πάντα χάριν τῶν ἐπιγινομένων τοῖς ἔργοις

12 ἡδέων ἡ καλῶν ἡ συμφερόντων. διὸ καὶ τῆς πραγματείας ταύτης τούτ’ ἔσται τελεσιούργημα, τὸ γνώναι τὴν κατάστασιν παρ’ ἐκάστοις, ποῖα τις ἢν μετὰ τὸ καταγωγισθῆναι τὰ ὀλα καὶ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐξοισίαν, ἔως τῆς μετὰ ταύτα πάλιν ἐπι-

13 γενομένης ταραχῆς καὶ κινήσεως. ὑπὲρ ἦς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πράξεων καὶ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν συμβαίνοντων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον διὰ τὸ τῶν πλεῖστων μὴ μόνον αὐτόπτης, ἀλλ’ ὡν μὲν συνεργός, δὴν δὲ καὶ χειριστὴς γεγονέναι, προήχθην οἰον ἄρχην

5 ποιησάμενος ἄλλην γράφειν. ἢν δ’ ἡ προερημένη κύνησις, ἐν ἢ Ῥωμαίοι μὲν πρὸς Κελτιβηρας καὶ Οὐακκαίους ἐξήνεγκαν πόλεμον, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὸν πρὸς Μασσανάσσαν βασιλέα τῶν Λιβύων.

2 περὶ δὲ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἀτταλὸς μὲν καὶ Προυσίας πρὸς ἄλληνος ἐπολέμησαν, ὅ δὲ τῶν Καππα-

10 δοκῶν βασιλεῖας Ἀριαράθης, ἐκπέσων ἐκ τῆς ἄρχης ὅπ’ Ὀροφέρνους διὰ Δημητρίου τοῦ βασιλέως, αὐθες ἀνεκτήσατο δὴ Ἀτταλὸ τὴν πατρῴαν ἄρχην.

3 ὁ δὲ Σελεύκου Δημήτριος κύριος γενομενος ἐτη διώδεκα τῆς ἐν Συρία βασιλείας ἁμα τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἄρχης ἐστερῆθη, συντραφέτων ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τῶν

4 ἄλλων βασιλέων. ἀποκατέστησαν δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαίοι τοὺς Ἔλληνας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Περσικοῦ πολέμου καταπιεθέντας, ἀπολύσαντες τῆς ἐπενεχ-
and the subjection of all to their rule; since no man of sound sense goes to war with his neighbours simply for the sake of crushing an adversary, just as no one sails on the open sea just for the sake of crossing it. Indeed no one even takes up the study of arts and crafts merely for the sake of knowledge, but all men do all they do for the resulting pleasure, good, or utility. So the final end achieved by this work will be, to gain knowledge of what was the condition of each people after all had been crushed and had come under the dominion of Rome, until the disturbed and troubled time that afterwards ensued. About this latter, owing to the importance of the actions and the unexpected character of the events, and chiefly because I not only witnessed most but took part and even directed some, I was induced to write as if starting on a fresh work. 5. This period of disturbance comprises, firstly the war waged by Rome against the Celtiberians and Vaccaei, that between Carthage and Massinissa the King of the Libyans and that between Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Next, Ariarathes, King of Cappadocia was expelled from his kingdom by Orophernes through the agency of King Demetrius and recovered his ancestral throne by the help of Attalus. Then Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after reigning in Syria for twelve years lost both his kingdom and his life, the other kings combining against him. Next the Romans restored to their homes the Greeks who had been accused in consequence of the war with Perseus, acquitting them of the charges brought against them.
5 θείσης αὐτοῖς διαβολής. οί δ’ αὐτοὶ μετ’ οὗ πολύ
Καρχηδονίοις ἐπέβαλον τὰς χείρας, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
μεταναστήσαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἅρδην αὐτοὺς
ἐξαναστήσαι προθέμενοι διὰ τὰς ἑν τοῖς ἐξής ῥήθη-

6 σομένας αἵτις. οἷς κατάλληλα Μακεδόνων μὲν
ἀπὸ τῆς Ρωμαίων φυλίας, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῆς
tῶν Ἀχαιῶν συμπολιτείας ἀποστάτων, ἀμα τὴν
ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐσχε τὸ κοινὸν ἀτύχημα πάσης
tῆς Ἐλλάδος.

7 Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα· προσδεῖ
δ’ ἐτι τῆς τύχης, ἵνα συνδράμη τὰ τοῦ βίου πρὸς
8 τὸ τῆς πρόθεσιν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν. πέπεισμαι μὲν
γάρ, κἂν τι συμβῇ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπων, οὐκ
ἀργήσειν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐδ’ ἀπορήσειν ἄνθρων
ἀξιόχρεων, διὰ τὸ κάλλους πολλοὺς κατεγγυθήσε-
σθαι καὶ σπουδάσειν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν αὐτὴν.

9 'Εσπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας τῶν πράξεων ἐπίκεφα-
λαίου διελήλυθαμεν, βουλόμενοι καὶ καθόλου καὶ
κατὰ μέρος εἰς ἐννοιαν ἀγαγεῖν τῆς ὦλης ἱστορίας
tῶν ἐντυγχάνοντας, ὥρα μνημονεύοντας τῆς προ-
θέσεως ἐπαναγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αὐτῶν ὑπο-
θέσεως.

6 "Εννοι δὲ τῶν συγγεγραφότων τὰς κατ’ Άννίβαν
πράξεις, βουλόμενοι τὰς αἵτις ἡμῖν ὑποδείκνυσαι,
δι’ ἀς Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις ὁ προειρημένος
ἐνέστη πόλεμος, πρῶτην μὲν ἄποφαίνουσι τὴν Ζα-
2 κάνθης πολιορκίαν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων, δευτέραν δὲ
τὴν διάβασιν αὐτῶν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τοῦ προ-
γορευομένου παρὰ τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις Ἰβηρος ποταμοῖ.
3 ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτας ἅρχας μὲν εἶναι τοῦ πολέμου φή-
σαι’ ἀν, αἵτις γε μὴν οὐδαμῶς ἄν συγχωρήσαιμι.
4 πολλοῦ γε δεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διά-
BOOK III. 5.5—6.4

A little later the Romans attacked Carthage, having resolved in the first place on changing its site and subsequently on its utter destruction for the reasons that I shall state in due course. Close upon this followed the withdrawal of the Macedonians from their alliance with Rome and that of the Lacedaemonians from the Achaean League, and hereupon the beginning and the end of the general calamity that overtook Greece.

Such is the plan I propose, but all depends on Fortune’s granting me a life long enough to execute it. However I am convinced that in the event of my death, the project will not fall to the ground for want of men competent to carry it on, since there are many others who will set their hands to the task and labour to complete it.

Now having given a summary of the most important events, with the object of conveying to my readers a notion of this work as a whole and its contents in detail, it is time for me to call to mind my original plan and return to the starting-point of my history.

6. Some of those authors who have dealt with Hannibal and his times, wishing to indicate the causes that led to the above war between Rome and Carthage, allege as its first cause the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians and as its second their crossing, contrary to treaty, the river whose native name is the Iber. I should agree in stating that these were the beginnings of the war, but I can by no means allow that they were its causes, unless we call Alexander’s crossing to Asia the cause
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6 μαίων; ἄλλ' ἥσαν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοιαῦτα μῆ διειληφότων ἀρχῇ τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διέστηκεν αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως, καὶ διότι τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρῶτα τῶν ἀπάντων, ἢ δ' ἀρχῇ τελευταίον τῶν εἰρημένων.

7 ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι φημὶ τὰς πρῶτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἡδῆ κεκρμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγούμενας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεως. λέγω δ' ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεως καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ δι' ὅν ἐπὶ τὸ κρίναι τι 8 καὶ προθέσθαι παραγινόμεθα. δῆλον δ' οἶδον τὸ 9 προειρημένον έκ τῶν εἰπερομένων. τῶν γὰρ ἄληθῶς ἥσαν αἰτίας καὶ πόθεν φύναι συνέβη τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πόλεμον, εὐμαρές καὶ τῷ τυχόντι συνιδεῖν. ἦν δὲ πρώτη μὲν ἡ τῶν μετὰ Εὐσωτεροῦντος Ἐλλήνων ἐκ τῶν ἀνω σατραπεῖων ἑπάνοδος, ἐν ᾧ πάσαν τὴν Ἀσίαν διαπορευομένων αὐτῶν πολεμίαν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα μένεν κατὰ πρόσωπον 10 τῶν βαρβάρων; δευτέρα δ' τὴν Δακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως Ἀγησίλαος διάβασις εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἐν ᾧ 'κείνου οὐδὲν ἀξιόχρεων οὐδ' ἀντίταλον εὑρὼν ταῖς σφετέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἀπρακτὸς ἤγαγκάζησθη μεταξὺ 11 τῶν βαρβάρων: δευτέρα δ' της Δακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως Ἀγησίλαος διάβασις εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἐν ᾧ 'κείνου οὐδὲν ἀξιόχρεων οὐδ' ἀντίταλον εὑρὼν ταῖς σφετέραις ἐπιβολαῖς ἀπρακτὸς ἤγαγκάζησθη μεταξὺ 12 διὰ τὰς περὶ τὴν Ἐλλάδα ταραχὰς ἐπανελθεῖν. ἦν δὲ Φίλιππος κατανοήσας καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν
of his war against Persia and Antiochus' landing at Demetrias the cause of his war against Rome, neither of which assertions is either reasonable or true. For who could consider these to be causes of wars, plans and preparations for which, in the case of the Persian war, had been made earlier, many by Alexander and even some by Philip during his life, and in the case of the war against Rome by the Aetolians long before Antiochus arrived? These are pronouncements of men who are unable to see the great and essential distinction between a beginning and a cause or purpose, these being the first origin of all, and the beginning coming last. By the beginning of anything I mean the first attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have decided, by its causes what is most initiatory in our judgements and opinions, that is to say our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about these, and everything through which we reach decisions and projects. The nature of these is evident from the instances adduced above; it is easy for anyone to see the real causes and origin of the war against Persia. The first was the retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon from the upper Satrapies, in which, though they traversed the whole of Asia, a hostile country, none of the barbarians ventured to face them. The second was the crossing of Agesilaus, King of Sparta, to Asia, where he found no opposition of any moment to his projects, and was only compelled to return without effecting anything owing to the disturbances in Greece. From both of these facts Philip perceived and reckoned on the
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Περσῶν ἀνανδρίαν καὶ βαθμίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεξίαν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῶν ἐσομένων ἄθλων

13 ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέμενος, ἃμα τῷ περιπούσασθαι τὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἐλλήνων εὐνοιαν ὀμολογουμένην, εὐθέως προφάσει χρώμενος ὁτι σπεύδει μετελθεῖν τὴν Περσῶν παρανομίαν εἰς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας, ὅρμην ἑσχε καὶ προέβετο πολεμεῖν, καὶ πάντα

14 πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἡτοίμαζε. διόπερ αἰτίας μὲν τὰς πρῶτας ῥηθείσας ἡγητέον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Πέρσας πολέμου, πρόφασιν δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, ἀρχὴν δὲ τῆν

7 Ἀλεξάνδρου διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν. καὶ μὴν τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀντίοχον καὶ Ῥωμαίοις δῆλον ὡς αἰτίαν μὲν τὴν Αἰτωλῶν ὀργὴν θετέον. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ δόξαντες ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὀλιγορήσθαι κατὰ πολλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκβασιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Φιλίππου πολέμου, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὐ μόνον Ἀντίοχον ἐπεσπάσαντο, πάν δὲ καὶ πρᾶξαν καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέστησαν διὰ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην ὀργὴν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων καιρῶν.

3 πρόφασιν δ᾽ ἡγητέον τὴν τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἑλευθέρωσιν, ἣν ἐκεῖνοι περιποεῦμενοι μετ᾽ Ἀντίοχον τὰς πόλεις ἀλόγως καὶ ψευδῶς κατηγγελλον, ἀρχὴν δὲ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ Ἀντίόχου κατάπλουν εἰς Δημητρίαδα.

4 Ἔγω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ πλείον διαστολὴν πεποίημαι περὶ τούτων ὑπὲρ ἑνεκα τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων ἐπιτιμήσεως, χάριν δὲ τῆς τῶν φιλομαθοῦντων ἐπανορθώσεως. τί γὰρ ὀφέλος ἵστροῦ κάμυνον ἄγνοοντος τὰς αἰτίας τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα διαλέσεων; τί δ᾽ ἀνδρὸς πραγματικοῦ μὴ δυναμένου συλλογίζεσθαι πῶς καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πόθεν ἔκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἀφορμὰς εἰληφεῖν; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκείνον εἰκὸς οὐδὲν—
cowardice and indolence of the Persians as compared with the military efficiency of himself and his Macedonians, and further fixing his eyes on the splendour of the great prize which the war promised, he lost no time, once he had secured the avowed good-will of the Greeks, but seizing on the pretext that it was his urgent duty to take vengeance on the Persians for their injurious treatment of the Greeks, he bestirred himself and decided to go to war, beginning to make every preparation for this purpose. We must therefore look on the first considerations I have mentioned as the causes of the war against Persia, the second as its pretext and Alexander's crossing to Asia as its beginning. 7. Similarly it is evident that the cause of the war between Antiochus and the Romans was the anger of the Aetolians, who (as I above stated) looking upon themselves as having been slighted in many ways by the Romans as regards their share in bringing the war with Philip to an end, not only invited Antiochus over, but were ready to do and suffer anything owing to the anger they conceived under the above circumstances. But the liberation of Greece, which they announced in defiance of reason and truth going round with Antiochus from city to city, we must consider to be a pretext of this war, and its beginning the landing of Antiochus at Demetrias.

In speaking at such length on this matter, my object has not been to censure previous writers, but to rectify the ideas of students. For of what use to the sick is a physician who is ignorant of the causes of certain conditions of the body? And of what use is a statesman who cannot reckon how, why, and whence each event has originated? The
ποτε δεόντως συντήσασθαι τάς τῶν σωμάτων θεραπείας οὐτε τῶν πραγματικῶν οὐδὲν οἶδον τε κατὰ τρόπον χειρίζαι τῶν προσπιπτόντων ἀνευ τῆς τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιγιγνώσεως. διὸ περ οὐδὲν οὔτω φυλακτέον καὶ ζητητέον ὃς τάς αἰτίας ἐκάστου τῶν συμβαίνόντων, ἐπειδὴ φύεται μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πολλάκις τά μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἵδιοθαὶ δὲ βαστῶν ἐστὶ παντὸς τὰς πρῶτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ διαλήψεις.

8 Φάβιος δὲ φησιν ὁ Ρωμαϊκὸς συγγραφέως ἀμα τῷ κατὰ Ζακανθαίους ἀδικήματι καὶ τῆν Ἀσδρούβοβο δεποεξιάν καὶ φιλαρχίαν αἰτίαν γενέσθαι τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν πολέμου. ἐκεῖνον γὰρ μεγάλην ἀνεληφότα τὴν δυναστείαν ἐν τοῖς κατ᾽ Ἰβηρίαν τόποις, μετὰ ταῦτα παραγενόμενον ἐπὶ Λιβύην ἐπιβαλέσθαι καταλύσαντα τοὺς νόμους εἰς μοναρχίαν περιστήσασι τὸ πολίτευμα τῶν Καρχηδονίων, τοὺς δὲ πρῶτοις ἀνδραῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ πολιτεύματος προϊδομένους αὐτοῦ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς συμφρονήσας καὶ διαστήμας πρὸς αὐτῶν τῶν δ᾽ Ἀσδρούβαν ὑπιδόμενον, ἀναχωρήσατ' ἐκ τῆς Λιβύης, τὸ λυπότα ἰδῆ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν χειρίζειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαιρέσιν, οὐ προσέχοντα τῷ συνεδρίῳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. Ἀννίβαν δὲ κοινωνίαν καὶ ἥλωτην ἐκ μειρακίου γεγονότα τῆς ἐκεῖνος προαιρέσεως, καὶ τότε διαδεξάμενον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, τὴν αὐτὴν ἄγωγὴν Ἀσ-6 δροῦβα ποιεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων. διὸ καὶ νῦν τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον ἐξενηνοχεῖναι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαιρέσιν Ῥωμαῖοι παρὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων γνώμῃν. οὐδένα γὰρ εὐδοκεῖν τῶν ἀξιολόγων ἀνδρῶν ἐν Καρχηδόν τοῖς ὑπ᾽ Ἀννίβου περὶ τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν πραχθεῖσιν. ταύτα δ᾽ εἰπών φησι μετὰ τῆς τῆς 20
former will scarcely be likely to recommend proper treatment for the body and it will be impossible for the latter without such knowledge to deal properly with circumstances. Nothing, therefore, should be more carefully guarded against and more diligently sought out than the first causes of each event, since matters of the greatest moment often originate from trifles, and it is the initial impulses and conceptions in every matter which are most easily remedied.

8. Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal’s ambition and love of power. He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy. The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Africa and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal’s principles; and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same method as Hasdrubal. Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of
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προειρημένης πόλεως ἀλωσιν παραγενέσθαι τοὺς Ἡρωιαύους, οἵομενοι δεῖν ἢ τὸν Ἰούνίβαιν ἐκδιδόναι σφίσι τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους ἢ τὸν πόλεμον ἀναλαμβάνειν. εἰ δὲ τις ἐρῳτο τὸν συγγραφέα ποίος ἢ καὶ ῥός οἰκείωτερος τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις ἢ ποίον πράγμα τούτου δικαιοτέρον ἢ συμφορώτερον, ἐπείπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυσηρεστοῦντο, καθάπερ οὐτός φησι, τοῖς ὑπ’ Ἰούνιβου πραττομένοις, τοῦ πειθόντας τότε τοῖς ὑπὸ Ἡρωιαύων παρακαλομένοις ἐκδοῦναι μὲν τὸν αἰτίαν τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ἐπανελέσθαι δὲ εὐλόγως δι’ ἐτέρων τῶν κοινῶν ἑχθρῶν τῆς πόλεως, περιποιήσασθαι δὲ τῇ χώρᾳ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἀποτρυφαμένους τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον πόλεμον, δόγματι μόνον τὴν ἐκ- δίκησιν ποιησάμενοι, τῖν’ ἢν εἰπεῖν ἔχοι πρὸς αὐτά; δὴν γὰρ ὡς οὐδέν. οἱ γε τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῖς πράξαι τι τῶν προειρήμενων, ὡς ἐπτακαίδεκ’ ἐτή συνεχῶς πολεμήσαντες κατὰ τὴν Ἰούνιβου προαιρε- σιν οὐ πρότερον κατελύσαντο τὸν πόλεμον ἐὸς οὐ πάσας ἑξελέγχαντες τὰς ἐλπίδας τελευταίον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ σωμάτων παρ- εγένοντο κῦδων.

9 Τίνος δὴ χάριν ἐμνήσθην Φαβίου καὶ τῶν ὑπ’ ἔκεινοι γεγραμμένων; οὐχ ἕνεκα τῆς πιθανότητος τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀγωνιῶν μὴ πιστευθῆ παρὰ τινών· ἢ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τούτων ἀλογία καὶ χωρίς τῆς ἐμῆς εξηγήσεως αὐτή δι’ αὐτῆς δύναται ὑθερείσθαι παρὰ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνονσιν· ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀναλαμβανόντων τὰς ἐκείνου βύβλους ὑπομνήσεως, ὡς μὴ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιγραφήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα βλέπωσιν. ἔνιοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ λεγόμενα συνεπιστήσαντες, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τὸν λέγοντα, καὶ λαβόντες εἰς νῦ διότι κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ὁ γράφων γέγονε καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου 22
this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war. Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer—how opportunity could have better favoured the Carthaginians' wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal's action from the outset) than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offence, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution—if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing; for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal's decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril.

9. One may ask why I make any mention of Fabius and his statement. It is not from apprehension lest it may find acceptance from some owing to its plausibility; for its inherent unreasonableness, even without my comment, is self-evident to anyone who reads it. But what I wish is to warn those who consult his book not to pay attention to the title, but to facts. For there are some people who pay regard not to what he writes but to the writer himself and, taking into consideration that he was a contemporary and a Roman senator, at once accept
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μετείχε τῶν Ῥωμαίων, πάνε εὐθέως ἕγονται τὸ λε- 5 γόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦτον πιστὸν. ἔγω δὲ φημὶ μὲν δεῖν ὅ- ουκ ἐν μικρῷ προσλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ συγγρα- 
féως πίστιν, οὐκ αὐτοτελὴ δὲ κρῖνει, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἐ- ξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγι- 
nώσκοντας τὰς δοκιμασίας.

6 Ὅπως καὶ τοῦ γε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδο- 

νίων πολέμου, τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιη- σάμεθα, νομίστεον πρὸ τοῦ μὲν αὐτῶν γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμύλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλομένου, πα- 7 τρός δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος. ἐκείνοις γάρ ὁ- υχ ἦττηθείς τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ τῇ ψυχῇ, τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκέραια διατετηρήκεναι τὰ περὶ 
τὸν Ὑβρυκα στρατόπεδα ταῖς ὀρμαῖς ἐφ’ ὅν αὐτὸς 
ἠ, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἠ- 
τταν τοῖς καιροῖς εἰκὼν πεποίησθαι τὰς συνθήκας, ἐ- 
μενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀρμῆς, τηρῶν ἅι πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν. ἐ- 8 εὶ μὲν οὖν μὴ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἕγειος ἐγένετο κύνημα 
τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, εὐθέως ἀν ἀλλῆλην ἀρχὴν ἐποιεῖτο 
καὶ παρασκευῇ πραγμάτων, ὅσον ἐπ’ ἐκείνως. προ- 
καταληφθέείς δὲ ταῖς ἐμφυλίοις ταραχαῖς ἐν τούτοις 
καὶ περὶ ταύτας διέτριβε τὰς πράξεις. Ῥωμαίων δὲ 
μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προερη- 
μένην ταραχήν ἀπαγγελάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ 
μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβανον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες 
αὐτοὺς νικήσεων τοῖς δικαίοις, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸ 
2 ταύτης βύβλοις περὶ τούτων δεδηλώκαμεν, ὃν χωρίς 
όχι οἶον τ’ ἦν συμπεριενεχθῆναι δεόντως οὔτε τοῖς 
νῦν λεγομένους οὔτε τοῖς μετὰ ταύτα ῥήθησομένοις 
3 ὑπ’ ἡμῶν. πλὴν οὖν ἐντερπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, 
εἰσαντες τῇ περιστάσει, καὶ θαρρούμενοι μὲν, οὐκ 
ἑχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὔδὲν, ἐξεξήγησαν Σαρδόνος, συν- 
24
all he says as worthy of credit. But my own opinion is that while not treating his authority as negligible we should not regard it as final, but that readers should in most cases test his statements by reference to the actual facts.

To return to the war between Rome and Carthage, from which this digression has carried us away, we must regard its first cause as being the indignation of Hamilcar surnamed Barca, the actual father of Hannibal. Unvanquished in spirit by the war for Sicily, since he felt that he had kept the army at Eryx under his command combative and resolute until the end, and had only agreed to peace yielding to circumstances after the defeat of the Carthaginians in the naval battle, he maintained his resolve and waited for an opportunity to strike. Had not the mutinous outbreak among the mercenaries occurred, he would very soon, as far as it lay in his power, have created some other means and other resources for resuming the contest, but he was hampered by these civil disturbances which occupied all his time and attention. 10. When, on the suppression of this disturbance by the Carthaginians, the Romans announced their intention of making war on Carthage, the latter at first was ready to negotiate on all points, thinking that, justice being on her side, she would prevail (about this I have spoken in the preceding Books, without a perusal of which it is impossible to follow properly what I am now saying and what I am about to say); but as the Romans refused to negotiate, the Carthaginians had to yield to circumstances, and though deeply aggrieved they were powerless, and evacuated
εξώρησαν δ' εἰσοίσεων ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τά—

4 εκείνως ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς. διό καὶ δευτέ—

5 ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμοιν. Ἀμίλκας γὰρ προσ-

6 ἦν δὴ καὶ τρίτην αἰτίαν νομιστέον, λέγω δὲ τὴν

11 πίστιν ἄρκοιν ἔσται τὸ λέγεσθαι μέλλον. καθ' οὐς

2 βασιλέως προσάρεσθαι. οἶ δὲ πρέσβεις, ἀρωντες τὸν

3 τίσχον. ὁ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. προβαίνοντος γὰρ

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Sardinia, agreeing also to pay twelve hundred talents in addition to the sum previously exacted, in order not to be forced to accept war at that time. This, then, we must take to be the second and principal cause of the subsequent war; for Hamilcar, with the anger felt by all his compatriots at this last outrage added to his old indignation, as soon as he had finally crushed the mutiny of the mercenaries and secured the safety of his country, at once threw all his efforts into the conquest of Spain, with the object of using the resources thus obtained for the war against Rome. This success of the Carthaginian project in Spain must be held to be the third cause of the war, for relying on this increase of strength, they entered upon it with confidence.

Of the fact that Hamilcar, although he died ten years before the beginning of the Second Punic War, contributed much to its origin many evidences can be found; but the anecdote I am about to relate suffices, I think, to confirm this. 11. At the time when Hannibal on his final defeat by the Romans had left his native land and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the Romans, who saw through the project of the Aetolians, sent an embassy to Antiochus, wishing to be fully aware what the king’s purpose was. The legates, as they saw that Antiochus was lending an ear to the Aetolians and was disposed to go to war with Rome, paid many attentions to Hannibal, wishing to make Antiochus suspicious of him, as in fact they succeeded in doing. For as time went on, the king’s mistrust of Hannibal grew ever more strong; and it fell out on one occasion that
4 πίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐν δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀπολογισμοὺς
ποιησάμενος Ἀννίβας τέλος ἐπὶ το τοιοῦτο κατῆν-
5 της, δυσχρηστούμενος τοῖς λόγοις. ἔφη γάρ, καθ’
δὲ καὶ Καίρον ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰς Ἱβηρίαν ἔξοδον
μέλλοι στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἔτη μὲν
ἔχειν ἐννέα, θύοντος δ’ αὐτοῦ τῷ Διὶ παρεστάναι.
they came to have a talk about the alienation which had been secretly growing up between them. In the course of the conversation Hannibal defended himself on various grounds, and at length, being at a loss for further arguments, resorted to the following. He said that at the time when his father was about to start with his army on his expedition to Spain, he himself, then nine years of age, was standing by the altar, while Hamilcar was sacrificing to Zeus. When, on the omens being favourable, Hamilcar had poured a libation to the gods and performed all the customary rites, he ordered the others who were attending the sacrifice to withdraw to a slight distance and calling Hannibal to him asked him kindly if he wished to accompany him on the expedition. On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the friend of the Romans. He begged Antiochus, then, now he knew this for a fact, as long as his intentions were hostile to Rome, to rely on him confidently and believe that he would have in him his sincerest supporter, but from the moment he made peace and alliance with her he had no need to wait for accusations but should mistrust and beware of him; for there was nothing he would not do against the Romans. 12. Antiochus, listening to this, thought he spoke genuinely and sincerely and in consequence abandoned all his former mistrust. However, we should consider this as an unquestionable proof of Hamilcar’s hostility and general purpose, and it is confirmed by the facts. For he made of his daughter’s husband Hasdrubal and his own
Τῆς θυγατρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὑδν Ἀννίβαν ὡστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολὴν δυσμενείας.
4 Ἀσδρούβας μὲν οὖν προαιτοθανῶν οὐ πάσαν ἐκδήλων ἐποίησε τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόθεσιν, Ἀννίβα δὲ παρεδωκαν οἱ καιροὶ καὶ λίαν ἐναποδείξασθαι τὴν πα-
5 τρίαν ἔχθραν εἰς Ἡρωμάιοις. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταττομένους χρῆ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον φροντίζειν ὡς τοῦ μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς προ-
αιρέσεις τῶν διαλυμένων τὰς ἔχθρας ἡ συντιθε-
μένων τὰς φιλίας, πότε τοῖς καιροῖς εἶκοντες καὶ τὸ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡττώμενοι ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθή-
kas, ἢν τοὺς μὲν ἐφέδρους νομίζοντες εἶναι τῶν καιρῶν ἀεὶ φιλαττοῦνται, τοῖς δὲ πιστεύοντες, ὡς ὑπηκόοις ἢ φίλοις ἀληθῶν, πᾶν τὸ παραπίπτον ἐξ ἐτοίμου παραγγέλλωσιν.
7 Αἰτίας μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατ' Ἀννίβαν πολέμου τὰς προερμήνειας ἡγητέον, ἄρχας δὲ τὰς μελλούσας λέ-
13 γεσθαί. Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ βαρέως μὲν ἐφέρον καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ Σικελίας ἤτταν, συνεπέτευε δ' αὐτῶν τὴν ὀργῆν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, τὰ κατὰ Σαρ-
δόνα καὶ τὸ τῶν τελευταίον συντεθέντων χρημάτων
2 πλῆθος. διὸπερ ἀμα τῷ τὰ πλεῖστα κατ' Ἰβηρίαν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι πρὸς πᾶν ἐτοίμως διέκειντο
3 τὸ κατὰ Ἡρωμάιοιν ὑποδεικνύμενον. προσπεσουσίης οὖν τῆς Ἀσδρούβου τελευτῆς, ἢ μετὰ τῶν Ἀμίλκου
θάνατον ἐνεχείρισαν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, τὸ μὲν
4 πρῶτον ἐκαραδόκουν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὄρμας· ἀφ-
ικομένης δὲ τῆς ἀγγελίας ἐκ τῶν στρατοπέδων ὡς συμβαίνει τὰς δυνάμεις ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἠρήσαθαι στρα-
τηγὸν Ἀννίβαν, παρατικα συναθροίσαντες τὸν δή-
30
son Hannibal such enemies of Rome that none could be more bitter. As Hasdrubal died before putting his purpose into execution, it was not in his case fully evident, but circumstances put it in the power of Hannibal to give only too manifest proof of his inherited hatred of Rome. Therefore, statesmen should above all take care that the true motives of the reconciliation of enmities and the formation of friendships do not escape them. They should observe when it is that men come to terms under pressure of circumstances and when owing to their spirit being broken, so that in the former case they may regard them as reserving themselves for a favourable opportunity and be constantly on their guard, and in the latter they may trust them as true friends and subjects and not hesitate to command their services when required.

We must consider, then, the causes of the Hannibalic War to have been those I have stated, while its beginnings were as follows. 13. The Carthaginians could ill bear their defeat in the war for Sicily, and, as I said above, they were additionally exasperated by the matter of Sardinia and the exorbitancy of the sum they had been last obliged to agree to pay. Therefore, when they had subjugated the greater part of Iberia, they were quite ready to adopt any measures against Rome which suggested themselves. On the death of Hasdrubal, to whom after that of Hamilcar they had entrusted the government of Iberia, they at first waited for a pronouncement on the part of the troops, and when news reached them from their armies that the soldiers had unanimously chosen Hannibal as their commander, they hastened to summon a general assembly.
μον μιὰ γνώμη κυρίαν ἐποίησαν τὴν τῶν στρατο-
5 πέδων αἵρεσιν. Ἅννίβας δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν
εὑθέως ὁρμήσειν ὡς καταστρεφόμενος τὸ τῶν Ὀλκά-
δων ἔθνος· ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς Ἀλθαίαν τὴν βα-
6 rυτάτην αὐτῶν πόλιν κατεστρατοπέδευσε. μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα χρησάμενος ἐνεργοῖς ἅμα καὶ καταπληκτικὰς
προσβολαίς ταχέως ἐκράτησε τῆς πόλεως. οἱ συμ-
βάντος οἱ λοιποὶ γενόμενοι καταπλαγεῖς ἐνέδωκαν
7 αὐτοὺς τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἀργυρολογήσας δὲ τὰς
πόλεις, καὶ κυριεύσας πολλῶν χρημάτων, ἢκε παρα-
8 χειμάσων εἰς Καίνην πόλιν. μεγαλοψύχως δὲ χρη-
σάμενος τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις, καὶ τὰ μὲν δοῦς τῶν
ὁφνών τοῖς συστατευομένοις, τὰ δὲ ύπισχυό-
μενος, πολλὴν εὐνοιαν καὶ μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἐνερ-

14 γάσατο ταῖς δυνάμεσι. τῷ δὲ ἐπιγυνομένῳ θέρει
πάλιν ὀρμήσας ἐπὶ τοὺς Ὄιακκαίους Ἑλμαντικὴν
μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου ποιησάμενος προσβολὰς κατέσχεν,
Ἀρβουκάλην δὲ διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὸ
πλῆθος, ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν γενναιότητα τῶν οἰκητῶν,
μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαμωρίας πολιορκήσας κατὰ κράτος
2 εἰλε. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παραδόξως εἰς τοὺς μεγίστους
ἥλθε κυδύνους ἑπανάγων, συνδραμόντων ἐπ’ αὐτὸν
τῶν Καρπησίων, ὃ σχεδὸν ἵσχυροτάτον ἐστιν ἔθνος
3 τῶν κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν
ἀστυγειτῶν ἀθροισθέντων ἃμα τοῦτοι, οὐς ἤρε-
θισαν μᾶλιστα μὲν οἱ τῶν Ὀλκάδων φυγάδες, συν-
εξέκαυσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλμαντικῆς οἱ διασω-
4 θέντες. πρὸς οὓς εἰ μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως ἡγακά-
σθησαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι διακυνδυνεύειν, ὀμολογοῦ-
μένως ἂν ἡττήθησαν. νῦν δὲ πραγματικῶς καὶ
νουνεχὼς ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἀναχωρήσατο Ἀννίβου,
καὶ πρόβλημα ποιησάμενον τὸν Τάγον καλούμενον
32
of the commons, which unanimously ratified the choice of the soldiers. Hannibal on assuming the command, at once set forth with the view of subduing a tribe called the Olcades, and arriving before their most powerful city Althaea,\(^a\) encamped there and soon made himself master of it by a series of vigorous and formidable assaults, upon which the rest of the tribe were overawed and submitted to the Carthaginians. After exacting tribute from the towns and possessing himself of a considerable sum, he retired to winter quarters at New Carthage. By the generosity he now displayed to the troops under his command, paying them in part and promising further payment, he inspired in them great good-will to himself and high hopes of the future. 14. Next summer he made a fresh attack on the Vaccaei, assaulted and took Hermandica at the first onset, but Arbacala being a very large city with a numerous and brave population, he had to lay siege to it and only took it by assault after much pains. Subsequently on his return he unexpectedly found himself in great peril, the Carpetani, the strongest tribe in the district gathering to attack him and being joined by the neighbouring tribes, all incited to this by the fugitive Olcades, and also by those who had escaped from Hermandica. Had the Carthaginians been obliged to meet all this host in a pitched battle, they would assuredly have suffered defeat; but, as it was, Hannibal very wisely and skilfully faced about and retreated so as to place the river Tagus in his front,

\(^a\) Livy calls it Castala.
ποταμόν, καὶ περὶ τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διάβασιν συν- 
στησαμένου τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀμα δὲ συγχρησαμένον 
συναγωνιστὴ τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ τοῦς θηρίους οἰς εἶχε 
περὶ τετταράκοντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, συνέβη τὰ ὀλα 
6 παραδόξως καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐτῷ χωρῆσαι. 
τῶν γὰρ 

barbáρων ἑπιβαλομένων κατὰ πλείους τόπους βιά-
ξεθαι καὶ περαιούσθαι τὸν ποταμὸν, τὸ μὲν πλεῖ-

ston αὐτῶν μέρος διεθάρη περὶ τὰς ἐκβάσεις, 

παραπομεμενων τῶν θηρίων παρὰ τὸ χεῖλος καὶ 

7 τοὺς ἐκβαινοντας ἀεὶ προκαταλαμβανόντων. 

πολλοὶ 

dὲ κατ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ύπὸ τῶν ἐπτέων ἀπ-

윅ον, διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ βεῦματος 

tῶν ἐπτούς, ἔξ ὑπερδεξίου δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν 

μάχην 

8 τῶν ἐπτέας πρὸς τοὺς πεζούς. 

τέλος 

dὲ τοὐμπαλῶν 

ἐπιδιάβαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρ-

βάρους ἑτρέψαντο πλείους ἄν 

δέκα μυριάδας ἀνθρῶ-

πων. 

ἐν 

ηττηθέντων ὦδεις ἐτὶ τῶν ἐντὸς Ἰβηρος 

ποταμοῦ ῥάδιως πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν ἐτόλμα 

πλὴν Ἱπαθαίων. 

ταύτης 

dὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐπειράτο 

κατὰ δύναμιν ἀπέχεσθαι, 

βουλόμενος μηδεμί 

ἀφορμὴν ὄμολογουμένην δοῦναι τοῦ πολέμου Ἑρ-

μαίος, ἔως τάλα πάντα βεβαίως ὑφ’ αὐτὸν ποιή-

σαιτο κατὰ τὰς Ἀμίλκου τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποθήκας καὶ 

παρανέσεις.

15 Οἱ δὲ Ἱπαθαιοὶ συνεχῶς ἐπεμπὸν εἰς τὴν 

Ῥώμην, ἀμα μὲν ἄγωνυότες περὶ σφῶν καὶ προ-

ορῶμενοι τὸ μέλλον, ἀμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μὴ λαν-

θάνειν Ῥωμαίους τὴν γυνομένην εὑροιαν Καρχηδο-

2 νίοις τῶν κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων. Ῥωμαίοι δὲ, 

πλεονάκις αὐτῶν παρακηκοτε, τότε πρεσβευτὰς 

ἐξαπέστειλαν τοὺς ἐπισκεψομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν προσ-

3 πιπτόντων. Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ

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and remained there to dispute the crossing, availing himself of the aid both of the river and of his elephants, of which he had about forty, so that everything went as he had calculated and as no one else would have dared to expect. For when the barbarians tried to force a crossing at various points, the greater mass of them perished in coming out of the river, the elephants following its bank and being upon them as soon as they landed. Many also were cut down in the stream itself by the cavalry, as the horses could bear up better against the current, and the mounted men in fighting had the advantage of being higher than the unmounted enemy. Finally, Hannibal in his turn crossed the river and attacked the barbarians, putting to flight a force of more than one hundred thousand. After their defeat none of the peoples on that side of the Ebro ventured lightly to face the Carthaginians, with the exception of the Saguntines. Hannibal tried as far as he could to keep his hands off this city, wishing to give the Romans no avowed pretext for war, until he had secured his possession of all the rest of the country, following in this his father Hamilcar's suggestions and advice.

15. But the Saguntines sent repeated messages to Rome, as on the one hand they were alarmed for their own safety and foresaw what was coming, and at the same time they wished to keep the Romans informed how well things went with the Carthaginians in Spain. The Romans, who had more than once paid little attention to them, sent on this occasion legates to report on the situation. Hannibal at the same time, having reduced the tribes he
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ροὺς πεποιημένος υφ’ αὐτὸν οὐς προέθετο, παρὴν αὐθὶς μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων παραχειμάσων εἰς Καὶ-
νὴν πόλιν, ἦτις ὥς ἂν εἰ πρόσχημα καὶ βασίλειον ἢν Καρχηδονίων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν τόποις.

4 καταλαβὼν δὲ τὴν παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων προσβείαν, καὶ δοῦσαν αὐτὸν εἰς ἐντευξίαν, διήκουσε περὶ τῶν ἐν

5 εστώτων. Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν οὖν διεμαρτύροντο Ζακαν-
θαίων ἀπέχεσθαι, κείσαντι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ σφε-
τέρᾳ πίστει, καὶ τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμὸν μὴ διαβαίνειν

6 κατὰ τὰς ἐπ’ Ἀνδροῦβου γενομένας ὁμολογίας. ὦν
δ’ Ἀννίβας, ἀτε νέος μὲν ὄν, πλήρης δὲ πολεμικῆς

6 όρμῆς, ἐπιτυχῆς δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, πάλαι δὲ παρ-

7 ὄρμημένος πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἔχθραν, πρὸς

8 μὲν ἔκεινος, ὦς κηδόμενος Ζακανθαίων, ἐνεκάλει

Ῥωμαῖοι διότι μικρὸι ἐμπροσθεν χρόνοις, στασια-

9 τομέων αὐτῶν, λαβόντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν [εἰς τὸ δια-

λύσαι] ἀδίκως ἐπανέλυσαν τινὰς τῶν προστώτων,

9 τιμῶν ἐπιστρεφόμενοι παρεπεστὶοι: πάρτιον γὰρ

10 εἶναι Καρχηδονίους τὸ μηδένα τῶν ἀδικουμένων

περιοράν. πρὸς δὲ Ζακανθοῦν διεπέμπτετο, πυν-

θανόμενος τὰς δὲ ποιεῖν, ὅτι Ζακανθαῖοι πιστεύον-

tης τὴ Ῥωμαίων συμμαχία τινὰς τῶν υφ’ αὐτοὺς

καθόλου δ’ ἢν πλήρης ἀλο-

γίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου. διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς

ἄλλας οὐκ ἐχρὴ, κατέφευγε δ’ εἰς προφάσεις ἀλο-

γοὺς: ἀπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν οἱ διὰ τὰς προεγκαθη-

μένας αὐτοῖς ὁρμὰς ὀλγῳροῦντες τοῦ καθῆκοντος.

πόσω γὰρ ἢν ἄμενων οἴεσθαι δεῖν Ῥωμαῖοι ἀπο-

δοῦναι σφίσι Σαρδόνα καὶ τοὺς ἐπιταχθέντας ἀμα

ταῦτῃ φόρους, ο ὅς τοῖς καρποῖς συνεπιλέμενοι πρό-

περον ἀδίκως παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐλαβον’ ε’ δὲ μῆ, φάναι

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intended, arrived with his forces to winter at New Carthage, which was in a way the chief ornament and capital of the Carthaginian empire in Spain. Here he found the Roman legates, to whom he gave audience and listened to their present communication. The Romans protested against his attacking Saguntum, which they said was under their protection, or crossing the Ebro, contrary to the treaty engagements entered into in Hasdrubal’s time. Hannibal, being young, full of martial ardour, encouraged by the success of his enterprises, and spurred on by his long-standing enmity to Rome, in his answer to the legates affected to be guarding the interests of the Saguntines and accused the Romans of having a short time previously, when there was a party quarrel at Saguntum and they were called in to arbitrate, unjustly put to death some of the leading men. The Carthaginians, he said, would not overlook this violation of good faith for it was from of old the principle of Carthage never to neglect the cause of the victims of injustice. To Carthage, however, he sent, asking for instructions, since the Saguntines, relying on their alliance with Rome, were wronging some of the peoples subject to Carthage. Being wholly under the influence of unreasoning and violent anger, he did not allege the true reasons, but took refuge in groundless pretexts, as men are wont to do who disregard duty because they are prepossessed by passion. How much better would it have been for him to demand from the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and at the same time of the tribute which they had so unjustly exacted, availing themselves of the misfortunes of Carthage, and to threaten war in
11 πολεμήσεων; νῦν δὲ τὴν μὲν οὖσαν αὐτίαν ἀληθινὴν παρασιωπῶν, τὴν δ' οὕς ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ Ζακανθαίων πλάττων, οὐ μόνον ἀλόγως, ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον
12 ἀδίκως κατάρχειν ἐδόκει τοῦ πολέμου. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις, ὡς μὲν εἴη πολεμητέον σαφῶς εἰδότες, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς Καρχηδόνα, τὰ παραπλήσια
13 θέλοντες ἐπιμαρτύρασθαι κάκεινος· οὐ μὴν ἐν Ἰταλία γε πολεμήσεων ἡλπίσαν, ἀλλ' ἐν Ἰβηρία, χρήσεθαι δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὀρμητηρίῳ τῇ Ζακανθαίων πόλει.
16 Διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταύτῃν ἀμοιβόμενοι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἢ σύγκλητος ἐκρενεν ἀσφαλισθαί τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πράγματα, προορωμένη διότι μέγας ἦσταν καὶ πολυχρόνος καὶ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ὁ πόλεμος. συνέβαλε γὰρ κατ' ἐκείνους τὸν καιρὸν Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον, ἐπιλεκτικεῖον μὲν τῶν προγεγονότων εἰς αὐτὸν εὐεργετημάτων ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, καταπεφρονηκότα δὲ πρότερον μὲν διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ Γαλατῶν, τὸτε δὲ διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ Καρχηδονίων
3 φόβον περιεστῶτα Ῥωμαίους, πάσας δ' ἔχοντα τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν τῇ Μακεδόνων οἰκίᾳ διὰ τὸ συμπεσολεμηκέναι καὶ μετεσχηκέναι τῶν πρὸς Κλεομένη κυνδύων Ἀντιγόνων, πορθεῖν μὲν καὶ καταστρέφεσθαι τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πόλεις τὰς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους ταττομένας, πεπλευκέναι δ' ἐξω τοῦ Δίσσου παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας πεντήκοντα λέμβοις καὶ πεπορθηκέναι κέναι πολλὰς τῶν Κυκλάδων νῆσων. εἰς αἱ βλέποντες Ῥωμαίους, καὶ θεωροῦντες ἀνθοῦσαν τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν, ἐπεσευδον ἀσφαλισθαί τὰ πρὸς ἐω τῆς Ἰταλίας, πεπεισμένοι καταταχήσεως διορθωσάμενοι μὲν τὴν Ἰλλυρίων ἄγνοιαν, ἐπιτυμήσαντες δὲ καὶ κολάσαντες τὴν ἀχαριστίαν καὶ
the event of refusal! But as it was, by keeping silent as to the real cause and by inventing a non-existing one about Saguntum, he gave the idea that he was entering on the war not only unsupported by reason but without justice on his side. The Roman legates, seeing clearly that war was inevitable, took ship for Carthage to convey the same protest to the Government there. They never thought, however, that the war would be in Italy, but supposed they would fight in Spain with Saguntum for a base.

16. Consequently, the Senate, adapting their measures to this supposition, decided to secure their position in Illyria, as they foresaw that the war would be serious and long and the scene of it far away from home. It so happened that at that time in Illyria Demetrius of Pharos, oblivious of the benefits that the Romans had conferred on him, contemptuous of Rome because of the peril to which she was exposed first from the Gauls and now from Carthage, and placing all his hopes in the Royal House of Macedon owing to his having fought by the side of Antigonus in the battles against Cleomenes, was sacking and destroying the Illyrian cities subject to Rome, and, sailing beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of the treaty, with fifty boats, had pillaged many of the Cyclades. The Romans, in view of those proceedings and of the flourishing fortunes of the Macedonian kingdom, were anxious to secure their position in the lands lying east of Italy, feeling confident that they would have time to correct the errors of the Illyrians and rebuke and
5 προπέτειαν τὴν Δημητρίου. διεψευθησαν δὲ τοῖς λογισμοῖς· κατετάχθη γὰρ αὐτοὺς Ἄννιβασ,
6 ἐξελὼν τὴν Ζακάνθαιαν πόλιν. καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ συνέβη τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ, πρὸς αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν γενέσθαι τὴν Ἰταλίαν.
7 οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τούτως χρησάμενοι τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς Ῥωμαίων μὲν ύπὸ τὴν ὁραίαν Λευκίων τὸν Ἀμίλιον ἐξαπέστειλαν μετὰ δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰλυρίδα πράξεις κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτὸς τῆς ἐκατοστής καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος.
17 ' Ἄννιβας δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῆς Καυνῆς πόλεως προῆγε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὴν Ζάκανθαν. ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐτῆς κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ πρὸς θάλατταν καθήκοντι πρὸποδί τῆς ὁρείνης τῆς συναπτούσης τὰ πέρατα τῆς Ἰβηρίας καὶ Κελτιβηρίας, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ὡς ἑπτὰ στάδια.  
3 νέμονται δὲ χώραν οἱ κατοικοῦντες αὐτῆς πάμφορον καὶ διαφέρουσαν ἀρετῇ πάσης τῆς Ἰβηρίας. ἢ τότε παραστρατοπεδεύσας Ἄννιβας ἐνεργὸς ἐγίνετο περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας, πολλὰ προορώμενος ἐυχρηστα πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐκ τοῦ κατά κράτος ἐλείων αὐτῆς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὑπελαβεὶ παρελθεῖα Ῥωμαίων τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ συστήσασθαι τοῦ πόλεμον ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ. δεύτερον δὲ καταπληξάμενος ἀπαντᾶς εὐτακτοτέρους μὲν ἐπέπειστο παρασκευάσειν τοὺς υφ’ αὐτῶν ἦδη ταττομένους, εὐλαβεστέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀκμῆν αὐτοκράτορας τοὺς ὅταν τῆς ἤτοι ἐν τοῖς κατ’ ἐνεργάσεσθαι τοῖς δυνάμεις ἑκ τῆς ἐσομένης ἐκάστοις ὥφελεται, προκαλέσει
chastise Demetrius for his ingratitude and temerity. But in this calculation they were deceived; for Hannibal forestalled them by taking Saguntum, and, as a consequence, the war was not waged in Spain but at the very gates of Rome and through the whole of Italy. However, the Romans now moved by these considerations dispatched a force under Lucius Aemilius just before summer in the first year of the 140th Olympiad to operate in Illyria.

17. Hannibal at the same time quitted New Carthage with his army and advanced towards Saguntum. This city lies on the seaward foot of the range of hills connecting Iberia and Celtiberia, at a distance of about seven stades from the sea. The territory of the Saguntines yields every kind of crop and is the most fertile in the whole of Iberia. Hannibal, now encamping before the town, set himself to besiege it vigorously, foreseeing that many advantages would result from its capture. First of all he thought that he would thus deprive the Romans of any prospect of a campaign in Iberia, and secondly he was convinced that by this blow he would inspire universal terror, and render the Iberian tribes who had already submitted more orderly and those who were still independent more cautious, while above all he would be enabled to advance safely with no enemy left in his rear. Besides, he would then have abundant funds and supplies for his projected expedition, he would raise the spirit of his troops by the booty distributed
σθαι δὲ τὴν εὕνοιαν τῶν ἐν οἶκῳ Καρχηδονίων διὰ τῶν ἀποσταλησμοῖν τούτως λαφύρων. τοιούτως δὲ χρώμενος διαλογισμοῖς, ἐνεργῶς προσέκειτο τῇ πολιορκίᾳ, τότε μὲν ὑπόδειγμα τῷ πλῆθει ποιῶν αὐτὸν καὶ γνώμενος αὐτουργὸς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐργοῖς ταλαιπωρίας, ἐστι δ’ ὅτε παρακαλῶν τὰ πλῆθη καὶ παραβόλως διδοὺς αὐτὸν εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους. πᾶσαν δὲ κακοπάθειαν καὶ μέριμναν ὑπομείνας τέλος ἐν ὁκτώ μησὶ κατὰ κράτος εἰς τὴν πόλιν. κύριος δὲ γενόμενος χρημάτων πολλῶν καὶ σωμάτων καὶ κατασκευῆς, τὰ μὲν χρήματ’ εἰς τὰς ἀθίας ἐπι- βολὰς παρέθετο κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, τὰ δὲ σώματα διένεμε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν ἐκάστοις τῶν συ- στρατευόμενων, τὴν δὲ κατασκευὴν παραχρῆμαπάσαν ἐξέπεμψε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ταῦτα δὲ πράξας οὐ διεθεύθη τοῖς λογισμοῖς οὔτ’ ἀπέτυχε τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τε στρατιῶτας προθυμοτέρους ἐποίησε πρὸς τὸ κινδυνεῦν, τοὺς τε Καρχηδονίους ἐτοίμως παρεσκεύασε πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον, αὐτὸς τε πολλὰ τῶν χρησίμων μετὰ ταῦτα κατ- ευργάσατο διὰ τῆς τῶν χορηγῶν παραβέσεως.

18 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοῦ καιροὺς Δημήτριος ἀμα τῷ συνεῖναι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῶν Ἦρωιμῶν παρατίκα μὲν εἰς τὴν Διμάλην ἀξιόχρεων φρουράν εἰσέπεμψε καὶ τὰς ἀρμοζούσας ταύτης χορηγίας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν πόλεων τοὺς μὲν ἀντιπολιτευόμενοις ἐπαν- είλετο, τοῖς δ’ αὐτοῦ φίλοις ἐνεχείρεσε τὰς δυνα- 2 στείας, αὐτὸς δ’ ἐκ τῶν ὑποτεθεμένων ἐπιλέξας τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἐξακίουχιλίους συνέστησε τοὺ- 3 τοὺς εἰς τὴν Φάρον. ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἦρωιμῶν, ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, καὶ θεωρῶν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἀρροῦντας ἐπὶ τῇ
among them and would conciliate the Carthaginians at home by the spoils he would send them. From all these considerations he actively pursued the siege, now setting an example to the soldiers by sharing personally the fatigue of the battering operations, now cheering on the troops and exposing himself recklessly to danger. At length after eight months of hardship and anxiety he took the city by storm. A great booty of money, slaves, and property fell into his hands. The money, as he had determined, he set aside for his own purposes, the slaves he distributed among his men according to rank, and the miscellaneous property he sent off at once to Carthage. The result did not deceive his expectations, nor did he fail to accomplish his original purpose; but he both made his troops more eager to face danger and the Carthaginians more ready to accede to his demands on them, while he himself, by setting aside these funds, was able to accomplish many things of much service to him.

18. While this was taking place Demetrius, getting wind of the Romans' purpose, at once sent a considerable garrison to Dimale with the supplies requisite for such a force. In the other cities he made away with those who opposed his policy and placed the government in the hands of his friends while he himself, selecting six thousand of his bravest troops, quartered them at Pharos. The Roman Consul, on reaching Illyria with his army and observing that the enemy were very confident in
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τῆς Διμάλης ὀχυρότητι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, ἕτερα δὲ τῶν δοκείν αὐτήν ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχειν, ταύτῃ πρώτων ἐγχειρεῖν ἐκρίνε, βουλόμενος καταπλήξασθαι τό 4 τοὺς πολέμους. παρακαλέσας δὲ τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνας, καὶ προσαγαγὼν ἤργα κατὰ πλείους τό- 5 πους, ἦρξατο πολιορκεῖν. λαβὼν δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐν ἧμεραις ἐπτα παραχρήμα πάντας ἡττησε ταῖς 6 ψυχαῖς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. διότερο εὐθέως παρῆσαν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων ἐπιτρέποντες καὶ διδόντες 7 αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἱωμαιῶν πίστιν. δὲ δὲ προσ- δεξάμενος ἐκάστους ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀρμοζούσαις ὁμολο- γίαις ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν εἰς τὴν Φάρον ἐπ' αὐτὸν 8 τὸν Δημήτριον. πυθανόμενος δὲ τὴν τε πόλιν ὀχυρὰν εἶναι καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων διαφερόντων εἰς αὐτὴν ἠθροίσθαι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ταῖς χορηγίαις ἐξηρτύσθαι καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαις παρασκευαῖς, ὑφεσάτο μὴ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνοις συμβῆ γενέσθαι τὴν 9 πολιορκίαν. διὸ προορώμενος ἐκάστα τούτων ἐχρῆ- σατο παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καίρὸν τοιῶδε των γένει στρα- 10 τηγῆματος. πυθανόμενος γὰρ τὸν ἐπίπλουν νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι, τὸ μὲν πλεῖον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπέβιβασεν εἰς τινὰς υλῶδεις 11 καὶ κοίλους τόπους, ἐξοπεινὰ δὲ ναυσὶν ἐπιγενομένης ἴμηρας ἐπλεῖ προδήλως ἐπὶ τὸν ἔγγιστα τῆς πόλεως 12 λιμένα. συνορώντες δὲ τὰς ναῦς οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημή- τριον, καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ πλῆθους, ἀρμηναῖ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸν λιμένα, κωλύσοντες τὴν ἀπό- 19 βασιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἀμα δὲ τῷ συμμίξας γινο- μένης ἱσχυρᾶς τῆς συμπλοκῆς προσεβοήθουν αἰὲ πλείους τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως· τέλος δὲ πάντες ἐξ- 2 εὐθησαν εἰς τὸν κίνδυνον. τῶν δὲ Ἱωμαιῶν οἱ 19 τῆς νυκτὸς ἀποβάντες εἰς τὸν καίρὸν τούτων συν- 44
the natural strength of Dimale and the measures they had taken for its defence, there being also a general belief that it was impregnable, decided to attack it first, wishing to strike terror into them. Having given instructions to his officers and erected batteries in several places he began to besiege it. By capturing it in seven days, he at one blow broke the spirit of all the enemy, so that from every city they at once flocked to surrender themselves unconditionally to Rome. Having accepted their submission and imposed suitable conditions on each he sailed to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Learning that the city was very strong, that a large force of exceptionally fine troops was assembled within it and that it was excellently furnished with supplies and munitions of war, he was apprehensive that the siege might prove difficult and long. In view of this, therefore, he employed the following impromptu stratagem. Sailing up to the island at night with his whole force he disembarked the greater part of it in certain well-wooded dells, and at daybreak with twenty ships sailed openly against the harbour which lies nearest to the town. Demetrius, seeing the ships and contemptuous of their small number, sallied from the city down to the harbour to prevent the enemy from landing. On his encountering them (19) the struggle was very violent, and more and more troops kept coming out of the town to help, until at length the whole garrison had poured out to take part in the battle. The Roman force which had landed in the night now
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ήμαν, διὰ τῶν ἀδήλων ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν. 3 καὶ καταλαβόμενοι μεταξύ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ λιμένος λόφον ἐρυμυνὸν διέκλεισαν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς ἐκβεβοηθηκότας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον, συννοήσαντες τὸ γεγονός, τοῦ μὲν διακωλύειν τοὺς ἀποβαίνοντας ἀπέστησαν, συναθροίσαντες δὲ σφάς αὐτοὺς καὶ παρακαλέσαντες ὄρμησαν, κρίναντες ἐκ παρατάξεως διακυδυνεύειν πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον.
5 οἱ δὲ 'Ῥωμαίοι, θεωροῦντες τὴν ἔφοδον τῶν Ἰλλυρίων ἑνεργὸν καὶ συντεταγμένην, ἀντέπεσον ταῖς σπείραις καταπληκτικῶς. ἀμα δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις οἱ πεπουμένοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, συνορᾶντες τὸ γνώμενον, προσέκειντο κατόπιν· καὶ πανταχόθεν προσπίπτοντες θόρυβον καὶ παραχήν οὐ μικρὰν ἐν τοῖς Ἰλλυρίοις κατεσκεύαζον. εὔς οὖ τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νῦτον πονοῦντων, τέλος οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημήτριον ἐτράπησαν· καὶ τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐφυγον ὡς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ τλείους ἄνοδια κατὰ τῆς νῆσου διεσπάρθησαν. οἱ δὲ Δημήτριος, ἐχὼν ἐτοιμὸς λέμβους πρὸς τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς τόποις ἐρήμους υφομοῦντας, ἐπὶ τούτους ἐπούμενο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν. εἰς οὓς ἐμβασὶ ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀπέπλευσε, καὶ διεκομίσθη παραδόξως πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Φίλιππον, παρ' ὅτι 9 λοιπὸν διέτριβε τὸν βίου μέρος, ἀνὴρ θράσος μὲν καὶ τόλμαν κεκτημένος, ἀλόγιστον δὲ ταύτην καὶ τελέως ἀκρυτον. διὸ καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν παραπλησίαν αὐτῷ συνέβη γενέσθαι τῇ κατὰ τὸν ὄλον βίον προαιρέσει. καταλαβέσθαι γὰρ ἐγχειρήσος μετὰ τῆς Φιλίππου γνώμης τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν εἰκῆ καὶ παραβόλοις, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πράξεως καίρῳ διεφθάρῃ· περὶ ὃν ἦμεις τὰ κατὰ μέρος.
opportunely arrived, having marched by a concealed route, and occupying a steep hill between the city and the harbour, shut off from the town the troops who had sallied out. Demetrius, perceiving what had happened, desisted from opposing the landing and collecting his forces and cheering them on started with the intention of fighting a pitched battle with those on the hill. The Romans, seeing the Illyrians advancing resolutely and in good order, formed their ranks and delivered a terrible charge, while at the same time those who had landed from the ships, seeing what was going on, took the enemy in the rear, so that being attacked on all sides the Illyrians were thrown into much tumult and confusion. At the end, being hard pressed both in front and in the rear, Demetrius' troops turned and fled, some escaping to the city, but the greater number dispersing themselves over the island across country. Demetrius had some boats lying ready for such a contingency at a lonely spot, and retreating there and embarking sailed away at nightfall and managed to cross and reach King Philip, at whose court he spent the rest of his life. He was a man of a bold and venturesome spirit, but with an entire lack of reasoning power and judgement, defects which brought him to an end of a piece with the rest of his life. For having, with the approval of Philip, made a foolhardy and ill-managed attempt to seize Messene, he perished in the action, as I shall narrate
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12 ὅταν ἐπὶ τοὺς καρποὺς ἐλθωμεν, διασαφήσομεν. ὅ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων Ἀἰμίλιος τὴν μὲν Φάρουν εὐθέως ἐξ ἐφόδου παραλαβὼν κατέσκαψε, τῆς δὲ λουτῆς Ἑλλυρίδος ἐγκρατῆς γενόμενος, καὶ πάντα διατάξας κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν, μετὰ ταῦτα ληγούσης ἥδη τῆς θερείας εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἐπανήλθε, καὶ τὴν εἰσόδον ἐπονήσατο μετὰ θριάμβου καὶ τῆς ἀπάσης εὐδοξίας. ἔδοκεν γὰρ ὦ μόνον ἐπιδεξίως, ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνδρωδῶς κεχρήσατο τοῖς πράγμασιν.

20 Ὅτι δὲ Ῥωμαίου, προσπεπτωκύιας αὐτοῖς ἥδη τῆς τῶν Ζακανθαίων ἀλώσεως, οὐ μὰ Δία περὶ τοῦ πολέμου τότε διαβούλιον ἕγγον, καθάπερ ἕνοι τῶν συγγραφέων φασὶ, προσκατατάττοντες ἐτὶ καὶ τοὺς εἰς ἐκάτερα ῥήθεντας λόγους, πάντων ἀντοπώτατον

2 πράγμα ποιούντες. πῶς γὰρ οἶδον τῇ Ῥωμαίους τοὺς ἐνιαυτῷ πρότερον ἐπηγγελκότας πόλεμον Καρχηδονίου, ἕαν ἐπιβαίνωσι τῆς Ζακανθαίων χώρας, τούτους κατὰ κράτος ἑαλωκύιας αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως τότε βουλεύεσθαι συνελθόντας πότερα πολεμητέον

3 ἡ τούναντίων; πῶς δὲ καὶ τῖνα τρόπον ἅμα μὲν τῆς στυγνότητα τοῦ συνεδρίου παρεισάγωσι βαθμάσιν, ἀμα δὲ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀπὸ δώδεκ' ἐτῶν ἁγεῖν φασὶ τοὺς πατέρας εἰς τὸ συνέδριον, οὕς μετέχοντας τῶν διαβούλιων οὐδὲ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδεὶ προεσθαί

4 τῶν ἀπορρήτων οὐδέν; ὥν ὄντι εἰκὸς οὐτ' ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ νῆ Δία πρὸς τοῖς ἀλλοις ή τύχη καὶ τούτο προσένεμε Ῥωμαίοις, τὸ 5 φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ἐκ γενετῆς. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν συγγραμμάτων ὁ γράφει Χαρέας καὶ Σωσύλος οὐδέν ἀν δεοὶ πλέον λέγεων· οὐ γὰρ ἱστορίας, ἀλλὰ κουρεακῆς καὶ πανδήμου λαλιᾶς ἐμοιγε δοκούσι τάξιν ἐχειν καὶ δύναμιν.

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in detail when we reach that date. Aemilius, the Roman Consul, took Pharos at once by assault and razed it to the ground, and after subduing the rest of Illyria and organizing it as he thought best, returned to Rome late in summer and entered the city in triumph, acclaimed by all, for he seemed to have managed matters not only with ability, but with very high courage.

20. The Romans, when the news of the fall of Saguntum reached them, did not assuredly hold a debate on the question of the war, as some authors allege, even setting down the speeches made on both sides—a most absurd proceeding. For how could the Romans, who a year ago had announced to the Carthaginians that their entering the territory of Saguntum would be regarded as a *casus belli*, now when the city itself had been taken by assault, assemble to debate whether they should go to war or not? How is it that on the one hand these authors draw a wonderful picture of the gloomy aspect of the Senate and on the other tell us that fathers brought their sons from the age of twelve upwards to the Senate House, and that these boys attended the debate but divulged not a syllable even to any of their near relatives? Nothing in this is the least true or even probable, unless, indeed, Fortune has bestowed on the Romans among other gifts that of being wise from their cradles. No further criticism, indeed, of such works as those of Chaereas and Sosylus* is necessary; they rank in authority, it seems to me, not with history, but with the common gossip of a barber's shop.

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* Of Chaereas nothing is known. Sosylus was Hannibal's Greek teacher and accompanied him on his campaign.
6 'Ρωμαῖοι δὲ, προσπεσόντος σφίσι τοῦ γεγονότος κατὰ τοὺς Ζακανθαῖους ἀτυχήματος, παραχρῆμα προσβευτὰς ἐλόμενοι κατὰ στοιχῆν ἐξαπέστειλαν
7 εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, δύο προτείνοντες αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αἰσχῦνην ἄμα καὶ βλάβην ἐδόκει φέρεν δεξαμένοις τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον πραγμάτων καὶ
8 κυνόνων ἀρχὴν μεγάλων. ἦ γὰρ τὸν στρατηγὸν Ἀννίβαν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ συνεδροὺς [ἐκδότοις διδόναι] 'Ρωμαῖοι ἐκδοτέον ἥ προῆγγελλόν τὸν
9 πόλεμον. παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων, καὶ παρελθόντων εἰς τὸ συνέδριον καὶ διασαφούστων ταῦτα, δυσχερῶς ἤκουν οἱ Καρχηδονίοι τὴν αἱρε-
10 σιν τῶν προτεινόμενων. ὀμος δὲ προστησάμενοι τὸν ἐπιτηδεύτατον εἷς αὐτῶν ἥρξαντο περὶ σφῶν
21 δικαιολογεῖσθαι. τὰς μὲν οὖν πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν ὀμολογίας παρεσώπων, ὡς ὦτε γεγενημένας, εἰ τε γεγόνασιν, οὐδὲν οὖσας πρὸς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ χωρίς
2 τῆς σφητέρας πεπράχθαι γνώμης. ἔχρωντο δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν 'Ρωμαίων εἰς τοῦτο παραδείγματι. τὰς γὰρ ἐπὶ Δυτιτίου γενομένας συνθήκας ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ περὶ Σικελίας, ταύτας ἐφασαν ἥδη συνωμολογη-
3 μένας ὑπὸ Δυτιτίου μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν δῆμον τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ἀκύρους ποιῆσαι διὰ τὸ χωρίς τῆς αὐτοῦ
4 γενέσθαι γνώμης. ἐπιείκον δὲ καὶ προσπαθείδιοντο παρ' ὅλην τὴν δικαιολογίαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τελευταίας συν-
5 θήκας τὰς γεγομένας ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ. ἐν αἰσ ἐντὶ μὲν Ἰβηρίας οὐκ ἐφασαν ὑπάρχειν ἐγ-
6 γραφόν οὐδὲν, περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς ἐκατέρων συμμάχοις τὴν παρ' ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι ῥητῶς κατα-
7 ρωμαῖοι δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο πλεονάκις τὰς συνθήκας. ἦ θαυμαῖοι δὲ
The Romans, on hearing of the calamity that had befallen Saguntum, at once appointed ambassadors and sent them post-haste to Carthage, giving the Carthaginians the option of two alternatives, the one of which, if they accepted it, entailed disgrace and damage, while the other would give rise to extreme trouble and peril. Either they must give up Hannibal and the members of his Council or war would be declared. On the Roman envoys arriving and appearing before the Senate and delivering their message the Carthaginians listened with indignation to this choice of alternatives, but putting up their most able member to speak, they entered upon their justification. 21. They said not a word of the treaty with Hasdrubal, considering it as not existent, or if existent, as not concerning them, since it was made without their approval. Here they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, alleging that the treaty made in the war for Sicily under Lutatius, though agreed to by Lutatius, had been repudiated by the Romans as having been made without their approval. In all their plea of justification they founded and insisted on the treaty at the end of the war for Sicily, in which they said there was no mention of Iberia, but it was expressly set down that the allies of each power should be secure from attack by the other. They pointed out that at that time the Saguntines were not the allies of Rome, and to prove their point they read aloud several extracts from the treaty. The Romans
τοῦ μὲν δικαιολογεῖσθαι καθάπαξ ἀπεγίνωσκον, φάσκοντες ἀκεραίον μὲν ἔτι διαμενοῦσης τῆς τῶν Ζακανθαίων πόλεως ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πράγματα δικαιολογίαν καὶ δυνατὸν εἶναι λόγω περὶ τῶν
7 ἀμφισβητουμένων διεξάγειν· ταύτης δὲ παρεσπον-
δημένης ἦ τοὺς αὐτίους ἐκδοτέον εἶναι σφίσοι, δι’ οὗ
φανερὸν ἐσται πάσιν ὡς οὐ μετεσχήκασι τῆς ἀδικίας,
άλλ’ ἀνευ τῆς αὐτῶν γνώμης πεπράχθαι τοῦτο
8 τούργον, ἢ μὴ βουλομένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ὀμολογοῦν-
tας δὲ κοινωνεῖν <τῆς ἀδικίας καὶ συνανάδεχεσθαι
τῶν πόλεμον.
Οἱ μὲν ὦν καθολικῶτερον πῶς ἐχρῆσαντο τοῖς
9 λόγοις. ἦμεν δ’ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ μὴ παρα-
λείπειν ἀσκεπτὸν τοῦ τὸ μέρος, ἢν μὴθ’ οἷς
καθήκει καὶ διαφέρει τὸ σαφῶς εἰδέναι τὴν ἐν τοῦ-
tος ἀκριβείαν, παραπαίσω τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τοῖς
10 ἀναγκαιωτάτως διαβουλίως, μήθ’ οἱ φιλομαθῆθαν
περὶ τοῦτων ἀστοχῶσι, συμπλανώμενοι ταῖς ἀγνοίαις
καὶ φιλοτιμίαις τῶν συγγραφέων, ἀλλ’ ἢ τις ὀμолο-
γουμένῃ θεωρίᾳ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὑπαρξάντων
dικαιῶν 'Ρωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων πρὸς ἀλλή-
lους ἐώς εἰς τοὺς καθ’ ἦμᾶς καιροὺς.
22 Γίνονται τογαροῦν συνθῆκαί 'Ρωμαίων καὶ Καρ-
χηδονίως πρῶται κατὰ Λεύκιον Ἰούνιον Βροῦτον
καὶ Μάρκον Ὁράτιον, τοὺς πρῶτους κατασταθέντας
ἐπάτους μετὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων κατάλυσιν, ὡς
ἐν συνέβη καθιερωθῆναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἔρων
2 τοῦ Καπετωλίου. ταύτα δ’ ἐστι πρῶτερα τῆς Ἐρ-
ξου διαβάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τρίακοντ’ ἐτεσὶ λεί-
3 πουσι δυεῖν. ἀς καθ’ ὄσον ἢν δυνατὸν ἀκριβεῖστα
διερμηνεύσαντες ἡμεῖς υπογεγράφαμεν. τηλικαῦτη
γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ γέγονε τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ παρὰ 'Ρω-
52
refused definitely to discuss the matter of justification, saying that while Saguntum still stood unharmed matters admitted of a plea of justification and it was possible to reach a decision on the disputed points by argument, but now that the treaty had been broken by the seizure of the city either they must give up the culprits, which would make it clear to all that they had no share in the wrong, but that it had been done without their approval, or if they refused to do so and thus confessed that they were participators in the misdeed they must accept war.

On this occasion the question was dealt with in more or less general terms, but I think it necessary for myself not to neglect it, so that neither those whose duty and interest it is to be accurately informed about this may deviate from the truth in critical debates, nor students, led astray by the ignorance or partisanship of historians, acquire mistaken notions on the subject, but that there may be some survey generally recognized as accurate of the treaties between Rome and Carthage up to our own time.

22. The first treaty between Rome and Carthage dates from the consulship of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls after the expulsion of the kings, and the founders of the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. This is twenty-eight years before the crossing of Xerxes to Greece. I give below as accurate a rendering as I can of this treaty, but the ancient Roman language differs so
τῆς νῦν πρὸς τὴν ἄρχαίαν ὡς τε τοὺς συνετωμαίοις μόλις ἐξ ἐπιστάσεως διευκρινεῖν. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ συνθῆκαι τοιαῦτα τινές. "ἐπὶ τοῖς φιλίαις εἶναι Ρωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ρωμαίοις συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίων συμμάχοις.

5 μῆ πλεῖν μακραὶς ναυσὶ Ρωμαίοις μηδὲ τοὺς Ρωμαίους συμμάχους ἐπέκεινα τοῦ Καλὸν ἀκρωτηρίου, εἶνα τῇ ὑπὸ χειμώνος ἡ πολεμίων ἀναγκασθῶς εἰσὶ δὲ τὶς βιὰ κατενεχθῆ, μὴ ἐξεστὼ αὐτῷ μηδὲν ἀγοράζειν μηδὲ λαμβάνειν πλῆ ὁσα πρὸς τὸ πλοίου ἐπισκεπὴν ἡ πρὸς ἑρᾶ, ἐν πέντε δ' ἠμέραις ἀποτρεχέων.

8 τοῖς δὲ κατ' ἐμπορίαν παραγωγομένους μηδὲν ἐστώ τέλος πλῆ ἐπὶ κήρυκι ἡ γραμματεῖ.

9 ὅσα δ' ἂν τοῦτων παρόντων πραθῆ, δημοσίᾳ πίστευο ἡφιλέσθως τῳ ἀποδομένῳ, ὁσα ἂν Ἰη ἐν Διβύᾳ ἢ ἐν Σαρδόνῳ πραθη.

10 Ρωμαίοις τις εἰς Σικελίαν παραγίνεται, ἢς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ὡσα ἐστῶ τὰ 'Ρωμαίων πάντα. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖτωσαν δήμοιν 'Αρδεατῶν, 'Αντιατῶν, Λαρεντῖνων, Κιρκαιτῶν, Ταρρακινιτῶν, μηδὲ ἀλλον μηδένα.

12 Λατῖνων, ὅσοι ἂν ὑπῆκουσί, ἡν δὲ τινες μὴ ὅσων ὑπῆκουσί τῶν πόλεων ἀπεχέσθωσαν. ἂν δὲ λαβώσατι, 'Ρωμαίοις ἀποδιδότωσαν ἀκέραιον, φρούριον μὴ ἐνοικοδομεῖτωσαν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ. ἠω δὲ πολέμιοι εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσέλθωσαν, ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μὴ ἐνυκτερεύετωσαν.

23 Τὸ μὲν οὖν Καλὸν ἀκρωτηρίων ἐστὶ τὸ προκείμενον αὐτῆς τῆς Καρχηδόνος ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἀρκτοὺς.

2 μὲν καθάπαξ ἐπέκεινα πλεῖν ὡς πρὸς μεσημβρίαν οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν οἱ Καρχηδόνοι τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους μακραῖς ναυσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ θουλεσθαι γινώσκειν αὐτοὺς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μήτε τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Βυσσάτων.
much from the modern that it can only be partially made out, and that after much application, by the most intelligent men. The treaty is more or less as follows: “There is to be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies on these terms: The Romans and their allies not to sail with long ships beyond the Fair Promontory unless forced by storm or by enemies: it is forbidden to anyone carried beyond it by force to buy or carry away anything beyond what is required for the repair of his ship or for sacrifice, and he must depart within five days. Men coming to trade may conclude no business except in the presence of a herald or town-clerk, and the price of whatever is sold in the presence of such shall be secured to the vendor by the state, if the sale take place in Libya or Sardinia. If any Roman come to the Carthaginian province in Sicily, he shall enjoy equal rights with others. The Carthaginians shall do no wrong to the peoples of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Terracina, or any other city of the Latins who are subject to Rome. Touching those Latins who are not subjects, they shall keep their hands off their cities, and if they take any city shall deliver it up to the Romans undamaged. They shall build no fort in the Latin territory. If they enter the land in arms, they shall not pass a night therein.”

23. The “Fair Promontory” is that lying in front of Carthage to the North. The Carthaginians forbid the Romans absolutely to sail south of this on its western side in long ships, the reason being, I think, that they did not wish them to become acquainted either with the district round Byssatis or
μήτε τοὺς κατὰ τὴν μικρὰν Σῦρτιν τόπους, ἃ δὴ
3 καλοῦσιν Ἑμπόρια, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς χώρας. ἔαν
dὲ τις ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἡ πολεμίων βίᾳ κατενέχθεις
dέχται τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς ἔρα καὶ πρὸς
eπισκευὴν πλοίου, ταῦτα, πάρεξ δὲ μηδὲν οἴονται
dεῖν λαμβάνειν, καὶ κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἐν πένθ’ ἡμέραις
4 ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοὺς καθορμισθέντας. εἰς δὲ Καρ-
χηδόνα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρω-
tηρίου τῆς Λιβύης καὶ Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν, ἢς
eπάρχουσι Καρχηδόνιοι, κατ’ ἐμπορίαν πλεῖν Ἦω-
μαιοις ἔξεστιν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπισχυόνται βεβαι-
ώσειν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι <δημοσία πίστει. ἐκ δὲ τού-
tων τῶν συνθηκῶν περὶ μὲν Σαρδόνας καὶ Λιβύης
ἐμφαίνουσιν ὡς περὶ ἱδίας ποιούμενοι τὸν λόγον
ὑπὲρ δὲ Σικελίας τάναντία διαστέλλονται ῥήτως,
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων ποιούμενοι τὰς συνθῆκας, οὔς
τῆς Σικελίας ὑπὸ τὴν Καρχηδόνιον πίπτει δυνα-
στείαν. ὄμοιως δὲ καὶ Ἦωμαιοι περὶ τῆς Λατίνης
αὐτῆς χώρας ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθῆκας, τῆς δὲ λοιπῆς
Ἰταλίας οὐ μυθομενύοσιν, διὰ τὸ μὴ πίπτειν ὕπο
τὴν αὐτῶν ἔξοψιαν.
24 Μετὰ δὲ ταύτας ἑτέρας ποιοῦνται συνθῆκας, ἐν
αἷς προσπεριελήφασι Καρχηδόνιοι Τυρίους καὶ τὸν
2 Ἰτυκαίων δήμου. πρόσκειται δὲ καὶ τῷ Καλῷ
ἀκρωτηρίῳ Μαστία, Ταρσήμον. ὦν ἐκτὸς οἴονται
dεῖν Ἦωμαιοις μήτε λήξεσθαι μήτε πόλιν κτίζειν.
3 εἰς δὲ τοιαύτες τυνές: “ἐπὶ τούσδε φιλίαν εἶναι
Ἑωμαιοις καὶ τοῖς Ἦωμαιοις συμμάχοις καὶ
Καρχηδονίων καὶ Τυρίων καὶ Ἰτυκαίων δήμω καὶ
4 τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις. τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου,
Μαστίας, Ταρσήμον, μὴ λήξεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ἦω-
μαιοις μὴν ἐμπορεύεσθαι μηδὲ πόλιν κτίζειν. ἐὰν
56
that near the lesser Syrtis, which they call Emporia, owing to their great fertility. If anyone, carried there by a storm or driven by his enemies, requires anything for the purpose of sacrificing to the gods or of repairing his ships, he may have this, but nothing beyond it, and those who touch there must leave within five days. To Carthage itself and all parts of Libya on this side of the Fair Promontory, to Sardinia and the Carthaginian province of Sicily the Romans may come for trading purposes, and the Carthaginian state engages to secure payment of their just debts. The phrasing of this treaty shows that they consider Sardinia and Libya as their own, whereas they distinctly express themselves otherwise about Sicily, mentioning only in the treaty those parts of it which are under Carthaginian rule. Similarly, the Romans include in the treaty Latium alone, making no mention of the rest of Italy as it was not then subject to their authority.

24. At a later date they made another treaty, in 306 B.C., which the Carthaginians include Tyre and Utica, and mention, in addition to the Fair Promontory, Mastia and Tarseum as points beyond which the Romans may not either make marauding expeditions, or trade, or found cities. This treaty is more or less as follows: “There is to be friendship on the following conditions between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and the people of Utica and their respective allies. The Romans shall not maraud or trade or found a city on the farther side of Fair Promontory, Mastia, and
δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι λάβωσιν ἐν τῇ Λατινῇ πόλιν τινὰ μὴ οὖσαν ὑπῆκοον 'Ρωμαίως, τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξέτισαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἀποδιδότωσαν. ἕαν δὲ τινὲς Καρχηδόνιων λάβωσι τινὰς, πρὸς οὖς εἰρήνη μὲν ἐστὶν ἐγγυαπτὸς 'Ρωμαίοις, μὴ ὑποτάττονται δὲ τι αὐτοῖς, μὴ καταγείνοντο εἰς τοὺς 'Ρωμαίων λιμένας. εὰν δὲ καταχθέντος ἐπιλάβηται ὁ 'Ρωμαῖος, ἀφιέσθω. ὡσαύτως δὲ μηδ’ οἱ 'Ρωμαῖοι ποιεῖτωσαν. ἀν ἐκ τινὸς χώρας, ἃς Καρχηδόνοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ὡδῷρ ἡ ἐφόδια λάβῃ ὁ 'Ρωμαῖος, μετὰ τοῦτων τῶν ἐφοδίων μὴ ἀδικεῖτο μηδένα πρὸς οὖς εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία ἐστὶ 'Καρχηδονίως. ὡσαύτως δὲ μηδ’ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιεῖτω. εἰ δὲ, μὴ ἰδία μεταπορεύεσθω. εὰν δὲ τις τοῦτο ποιήσῃ, δημόσιον γυνέσθω τὸ ἀδίκημα. ἐν Σαρδόνι καὶ Λιβύη μηδεὶς 'Ρωμαίων μὴτ’ ἐμπορευέσθω μὴτε πόλιν κτιζέτω, . . . . εἰ μὴ ἦς τοῦ ἐφόδια λαβεῖν ἢ πλοῖον ἐπισκέυασαί. εὰν δὲ χειμῶν κατενέγκῃ, ἐν πένθ’ ἡμέραις ἀποτρέχετω. ἐν Σικελία, ἃς Καρχηδόνοι ἐπάρχουσι, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα καὶ ποιεῖτω καὶ πωλεῖτω ὡσαν καὶ τῷ πολίτῃ ἐξ- εστὶν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιεῖτω ἐν 'Ῥώμῃ.

Πάλιν ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συνθήκαις τὰ μὲν κατὰ Λιβύην καὶ Σαρδόνα προσπεπτεῖνοιν ἐξιδιαζόμενοι καὶ πάσας ἀφαιρούμενοι τὰς ἐπιβάθρας 'Ρωμαίων, περὶ δὲ Σικελίας τάναντια προσδιασφάσας, περὶ τῆς ὑπ’ αὐτοὺς ταπτομένης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 'Ρωμαῖοι περὶ τῆς Λατινῆς· οὐκ οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους ἀδικεῖν 'Αρδεάτας, 'Ἀντιάτας, Κιρκαίτας, Ταρρακίντας. αὕται δ’ εἰσὶν αἱ πόλεις
Tarseum. If the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium not subject to Rome, they shall keep the valuables and the men, but give up the city. If any Carthaginians take captive any of a people with whom the Romans have a treaty of peace, but who are not subject to Rome, they shall not bring them into Roman harbours, but if one be brought in and a Roman lay hold of him, he shall be set free. The Romans shall not do likewise. If a Roman gets water or provisions from any place over which the Carthaginians rule, he shall not use these provisions to wrong any member of a people with whom the Carthaginians have peace and friendship. The Carthaginians shall not do likewise. If either do so, the aggrieved person shall not take private vengeance, and if he do, his wrongdoing shall be public. No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya nor remain in a Sardinian or Libyan post longer than is required for taking in provisions or repairing his ship. If he be driven there by stress of weather, he shall depart within five days. In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and at Carthage he may do and sell anything that is permitted to a citizen. A Carthaginian in Rome may do likewise.”

Again in this treaty they lay particular stress on Libya and Sardinia, asserting them to be their own private property and closing all landing-places to the Romans, but of Sicily they distinctly speak contrariwise, mentioning the part of it subject to them. Similarly, the Romans in referring to Latium forbid the Carthaginians to wrong the people of Ardea, Antium, Circeii, and Terracina, the cities that stand...
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αἱ περιέχουσαι παρὰ θάλατταν τὴν Λατίνην χώραν, ὑπὲρ ἦς ποιοῦνται τὰς συνθήκας.

25 "Ετι τοιγαροῦν τελευταῖας συνθήκας ποιοῦνται. Ὀρμαῖοι κατὰ τὴν Πύρρου διάβασιν πρὸ τοῦ συστήσασθαι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὸν περὶ Σικελίας πόλεμον ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ τηροῦσι πάντα κατὰ τὰς ύπαρχούσας ὁμολογίας, πρόσκειται δὲ τούτοις τὰ ὑπογεγραμμένα. ἦν συμμαχίαι ποιοῦνται πρὸς Πύρρον, ἐγγραπτὸν ποιεῖσθωσαν ἁμφότεροι, ὅνα ἔξή βοηθεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων.

4 χώρα. ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν χρείαν ἔχουσι τῆς βοηθείας, τὰ πλοῖα παρεχέτωσαν Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ εἰς τὴν ὄδον καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐφοδον, τὰ δὲ ὀφώνια τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐκάτεροι. Καρχηδονίοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν Ὀρμαῖοις βοηθεῖτον, ἂν χρεία ἤ. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα μηδεῖς ἀναγκαζότω ἐκβαίνειν ἀκούσις.

6 Τὸν δ' ὄρκον ὅμνυεν ἔδει τοιοῦτον, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πρῶτων συνθηκῶν Καρχηδονίους μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς πατρώους, Ὀρμαῖοις δὲ Δία λίθον κατὰ τί παλαιὸν ἔθος, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων τὸν Ἄρην καὶ τὸν Ἐνυάλιον. ἦστε δὲ τὸ Δία λίθον τοιοῦτον· λαβὼν εἰς τὴν χείρα λίθον δ' ποιούμενος τὰ ὀρκία περὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν, ἐπειδὰν ὁμόσχημα δημοσία πίστει,

8 λέγει τάδε· εὐφρονεῖται μὲν μοι εἰς τάγαθα· εἰ δ' ἀλλως διανοηθείην τῇ ἡ πράξει, πάντων τῶν ἄλλων σωζομένων ἐν ταῖς ἱδίαις πατρίσιν, ἐν τοῖς ἱδίοις νόμοις, ἐπὶ τῶν ἱδίων βίων, ἱερῶν, τάφων, ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκπέμπομαι οὕτως ὡς ὑδε λίθος νῦν. καὶ ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐξελεί στὸν λίθον ἐκ τῆς χειρός.

26 Τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ τηρομένων τῶν συνθηκῶν ἔτι νῦν ἐν χαλκώμασι παρὰ τὸν Δία τὸν Καπετώλιον ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀγορανόμων.
on the coast of that Latin territory with which the treaty is concerned.

25. A further and final treaty with Carthage was made by the Romans at the time of Pyrrhus' invasion before the Carthaginians had begun the war for Sicily. In this they maintain all the previous agreements and add the following: "If they make an alliance with Pyrrhus, both shall make it an express condition that they may go to the help of each other in whichever country is attacked. No matter which require help, the Carthaginians are to provide the ships for transport and hostilities, but each country shall provide the pay for its own men. The Carthaginians, if necessary, shall come to the help of the Romans by sea too, but no one shall compel the crews to land against their will."

The oaths they had to swear were as follows. In the case of the first treaty the Carthaginians swore by their ancestral gods and the Romans, following an old custom, by Jupiter Lapis, and in the case of this latter treaty by Mars and Quirinus. The oath by Jupiter Lapis is as follows. The man who is swearing to the treaty takes in his hand a stone, and when he has sworn in the name of the state, he says, "If I abide by this my oath may all good be mine, but if I do otherwise in thought or act, let all other men dwell safe in their own countries under their own laws and in possession of their own substance, temples, and tombs, and may I alone be cast forth, even as this stone," and so saying he throws the stone from his hand.

26. The treaties being such, and preserved as they are on bronze tablets beside the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in the treasury of the Quaestors, who
2 ταμμεῖω, τῖς οὐκ ἢν εἰκότως θαυμάσειε Φιλίνου τοῦ συγγραφέως, οὐ διότι ταῦτ’ ἢν νεεί. τούτο μὲν γὰρ οὐ θαυμαστόν, ἐπεὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐτι καὶ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων οἱ πρεσβύτατοι καὶ μάλιστα δο-
3 κούντες περὶ τὰ κοινὰ σπουδάζειν ἢν νόουν. ἀλλὰ πόθεν ἢ πῶς ἔθαρρησε γράφαι τάναντι τούτοις, διότι Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων ὑπάρχον εὐνο-
θήκαι, καθ’ ἂς ἔδει Ῥωμαίοις μὲν ἀπέχεσθαι Σι-
4 κελίας ἀπάσης, Καρχηδονίους δὲ Ἰταλίας, καὶ διότι ὑπερέβαινον Ῥωμαίοι τὰς συνθήκας καὶ τοὺς ὀρκοὺς, ἐπεὶ ἐποιήσαντο τὴν πρώτην εἰς Σικελίαν διάβασιν, μήτε γεγονότος μὴν ὑπάρχοντος παράπαν ἐγγράφο
5 τοιοῦτου μηδενός. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τῇ δεύτερᾳ λέγει βύβλῳ διαρρήδην. περὶ δὲν ἢμεὶς ἐν τῇ παρασκευῇ τῆς ᾨδίας πραγματείας μνησθέντες, εἰς τούτον ὑπερ-
εθέμεθα τὸν καίρον κατὰ μέρος περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξερ-
γάσασθαι διὰ τὸ καὶ πλεῖονς διεξέσθαι τῆς ἄλη-
θείας ἐν τούτοις, πιστεύσωντα τῇ Φιλίνῳ γραφῇ.
6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ κατὰ τούτο τις ἐπιλαμβάνεται Ῥω-
μαίων περὶ τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν διαβάσεως, ὡς καθό-
λου Μαμερτίνους προσέλαβον εἰς τὴν φιλίαν καὶ 
μετὰ ταῦτα δεσμεύσω ἐξοθησαν, οὕτως οὐ μόνον 
τὴν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίων 
παρεπόνθησαν, εἰκὸτος ἄν δοξεὶ δυσαρεστεῖν.
7 εἰ δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ὀρκοὺς καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ὑπολαμ-
βάνει τις αὐτοῦς πεποιῆσθαι τὴν διάβασιν, ἀγνοεῖ 
προφανῶς.

27 Συντελεσθέντος τοῖνυν τοῦ περὶ Σικελίας πολέ-
μου ποιοῦνται συνθήκας ἄλλας, ἐν αἰς τὰ συνέχοντα
2 τῶν ἐγγράπτων ἢν ταῦτα. ἢ ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους
<καὶ Σικελίας ἀπάσης καὶ> τῶν νήσων ἀπασῶν τῶν
3 κειμένων Ἰταλίας μεταξὺ καὶ Σικελίας. τὴν ἀσφά-
can fail to be surprised at Philinus the historian, not indeed for his ignorance of them, for that is by no means surprising, since still in my time, the most aged among the Romans and Carthaginians and those best versed in public affairs were ignorant of them; but how did he venture and on what authority to state just the opposite, to wit that there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage by which the Romans were obliged to keep away from the whole of Sicily and the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy, and that the Romans broke the treaty and their oath by their first crossing to Sicily? There is, as a fact, no such document at all, nor ever was there; yet in his Second Book he states this in so many words. I mentioned the subject in the introductory part of this work, but deferred until the present occasion the detailed treatment it deserves, in view of the fact that many people, relying on Philinus' work, have false notions on the subject. True, if as regards the crossing of the Romans to Sicily anyone chooses to blame them for having ever consented to receive into their friendship and afterwards to help those Mamertines who seized treacherously not only Messene but Rhegium, he would have good reason for his disapproval, but if he supposes that they crossed contrary to treaty and to their oath he is obviously ignorant of the true facts.

27. At the close of the war for Sicily, then, they made another treaty, the clauses of which run as follows: "The Carthaginians are to evacuate the whole of Sicily and all the islands between Italy and Sicily. The allies of both parties are to be
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λειαν ὑπάρχειν παρ’ ἑκατέρων τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμά-χοις. μὴδετέρους ἐν ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἐπαρχίαις μηδὲν ἐπιτάττειν μηδ’ οἶκοδομεῖν δημοσία μηδ’ ἐξευλογεῖν μηδὲ προσλαμβάνειν εἰς φιλίαν τοὺς ἀλλήλων συμ-

5 μάχους. ἐξευγκεῖν Ἀρχηγονίους ἐν ἔτεσι δέκα δισχίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα, παραντικα δὲ δοῦ-

6 ναι χίλια. τοὺς ἀιχμαλώτους χωρίς λύτρων ἀπο-

δοῦναί πάντας Ἀρχηγονίους τοὺς Ἡρωιῶν.’

7 μετὰ δὲ ταύτα πάλιν λήξαντες τοῦ Λιβυκοῦ πολέμου Ἡρωιῶν Ἀρχηγονίους πόλεμον ἐξευγκαντε ἐως δόγματος ἐπισυνθήκας ἐποίησαντο τοιαῦτα: „ἐκ-

χωρεῖν Ἀρχηγονίους Σαρδόνος καὶ προσεξευγκεῖν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα,” καθάπερ ἐπάνω

9 προεῖπαμεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις τελευταίῳ πρὸς Ἀσδροῦβαν ἐν Ἰβηρία γίνονται διομολογήσεις, „ἐφ’ ὑ μὴ διαβαίνειν Ἀρχηγονίους ἐπὶ πολέμῳ

10 τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμόν.” ταῦθ’ ὑπῆρχε τὰ δίκαια Ἡρωιῶν καὶ Ἀρχηγονίους ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐως εἰς τοὺς κατ’ Ἁρνίβαν καιροὺς.

28 Ὡσπερ οὖν τὴν εἰς Σικελίαν διάβασιν Ἡρωιῶν οὗ παρὰ τοὺς ὄρκους εὐρίσκομεν γεγενημένην, οὐ-

τως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καθ’ ὃν ἐποίη-

σαντο τὰς περὶ Σαρδόνος συνθήκας, οὗτο πρόφασιν

2 οὕτ’ αἰτίαν εὑροὶ τις ἂν εὐλόγησον, ἄλλ’ ὀμολογο-

μένως τοὺς Ἀρχηγονίους ἥγαγκασμένους παρὰ

πάντα τὰ δίκαια διὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐκχωρῆσαι μὲν Σαρ-

δόνος, ἐξευγκεῖν δὲ τὸ προειρημένον πλῆθος τῶν

3 χρημάτων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἡρωιῶν περὶ τοῦτων λεγόμενον ἔγκλημα, διὸ τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν πλούτο-

μένους ἡδίκουν κατὰ τὸν Λιβυκόν πόλεμον, ἐλύθη

καθ’ οὐς καιροὺς κομμασάμενοι παρὰ Ἀρχηγονίων

ἀπανταὶ τοὺς κατηγμένους ἀντεδωρήσαντο χωρίς

64
secure from attack by the other. Neither party is entitled to impose any contribution to construct public buildings, or to enrol soldiers, in the dominions of the other, nor to form alliances with the allies of the other. The Carthaginians are to pay twenty-two hundred talents within ten years, and a sum of a thousand talents at once. The Carthaginians are to give up to the Romans all prisoners free of ransom.” Later, at the end of the Libyan War, 238 B.C. after the Romans had actually passed a decree declaring war on Carthage, they added the following clause, as I stated above: “The Carthaginians are to evacuate Sardinia and pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents.” The very last of this series of agreements is that made with Hasdrubal in Spain, that “The Carthaginians are not to cross the Ebro in arms.” Such is the diplomatic history of the relations between Rome and Carthage up to the time of Hannibal.

28. While therefore we find that the crossing of the Romans to Sicily was not contrary to treaty, for the second war, that in which they made the treaty about Sardinia, it is impossible to discover any reasonable pretext or cause. In this case everyone would agree that the Carthaginians, contrary to all justice, and merely because the occasion permitted it, were forced to evacuate Sardinia and pay the additional sum I mentioned. For from the charge brought by the Romans against them in justification of this, that in the Libyan war they inflicted wrongs on the crews of ships sailing from Rome, they had freed them on the occasion when they had received back from them all their sailors who had been brought into Carthage and in return gave back
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λύτρων ἐν χάριτι τοῦς παρὰ σφίσει υπάρχοντας
4 αἰχμαλώτους. ὑπὲρ δὲν ἦμείς τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ δεδηλώκαμεν.
5 Τούτων δὲ τοιούτων υπάρχοντων, λοιπὸν διευκρινῆσαι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀρνίβαν πολέμου ποτέρους αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετεῖν.
6 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων τὸτε ρηθέντα δεδηλώκαμεν, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων λεγόμενα νῦν ἑρωίμεν· οῖς τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο διὰ τὸν ἑπὶ τῇ Ζακανθαίων ἀπωλεία θυμὸν· λέγεται δὲ πολλὰς καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰς πρὸς Ἀσδρούβαν γενομένας ὁμολογίας οὐκ ἀδειπτεῖν, καθάπερ οἱ Καρχηδονίοι λέγειν ἐθάρρουν· οὐ γὰρ προσέκειτο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ Δυτιδίου, "κυρίας εἶναι ταύτας, ἐὰν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ δόξῃ τῶν Ῥωμαίων." ἀλλ' αὐτοτελῶς ἐποιήσατο τὰς ὁμολογίας Ἀσδρούβασ, ἐν αἷς ἦν, "τὸν Ἰβηρά ποταμὸν μὴ διαβαίνειν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους." καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Σικελίας συνθήκαις ἦν ἔγγραπτον, καθάπερ κάκεινοι φασίν, "ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀμφοτέρων συμμάχοις τὴν παρ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἀσφάλειαν," οὐκ αὐτοῖς μόνον τοῖς τότε συμμαχοῦσι, καθάπερ ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐκδοχήν οἱ Καρχηδονίοι. προσέκειτο γὰρ ἂν ἦτοι τὸ μὴ προσλαμβάνειν ἑτέρους συμμάχους παρὰ τοὺς υπάρχοντας ἢ τὸ μὴ παραλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς ὅστε- ΔΟ财富ν προσληφθέντας τούτων τῶν συνθηκῶν. ὅτε δὲ τούτων οὐδέτερον ἐγράφη, προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις, καὶ τοῖς οὕσι τότε καὶ τοῖς
all their own prisoners as an act of grace and without ransom. Of this I have spoken at length in my previous Book.

Having established these facts it remains for us to consider, after thorough investigation, to which of the two states we should attribute the cause of the Hannibalic war.

29. I have already stated what the Carthaginians alleged, and will now give the reply of the Romans—a reply indeed which they did not make at the time owing to their indignation at the loss of Saguntum, but it has been given on many occasions and by many different people at Rome. In the first place they contend that the treaty with Hasdrubal should not be ignored, as the Carthaginians had the audacity to say; for there was no conditioning clause at the end as in the treaty made by Lutatius: “This treaty shall be valid if the Roman people also agree to it,” but Hasdrubal finally and unconditionally made the agreement in which was the clause, “The Carthaginians shall not cross the Ebro in arms.” Again, in the treaty about Sicily there was, as the Carthaginians admit, the clause: “The allies of either party are to be secure from attack by the other,” and this does not mean “those who were allies at that time,” as the Carthaginians interpret it; for in that case there would have been a further clause to the effect either that neither party should enter into other alliances than their existing ones or that those subsequently received into alliance should not be admitted to the benefits of the treaty. But since neither of these clauses was appended, it is evident that each party undertook that all allies of the other, both those then existing and those sub-
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metā tauta proslēfθhseedoméneis, την παρ’ ἀμφοῖν
7 ἀσφάλειαν ἂεὶ δέον ἦν ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τοιαύτας ἐμελ-
λον ποιήσεσθαι συνθήκας δι’ ὅν ἀφελοῦνται τὴν
ἐξουσίαν σφῶν αὐτῶν τοῦ προσλαμβάνειν κατὰ και-
ροῦς, ἂν τινες ἐπιτήδειοι φανῶσιν αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ
8 σύμμαχοι, οὐδὲ μὴν προσλαβόντες εἰς τὴν σφετέραν
πίστιν περιόψεσθαι τούτους ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀδικουμέ-
νους. ἀλλ’ ἢν ἀμφοτέρων τὸ συνέχον τῆς ἐννοίας
τῆς ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις τῶν μὲν ὑπαρχόντων ἀμφο-
tέρως τότε συμμάχων ἀφέξεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μηδένα
τρόπον τοὺς ἑτέρους παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐπιδέξεσθαι
9 τινας τούτων εἰς συμμαχίαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν μετὰ ταύτα
προσληφθησομένων αὐτὸ τοῦτο μήτε ἐξενολογεῖν
μήτ’ ἐπιτάττειν μηδετέρους μηδὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀλλήλων
ἐπαρχίαις καὶ συμμαχίαις. ὑπάρχειν τε τὴν ἀσφά-
λειαν πάσι τὴν παρ’ ἀμφοῖν.

30 Τούτων δὴ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, ὁμολογούμε-
νον ἢν κάκειν διότι Ζακανθαίοι πλείοσιν ἔτεσιν
ηδὴ προτερον τῶν κατ’ Ἀνυβαν καίρων ἐδεδώκει-
2 σαν αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἦρωμαιν πίστιν. σημεῖον
δὲ τούτο μέγιστον καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς Καρχηδο-
nίοις ὁμολογούμενον ὅτι στασιάσαντες Ζακανθαίοι
πρὸς σφᾶς οὐ Καρχηδονίοις ἐπέτρεψαν, καίπερ ἐγγὺς
ὄντων αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἢδη πραττό-
των, ἀλλὰ Ἦρωμαιν, καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐπουργάσατο
3 τὴν κατόρθωσιν τῆς πολιτείας. διόπερ εἰ μὲν τις
τῆς Ζακάνθης ἀπωλειαν αἰτίαν τίθησι τοῦ πολέμου,
συγχωρητέον ἀδίκως ἐξηνοχέναι τοῦ πόλεμον Καρ-
χηδονίοις κατὰ τε τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου συνθήκας,
καθ’ ἂς ἐδει τοῖς ἐκατέρων συμμάχοις τὴν ύφ’ ἔκα-
sequently admitted to alliance, should be secure from attack. This indeed seems a quite reasonable view; for surely they would never have made a treaty by which they deprived themselves of the freedom to admit into alliance from time to time any peoples whose friendship seemed to be of advantage to them, nor, having taken such under their protection, was it to be supposed that they would ignore injuries done to them by certain people. But the chief meaning of the treaty to both parties when they made it was, that they would each leave unmolested the existing allies of the other and in no way admit any of those into their own alliance, whereas, regarding subsequent alliances, to which this clause particularly applies, they undertook not to enlist soldiers or levy contributions in the provinces of each or in countries allied to each, and that all allies of each in general should be secure from attack by the other.

30. This being so, it is an acknowledged fact that the Saguntines, a good many years before the time of Hannibal, placed themselves under the protection of Rome. The surest proof of this, and one accepted by the Carthaginians themselves, is that when a civil disturbance broke out at Saguntum they did not call in the mediation of the Carthaginians, although they were close at hand and already concerning themselves with Spanish matters, but that of the Romans, and with their help set right the affairs of the state. Therefore, if we take the destruction of Saguntum to be the cause of the war we must allow that the Carthaginians were in the wrong in beginning the war, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, in which it was stipulated that the allies
τέρων ὑπάρχειν ἁσφάλειαν, κατὰ τε τὰς ἐπ᾽ Ἀσ-δροῦβοι, καθ᾽ ἂς ὦκ ἔδει διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἰβηρα
4 ποταμῶν ἐπὶ πολέμως Καρχηδονίους: εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρ-δόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ σὺν ταύτῃ χρήματα, πάν-
tws ὀμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. καὶ ῥὰρ
πεισθέντες ἥμισυντὸ σὺν καὶρῳ τοὺς βλάψαντας.

31 Ὅσοι δὲ τῶν ἀκρίτως τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωμένων τάχ᾽ ἃν φήσαις εἰμᾶς ὄλκ ἀναγκαῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακρι-
βοῦν τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων λόγους. ἐγὼ δ᾽, εἰ
μὲν τις ὑπείληφε πρὸς πᾶσαν περίστασιν αὐτάρκης ὑπάρχειν, καλὴν μὲν, ὄλκ ἀναγκαίαν δ᾽ ἵνα ἡσ-
σαμ᾽ ἃν εἶναι τὴν τῶν προγεγονότων ἐπιστήμην.
3 εἰ δὲ μηδέν αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἑδίαν μήτε περὶ 
tῶν κοινῶν τολμήσαι τούτ᾽ εἴπείν ἀνθρωπὸς ὅν, διὰ
tό, καὶ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐτυχῆ, τῆν γε περὶ τοῦ 
μέλλοντος ἐλπίδα μηδέν ἃν ἐκ τῶν νῦν παρόντων 
eὐλόγως βεβαιώσασθαι μηδένα τῶν νοῦν ἔχοντων,
4 σοῦ μόνων καλὴν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναγκαίαν εἰταὶ 
φήμι διὰ ταύτα τὴν τῶν παρελθότων ἐπίγνωσιν.
5 πῶς γὰρ ἃν εἴτ᾽ αὐτὸς ἀδικούμενος τις ἤ τῆς πατρί-
dos ἀδικομένης βοηθοὺς εὐροὶ καὶ συμμάχους, εἴτε 
κτῆσασθαί τι καὶ προκατάρξασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς 
συνεργήσωσταν αὐτῷ παρομήσαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολὰς;
6 πῶς δ᾽ ἃν εὐδοκούμενος τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τοὺς 
βεβαιώσουστας τὴν αὐτοῦ προαιρέσιν καὶ διαφυλά-
exontas τὴν κατάστασιν παροξύναι δικαίως, εἰ μηδὲν 
eἰδείν τῆς τῶν προγεγονότων περὶ ἐκάστους ὑπομνὴν.
of each should be secure from attack by the other, and in view of the convention made with Hasdrubal, by which the Carthaginians undertook not to cross the Ebro in arms. If, however, we take the cause of the war to have been the robbery of Sardinia and the tribute then exacted, we must certainly confess that they had good reason for entering on the Hannibalic war, since having yielded only to circumstances, they now availed themselves of circumstances to be avenged on those who had injured them.

31. It might be said by some of these who look on such things without discernment, that these are matters which it was not necessary for me to treat in such detail. My answer is, that if there were any man who considered that he had sufficient force in himself to face any circumstances, I should say perhaps that knowledge of the past was good for him, but not necessary; but if there is no one in this world at least who would venture to speak so of himself either as regards his private fortunes or those of his country—since, even if all is well with him now no man of sense could from his present circumstances have any reasonable confidence that he will be prosperous in the future—I affirm for this reason that such knowledge is not only good but in the highest degree necessary. For how can anyone when wronged himself or when his country is wronged find helpmates and allies; how can he, when desirous of acquiring some possession or initiating some project, stir to action those whose co-operation he wishes; how, finally, if he is content with present conditions, can he rightly stimulate others to establish his own convictions and maintain things as they are, if he knows nothing at all of the
7 σεως; πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ παρὸν ἀεὶ πισς ἀρμοζόμενοι καὶ συνυποκρινόμενοι τοιαῦτα καὶ λέγουσι καὶ πράττουσι πάντες ὡστε δυσθεώρητον εἶναι τὴν ἐκάστοτον προαίρεσιν καὶ λίαν ἐν πολλοῖς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι τὴν
8 ἀλήθειαν. τὰ δὲ παρελθυότα τῶν ἐργών, ἔξι αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἐκάστων αἰρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις, καὶ δηλοῖ παρ᾽ οἷς μὲν χάριν, εὐφρεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἤμων ὑπάρχουσαν, παρ᾽ οἷς δὲ τάναντια
9 τούτων. ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἑλεύθοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα, πολλάκις κατ᾽
10 πολλῶν εὑρείν ἑστιν. ἀπερ ἔχει μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κονία καὶ κατ᾽ ἱδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.
11 διόπερ οὐχ οὔτως ἐστὶ φροντιστέον τῆς αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων ἐξηγήσεως, οὔτε τοῖς γράφουσιν οὔτε τοῖς ἀναγνώσκουσι τὰς ἱστορίας, ὡς τῶν πρότερον καὶ
12 τῶν ἁμα καὶ τῶν ἐπιγνωμένων τοῖς ἑργοῖς. ἱστο-
ρίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράξῃ τὸ πραξθὲν καὶ πότερον εὐ-
λογον ἐσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώ-
13 νισμα μὲν, μάθημα δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται, καὶ παρατικά
mὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὔδὲν ὄφελεὶ τὸ
παράπαν.

32 Ἡ καὶ τοὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντας δύσκητητον εἶναι
καὶ δυσανάγνωστον τὴν ἡμετέραν πραγματείαν διὰ
τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν βύβλων ἀγνοεῖν νο-
2 μιστέον. πόσω γὰρ βᾷ οὔτι καὶ κτήσασθαι καὶ
dιαγνώσκει νυβλους τετταράκοντα καθάπερ ἄν εἰ
cατὰ μίτον ἐξυφασμένας, καὶ παρακολουθήσαι σαφῶς
taῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην
πράξεων ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ Πύρρον [καὶ Τήμαιον συγ-
γραφέων καὶ καιρῶν ἐξηγήσεως] εἰς τὴν Καρχη-
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past history of those he would influence? For all men are given to adapt themselves to the present and assume a character suited to the times, so that from their words and actions it is difficult to judge of the principles of each, and in many cases the truth is quite overcast. But men's past actions, bringing to bear the test of actual fact, indicate truly the principles and opinions of each, and show us where we may look for gratitude, kindness, and help, and where for the reverse. It is by this means that we shall often and in many circumstances find those who will compassionate our distresses, who will share our anger or join us in being avenged on our enemies, all which is most helpful to life both in public and in private. Therefore both writers and readers of history should not pay so much attention to the actual narrative of events, as to what precedes, what accompanies, and what follows each. For if we take from history the discussion of why, how, and wherefore each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably expected, what is left is a clever essay but not a lesson, and while pleasing for the moment of no possible benefit for the future.

32. For this reason I must pronounce those to be much mistaken who think that this my work is difficult to acquire and difficult to read owing to the number and length of the Books it contains. How much easier it is to acquire and peruse forty Books, all as it were connected by one thread, and thus to follow clearly events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the time of Pyrrhus to the capture of Carthage,
3 δόνος ἄλωσιν, ταῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην οἰκουμένην ἀπὸ τῆς Κλεομένου τοῦ Σπαρτιάτου φυγῆς κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς μέχρι τῆς Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Ὁρμαιῶν περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν παρατάξεως, ἢ τὰς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γραφόντων συντάξεως ἀναγνώσκεις ἢ κτάσθαι;

4 χωρίς γὰρ τοῦ πολλαπλασίου αὐτὰς ύπάρχειν τῶν ἡμετέρων ὑπομνημάτων οὐδὲ καταλαβεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν βεβαιῶς οὐδὲν οἶδον τε τοὺς ἀναγνώσκοντας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ τοὺς πλείστους

5 μὴ ταύτα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γράφειν, εἴτε διὰ τὸ τὰς καταλήλους τῶν πράξεων παραλείπειν, ὥν ἐκ παραθέσεως συνθεωρούμενων καὶ συγκρινομένων ἀλλοιωτέρας ἐκαστα τυγχάνει δοκιμασίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος διαλήψεως, τῶν δὲ κυριωτάτων μηδὲ ψαύειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τὸ παράπαν.

6 ἀκμῇ γὰρ φαμεν ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τῆς ἱστορίας εἶναι τὰ τ᾽ ἐπιγνόμενα τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τὰ

7 παρεπόμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὰ περὶ τὰς αἰτίας. θεωροῦμεν δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀντιωχικὸν πόλεμον ἐκ τοῦ Φιλιππικοῦ τας ἀφορμὰς εἰληφότα, τὸν δὲ Φιλιππικὸν ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ Ἀννίβαν, τὸν δ᾽ Ἀννιβιακὸν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν, τὰ δὲ μεταξὰ τούτων πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐσχήκοτα διαβέβαιες, πάσας δὲ συν-

8 νευοῦσας πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ μὲν τῶν γραφόντων καθόλου δυνατον ἐπιγνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν, διὰ δὲ τῶν τοὺς πολέμους αὐτοὺς, οἶνον τὸν Περσικὸν ἢ τὸν Φιλιππικὸν, ἀδύ-

9 νατον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς παρατάξεις τις ἀναγνώσκων αὐτὰς ἐξ ὧν ἐκείνων γράφουσιν ὑπολαμβάνει σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκέναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ σύμπαντος

10 οἰκονομίαν καὶ διάθεσιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐδὲν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσῳ διαφέρει τὸ μαθεῖν τοῦ μόνον

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those in the rest of the world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta on till the battle of the Romans and Achaeans at the Isthmus, than to read or procure the works of those who treat of particular transactions. Apart from their being many times as long as my history, readers cannot gather anything with certainty from them, firstly because most of them give different accounts of the same matter, and next because they omit those contemporary events by a comparative review and estimation of which we can assign its true value to everything much more surely than by judging from particulars; and, finally, because it is out of their power even to touch on what is most essential. For I maintain that far the most essential part of history is the consideration of the remote or immediate consequences of events and especially that of causes. Thus I regard the war with Antiochus as deriving its origin from that with Philip, the latter as resulting from that with Hannibal, and the Hannibalic war as a consequence of that about Sicily, the intermediate events, however many and various their character, all tending to the same purpose. All this can be recognized and understood from a general history, but not at all from the historians of the wars themselves, such as the war with Perseus or that with Philip, unless indeed anyone reading their descriptions of the battles alone conceives that he has acquired an adequate knowledge of the management and nature of the whole war. This, however, is not at all so, and I consider that my history differs to its ad-
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άκούσαι, τοσοῦτῳ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὑπολαμβάνω διαφέρειν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους συντάξεως.

33 Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις, τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιησάμεθα, διακούσαντες τὰ
2 παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀλλο μὲν οὐδὲν εἶπαν, ὦ δὲ πρεσβύτατος αὐτῶν δείξας τοῖς ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ τὸν κόλπον, ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς ἔφη καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην φέρειν· ἐκβαλὼν οὖν, ὅποτερον ἀν
3 κελεύσωσιν ἀπολείψειν. ὦ δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ὅποτερον αὐτοῖς φαίνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκέλευσε. τοῦ δὲ Ῥωμαίου φίλοντος τὸν πόλεμον ἐκβαλεῖν, ἀνεφώνησαν ἄμα καὶ πλείους τῶν ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου, δέχεσθαι φάσκοντες. οἱ μὲν οὖν πρέσβεις καὶ τὸ συνεδρίον ἐπὶ τούτους ἔχωρίσθησαν.

5 Ἄννιβας δὲ, παραχεμάζων ἐν Καίνῃ πόλει, πρώτοι μὲν διαφήκει τοὺς Ἰβηρασ ἐπὶ τὰς ἔκακτὰς πόλεις, βουλόμενος ἐτοίμους καὶ προθύμους παρασκευάζειν
6 πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, δεύτερον δ᾽ Ἀσδρούβα τάδελφῳ διέταξε πῶς δεῖξῃ τῇ τε τῶν Ἰβηρῶν ἀρχῇ καὶ δυναστεία χρῆσαι ταῖς τε πρὸς Ῥωμαίους παρα-
7 σκευαῖς, ἐὰν αὐτῶς χωρίζηται που, τρίτον ύπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῶν ἐν Διβύνῃ προνοεῖτο πραγμάτων.
8 πάνω δ᾽ ἐμπέρως καὶ φρονίμως ἐκλογιζόμενος, ἐκ μὲν Διβύνῃς εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, ἐκ δ᾽ Ἰβηρίας εἰς Διβύνῃν διεβίβαξε στρατιώτας, ἐκδεσμεύων τὴν ἐκατέρων πλ-
9 στὸν εἰς ἀλλήλους διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας. ἤσαν δ᾽ οἱ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Διβύνῃ Θερσίται, Μαστία-
10 νοί, πρὸς δὲ τούτους Ὀρίητες Ἰβηρες, Ὀλκάδες, οἱ δὲ συμπαντες ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν ἔθνων ἱππεῖς μὲν
χίλιοι διακόσιοι, πεζοὶ δὲ μύριοι πρισκύλιοι ὀκτα-
11 κόσιοι πεντήκοντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτους Βαλιαρεῖς ὀκτα-
κόσιοι ἐποδμήκοντα ὦς κυρίως μὲν καλοῦσι σφεν-
vantage as much from the works on particular episodes as learning does from listening.

33. I interrupted my narrative to enter on this digression at the point where the Roman ambassadors were at Carthage. After listening to the Carthaginians' statement of their case, they made no other reply but the following. The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of his toga, told the Senate that it held both war and peace for them: therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them whichever of the two they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete bade him let fall whichever the Romans chose, and when the envoy said he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at once, "We accept it." The ambassadors and the Senate parted on these terms.

Hannibal, who was wintering in New Carthage, in the first place dismissed the Iberians to their own cities hoping thus to make them readily disposed to help in the future; next he instructed his brother Hasdrubal how to manage the government of Spain and prepare to resist the Romans if he himself happened to be absent; in the third place he took precautions for the security of Africa, adopting the very sensible and wise policy of sending soldiers from Africa to Spain, and vice versa. binding by this measure the two provinces to reciprocal loyalty. The troops who crossed to Africa were supplied by the Thersitae, Mastiani, Iberian Oretes and Olcades, and numbered twelve hundred horse and thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot, besides which there were eight hundred and seventy Balearians, a popular appellation, derived from ballein, "to throw," and
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δονήτας, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς χρείας ταύτης συνωνύμως καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν προσαγορεύονσι καὶ τὴν νῆσον.

12 τῶν δὲ προειρημένων τοὺς μὲν πλείους εἰς τὰ Μεταγωγόνα τῆς Λιβύης, των δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν Καρχηδόνα
13 κατέταξεν. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πόλεων τῶν Μεταγωγοτῶν καλούμενῶν ἀπεστειλεν ἄλλους εἰς Καρχηδόνα πε-
ζους τετρακισιούς, ὀμηρείας ἔχοντας καὶ βοη-
14 θείας ἀμα τάξιν. ἑπὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἀπέλυσεν
'Ασδρούβα τάδελφῳ πεντήρεις μὲν πεντήκοντα, τε-
τήρεις δὲ δύο καὶ τριήρεις πέντε. τοῦτων ἔχοντας
πληρώματα πεντήρεις μὲν τριάκοντα δύο, τριήρεις
δὲ πέντε. καὶ μὴν ἵππεις Λιβυτανίκων μὲν καὶ
Λιβύων τετρακισίους πεντήκοντα, Ἀργητῶν δὲ
τριακισίων, Νομάδων δὲ Μασυλίων καὶ Μασαισ-
λίων καὶ Μακκούων καὶ Μαυρούσιων τῶν παρὰ τῶν
16 ὄκεανὸν χιλίους ὀκτακισίους, πεζοὺς δὲ Λιβύων
μυρίους χιλίους ὀκτακισίους πεντήκοντα, Λυγυστι-
νοὺς τριακισίους, Βαλιαρεῖς πεντακισίους, ἐλέφαν-
tας εἶκοσὶ καὶ ἑνα.
17 Οὐ χρὴ δὲ θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀνα-
γραφῆς, εἰ τοιαύτη κεχρήμεθα περὶ τῶν ὑπ’ Ἀννί-
βου κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν πεπραγμένων οὐδὲ μόλις ἀν
χρήσιατο τις αὐτὸς κεχειρικός τὰς κατὰ μέρος πρά-
ξεις, οὐδὲ προκαταγωγώσκειν, εἰ πεποίηκαμεν παρα-
πλήσιον τοῖς ἀξιοπιστώς θευδομένως τῶν συγ-
18 γραφέων. ἦμεῖς γὰρ εὐρόντες ἐπὶ Λακινίω τὴν
γραφὴν ταύτην ἐν χαλκώματι κατατεγράμμην ὑπ’
Ἀννίβου, καθ’ οὕς καίρους ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰτα-
λίαν τόποις ἀνεστρέφετο, πάντως ἐνομίσαμεν αὐτὴν
περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιόπιστον εἶναι. διὸ καὶ κατ-
ακολουθεῖν εἰλόμεθα τῇ γραφῇ ταύτῃ.

34 Ἀννίβας δὲ πάντα προνοθείς περὶ τῆς ἀσφα-
meaning slingers, given to them owing to their skill with this weapon and extended to their nation and islands. He stationed most of these troops at Metagonia in Libya and some in Carthage itself. From the so-called Metagonian towns he sent four thousand foot to Carthage to serve both as a reinforcement and as hostages. In Spain he left with his brother Hasdrubal fifty quinqueremes, two tetraremes, and five triremes, thirty-two of the quinqueremes and all the triremes being fully manned. He also gave him as cavalry Liby-Phoenicians and Libyans to the number of four hundred and fifty, three hundred Ilergetes and eighteen hundred Numidians drawn from the Masylii, Masaesylii, Maccoei and Maurusi, who dwell by the ocean, and as infantry eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligurians, and five hundred Balearians, as well as twenty-one elephants.

No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal's arrangements in Spain, an accuracy which even the actual organizer of the details would have some difficulty in attaining, and I need not be condemned off-hand under the idea that I am acting like those authors who try to make their misstatements plausible. The fact is that I found on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to follow the document.

34. Hannibal, after taking all precautions for the
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λείας τῶν τε κατὰ Λιβύην πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰβηρίας λοιπῶν ἐκαραδόκει καὶ προσεδέχετο τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποστελλομένους.  

2 σαφῶς γὰρ ἐξητάκει καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ὑπὸ τᾶς Ἀλπείς καὶ περὶ τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν χώρας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κατοικοῦντων αὐτὴν, ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους τῶν ἀνδρῶν τόλμαν, καὶ τὸ μέγαστον τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δυσμένειαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος πολέμου πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, ὑπὲρ οὗ διήλθομεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ χάριν τοῦ συμπεριβέρεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς νῦν μέλλουσι.  

4 λέγεσθαι. διόπερ εἰχετο ταύτης τῆς ἐλπίδος, καὶ πάν υποχνεῖτο, διαπεμπόμενος ἐπιμελῶς πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς Ἀλπεσιν ἐνοικοῦντας, μόνως ἄν ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ συντήσασθαι τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον, εἰ δυνηθεὶς διαπεράσας τᾶς πρὸ τοῦ δυσχωρίας εἰς τοὺς προειρημένους ἀφικέσθαι τόπους καὶ συνεργοὺς καὶ συμμάχοις χρήσασθαι Κελ-  

6 τοῖς εἰς τὴν προκειμένην ἐπιβολὴν. ἀφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἁγγέλων, καὶ τὴν τε τῶν Κελτῶν βούλησιν καὶ προσδοκίαν ἀπαγγελάντων, τὴν τε τῶν Ἀλπεων ὄρων ὑπερβολὴν ἔπιπονοι μὲν καὶ δυσχερή λίαι, οὗ μὴν ἀδύνατον εἶναι φασκόντων, συνήγε τὰς δυ- νάμεις ἐκ τῆς παραχεμασίας ὑπὸ τὴν ἐαρινῆν ὡραν.  

7 προσπεπτωκότων δὲ προσφάτως αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος, ἐπαρθείς τῷ θυμῷ καὶ πιστεύων τῇ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐνοίας, παρεκάλει τὰς δυνάμεις φανερῶς ἤδη πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον, ἐμφάνιζων μὲν ὄν τρόπον ἐκδοτον αὐτὸν ἐγχειρή- σαιεν αἰτεῖσθαι Ῥωμαίου καὶ πάντας τοὺς τοῦ στρα- τοπέδου προεστῶτας, ὑποδεικνύων δὲ τὴν τῆς χώ-  

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safety of Africa and Spain, was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the messengers he expected from the Celts. He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war, and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans which I described in the preceding Book to enable my readers to follow all I am about to narrate. He therefore cherished high hopes of them, and was careful to send messengers with unlimited promises to the Celtic chiefs both on this side of the Alps and in the mountains themselves, thinking that the only means of carrying the war against the Romans into Italy was, after surmounting, if possible, the difficulties of the route, to reach the above country and employ the Celts as co-operators and confederates in his enterprise. When the messengers arrived and reported that the Celts consented and awaited him, at the same time saying that the crossing of the Alps was very toilsome and difficult, but by no means impossible, he drew out his troops from their winter quarters in the early spring. As the news of what had happened in Carthage had just reached him, his spirits were now high, and trusting in the favourable disposition of the citizens, he now called openly on his men to join him in the war against Rome, impressing upon them the demand of the Romans that he and all his principal officers should be given up to them, and pointing out at the same time the wealth of the country they were
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9 εὐνοιαν καὶ συμμαχίαν. εὐθύμως δὲ τῶν ὄχλων αὐτῷ συνεξισταμένων, ἐπανέσασ καὶ παραγγείλας τακτὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ᾧ ποιῆσεται τὴν ἔξοδον, τότε μὲν διέλυσε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

25 Ἐπιτελέσας δὲ τὰ προειρημένα κατὰ τὴν παρα-
χεμασίαν, καὶ παρασκευάσας ἰκανὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς
τε κατὰ τὴν Ἀιβηρίαν καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι,
παραγενομένης τῆς ταχθείσης ἡμέρας, προῆγε, πε-
ζὼν μὲν ἔχων εἰς ἐννέα μυριάδας, ἵππεις δὲ περὶ
2 μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους. καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Ἰβηρα πο-
ταμὸν κατεστρέφετο τὸ τε τῶν Ἰλουργητῶν ἔθνος
καὶ Βαργουσίων, ἐτι δὲ τοὺς Ἀἱρηνοίους καὶ τοὺς
Ἀνδοσίους, μέχρι τῆς προσαγορευμένης Πυρήνης.

3 ποιησάμενος δὲ πάντας υφ’ ἑαυτόν καὶ τινὰς πό-
λεις κατὰ κράτος ἐλών, ταχέως μὲν καὶ παρ’ ἐλ-
pίδα, μετὰ πολλῶν δὲ καὶ μεγάλων ἀγώνων ἔτι δὲ
πολλῆς καταφθορᾶς ἀνδρῶν, ἤγεμόνα μὲν ἐπὶ πά-
σης κατέληπτε τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ ποταμοῦ χώρας Ἀν-
νωνα, τῶν δὲ Βαργουσίων καὶ δεσπότην· μάλιστα
γὰρ τούτοις ἤπιστει διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐ-
5 νομαν, ἀπεμείρισε καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἂς εἰχε τῶ
μὲν Ἀνωνι πεζοὺς μυρίους, ἵππεις δὲ χιλίους, καὶ
τὰς ἀποσκευὰς ἀπέληπτε τοῦτῳ τῶν αὐτῶν συνεξορ-
6 μῶντων. εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπέλυσε τοὺς ἱσοὺς
τοῖς προειρημένοις, θουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς τε τούτους
εὐνοὺς ἀπολπεῖν, τοῖς τε λοιποῖς υποδεικνύων ἐλ-
pίδα τῆς εἰς οἶκον ἐπανόδου, καὶ τοῖς μεθ’ ἑαυτῶ
μὲν στρατευομένοις, ο兀 ἦττον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν οἴκῳ
μένουσι τῶν Ἰβηρῶν, ἵνα προβῆμως ἔξωρμασί πάν-
tες, ἀν ποτὲ τις ἐπικουρίας χρεῖα γένηται παρ’ αὐ-
7 τῶν. τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν στρατιὰν ἀναλαβὼν εὐξονον,
bound for and the friendly feelings of the Gauls who would be their allies. When he saw that the soldiers listened gladly and were as eager as himself to be off, he commended their alacrity and after ordering them to be ready on the day fixed for his departure, dismissed the meeting.

35. Having completed the arrangements I mentioned above during the winter and thus assured the security of Africa and Spain, he advanced on the day he had fixed with an army of about ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse. Crossing the Ebro, he set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes, Bargusii, Aerenosii, and Andosini as far as the Pyrenees, and having reduced them all and taken some cities by assault, with unexpected rapidity indeed, but after many severe engagements and with great loss, he left Hanno in command of all the country on this side of the river, placing the Bargusii under his absolute rule, as he mistrusted them most, owing to their friendly sentiments toward Rome. He assigned to Hanno out of his own army ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, and he left with him all the heavy baggage of the expeditionary force. He dismissed at the same time an equal number of troops to their homes, with the view of leaving them well disposed to himself and encouraging the hope of a safe return in the rest of the Spaniards, not only those who were serving with him, but those who remained at home, so that if he ever had to call on them for reinforcements, they might all readily respond. With the rest of his force, thus lightened of its impedimenta and
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πεζοὺς μὲν πεντακισμυρίους, ἐπεὶς δὲ πρὸς ἐννα-
κισχιλίους ἦγε διὰ τῶν Πυρηναῖων λεγομένων ὄρων
ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥωδανοῦ καλουμένου ποταμοῦ διάβα-
8 σιν, ἔχων οὐχ οὕτως πολλὴν δύναμιν ως χρησίμην
καὶ γεγυμνασμένην διαφερόντως ἐκ τῆς συνεχείας
τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀγώνων.

36 Ἰνα δὲ μὴ τῶν τόπων ἀγνοουμένων παντάπασιν
ἀσαφῆ γίνεσθαι συμβαίνῃ τὴν διήγησιν, ῥητέον ἂν
εἰτὶ πόθεν ὅρμησας ᾿Αννίβας καὶ τίνας καὶ πόσους
_dieλθὼν τόπους εἰς ποιὰ μέρη κατῆρε τῆς Ἰταλίας.

2 ῥητέον δ᾽ οὐκ αὐτὰς τὰς ὅνομασίας τῶν τόπων καὶ
ποταμῶν καὶ πόλεων, ὅπερ ἔννοι ποιοῦσι τῶν συν-
γραφέων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐν παντὶ πρὸς γνώσιν
καὶ σαφήνειαν αὐτοτέλες εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ μέρος. οἱ-
μαί δ᾽, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γνωριζομένων τόπων οὐ μικρά,
μεγάλα δὲ συμβάλλεσθαι πεποίηκε πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν
ἡ τῶν ὅνομάτων παράθεσις. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγνοουμέ-
νων εἰς τέλος ὁμοίαν ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ἡ τῶν ὅνο-
μάτων εξήγησις ταῖς ἀδιανοητοῖς καὶ κρουσματικοῖς

4 λέξεωι. τῆς γὰρ διανοιας ἐπ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀπερείδομένης
οὐδὲ δυναμένης ἐφαρμόττεν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπ᾽ οὐ-
δὲν γνώριμον, ἀνυπότακτος καὶ κωφὴ γίνεθ  ἡ δι-

5 ἡγήσις. διὸπερ ὑποδεικτέον ἂν εἰτὶ τρόπος, δι᾽ οὐ
δυνατῶν ἐσται περὶ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων λέγοντας κατὰ
ποσὸν εἰς ἀληθινὰς καὶ γνωρίμους ἐννοιας ἁγεὼ
τούς ἀκούοντας.

6 Πρώτη μὲν οὖν καὶ μεγίστη γνώσις, ἔτι δὲ κοινὴ
πάσην ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡμᾶς
diařeisis καὶ τάξεις, καθ᾽ ἣν πάντες, ὅν καὶ μικρὸν
ὁφελός, ἀνατολάς, δύσεις, μεσημβρίαν, ἀρκτον,
7 γνωρίζομεν. δευτέρα δὲ, καθ᾽ ἣν ἐκάστη διαφορὰ
τῶν προειρημένων τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς τόπους ὑποτάτ-

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consisting now of fifty thousand foot and about nine thousand horse, he advanced through the Pyrenees towards the crossing of the Rhone, having now an army not so strong in number as serviceable and highly trained owing to the unbroken series of wars in Spain.

36. That my narrative may not be altogether obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the topography I must explain whence Hannibal started, what countries he traversed, and into what part of Italy he descended. Nor must I simply give the names of countries, rivers, and cities, as some authors do under the idea that this is amply sufficient for a clear knowledge. I am of opinion that as regards known countries the mention of names is of no small assistance in recalling them to our memory, but in the case of unknown lands such citation of names is just of as much value as if they were unintelligible and inarticulate sounds. For the mind here has nothing to lean upon for support and cannot connect the words with anything known to it, so that the narrative is associated with nothing in the readers’ mind, and therefore meaningless to him. We must therefore light upon and indicate a method which will make it possible when speaking of unknown places to convey to the reader a more or less real and familiar notion of them.

Now the primary and most general conception and one common to all mankind is the division and ordering of the heavens by which all of us, even those of the meanest capacity, distinguish East, West, South, and North. The next step in knowledge is to classify the parts of the earth under each of these divisions,

* Cf. Bk. v. 21. 4.
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tontes καὶ φέροντες ἅεὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπί τι τῶν προειρημένων εἰς γνωρίσμους καὶ συνήθεις ἐπινοίας ἐμπίπτομεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀγνώστων κάσωμάτων οὗτων. τούτων δὲ περὶ τῆς ὀλης γῆς ὑποκείμενων, ἀκόλουθον ἄν εἰς τὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένης ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτόν λόγον διελομένους
eis ἐπίστασιν ἀγαγεῖ τοὺς ἀκούοντας. ταύτης διηνημένης εἰς τρία μέρη καὶ τρεῖς ὄνομασίας, τὸ μὲν ἐν μέρος αὐτῆς Ἀσίαν, τὸ δ᾽ ἔτερον Λιβύην, τὸ δὲ

tρίτον Ἑλληνίδα προσαγορεύουσι. τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς ταύτας ὀρίζουσιν ὑ' τε Τάναϊς ποταμὸς καὶ Νείλος
καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ Ἡρακλέους στῆλας στόμα. Νείλον μὲν
οὕν καὶ Τανάϊδος μεταξὺ τῆν Ἀσίαν κείσθαι συμβέβηκε, πίπτειν δὲ τοῦ περιέχοντος ὑπὸ τὸ μεταξὺ
diάστημα θερμών ἀνατολῶν καὶ μεσημβρίας. ἢ δὲ
Λιβύη κεῖται μὲν μεταξὺ Νείλου καὶ στηλῶν Ἡρα-
κλείων, τοῦ δὲ περιέχοντος πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τε τὴν
μεσημβρίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ὑπὸ τὰς χειμερι-
nᾶς δύσεις ἔως τῆς ἱσημερίνης καταφορᾶς, ἢ πίπτει
καθ᾽ Ἡρακλείους στῆλας. αὕτα μὲν οὐν αἱ χώραι
καθολικῶτερον θεωροῦμεν τὸν πρὸς τὴν μεσημ-
βρίαν τόπον ἐπέχουσι τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς βαλάττης ἀπὸ
tῶν ἀνατολῶν ὡς πρὸς τὰς δύσεις. ἢ δ᾽ Εὐρώπη
tαύταις ἀμφοτέραις ὡς πρὸς ἄρκτους ἀντιπαρά-
κειται, κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνατολῶν παρ-
ήκουσα μὲν ἄχρι πρὸς τὰς δύσεις, κεῖται δ᾽ αὐτῆς
tο μὲν ὄλοχερέστερον καὶ βαθύτερον μέρος ὑπ᾽
αὐτᾶς τὰς ἄρκτους μεταξὺ τοῦ τε Ταυάδος ποτα-
μοῦ καὶ τοῦ Νάρβωνος, ὡς οὗ πολὺν ἀπέχει τόπον
ὡς πρὸς δύσεις ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας καὶ τῶν τοῦ 'Ρο-
δανοῦ στομάτων, δὲ ἄν εἰς τὸ Σαρδόνιον πέλαγος
ἐξίησιν ὅ προειρημένος ποταμὸς. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Νάρ-
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ever mentally referring each statement to one of
them until we arrive at a familiar conception of
unknown and unseen regions. This once established
as regards the whole earth, it remains for me to lay
before my readers the division on the same principle
of that portion of the world known to us. This is
divided into three parts, each with its name, the one
part being called Asia, the second Africa, and the
third Europe. Their respective boundaries are the
river Don, the Nile, and the straits at the Pillars of
Hercules. Asia lies between the Nile and Don
and falls under that portion of the heaven lying
between the north-east and the south. Africa lies
between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and it
falls under the portion of the heaven which extends
from the south to the south-west and west, as far as
the point of the equinoctial sunset, in which latter
quarter are the Pillars of Hercules. These two
divisions of the earth, then, regarded from a general
point of view, occupy the part of it which lies to the
south of the Mediterranean, reaching from east to
west. Europe lies opposite to them on the north
shore of this sea, extending continuously from east
to west, its most compact and deepest portion lying
due north between the Don and the Narbo, the
latter river being not far to the west of Marseilles
and of the mouths by which the Rhone discharges
itself into the Sardinian Sea. The Celts inhabit the
βωνος καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦτον Κελτοί νέμονται μέχρι τῶν προσαγορευμένων Πυρηναίων ὅρων, ἀ δια-
τείνει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς θαλά-
της ἐώς έἰς τὴν ἐκτόσ. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς 
Εὐρώπης ἀπὸ τῶν προειρημένων ὅρων τὸ συνάπτον 
πρὸς τέ τὰς δύσεις καὶ πρὸς Ἦρακλείους στήλας 
περιέχεται μὲν ὑπὸ τε τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς καὶ τῆς ἔξω 
θαλάττης, καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὰ τὴν καθ’ ἡμᾶς 
παρῆκαν ἐώς Ἦρακλείων στήλην Ἰβηρία, τὸ δὲ 
παρὰ τὴν ἔξω καὶ μεγάλην προσαγορευμένην κοινήν 
μὲν ὀνομασίαν οὐκ ἔχει διὰ τὸ προσφάτως κατωπτεῦ-
σθαι, κατοικεῖται δὲ πάν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων ἑθῶν καὶ 
πολυανθρώπων, ὑπὲρ ὅν ἡμεῖς μετὰ ταύτα τὸν 
κατὰ μέρος λόγον ἀποδώσομεν. καθάπερ δὲ καὶ τῆς 
Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Λιβύης, καθὸ συνάπτοντος ἀλλήλαις 
περὶ τὴν Ἀἰθιοπίαν, οὐδές ἔχει λέγειν ἄτρεκὼς ἔως 
τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς καρπῶν πότερον ἤπειρός ἐστὶ κατὰ 
τὸ συνεχὲς τὰ πρὸς τὴν μεσημβρίαν ἡ θαλάττη περὶ-
2 ἐχεται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὸ μεταξὺ Τανάίδος καὶ 
Νάρβωνος εἰς τὰς ἄρκτους ἄνηκον ἁγιωτὸν ήμῖν 
ἔως τοῦ νῦν ἐστιν, ἐὰν μὴ τι μετὰ ταύτα πολυ-
3 πραγμονοῦντες ἱστορήσωμεν. τοὺς δὲ λέγοντάς τι 
περὶ τούτων ἀλλος ἡ γράφοντας ἁγιωταί καὶ μῦ-
θους διατίθεσθαι νομιστέον.
4 Ταύτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσω μοι χάριν τοῦ μῆ τε-
λέως ἀνυπότακτον εἶναι τοῖς ἀπείροις τῶν τόπων 
τὴν διήγησιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ γε τὰς ὀλοσχερεῖς δια-
φορὰς συνεπιβάλλειν καὶ φέρειν ἐπὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ 
τὸ λεγόμενον, τεκμαίρομένους ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος.
5 καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ὀράσεως εἰθίσμεθα συνεπι-
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country near the Narbo and beyond it as far as the chain of the Pyrenees which stretches in an unbroken line from the Mediterranean to the Outer Sea. The remaining part of Europe beyond the Pyrenees reaching to its western end and to the Pillars of Hercules is bounded on the one side by the Mediterranean and on the other by the Outer Sea, that portion which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules being called Iberia, while that part which lies along the Outer or Great Sea has no general name, as it has only recently come under notice, but is all densely inhabited by barbarous tribes of whom I shall speak more particularly on a subsequent occasion. 38. Just as with regard to Asia and Africa where they meet in Aethiopia no one up to the present has been able to say with certainty whether the southern extension of them is continuous land or is bounded by a sea, so that part of Europe which extends to the north between the Don and Narbo is up to now unknown to us, and will remain so unless the curiosity of explorers lead to some discoveries in the future. We must pronounce that those who either by word of mouth or in writing make rash statements about these regions have no knowledge of them, and invent mere fables. I have said so much in order that my narrative should not be without something to range itself under in the minds of those who are ignorant of the localities, but that they should have some notion at least of the main geographical distinctions, with which they can connect in thought and to which they can refer my statements, calculating the position of places from the quarter of the heaven under which they lie. For as in the case of physical sight we
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στρέφειν ἂει τά πρόσωπα πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνδει-ξιον υποδεικνύμενον, οὕτως καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρὴ συν-διανεύειν καὶ συρρέειν ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους ἂει τοὺς
diὰ τοῦ λόγου συνεπειδεικνυμένους. ἀφέμενοι δὲ
tοῦτων τρεξόμεθα πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς προκειμέ-
νης ἡμῶν διηγήσεως.

2 Ἡρακλείους στῆλας. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μὴκός ἐστι τῆς
παραλίας ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐξαικουσίλους καὶ μυρίους στα-
δίους. διαβάντες δὲ τὸν καθ' Ἡρακλείους στῆλας
πόρον ὁμοίως ἑκεκρατήκεισαν καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἀπά-
ςης ἐως τῆς βαρχίας, ὁ πέρας ἐστὶ πρὸς τῇ καθ'
ήμᾶς θαλάττῃ τῶν Πυρηναίων ὅρων, ἀ διορίζει
5 τοὺς Ἰβηρια καὶ Κελτοὺς. ἀπέχει δὲ τοῦ καθ'
Ἡρακλείους στῆλας στόματος οὗτος ὁ τόπος περὶ
6 ὀκτακουσίλους σταδίους. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ Καυνῆν πό-
λιν ἀπὸ στηλῆν εἶναι συμβαίνει τρισχίλιους, ὁθεν
ἐπιοεῖτο τὴν ὁμήρην Ἀννίβας τῆν εἰς Ἰταλίαν. [τὴν
dὲ Καυνῆν πόλιν ἕνων Νέαν Καρχηδόνα καλοῦσιν.] ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εἰςιν ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμὸν
7 ἐξακοσίου στάδιων πρὸς δισχίλιοι, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦτον
8 πάλιν εἰς Ἐμπόριοι χίλιοι σὺν ἐξακοσίοι, <ἀπὸ δ' Ἐμπορίου πόλεως εἰς Νάρβωνα περὶ ἐξακοσίους,>
καὶ μὴν ἐντεύθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διάβασιν
περὶ χιλίους ἐξακοσίους. ταῦτα γὰρ νῦν βεβημά-
tυσκαί καὶ σεσημεῖωτα κατὰ σταδίους ὁκτὼ διὰ
9 Ῥωμαίων εἰπμελῶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς διαβάσεως τοῦ
Ῥοδανοῦ πορευμένου παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὡς
ἐπὶ τὰς πηγὰς ἐως πρὸς τὴν ἀναβολὴν τῶν Ἀλπεων
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are in the habit of turning our faces in the direction of any object pointed out to us, so should we mentally ever turn and shift our glance to each place to which the story calls our attention.

39. Dismissing this matter I will now continue my narrative. At the time of which we are speaking the Carthaginians were masters of all that part of Africa which looks towards the Mediterranean from the Altars of Philaenus on the Greater Syrtis as far as the Pillars of Hercules. The length of this coast-line is more than sixteen thousand stades. Crossing the straits at the Pillars of Hercules they had similarly subdued all Iberia as far as the point on the coast of the Mediterranean where the Pyrenees, which separate the Celts from the Iberians, end. This spot is about eight thousand stades distant from the mouth of this sea at the Pillars of Hercules, the distance being three thousand stades from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which place Hannibal started for Italy, two thousand six hundred stades from hence to the Ebro, and from the Ebro to Emporium one thousand six hundred stades. From Emporium to Narbo it is about six hundred stades, and from Narbo to the passage of the Rhone about sixteen hundred, this part of the road having now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every eighth stade. From the passage of the Rhone, following the bank of the river in the direction of its source as far as the foot of the pass across the Alps to Italy, the distance is

* Originally the boundary between Egypt and Cyrene.
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10 τὴν εἰς Ἡταλίαν χίλιοι τετρακόσιοι. λυοπαι δ' αἱ τῶν Ἀλπεων ὑπερβολαί, περὶ χιλίους διακοσίους· ἀς ὑπερβαλὼν ἐμελλεν ἤξειν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον
11 πεδία τῆς Ἡταλίας. ὡστ' εἶναι τοὺς πάντας ἐκ Και-

νῆς πόλεως σταδίους περὶ ἐννακισχίλιοι, οὐς ἔδει
12 διελθεῖν αὐτὸν. τούτων δὴ τῶν τόπων κατὰ μὲν
tὸ μῆκος ἤδη σχεδὸν τοὺς ἡμισεῖς διελθύθη, κατὰ
dὲ τὴν δυσχέρειαν τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ μέρος ἀπελεύστη
tῆς πορείας.

40 Ἄννίβας μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρει ταῖς διεκβολαῖς τῶν
Πυρηναίων ὁρῶν, κατάφορος ὃν τοὺς Κελτοὺς διὰ
2 τὰς ὀχυρώτητας τῶν τόπων. ὘ρμαίοι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς
ἀυτοὺς καίρους διακούσαντες μὲν τῶν ἐξαποσταλέν-
tων εἰς Καρχηδόνα προσβητῶν τὰ δεδοµένα καὶ
tοὺς βρέθηκας λόγους, προσπεσόντος δὲ βάττον ἢ
προσεδόκων Ἀννίβαν διαβεβηκέναι τὸν Ἰβηρα πο-
tαμὸν μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, προεχειρίσαντο πέμπει
μετὰ στρατοπέδων Πόπλιον μὲν Κορυνήλιον εἰς Ἰβη-
ρίαν, Τεβέριον δὲ Σεμπρώνιον εἰς Λιβύην.

3 Ἐν ὀσῳ δ' οὔτοι περὶ τὰς καταγραφὰς ἐγίνοντο
tῶν στρατοπεδίων καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν,
ἐσπευσάν ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀποικίας,
oi δὴ πρότερον ἦσαν εἰς Γαλατίαν ἀποστέλλειν προ-
4 κεχειρισμένοι. τὰς μὲν οὖν πόλεις ἐνεργῶς ἐτείχιζον,
tοὺς δ' οἰκήτορας ἐν ἡμέραις τριάκοντα παρήγγειλαν
ἐπιτόπους γίνεσθαι, τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντας εἰς ἐκατέραν
5 τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἐξακισχίλιους· ὅν τὴν μὲν μίαν ἐκτι-
ζον ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Πάδου ποταμοῦ, προσαγορεύσαν-
tες Πλακεντίαν, τὴν δ' ἄλλην ἐπὶ θάτερα, κατονο-
6 μάσαντες Κρεμώνην. ἦδη δὲ τούτων συνωκισμένων,
oi Βοῦι καλούμενοι Γαλάται, πάλαι μὲν οὖν λο-
χώντες τὴν πρὸς Ὀρμαίους φιλίαν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ
BOOK III. 39. 10 – 40. 6

fourteen hundred stades, and the length of the actual pass which would bring Hannibal down into the plain of the Po, about twelve hundred. So that to arrive there he had, starting from New Carthage, to march about nine thousand stades. Of this, as far as distance goes, he had nearly traversed the half, but if we look to difficulty far the largest part lay before him.

40. While Hannibal was thus attempting to cross the Pyrenees, in great fear of the Celts owing to the natural strength of the passes, the Romans, having received from the envoys they had sent to Carthage an account of the decision arrived at, and the speeches made there, and on news reaching them sooner than they had expected that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army, determined to send, with their legions, the Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Africa.

While occupied in enrolling the legions and making other preparations they were pushing on the project of establishing in Cisalpine Gaul the colonies on which they had decided. They took active steps to fortify the towns, and ordered the colonists, who were about six thousand in number for either city, to be on the spot within thirty days. The one city they founded on this side of the Po, calling it Placentia, the other, which they named Cremona, on the far side. Scarce had both these colonies been established when the Boii Gauls, who had been for long as it were lying in wait to throw off their allegiance to Rome, but had hitherto found no
ΤΟΣ ΚΑΙΡΟΝ, ΜΕΤΕΡΩΡΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΙΣΤΕΥΟΝΤΕΣ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΔΙΑΠΕΡΙΠΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΤΗ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΡΧΙΣΤΟΝΩΝ, ΑΠΕΣΤΗΣΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΠΟΥΜΑΙΩΝ, ΕΥΚΑΤΑΛΙΠΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΜΗΡΟΥΣ, ΟΥΣ ΕΔΟΣΑΝ ΕΚΒΑΙΝΟΝΤΕΣ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΓΕΝΟΤΟΣ, ΥΠΕΡ ΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΕΞΗΓΗΣΙΝ ΗΜΕΙΣ ΕΝ ΤΗ 
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ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΥΝ ΣΦΙΣΙ ΣΥΝΕΛΘΕΙΝ, ΥΠΗΚΟΥΣΑΝ ΟΙ 
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ΚΟΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΟΜΗΡΟΥΣ. ΛΕΥΚΙΟΣ ΔΕ ΜΑΛ 
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ΤΩΝ ΤΟΠΩΝ ΜΕΤΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΣ, ΑΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΤΟ ΓΕΓΟΝΟΣ, 
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opportunity, elated now by the messages they received assuring them of the near arrival of the Carthaginians, revolted from Rome, abandoning the hostages they gave at the end of the former war which I described in my last Book. Calling on the Insubres to join them, whose support they easily gained owing to their long-standing rancour against Rome, they overran the lands which the Romans had allotted to their colonies and on the settlers taking to flight, pursued them to Mutina, a Roman colony, and there besieged them. Among those shut up there were three men of high rank who had been sent to carry out the partitionment of the country, Gaius Lutatius, a former Consul, and two former Praetors. On these three requesting a parley with the Boii, the latter consented, but when they came out for the purpose they treacherously made them prisoners, hoping by means of them to get back their own hostages. When the Praetor Lucius Manlius, who with his troops was occupying an advanced position in the neighbourhood, heard of this, he hastened up to give help. The Boii had heard of his approach, and posting ambuscades in a certain forest attacked him from all sides at once as soon as he reached the wooded country, and killed many of the Romans. The remainder at first took to flight, but on getting to higher ground rallied just enough to give their retreat an appearance of order. The Boii following at their heels shut this force too up in the place called Vicus Tannetis.¹ When the news reached Rome that the

¹ Near Parma.
Τα μέν οὖν κατὰ Κελτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕως εἰς τὴν 'Αννίβου παρουσίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν καὶ τοι-αύτην εἰλήφει διέξοδον, οίαν ἐν τε τοῖς πρὸ τοῦ 2 καὶ νῦν διελθόμεν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν 'Ρω-μαίων ἐτομμασάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τὰς ἱδίας ἐπίβολας, ἐξέπλευν ὑπὸ τὴν ὤραιάν ἐπὶ τὰς προκειμένας πρά-ξεις, Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξηκοντα ναυσί, Τεθέριος δὲ Σεμπρώνιος εἰς Λιβύην ἐκατόν ἔξηκον-
3 τα σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς. οἱ οὖσι καταπληκτικῶς ἐπεβάλετο πολεμεῖν καὶ τοιαύτας ἐποιεῖτο παρα-
σκευᾶς ἐν τῷ Λιβυθαίῳ, πάντας καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀθροίζων, ὡς εὐθέως ἐκ κατάπλου πολιορκήσων 4 αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα. Πόπλιος δὲ κομισθείς παρὰ τὴν Λιγυστίνην ἦκε πεμπταῖος ἀπὸ Πισών εἰς τοὺς 5 κατὰ Μασσαλίαν τόπους, καὶ καθορμοθείς πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον στόμα τοῦ 'Ροδανοῦ, τὸ Μασσαλιστικὸν 6 προσαγορευόμενον, ἀπεβίβαζε τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀκούων μὲν ὑπερβάλλει τὰ τῶν Πυρηναία τοῦ 'Αννίβαν ὀρη, πεπεισμένος δὲ ἔτι μακρὰν ἀπέχειν αὐτὸν διὰ τε τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος 7 τῶν μεταξὺ κεμμένων Κελτῶν. 'Αννίβας δὲ παρα-
δόξως, τοὺς μὲν χρήμασι πείσας τῶν Κελτῶν, τοὺς δὲ βιασάμενος, ἥκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, δεξίων ἔχων τὸ Σαρδόνιον πέλαγος, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ 'Ροδανοῦ 8 διάβασιν. δὲ Πόπλιος, διασαφηθέντος αὐτῶ παρ-
είναι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, τὰ μὲν ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ 96
fourth legion was surrounded by the Boii and besieged, they instantly sent off the legions destined for Publius under the command of a Praetor to its assistance, ordering Publius to enrol other legions from the allies.

41. The condition and course of Celtic affairs from the outset up to the arrival of Hannibal were such as I have narrated here and in the previous Book. The two Roman Consuls, having made all preparations for their respective enterprises, set sail early in summer to take in hand the operations determined on, Publius bound for Iberia with sixty ships and Tiberius Sempronius for Africa with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes. With these he threatened such a redoubtable expedition and made such vast preparations at Lilybaeum, collecting all kinds of forces from everywhere, that it seemed as if he expected to sail up to Carthage and at once lay siege to it. Publius, coasting along Liguria, reached the neighbourhood of Marseilles from Pisa in five days, and coming to anchor off the first mouth of the Rhone, known as the Massaliotic mouth, disembarked his forces there, having heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, but convinced that he was still at a distance of many days' march owing to the difficulty of the country and the numbers of Celtic tribes between them Hannibal, however, who had bribed some of the Celts and forced others to give him passage, unexpectedly appeared with his army at the crossing of the Rhone, having marched with the Sardinian Sea on his right. Publius, when the arrival of the enemy was reported to him, being partly incredulous owing to the
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τάχος τῆς παρουσίας, τὰ δὲ βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνελάμβανε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ πλοῦ, καὶ διενοεῖτο μετὰ τῶν χυλιάρχων ποιοῖς χρηστέον τῶν τόπων καὶ συμμικτέον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. τριακοσίους δὲ τῶν ἔπεων ἐξεπέστειλε τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους, συστήσας μετ’ αὐτῶν καθηγεμόνας ἄμα καὶ συναγωγιστὰς Κέλτων, οἱ παρὰ τοὺς Μασσαλώτας ἐτύγχανον μισθοφοροῦντες.

2 ὁδὸν ἀπέχων στρατοπέδως τῆς θαλάττης. καὶ φιλοποιήσαμενος παντὶ τρόπῳ τοὺς παροικοῦντας τὸν ποταμὸν ἐξηγόρασε παρ’ αὐτῶν τὰ τε μονόξυλα πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τοὺς λέμβους, οὕτως ἱκανοῦ τῷ πλῆθει διὰ τὸ ταῖς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἐμπορίας πολλοῦς χρήσθαι τῶν παροικοῦντων τὸν Ῥόδανον. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἁμόξουσαν ἐνυλειάν ἔξελαβε πρὸς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῶν μονοξύλων. ἐξ ὧν ἐν δυσὶν ἡμέραις πλῆθος ἀναρίθμητον ἐγένετο πορθμεῖων, ἐκατόστου στεύδοντος μὴ προσδεῖσθαι τοῦ πέλας, ἐν αὐτῷ δ’ ἔχετα τὰς τῆς διαβάσεως ἐλπίδας. κατὰ δὲ τὸν κατ’ Ῥόδον τοῦτον ἐν τῷ πέραν πλῆθος ἡθορισθῇ παραβάρων χάριν τοῦ κωλύειν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων διάβασιν. εἰς οὐς ἀποβλέπων Ἀννίβας καὶ συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ὡς οὕτε διαβαίνειν μετὰ βίας δυνατῶν εἰς τοσοῦτον πολεμίως ἐφεστώτων, οὕτ’ ἐπιμένειν, μὴ παυταχόθεν προσδεξῆται τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἐπιγενομένης τῆς τρίτης νυκτὸς ἐξαποστέλλει μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως, συστήσας καθηγεμόνας ἐγχωρίους, ἔπι δὲ πάντων Ἀρνώνα τὸν Βοαμίλκου τοῦ βασιλέως. οἱ ποιησάμενοι τὴν πο-
rapidity of their advance and partly desirous of ascertaining the exact truth—while he himself was refreshing his troops after their voyage and consulting with his Tribunes in what place it would be wisest to offer battle to the enemy—sent out three hundred of his bravest cavalry, giving them as guides and supports certain Celts who were in the service of the Massaliots as mercenaries.

42. Hannibal, on reaching the neighbourhood of the river, at once set about attempting to cross it where the stream is single at a distance of about four days' march from the sea. Doing his best to make friends with the inhabitants of the bank, he bought up all their canoes and boats, amounting to a considerable number, since many of the people on the banks of the Rhone engage in maritime traffic. He also got from them the logs suitable for making the canoes, so that in two days he had an innumerable quantity of ferry-boats, every one doing his best to dispense with any assistance and relying on himself for his chance of getting across. In the meantime a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing. Hannibal observing this and concluding that as things stood it was neither possible to force a crossing in face of such a strong hostile force nor to put it off, lest he should find himself attacked on all sides, sent off on the third night after his arrival a portion of his army, giving them native guides and placing them under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the Suffete.
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ρείαι τῶν ρέματι παρὰ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐπὶ διακόσια στάδια, παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τινὰ τόπον, ἐν ὧν συνέβαινε περὶ τὶ χωρίον ἣς ὑπὸ περισχίζεται, 8 οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ποταμῶν, ἐνταῦθα κατέμεναν. ἔκ δὲ τῆς παρακεμένης ὕλης τὰ μὲν συμπηγνώντες τῶν ξύλων, τὰ δὲ συνδεσμεύοντες, ἐν ὠλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰς ἡρμοσαν σχέδια, ἄρκουσας τῇ χρείᾳ πρὸς τὸ παρόν ἐφ' ἀλλ' διεκομίσθησαν ἀσφαλῶς οὕδενος κωλύοντος.

9 καταλαβόμενοι δὲ τόπον ἔχυρον ἐκεῖνην μὲν τὴν ἥμεραν ἔμειναν ἀναπαύοντες σφάς ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης κακοπαθείας, ἀμα δὲ παρασκευαζόμενοι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιούσαν χρείαν κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον.

10 καὶ μὴν Ἀννίβας τὸ παραπλήσιον ἐποίει περὶ τὰς μεθ' ἐαυτοῦ καταλειπθείσας δυνάμεις. μάλιστα δ' αὐτῷ παρεῖχε δυσχρηστίας ἠ τῶν ἐλεφάντων διάβασις. οὕτω δ' ἦσαν ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα τὸν ἄριθμὸν.

43 ὦ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπιγενομένης τῆς πέμπτης νυκτὸς οἱ μὲν προδιαβάντες ἐκ τοῦ πέραν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθενημένην προῆγον παρ' αὐτῶν τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄντιπερα βαρβάρους, δ' Ἕλεος ἐποίησεν ἐπικοινωνίαν, τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπέειχε τῇ διαβάσει, τοὺς μὲν λέμβους πεπληρωκὼς τῶν πελτοφόρων ἱππέων, τὰ δὲ μονόξυλα τῶν εὐκυνητότατῶν πεζῶν. ἐξείλον, δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου καὶ παρὰ τὸ ρέμα τάξιν οἱ λέμβοι, τὴν δ' ὑπὸ τούτους τὰ λεπτὰ τῶν πορθμεῖων, ῥᾳ τὸ πολὺ τῆς τοῦ ρέματος βίας ἀποδεχομένων τῶν λέμβων ἀσφαλεστέρα γίνοιτο τοὺς μονοξύλους ἡ παρακομιδὴ διὰ τοῦ πόρου. κατὰ δὲ τὰς πρύμνας τῶν λέμβων ἐφέλκειν διενοοῦντο τοὺς ἱπποὺς νέοντας, τρεῖς οἱ μὲν καὶ τέτταρας τοῖς ἀγωγεῦσιν ἔνος ἄνδρος ἐξ ἐκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πρύμνης οἰκικονομεῖαν.
Advancing up the bank of the river for two hundred stades they reached a place at which the stream divides, forming an island, and here they stopped. Using the timber they found ready to hand and either nailing or lashing logs together they soon constructed a number of rafts sufficient for their present need, and on these they crossed in safety, meeting with no opposition. Occupying a post of some natural strength they remained there for that day to rest after their exertions and at the same time to prepare for the movement which they had been ordered to execute. Hannibal, moreover, with the part of the army that remained behind with him, was similarly occupied. The question that caused him the greatest embarrassment was how to get the elephants, thirty-seven in number, across.

43. On the fifth night, however, the force which had already crossed began a little before dawn to advance along the opposite bank against the barbarians there, while Hannibal had got his soldiers ready and was waiting till the time for crossing came. He had filled the boats with his light horse and the canoes with his lightest infantry. The large boats were placed highest up stream and the lighter ferry-boats farther down, so that the heavier vessels receiving the chief force of the current the canoes should be less exposed to risk in crossing. They hit on the plan of towing the horses astern of the boats swimming, one man at each side of the stern guiding three or four horses by their leading reins, so that
5 οὖντος, ὃστε πλήθος ἰκανὸν ἵππων συνδιακομίζει·
6 ὅποιοι κατὰ τὴν πρώτην εὐθέως διάβασιν. οἱ δὲ
7 βαρβαροὶ, θεωροῦντες τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῶν ὑπεναν-
8 τίων, ἀτάκτως ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος ἐξεχέοντο καὶ σπο-
9 ράδην, πεπεισμένοι κωλύειν εὐχερῶς τὴν ἀπόβασιν
10 τῶν Καρχηδονίων. Ἄνυβας δ᾽ ἀμα τῷ συνιδεῖν
11 ἐν τῷ πέραν ἐγγίζοντας ἦδη τοὺς παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ στρα-
12 τιώτας, σημηνάντων ἑκέινων τὴν παρουσίαν τῷ
13 καπνῷ κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον, ἐμβαίνειν ἄπασιν
14 ἀμα παρῆγγελλε καὶ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ῥέμα τοῖς
15 ἐπὶ τῶν πορθμείων τεταγμένοις. ταχὺ δὲ τούτῳ
16 γενομένου, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ἀμιλλωμένων
17 μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μετὰ κρανυγῆς, διαγωνιζομένων
18 δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ βίαν, τῶν δὲ στρατοπε-
19 δῶν ἀμφοτέρων ἡς ἐκατέρω τοῦ μέρους παρὰ τὰ
20 χείλη τοῦ ποταμοῦ παρεστώτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων
21 συναγωνιῶντων καὶ παρακολουθοῦντων μετὰ κραν-
22 υγῆς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον βαρβάρων παιανιζόν-
23 των καὶ προκαλομένων τὸν κύδυνον, ἤν τὸ γινό-
24 μενὸν ἐκπληκτικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν ἀγωνίας. ἐν
25 ω καιρῷ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπολεολοπτῶν τὰς σκηνὰς
26 ἐπιπεσοῦντες ἄφνω καὶ παραδόξως οἱ πέραν Καρχη-
27 δόνιοι, τυχὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐνεπίμπρασαν τὴν στρατο-
28 πεδεῖαν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἄρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν διά-
29 βασιν τηροῦντας. οἱ δὲ βαρβαροὶ, παραλόγον τοῦ
30 πράγματος φανέντος αὐτοῖς, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς
31 ἐφέροντο βοηθήσοντες, οἱ δὲ ἡμύσνοντο καὶ διεμά-
32 χοντο πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιθημένους. Ἄνυβας δὲ, κατὰ
33 τὴν πρόσεχιν αὐτῶν συντρεχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων,
34 εὐθέως τοὺς πρῶτους ἀποβαίνοντας συνίστα καὶ
35 παρεκάλει, καὶ συνεπλέκετο τοῖς βαρβάροις. οἱ δὲ
36 Κελτοῖ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀταξίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον
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a considerable number were got across at once in the first batch. The barbarians seeing the enemy’s project poured out of their camp, scattered and in no order, feeling sure that they would easily prevent the Carthaginians from landing. Hannibal, as soon as he saw that the force he had previously sent across was near at hand on the opposite bank, they having announced their approach by a smoke-signal as arranged, ordered all in charge of the ferry-boats to embark and push up against the current. He was at once obeyed, and now with the men in the boats shouting as they vied with one another in their efforts and struggled to stem the current, with the two armies standing on either bank at the very brink of the river, the Carthaginians following the progress of the boats with loud cheers and sharing in the fearful suspense, and the barbarians yelling their war-cry and challenging to combat, the scene was in the highest degree striking and thrilling. At this moment, the barbarians having deserted their tents, the Carthaginians on the far bank attacked suddenly and unexpectedly, and while some of them set fire to the enemy’s encampment, the larger portion fell upon the defenders of the passage. The barbarians, taken quite by surprise, rushed some of them to save their tents, while others defended themselves against their assailants. Hannibal, all falling out favourably as he had purposed, at once marshalled those of his men who were the first to land, and after addressing some words of exhortation to them, led them to meet the barbarians, upon which the Celts, owing to their disordered
44 'О δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἁμα τῆς τε διαβάσεως καὶ τῶν ὑπεναντίων κεκρατηκῶς παραυτίκα μὲν ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῇ παρακομιδῇ τῶν πέραν
2 ἀπολειπομένων ἄνδρῶν, πάσας δὲ ἐν βραχεὶ χρόνῳ
diαπεραίωσας τὰς δυνάμεις ἔκεινη μὲν τὴν νύκτα
3 παρ' αὐτῶν τὸν ποταμὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσε, τῇ δὲ
ἐπαύριον ἄκουσαι τῶν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλον περὶ
tὰ στόματα τοῦ ποταμοῦ καθωρμίσθαι, προχειρισά-
μενος πεντακοσίους τῶν Νομαδικῶν ἱππέων ἐξαπ-
έστειλε κατασκευομένους ποὺ καὶ πόσοι τυγχάνου-
4 σιν ὄντες καὶ τὶ πράττουσιν οἱ πολέμιοι. κατὰ δὲ
tὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων διά-
5 βασιν προχειρίσατο τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους. αὐτὸς δὲ
συναγαγὼν τὰς δυνάμεις εἰσήγαγε τοὺς βασιλίσκους
tοὺς περὶ Μάγιλον· οὕτω γὰρ ἦκον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ
tῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων καὶ δὲ ἔρμηνεως τὰ
6 δεδογμένα παρ' αὐτῶν διεσάφει τοῖς ὀχλοῖς. ἂν
dὲ τῶν λεγομένων ἵσχυρότατα πρὸς θάρσος τῶν
πολλῶν πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς παρουσίας ἐνάργεια τῶν
ἐπισπωμένων καὶ κοινωνίης ἐπαγγελλομένων τοῦ
7 πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πολέμου, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπ-
αγγελίας αὐτῶν ἀξίοποτον, ὅτι καθηγήσονται διὰ
tόπων τοιούτων δὲ ἄν ωδενὸς ἐπιδεόμενοι τῶν
ἀναγκαῖων συντόμως ἁμα καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ποι-
8 ἱσουνται τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
ἡ τῆς χώρας γενναιότης, εἰς ἣν ἀφίζονται, καὶ τὸ
μέγεθος, ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν ἄνδρῶν ἡ προθυμία, μεθ' ὃν
μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγώνας πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ῥω-
9 μαίνων δυνάμεις. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κελτοὶ τοιαύτα δια-
10 λεχθέντες ἀνεχώρησαν. μετὰ δὲ τούτους εἰσελθὼν
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condition and to their being taken by surprise, soon turned and turned to flight.

44. The Carthaginian general, having thus made himself master of the passage and defeated the enemy, at once occupied himself in fetching over the men who had been left on the other bank, and having in a very short time brought his whole army across encamped for that night beside the river. Next morning, hearing that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the Rhone, he selected five hundred of his Numidian horse and sent them off to observe the whereabouts and number of the enemy and what they were about. At the same time he set the proper men to the task of bringing the elephants across and then called a meeting of his soldiers and, introducing Magilus and the other chieftains who had come to him from the plain of the Po, made the troops acquainted through a dragoman with what they reported to be the decision of their tribes. What encouraged the soldiers most in their address was firstly the actual and visible presence of those Gauls who were inviting them to Italy and promising to join them in the war against Rome, and secondly the reliance they placed on their promise to guide them by a route which would take them without their being exposed to any privations, rapidly and safely to Italy. In addition to this the Gauls dwelt on the richness and extent of the country they were going to, and the eager spirit of the men by whose side they were about to face the armies of Rome. The Celts, after speaking in this sense, withdrew, and Hannibal
αὐτὸς πρῶτον μὲν τῶν προγεγενεμένων πράξεων ἀνέμνησε τοὺς ὁχλοὺς· ἐν αἷς ἐφὶ πολλοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ παραβόλοις ἔργοις καὶ κυνύνοις ἐπικεχειρη-κότας ἐν οúdeνι διεσφάλθαι, κατακολουθήσαντας τῇ
11 'κείνου γνώμην καὶ συμβουλίαν. τοῦτοι δ' ἔξῆς εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει, θεωροῦντας διότι τὸ μέγιστον ἦν σταῖ τῶν ἔργων, ἐπειδὴ τῆς τε τοῦ ποτα-μοῦ διαβάσεως κεκρατήκασι τῆς τε τῶν συμμάχων
12 εὐνοίας καὶ προθυμίας αὐτόπται γεγόνασι. διόπερ ὠετο δὲν περὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ῥαθυμεῖν, ὡς αὐτῷ μελόντων, πειθαρχοῦντας δὲ τοῖς παραγγέλμασι ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν προγεγο-
13 νότων ἔργων ἄξιοις. τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἐπισημανο-
μένου καὶ μεγάλην ὁμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν εἰμφαίνο-
τος, ἐπανέως αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων εὐξάμενος διαφήκε, παραγγείλας θεραπεύειν σφᾶς καὶ παρασκευάζοντας μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὡς εἰς τὴν αὐ-
ριον ἀναξιώθης ἐσομένης.

45 Δυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἑκκλησίας ἦκον τῶν Νομάδων
οἱ προαποσταλέντες ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπὴν, τοὺς μὲν
πλεῖστος αὐτῶν ἀπολογλεκότες, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ προ-
2 τροπάδην πεφευγότες. συμπεσόντες γὰρ οὐ μακρὰν
ἀπὸ τῆς ἱδίας στρατοπεδείας τοῖς τῶν Ὀρμαίων ἔπευσι τοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν χρέιαν ἐξαπεσταλμένους
ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποπλίου τοιαύτην ἐποιήσαντο φιλοτιμίαν
ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ὅστε τῶν Ὀρμαίων
καὶ Κελτῶν εἰς ἐκατόν ὑπεῖς καὶ τετταράκοντα δια-
φθαρῆναι, τῶν δὲ Νομάδων ὑπὲρ τοὺς διακοσίους.
3 γενομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ὀρμαίοι συνεγγίσαντες
κατὰ τὸ δίωγμα τῶν Ὁρμαίων χάρακι καὶ
κατοπτεύσαντες, ἀφθινὲς ἔξ ὑποστροφῆς ἔπειγοντο,
διασαφῆσοντες τῶν στρατηγῶν τῆς παρουσίαν τῶν
himself now came forward and began by reminding them of their achievements in the past: though, he said, they had undertaken many hazardous enterprises and fought many a battle they had never met with ill success when they followed his plans and counsels. Next he bade them be of good heart considering that the hardest part of their task was now accomplished, since they had forced the passage of the river and had the testimony of their own eyes and ears to the friendly sentiments and readiness to help of their allies. He begged them therefore to be at their ease about details which were his own business, but to obey orders and behave like brave men and in a manner worthy of their own record in the past. When the men applauded him, exhibiting great enthusiasm and ardour, he commended them and, after offering a prayer to the gods on behalf of all, dismissed them, bidding them get everything ready expeditiously as they would start on their march next day.

45. After the assembly had broken up the Numidian scouts who had been sent out to reconnoitre returned, the greater part of the force lost and the remainder in headlong flight. Not far from their own camp they had fallen in with the Roman cavalry sent out by Publius on the same errand, and both forces had shown such heroism in the engagement that the Romans and Celts lost about a hundred and forty horsemen and the Numidians more than two hundred. Afterwards the Romans carried their pursuit close up to the Carthaginian camp, and having surveyed it, turned and hastily rode off to report to the Consul the arrival of the
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πολεμίων ἀφικόμενοι δ' εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἂνήγ
4 γείλαν. Πόπλιος δὲ παρατίκα τὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἀνα-
θέμενος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἀνεξευξε παντὶ τῷ στρατεύ-
ματι, καὶ προῆγε παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν, σπεύδων συμ-
μίξαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.
5 Ἄννίβας δὲ τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα τῆς ἐκκλησίας
ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐπείξ προέθετο πάντας ὡς
πρὸς θάλατταν, ἐφεδρείας ἔχοντας τάξιν, τὴν δὲ
τῶν πεζῶν ἐκίνει δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος εἰς πο-
ρείαν. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἔξεδέχετο καὶ τοὺς
ἀμα τοῦτος ἀπολελειμμένους ἄνδρας. ἐγένετο δ' ἡ
diакομιδὴ τῶν θηρίων τοιαύτῃ τις. τήξαντες
σχεδὸς καὶ πλείους ἀραρτῶς, τοῦτων δύο πρὸς
ἀλλήλας ζεύξαντες βιαίως ἤρεισαν ἀμφότερας εἰς
tὴν γην κατὰ τὴν ἐμβασιν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, πλάτος
έχουσας τὸ συναμφότερον ὡς πεντήκοντα πόδας.
2 ταύταις δὲ συζευγνύντες ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν ἐκτὸς προσ-
ήμορον, προτείνοντες τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἐγγ-
ματος εἰς τὸν πόρον. τὴν δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑεύματος
πλευράν ἡσφαλίζοντο τοῖς ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐπιγύοις, εἰς
τὰ περὶ τὸ χείλος πεφυκότα τῶν δένδρων ἐνάπτο-
ντες, πρὸς τὸ συμμένει καὶ μὴ παρωθεῖσθαι τὸ
4 ὅλον ἐργὸν κατὰ τοῦ ποταμοῦ. ποιήσαντες δὲ πρὸς
δύο πλέθρα τῷ μήκει τὸ πάν ζεύγμα τῆς προβολῆς,
μετὰ ταύτα δύο πεπηγνίας σχεδὸς διαφέροντως
[τὰς μεγίστας] προσέβαλλον ταῖς ἐσχάταις, πρὸς
ἀυτὰς μὲν βιαῖως δεδεμένας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας
οὕτως ὅστ' εὐδιακόπους αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς δεσμοὺς.
5 ρύματα δὲ καὶ πλείω ταύταις ἐνήψαν, οἷς ἐμελλὼν
οἱ λέμβοι ῥυμούλκοντες οὐκ ἐάσευν φέρεσθαι κατὰ
ποταμοῦ, βία δὲ πρὸς τὸν ῥοῦν κατέχοντες παρα-
6 κομιεῖν καὶ περαιώσειν ἐπὶ τούτων τὰ θηρία. μετὰ
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enemy, and on reaching their camp did so. Publius at once put his baggage on board the ships and started with his whole army marching up the river bank with the view of encountering the Carthaginians. Hannibal, on the day after the assembly, advanced his cavalry in the direction of the sea to act as a covering force and then moved his infantry out of the camp and sent them off on their march, while he himself waited for the elephants and the men who had been left with them. The way they got the elephants across was as follows. They built a number of very solid rafts and lashing two of these together fixed them very firmly into the bank of the river, their united width being about fifty feet. To these they attached others on the farther side, prolonging the bridge out into the stream. They secured the side of it which faced the current by cables attached to the trees that grew on the bank, so that the whole structure might remain in place and not be shifted by the current. When they had made the whole bridge or pier of rafts about two hundred feet long they attached to the end of it two particularly compact ones, very firmly fastened to each other, but so connected with the rest that the lashings could easily be cut. They attached to these several towing-lines by which boats were to tow them, not allowing them to be carried down stream, but holding them up against the current, and thus were to convey the elephants which would be in
δὲ ταῦτα χοῦν ἐφερον ἐπὶ πάσας πολύν, ἐως ἐπι-βάλλοντες ἐξωμοίωσαν, ὄμαλὴν καὶ σύγχρονον ποι-ούντες τῇ διὰ τῆς χέρσου φερούσῃ πρὸς τὴν διά-βασιν ὅδῳ. τῶν δὲ θηρίων εὐθυσμένων τοὺς Ἰνδοὺς μέχρι μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀεὶ πειθαρχεῖν, εἰς δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐμβαίνειν οὐδαμῶς ἐπὶ τολμῶντος, ἦγον διὰ τοῦ χῶματος δύο προθέμενοι θηλείας, πειθαρχούν-
των αὐταῖς τῶν θηρίων. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐπὶ τὰς τελευ-
tαλας ἐπέστησαν σχεδίας, διακόψαντες τοὺς δεσμοὺς, οἷς προσήρτητο πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, καὶ τοῖς λέμβοις ἐπισπασάμενοι τὰ ὑματα, ταχέως ἀπέσπασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ χῶματος τὰ τε θηρία καὶ τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτοῖς σχε-
δίας. οὐ γενομένου διαταραχθέντα τὰ ζώα κατὰ μὲν τὰς ἁρχὰς ἐστρέφετο καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὸπον ὦρμα, περιεχόμενα δὲ πανταχῶθεν ὕπο τοῦ ρεύμα-
tος ἀπεδεικία καὶ μέειν ἤναγκάζετο κατὰ χώραν.
καὶ τοιούτω δὴ τρόπῳ προσαρμοζόμενων αἰς σχε-
διῶν δυνεῖν, τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν θηρίων ἐπὶ τούτων
dιεκομόθη, τινὰ δὲ κατὰ μέσον τὸν πόρον ἀπέρ-
ρυθεῖν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν αὐτὰ διὰ τὸν φόβον· ὅπως
τοὺς μὲν Ἰνδοὺς ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη πάντας, τοὺς
ἔλεφαντας διασωθήναι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν προβοσκίδων ἐξαίροντες ταῦτας
ὑπὲρ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ διαπνέοντες, ἀμα δὲ ἐκφυσώτες
πᾶν τὸ παρεμπιττὸν, ἀντέσχον, τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἦδα-
tος ὀρθὸι ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν.

Περαιωθέντων δὲ τῶν θηρίων, ἀναλαβῶν Ἀν-
νίβας τοὺς ἐλέφαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτείς προῆγε τοὺ-
tους ἀποφυγόν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἀπὸ θαλάττης
ως ἐπὶ τὴν ἑω, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς εἰς τὴν
μεσόγαιον τῆς Εὐρ ὅποιος ἔχει τὰς μὲν πηγὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀδριατικὸν μυχόν πρὸς τὴν
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them across. After this they piled up a quantity of earth on all the line of rafts, until the whole was on the same level and of the same appearance as the path on shore leading to the crossing. The animals were always accustomed to obey their mahouts up to the water, but would never enter it on any account, and they now drove them along over the earth with two females in front, whom they obediently followed. As soon as they set foot on the last rafts the ropes which held these fast to the others were cut, and the boats pulling taut, the towing-lines rapidly tugged away from the pile of earth the elephants and the rafts on which they stood. Hereupon the animals becoming very alarmed at first turned round and ran about in all directions, but as they were shut in on all sides by the stream they finally grew afraid and were compelled to keep quiet. In this manner, by continuing to attach two rafts to the end of the structure, they managed to get most of them over on these, but some were so frightened that they threw themselves into the river when half-way across. The mahouts of these were all drowned, but the elephants were saved, for owing to the power and length of their trunks they kept them above the water and breathed through them, at the same time spouting out any water that got into their mouths and so held out, most of them passing through the water on their feet.

47. After the elephants had been put across, Hannibal, taking them and his cavalry and forming these into a rear-guard, advanced up the river bank away from the sea in an easterly direction as though making for the centre of Europe. The Rhone rises north-west of the head of the Adriatic on the northern
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έσπέραν νευόσας, ἐν τοῖς ἀποκλίνουσι μέρεσι τῶν Ἀλπεων ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἀρκτοὺς, ἰδιὸ γὰρ πρὸς [τὰς] δύσεις χειμερινάς, ἐκβάλλει δ’ εἰς τὸ Σαρδῶν πέλαγος. φέρεται δ’ ἐπὶ πολὺ δι’ αὐλῶνος, οὐ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἀρκτοὺς Ἀρδυνεῖς Κελτοῖ κατοικοῦσι, τὴν δ’ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας αὐτοῦ πλευράν ὀρίζουσι πᾶσαν αἱ πρὸς ἄρκτου κεκλιμένα τῶν Ἀλπεων παρώρειαι.

4 τὰ δὲ πεδία τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδου, ὑπὲρ ὅπ’ ἦμῖν εἶρηται διὰ πλειόνων, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ὀρδανὸν αὐλῶνος διαζευγνύουσιν αἰ τῶν προειρημένων ὀρῶν ἀκρώμεια, λαμβάνουσι τὴν ἁρχήν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας ἑως ἐπὶ τοῦ παντὸς Ἄδριον μυχῶν. ἃς τὸθ ὑπεράρασ Ἀννίβας ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ὀρδανὸν τόπων ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ἰταλίαν.

6 Ἕνιοι δὲ τῶν γεγραφῶν περὶ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ταύτης, βουλόμενοι τοὺς ἀναγνώσκοντας ἐκπλήττειν τῇ περὶ τῶν προειρημένων τῶν παραδοξολογίας, λανθάνουσιν ἐμπίπτοντες εἰς δύο τὰ πάσης ἱστορίας ἀλλοτριώτατα: καὶ γὰρ ψευδολογεῖν καὶ  μαχόμενα γράφειν αὐτοῖς ἀναγκάζονται. ἀμα μὲν γὰρ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀμίμητον τινα παρευσάγοντες στρατηγὸν καὶ τόλμη καὶ προνοία τοῦτον ὀμολογεῖν ὑμῖν ἀλογιστότατον, ἀμα δὲ καταστροφήν οὐκ ὑπάρχει οὐδ’ ἔξοδον τοῦ ψεύδους θεούς καὶ θεών παϊδᾶς εἰς πραγmetrical

7 ματικὴν ἱστορίαν παρευσάγοντι. ὑποθέσει τοῖς ἐρμηνοτησίς καὶ τραχύτητας τῶν Ἀλπεων ὀρῶν τοιαύτας ὥστε μὴ οἶνον ὑπογραμμίζει καὶ στρατόπεδα, σὺν δὲ τοῦτοι ἐλέφαντας, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐξοχοῖς εὐξώνους εὐχερῶς ἀν διελθεῖν, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔρημον τοιαύτην τινὰ περὶ τοὺς τόπους ὑπογράφαντες ἦμῖν ὡστ’ εἰ μὴ θεοὶ ἢ τὸς ἦρως ἀπαν-

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slope of the Alps, and running in a south-westerly direction, falls into the Sardinian Sea. A great part of its course is through a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the Ardyes, while on the south it is bounded for its whole extent by the northern spurs of the Alps. The plain of the Po which I described above at length is separated from the Rhone valley by the lofty main chain of these mountains, which starting from Marseilles extends to the head of the Adriatic. It is this chain which Hannibal now crossed to enter Italy from the Rhone valley.

Some of the writers who have described this passage of the Alps, from the wish to impress their readers by the marvels they recount of these mountains, are betrayed into two vices ever most alien to true history; for they are compelled to make both false statements and statements which contradict each other. While on the one hand introducing Hannibal as a commander of unequalled courage and foresight, they incontestably represent him to us as entirely wanting in prudence, and again, being unable to bring their series of falsehoods to any close or issue they introduce gods and the sons of gods into the sober history of facts. By representing the Alps as being so steep and rugged that not only horses and troops accompanied by elephants, but even active men on foot would have difficulty in passing, and at the same time picturing to us the desolation of the country as being such, that unless
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τῆσας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ὑπέδειξε τὰς ὁδοῖς, ἐξαπορήσατας ἣν καταφθάρηνα πάντας, ὁμολογούμενως ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκάτερον τῶν προειρημένων ἀμαρτημάτων ἐμπίπτουσι. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἂν τῖς φανεῖν στρατηγὸς ἀλογιστότερος Ἀννίβου τίς καὶ

2 σκαῖρερος ἡγεμῶν, ὁς τοσοῦτων ἡγούμενος δυνάμεως καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐλπίδας ἐχὼν ἐν τούτοις τοῦ κατορθώσειν τοῖς ὀλίγοις, οὔτε τὰς ὁδοὺς οὔτε τόπους, ὡς οὔτοι φασίν, οὔτε ποι ἐπερεύεται τὸ

3 παράπαν οὔτε πρὸς τίνας ἑγίνωσκε, τὸ δὲ πέρας οὐδ’ εἰ καθόλου [τούναντίον] δυνατοὶς ἐπιβάλλεται

4 πράγμασιν; ἀλλ’ ὅπερ οἱ τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἑπτακότες καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπουν ἐξαποροῦντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν, ὡστ’ εἰς ἀπρονοήτους καθίεινα τόπους μετὰ δυνάμεως, τούτῳ περιτλέασιν οἱ συγγραφεῖς Ἀννίβα τῷ τὰς μεγίστας ἐλπίδας ἀκεραίους ἐχοντι περὶ τῶν

5 καθ’ αὐτὸν πραγμάτων. ὁμιλώς δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἐτι δ’ ἐρυμινότητος καὶ δυσχωρίας τῶν

6 τόπων ἐκδηλοῦν ποιεῖ τὸ ἴενδος αὐτῶν. οὐχ ἱστο-

7 ρήσαντες γὰρ ὅτι συμβαίνει τοὺς Κελτοὺς τοὺς παρὰ τὸν Ῥωμαίον ποταμῷ ὀλικοῦντας οὐχ ἀπαξ οὔδε δις πρὸ τῆς Ἀννίβου παρουσίας, οὔδε μὴν πάλιν, προσ-

8 φάτως δὲ, μεγάλοις στρατοπέδοις ὑπερβαίνατας τὰς Ἀλπεῖς παρατεῖχαμεν μὲν Ῥωμαίοις, συνηγώνωσθαι δὲ Κελτοίς τοῖς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάνων πεδία κατα-

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some god or hero had met Hannibal and showed him
the way, his whole army would have gone astray
and perished utterly, they unquestionably fall into
both the above vices. 48. For in the first place
can we imagine a more imprudent general or a more
incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been,
if with so large an army under his command and all
his hopes of ultimate success resting on it, he did
not know the roads and the country, as these writers
say, and had absolutely no idea where he was
marching or against whom, or in fact if his enter-
prise were feasible or not? What they would have
us believe is that Hannibal, who had met with
no check to diminish his high hopes of success,
ventured on a course that no general, even after
a crushing defeat and utterly at his wits' end, would
take, to march, that is, into a country as to which
he had no information. Similarly, in what they say
about the loneliness, and the extreme steepness
and difficulty of the road, the falsehood is manifest.
For they never took the trouble to learn that the
Celts who live near the Rhone not on one or on two
occasions only before Hannibal's arrival but often,
and not at any remote date but quite recently, had
crossed the Alps with large armies and met the
Romans in the field side by side with the Celts who
inhabit the plain of the Po (as I narrated in an
earlier Book) nor are they aware that there is a
considerable population in the Alps themselves;
but in entire ignorance of all this they tell us that
some hero appeared and showed the road. The
natural consequence is that they get into the same
difficulties as tragic dramatists all of whom, to bring
10 τέλος; Ἄννίβας γε μὴν, οὐχ ὃς οὗτοι γράφουσιν, λίγαν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πραγματικῶς ἐχρήτω ταῖς ἐπι-
11 βολαῖς. καὶ γὰρ τὴν τῆς χύρας ἀρετὴν, εἰς ἣν ἐπεβάλετο καθιέναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄχλων ἀλλοτριό-
tητα πρὸς Ῥωμαίοις ἐξητάκει σαφῶς, εἰς τε τὰς μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας ὁδηγοῖς καὶ καθηγεμόσων ἐγχω-
ρίοις ἐχρῆτο τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ἑλπίδων μέλλουσι
12 κοινωνεῖν. ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀπο-
φαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ἱστορηκέναι τῶν παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ τόπους κατωπτευκέναι καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἀλπεων αὐτοὶ κεχρήσθαι πορεία γνώσεως ἕνεκα καὶ θέας.
49 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Πόπλιος μὲν ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὁ παρατηγός ἢμεραὶ ὑστερον τριαὶ τῆς ἀναζυγῆς τῆς τῶν Καρχηδονίων παραγενόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πο-
tαμοῦ διάβασιν, καὶ καταλαβὼν ὥρμηκότας τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἐξενίσθη μὲν ὡς ἐνδέχεται μάλιστα,
2 πεπεισμένος οὐδέποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς τολμήσαι τῇ ὁ ποιῆσαι τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν, διὰ τὸ πλή-
θος καὶ τὴν ἀδεσίαν τῶν κατοικοῦντων τοὺς το-
3 ποὺς βαρβάρων. θεωρῶν δὲ τετολμηκότας, αὐθίς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἥπειγετο, καὶ παραγενόμενος ἐνεβίβαζε
tὰς δυνάμεις. καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀδελφὸν ἐξέσπεμπε ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν Ἰβηρία πράξεις, αὐτὸς δὲ πάλιν ὑποστρέφεισ
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their dramas to a close, require a deus ex machina, as the data they choose on which to found their plots are false and contrary to reasonable probability. These writers are necessarily in the same strait and invent apparitions of heroes and gods, since the beginnings on which they build are false and improbable; for how is it possible to finish conformably to reason what has been begun in defiance of it? Of course Hannibal did not act as these writers describe, but conducted his plans with sound practical sense. He had ascertained by careful inquiry the richness of the country into which he proposed to descend and the aversion of the people to the Romans, and for the difficulties of the route he employed as guides and pioneers natives of the country, who were about to take part in his adventure. On these points I can speak with some confidence as I have inquired about the circumstances from men present on the occasion and have personally inspected the country and made the passage of the Alps to learn for myself and see.

49. Now the Roman Consul Publius arrived at the crossing of the river three days after the departure of the Carthaginians, and finding the enemy gone was in the highest degree astonished, as he had been convinced that they would never venture to march on Italy by this route owing to the number and unruly character of the native inhabitants. On seeing that they had done so he returned with all speed to his ships and began to embark his forces. Sending his brother to conduct the campaign in Spain, he himself turned back and made sail for
5 Ἀννίβας δὲ ποιησάμενος ἔξης ἐπὶ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν πορείαν ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως ἤκε πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην Νήσον, χώραν πολύσχολω καὶ συνοφόρον, ἐξούσαν δὲ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ συμπτωμάτος. ἦ μὲν γὰρ ὁ 'Ῥοδανὸς, ἢ δ’ Ἰσάρας προσαγορευόμενος, ἰέντεις παρ’ ἐκατέραν τὴν πλευράν, ἀποκορυφοῦσαν αὐτῆς τὸ σχῆμα κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους σύμπτωσιν. ἔστε δὲ παραπλησία τῷ μὲν ἐξεί καὶ τῷ σχῆματι τῷ κατ’ Ἀἰγυπτίων καλουμένω Δέλτα, πλὴν ἐκείνου μὲν θάλασσα τὴν μίαν πλευρὰν καὶ τὰς τῶν ποταμῶν ρύσεις ἐπιζηγνυσι, τάυτης δ’ ὄρη δυσπρόσοδα καὶ δυσέμβολα καὶ σχεδὸν ὃς ἐπείναι ἀπρόσιτα. πρὸς ἦν ἀφικόμενος, καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐν αὐτῇ δ’ ἀδελφοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς βασιλείας στασιάζοντας καὶ μετὰ στρατοπέδων ἀντικαθημένους ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιστημονόν τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου καὶ παρακαλοῦντος εἰς τὸ συμπράξαι καὶ συμπεριοῦσας τὴν ἄρχην, [αὐτῶ] ὑπήκουσε, προδήλου σχεδὸν υπαρχοῦσης τῆς πρὸς τὸ παρόν ἐςομείνης αὐτῷ χρείας. διὸ καὶ συνεπιθέμενος καὶ συνεκβαλὼν τὸν ἐτέρον πολλῆς ἐπικουρίας ἐτυχε παρὰ τοῦ κρατῆσαντος· οὐ γὰρ μόνον σίτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἐπιτηδείοις ἀφθόνως ἐχορήγησε τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ πεπονηκότα πάντα διαλλάξας ἐκαίνιοτήσε 12 πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν εὐκαίρως, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους ἐσθήτη καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὑποδέσει κοσμήσας μεγάλην εὐχρηστίαν παρέσχετο πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀρῶν ὑπερβολὰς. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, εὐλαβῶς διακειμένους 118
Italy with the design of marching rapidly through Etruria and reaching the foot of the pass over the Alps before the enemy.

Hannibal, marching steadily from the crossing-place for four days, reached a place called the "Island," a populous district producing abundance of corn and deriving its name from its situation; for the Rhone and Isère running along each side of it meet at its point. It is similar in size and shape to the Egyptian Delta; only in that case the sea forms the base line uniting the two branches of the Nile, while here the base line is formed by a range of mountains difficult to climb or penetrate, and, one may say, almost inaccessible. On arriving there he found two brothers disputing the crown and posted over against each other with their armies, and on the elder one making overtures to him and begging him to assist in establishing him on the throne, he consented, it being almost a matter of certainty that under present circumstances this would be of great service to him. Having united with him therefore to attack and expel the other, he derived great assistance from the victor; for not only did he furnish the army with plenty of corn and other provisions but he replaced all their old and worn weapons by new ones, thus freshening up the whole force very opportunely. He also supplied most of them with warm clothing and foot-wear, things of the greatest possible service to them in crossing the mountains. But the most important of all was, that the Carthaginians being not at all easy on the
πρὸς τὴν διὰ τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων καλουμένων Γαλατῶν πορείαν ἀπουραγήσας μετὰ τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως ἀσφαλῆ παρεσκεύασε τὴν δίοδον αὐτοῖς, ἔως ἡγυγιαν τῇ τῶν Ἀλπεων ὑπερβολῆ.

50 Ἀννίβας δ’ ἐν ἡμέρας δέκα πορευθεὶς παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν εἰς ὁκτακοσίους σταδίους ἡξέτατο τῆς πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς ἀναβολῆς, καὶ συνέβη μεγίστοις αὐτοῖν.

2 περιπεσεῖν κινδύνοις. ἔως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέ- δοις ἦσαν, ἀπείχοντο πάντες αὐτῶν οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων, τὰ μὲν τοὺς ἑπεὶς δεδιότες, τὰ δὲ τοὺς παραπέμποντας βαρβάρους.

3 ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀπηλλάγησαν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἤρξαντο προάγειν εἰς τὰς δυσχωρίας, τότε συναθροίσαντες οἱ τῶν Ἀλλοβρί- γων ἡγεμόνες ίκανὸν τι πλῆθος, προκατέλαβοντο τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους, δι’ ὧν ἔδει τοὺς περὶ τὸν.

4 Ἀννίβαν κατ’ ἀνάγκην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀναβολήν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔκρυσαν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ὀλοσχέρως ἀν δι- ἐφθείραν τὸ στρατεύμα τῶν Καρχηδονίων. νῦν δὲ καταφανεῖς γενόμενοι μεγάλα μὲν καὶ τοὺς περὶ.

5 Ἀννίβαν ἔβλαψαν, οὐκ ἐλάττω δ’ ἔαυτοις. γνοὺς γὰρ ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ὅτι προκατέχου- σιν οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους, αὐτὸς μὲν καταστρατοπεδέως πρὸς ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ἐπέμενε,

6 προέπεμψε δὲ τινας τῶν καθηγουμένων αὐτοῖς Γα- λατῶν χάριν τοῦ κατασκέψασθαι τὴν τῶν ὑπενα- τίων ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν ὀλὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὃν πραξάν- των τὸ συνταχθὲν, ἐπιγνοῦσ’ ὁ στρατηγὸς ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐπιμελώς παρευτακτοῦσι καὶ τηροῦσιν τοὺς τόπους οἱ πολέμιοι, τὰς δὲ νύκτας εἰς τινα παρακεμένην πόλιν ἀπαλλάττονται, πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀρμοζόμενος συνεστήσατο πρᾴν 120
subject of their passage through the territory of the Allobroges, he protected them in the rear with his own forces and enabled them to reach the foot of the pass in safety.

50. After a ten days’ march of eight hundred stades along the bank of the Isère a Hannibal began the ascent of the Alps and now found himself involved in very great difficulties. For as long as they had been in flat country, the various chiefs of the Allobroges had left them alone, being afraid both of the cavalry and of the barbarians who were escorting them. But when the latter had set off on their return home, and Hannibal’s troops began to advance into the difficult region, the Allobrogian chieftains got together a considerable force and occupied advantageous positions on the road by which the Carthaginians would be obliged to ascend. Had they only kept their project secret, they would have utterly annihilated the Carthaginian army, but, as it was, it was discovered, and though they inflicted a good deal of damage on Hannibal, they did more injury to themselves; for the Carthaginian general having learnt that the barbarians had seized on these critical positions, encamped himself at the foot of the pass, and remaining there sent on in advance some of his Gaulish guides, to reconnoitre and report on the enemy’s plan and the whole situation. His orders were executed, and on learning that the enemy remained most strictly at their post during the day-time but retired at night to a neighbouring township, he adapted his measures to this intelligence

a Polybius says simply “the river.”

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8 Τοιαύτην. ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν προῆγεν ἐμφανῶς, καὶ συνεγγύσας ταῖς δυσχωρίαις οὗ μακρὰν
9 τῶν πολεμίων κατεστρατοπέδευσε. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης, συντάξας τὰ πυρὰ καὶ εἰς, τὸ μὲν
πλεῖον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ κατέλιπε, τοὺς δ’ ἐπιτηδευτάτους εὐζώνους ποιήσας διήλθε τὰ
στενὰ τῆν νύκτα καὶ κατέσχε τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων προκαταληφθέντας τῶν, ἀποκεχωρηκότων
τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
51 οὗ συμβάντος καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ βάρβαροι συνθεασάμενοι τὸ γεγονός τὰς μὲν ἄρχας
2 ἀπέστησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θεωροῦντες τὸ τῶν ὑποζυγίων πλήθος καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς δυσχερῶς ἐκμηρυμομένους καὶ μακρῶς τὰς δυσχωρίας, ἐξεκλήθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐξάπτεσθαι τῆς
3 πορείας. τούτων δὲ γενομένου, καὶ κατὰ πλεῖον μέρη προσπεσόντων τῶν βαρβάρων, οὐχ οὔτως ὑπὸ
tῶν ἁνδρῶν ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν τόπων πολὺς ἐγίνετο φθόρος τῶν Ῥαρχηδονίων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἵππων καὶ
4 τῶν ὑποζυγίων. οὐσίας γὰρ οὐ μόνον στενῆς καὶ
tραχείας τῆς προσβολῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κρημνώδους, ἀπὸ
pantὸς κινήματος καὶ πάσης ταραχῆς ἐφέρετο κατὰ
tῶν κρημνῶν ὁμός τοὺς φορτίους πολλὰ τῶν ὑπο-
5 ἡγιῶν. καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἐποίησαν
οἱ τραυματιζόμενοι τῶν ἵππων· τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν
ἀντίοι συμπέπτοντες τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις, ὁπότε διαπτο-
θείεν ἐκ τῆς πληγῆς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς τοὺς προ-
οθεὶν ὄρμην ἐξωθοῦντες πᾶν τὸ παραπάτηστον ἐν ταῖς
6 δυσχωρίαις, μεγάλην ἀπειράξαντο ταραχήν. εἰς δὲ
βλέπων Ἀννίβας, καὶ συλλογίζομενος ὡς οὔδὲ τοῖς
dιαφυγοῦσι τῶν κίνδυνον ἔστι σωτηρία τοῦ σκευο-
φόρου διαφθαρέντος, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς προκατασχόν.
and arranged the following plan. He advanced openly with his whole army, and on approaching the difficult points he encamped not far from the enemy. As soon as it was night, he ordered the fires to be lit, and leaving the greater part of his forces there, took the men most fitted for the enterprise, whom he had lightened of their accoutrements, and passing through the narrow part of the road occupied the posts abandoned by the enemy, who had retired as usual to the town. 51. At daylight the enemy observed what had happened and at first desisted from their project, but afterwards on seeing the long string of sumpter-animals and horsemen slowly and with difficulty winding up the narrow path, they were tempted by this to molest their march. On their doing so and attacking at several different points, the Carthaginians suffered great loss chiefly in horses and sumpter-mules, not so much at the hands of the barbarians as owing to the ground. For the road up the pass being not only narrow and uneven but precipitous, the least movement or disturbance caused many of the animals to be pushed over the precipice with their packs. It was chiefly the horses on being wounded which caused the disturbance, some of them, terrified by the pain, turning and meeting the pack-animals and others rushing on ahead and pushing aside in the narrow path everything that came in their way, thus creating a general confusion. Hannibal, on seeing this and reflecting that there would be no chance of safety even for those who escaped from the battle if the pack-train were destroyed, took with him the men
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tas tην νύκτα τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ὀρμησε παραβοηθή-
7 σων τοὺς τῇ πορεία προλαβοῦσιν. οὐ γενομένου
πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν πολεμίων ἀπώλυντο διὰ τὸ ποιε
thαι τὴν ἐφοδον ἔξ ὑπερδεξίων τῶν Ἀνώβαν, ὦκ
8 ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ τῶν ἴδιων ὁ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πορείαν
θόρυβος ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἦν ἥξετο διὰ τὴν τῶν προειρ-
9 μένων κραυγὴν καὶ συμπλοκήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοὺς μὲν
πλείστους τῶν Ἀλλοβρίγων ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοι
pους τρεφάμενος ἡνάγκασε φυγεῖν εἰς τὴν ὁικέαν,
tότε δὴ τὸ μὲν ἔτι περιεπύμενον πλῆθος τῶν ὑπο-
ξυγίων καὶ τῶν ἵππων μόλις καὶ ταλαιπώρως δήμυ
tάς δυσχωρίας, αὐτὸς δὲ συναθροίσας ὄσους ἦδυ-
vato πλείστους έκ τοῦ κινδύνου, προσέβαλε πρὸς
tὴν πόλιν, ἔξ ἂς ἐποίησαντο τὴν ὄρμην οἱ πολέμιοι.
11 καταλαβὼν δὲ σχεδὸν ἔρημον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐκκλη-
θῆναι πρὸς τὰς ωφελείας, ἔγκρατής ἐγένετο τῆς πό-
λεως. ἐκ δὲ τούτου πολλὰ συνέβη τῶν χρησίμων
12 αὐτῷ πρὸς τε τὸ παρόν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. παρ-
ατικά μὲν γὰρ ἐκομίσατο πλῆθος ἰππῶν καὶ ὑπο-
ξυγίων καὶ τῶν ἁμα τούτους ἐαλωκότων ἄνδρῶν,
eῖς δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἐσχε μὲν καὶ σίτου καὶ θρεμμά-
tῶν ἐπὶ δυνέω καὶ τρισάν ἡμέραις εὐπορίαν, τὸ δὲ
συνέχον, φόβον ἐνειργάσατο τοῖς ἐξῆς, πρὸς τὸ μὴ
tολμᾶν αὐτῷ ῥαδίως ἐγχειρεῖν μηδένα τῶν παρα-
κειμένων ταῖς ἀναβολαῖς.

52 Τότε μὲν ὁν αὐτοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν παρέμβο-
2 λήν, καὶ μίαν ἐπιμείνας ἡμέραν, αὕθις ὄρμα. ταῖς
d' ἐξῆς μέχρι μὲν τινος ἀσφαλῶς διήγε τὴν στρα-
tιῶν. ἶδος δὲ τεταρταῖος ὡν αὕθις εἰς κινδύνους
3 παρεγένετο μεγάλους. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δῖοδον οἱ-
κοινεῖς συμφρονήσαντες ἐπὶ δόλῳ συνήμτων αὐτῶ,
who had occupied the heights at night and hastened to render assistance to the head of the marching column. He inflicted great loss on the Allobroges, as he was charging from higher ground, but the loss was equally heavy among his own troops, since the column on the march was thrown into further confusion in both directions at once owing to the shouting and struggling of those taking part in this combat. It was only when he had put the greater part of the Allobroges to the sword and compelled the rest to take to flight and run for their own land, that the remainder of the pack-train and the horses got slowly and with great difficulty over the dangerous part, and he himself rallying as many troops as he could after the fight, attacked the town from which the enemy had issued to make their onslaught. He found it nearly deserted, as all the inhabitants had been tempted out by hope of pillage, and seized on it. This proved of great service to him for the future as well as the present; for not only did he recover a number of pack-animals and horses and the men who had been captured together with them, but he got a supply of corn and cattle amply sufficient for two or three days, and in addition to this he struck such terror into the next tribes that none of those in the neighbourhood of the ascent were likely to venture to molest him.

52. For the present, he encamped here, and after a stay of one day resumed his march. For the following days he conducted the army in safety up to a certain point, but on the fourth day he was again placed in great danger. The natives near the pass conspired together and came out to meet him with treacherous intentions, holding olive-branches
θαλλεύς ἔχοντες καὶ στεφάνους· τοῦτο γὰρ σχεδὸν
πάσι τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστὶ σύνθημα φιλίας, καθάπερ
4 τὸ κηρύκειον τοῖς Ἑλλησπ. εὐλαβώς δὲ διακεί-
μενος πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην πίστιν Ἀννίβας ἐξήτασε
φιλοτίμως τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβο-
λῆν. τῶν δὲ φασκόντων καλῶς εἰδέναι καὶ τὴν τῆς
πόλεως ἀλώσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐγχειρησάντων αὐτῶν
ἀδικεῖν ἀπώλειαν, καὶ διασαφοῦντων ὅτι πάρεισι
διὰ ταῦτα, βουλόμενοι μήτε ποιῆσαι μήτε παθεῖν
μηδὲν δυσχερές, ὑπισχυομένων δὲ καὶ δῶσεων ἢ
6 αὐτῶν ὄμηρα, πολὺν μὲν χρόνον εὐλαβεῖτο καὶ
διηγήσει τοῖς λεγομένοις, συλλογιζόμενος < Dion ὡς
dεξάμενος > μὲν τὰ προτεινόμενα, τάχ’ ἄν ἵσως
εὐλαβεστέρους καὶ προστέρους ποιήσαι τοὺς παρα-
γεγονότας, μὴ προσδεξάμενος δὲ προδήλους ἐξεὶ πο-
λεμίους αὐτοὺς, συγκατένευσε τοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ
7 συνυπεκρίθη τίθεσθαι φιλίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς. τῶν δὲ
βαρβάρων τὰ ὄμηρα παραδόντων καὶ θρέμασι χρη-
ργοῦντων ἀφθόνως, καὶ καθόλου διδόντων σφάς
αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰς χείρας ἀπαρατηρήτως, ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐπὶ-
στευσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ὡστε καὶ καθηγε-
μόσιν αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἔξεις δυσχωρίας.
8 προπορευομένων δ’ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ δυ’ ἡμέραις, συναθρο-
σθέντες οἱ προειρήμενοι καὶ συνακολουθήσαντες
ἐπιτίθενται, φάραγγα τῶν δύσβατον καὶ κρημνώδη
53 περαιομένων αὐτῶν. ἐν ὧν καρφὶ πάντας ἀν ἄρ-
δην ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, εἰ
μὴ δεδίστης ἀκμήν ἐπὶ ποσὸν καὶ προορώμενοι τὸ
μέλλον τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἔχον ἐν
τῇ πρωτοπορείᾳ, τοὺς δ’ ὀπλίτας ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας.
2 τούτων δ’ ἐφεδρεύοντων ἐλαττον συνέβη γενεσθαι
τὸ πάθος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐστεξαν τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τῶν βαρ-
and wreaths, which nearly all the barbarians use as tokens of friendship, just as we Greeks use the herald's staff. Hannibal, who was a little suspicious of such proffers of alliance, took great pains to ascertain what their project and general motives were. When they told him that they knew all about the capture of the city and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong, and assured him that for this reason they were come to him, as they neither wished to inflict nor to suffer any injury, and on their promising to give him hostages from among themselves, he for long hesitated, distrusting their word. But, reflecting that if he accepted their offers, he might perhaps make them more chary of attacking him and more pacific, but that if he refused, they would certainly be his declared enemies, he finally agreed to their proposals, and feigned to accept their friendship. Upon the barbarians now delivering the hostages and providing him with cattle in abundance, and altogether putting themselves unreservedly into his hands, he trusted in them so far as to employ them as guides for the next difficult part of the road. But after two days' march these same barbarians collecting and following on the heels of the Carthaginians, attacked them as they were traversing a certain difficult and precipitous gorge. 53. On this occasion Hannibal's whole army would have been utterly destroyed, had he not still been a little apprehensive and foreseeing such a contingency placed the pack-train and cavalry at the head of the column and the heavy infantry in the rear. As the latter now acted as a covering force, the disaster was less serious, the infantry
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3 βάρων. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ τούτου συγκυρήσαντος πολύ τι πλήθος καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων
4 καὶ τῶν ἱππών διεφθάρη. τῶν γὰρ τόπων ὑπερ-
δεξίων ὄντων τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀντιπαράγοντες οἱ
βάρβαροι ταῖς παρωρείαις, καὶ τοῖς μὲν τὰς πέτρας
ἐπικυλίοντες, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ χειρὸς τοῖς λίθοις τύπτοντες,
5 εἰς ὀλοσχερή διατροπὴν καὶ κύδυνον ἦγον, οὕτως
ώστε ἀναγκασθῆναι τὸν Ἀννίβαν μετὰ τῆς ἡμισείας
dυνάμεως νυκτερίσαι περὶ τι λευκόπετρου ὄχυρον
χωρὶς τῶν ἱππῶν καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων, ἐφεδρεύοντα
τούτοις, ἦσς ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ νυκτὶ ταῦτα μόλις ἐξεμηρύ-
6 σατο τῆς χαράδρας. τῇ δὲ ἐπαύριον τῶν πολεμίων
χωρισθέντων, συνάπτας τοὺς ἱππεύσαι καὶ τοὺς ὑποζυ-
γίους προῆγε πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τὰς ἀνωτάτων τῶν
Ἀλπεων, ὀλοσχερεὶ μὲν οὐδενὶ περπάτων ἐτί συ-
στήματι τῶν βαρβάρων, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ κατὰ τό-
7 ποὺς παρενοχλούμενος ὕπτ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ
tῆς οὐραγίας, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτοπορείας ἀπέσπων
tῶν σκευοφόρων ἐνα, προσπίπτοντες εὐκαίρως.
8 μεγίστην δ' αὐτῷ παρέίχετο χρείαν τὰ θηρία· καθ'
διὸν γὰρ ἄν τόπον ὑπάρχοι τῆς πορείας ταῦτα, πρὸς
tὸν τὸ κέρος οὐκ ἐτόλμων οἱ πολεμίοι προσέναι,
tὸ παράδοξον ἐκπληθτέμενοι τῆς τῶν ζώων φαντα-
9 σίας. ἐνατάιος δὲ διανύσας εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς αὐτοῦ
cατεστρατοπέδευσε, καὶ δ' ἡμέρας προσέμενε, βου-
λόμενος ἀμα μὲν ἀναταύσαι τοὺς διασφοξιομένους,
10 ἀμα δὲ προσδέξασθαι τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους. ἐν ὦ
καλῷ συνέβη πολλοὺς μὲν ἱπποὺς τῶν ἀπεπτυγμέ-
νων, πολλὰ δ' ὑποζύγια τῶν ἀπετριφότων τὰ φορ-
tία παραδόξως ἀναδραμεῖν τοῖς στίβοις ἐπόμενα
54 καὶ συνάψαι πρὸς τὴν παρεμβολὴν. τῆς δὲ χιόνος

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meeting the brunt of the attack. But in spite of all this a great many men, pack-animals, and horses were lost. For the enemy being on higher ground skirted along the slopes and either by rolling rocks down or by hurling stones from the hand threw the Carthaginians into such extreme peril and confusion that Hannibal was compelled to pass the night with half of his force at a certain place defended by bare rocks and separated from his horses and pack-train, whose advance he waited to cover, until after a whole night's labour they managed to extricate themselves from the defile. Next day, the enemy having taken their departure, he joined the cavalry and pack-animals and advanced to the summit of the pass, encountering no longer any massed force of barbarians, but molested from time to time and in certain places by some of them who took advantage of the ground to attack him either from the rear or from the front and carry off some of the pack-animals. In these circumstances the elephants were of the greatest service to him; for the enemy never dared to approach that part of the column in which these animals were, being terrified by the strangeness of their appearance. After an ascent of nine days Hannibal reached the summit, and encamping there remained for two days to rest the survivors of his army and wait for stragglers. During this interval a good many of the horses which had broken away in terror and a number of those sumpter-animals which had thrown off their packs returned strangely enough, having followed the track of the march, and came into the camp. 54. As it was now close
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ηδη περι τοὺς ἀκροὺς ἄθροιζομένης διὰ τὸ συνάπτειν τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος δύσιν, θεωρῶν τὰ πλῆθη δυσθύμως διακείμενα καὶ διὰ τὴν προγεγενήμενην τα-2 λαιπωρίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἑτὶ προσδοκομμένην, ἐπει-ράτο συναθροίσαι παρακαλείν, μὲν ἔχων ἀφορμὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν. οὕτως γὰρ ὑποτεπτύκει τοῖς προειρημένοις ὀρεσιν ὡστε συν-theadrovmevnwv amfoi akropolewv fainesthai dia-3 thesn echein tas "Alpeis tis olis 'Italiias. dioper endeiknymenos authois ta peri tovn Padon pedia, kai katholou tis euvoias upomymhskwv tis tis katoikounwv auta Galatwn, ame de kai tov tis 

4 seis epoiste tois anbropous. thi de epaurion ana-zeugias enhexeto tis katabasewos. en h polemious mewn ouketi perieutuxh plhn twv lathra kakhopoiwnwv, upo de twv topwv kai tis xivous ou pollyw leipontas appebale twv katas thn anabasin ftharvn-

5 twv. ouvsis gar stenhs kai kathferous tis kata-basewos, tis de xivous adhlon poioyshis ekastois tihn epibasin, pain to parapeson tis odou kai 
6 sofalen efereito kata twv kramwv. ouh mhn alla tautein mewn upheferon thn talaiopirian, ate sun-

7 theis ouites hde tois toioutois kakhise. ame de tw paragenevesh th prs toisoud topon, ouute tois theriois ouite tois upozugwios dunaton hven parethein dia thn stenvntia, schexon epitri hmiastadia tis aporrwgos kai pr to mou ouvsis, tote de kai maal- 

8 louw eti prosfattos aperrwugias, entatha palw athw- 

muhsai kai diatrapnynai synbhe th plhados. to men ouv prwtos epevaleto perielevein tas duhshrias 

o twv Karrhdonwv strathtgos. epigenvomevth de 130
on the setting of the Pleiads snow had already gathered on the summit, and noticing that the men were in bad spirits owing to all they had suffered up to now and expected to suffer he summoned them to a meeting and attempted to cheer them up, relying chiefly for this purpose on the actual view of Italy, which lies so close under these mountains, that when both are viewed together the Alps stand to the whole of Italy in the relation of a citadel to a city. Showing them, therefore, the plain of the Po, and reminding them of the friendly feelings of the Gauls inhabiting it, while at the same time pointing out the situation of Rome itself, he to some extent restored their spirits. Next day he broke up his camp and began the descent. During this he encountered no enemy, except a few skulking marauders, but owing to the difficulties of the ground and the snow his losses were nearly as heavy as on the ascent. The descending path was very narrow and steep, and as both men and beasts could not tell on what they were treading owing to the snow, all that stepped wide of the path or stumbled were dashed down the precipice. This trial, however, they put up with, being by this time familiar with such sufferings, but they at length reached a place where it was impossible for either the elephants or the pack-animals to pass owing to the extreme narrowness of the path, a previous landslip having carried away about one and a half stades of the face of the mountain and a further landslip having recently occurred, and here the soldiers once more became disheartened and discouraged. The Carthaginian general at first thought of avoiding the difficult part by a detour, but as a fresh fall of snow made progress
χίώνος καὶ ταῦτην ἀδύνατον ποιοῦσθη τὴν πορείαν,
55 ἀπέστη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. τὸ γὰρ συμβαίνον ήδιν ἢ
καὶ παρηλλαγμένον. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆν προὔπορχοσον ξίνα
καὶ διαμεμενηκυίαν ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον χειμῶν
νος ἀρτι τῆς ἐπί έτους πεπτωκυίας, ταύτην μὲν εὐ-
διάκοπτον εἶναι συνεβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον
υόσαν ἀπαλῆν ὑπάρχει καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδέπω βάθος
2 ἐχειν. ὅποτε δὲ ταύτην διαπατήσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπο-
κάτω καὶ συνεστηκυίαν ἐπιβαίει, οὐκέτι διέκοπτον,
ἀλλʼ ἐπέπλεον ὁλισθάνοντες ἀμφοτέροις ἀμα τοῖς
ποσὶ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῇ γῆς συμβαίνει τοῖς διὰ τῶν
3 ἀκροπήλων πορευομένοις. τὸ δὲ συνεξακολουθοῦν
4 τούτοις ἐπὶ δυσχερέστερον ὑπήρχει. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄν-
δρες οὐ δυνάμενοι τὴν κάτω χώνα διακόπτειν, ὅποτε
πεσόντες βουληθεὶν ἢ τοῖς γόνασιν ἢ ταῖς χερσὶ
προσεξερεύσασθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐξαναστασιν, τότε καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐπέπλεον ἀμα πάσι τοῖς ἐρείσμασιν, ἐπὶ
5 πολὺ καταφερῶν ὄντων τῶν χωρίων: τὰ δʼ ὑπο-
ξύγα διέκοπτεν, ὅτε πέσοι, τὴν κάτω χώνα κατα
τὴν διανάστασιν: διακόμβαντα δʼ ἐμενε μετὰ τῶν φορ-
τῶν οἶνον καταπεπηγότα διὰ τὸ βάρος καὶ διὰ
6 τὸ πήγαμα τῆς προὔπορχοσῆς χίώνος. οθὲν ἀπο-
στάς τῆς τουαύτης ἐλπίδος ἐστρατοπεδεύει, περὶ τὴν
ῥάχιν, διαμιγάμενος τὴν ἐπʻ αὐτῆς χίώνα, καὶ μετὰ
ταῦτα παραστῆσας τὰ πλήθη τὸν κρημνὸν ἐξωκο-
7 δόμει μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὑπο-
ξυγίοις καὶ τοῖς ἵπποις ἰκανήν ἐποίησε πάροδον ἐν
ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ. διὸ καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εὐθέως διαγαγὼν
καὶ καταστροτοπεδεύσας περί τοὺς ἐκφεύγοντας ἢδη
8 τὴν χώνα τόπους διαφηκε πρὸς τὰς νομᾶς, τούς δὲ
Νομάδας ἀνὰ μέρος προῆγε πρὸς τὴν ὀικοδομίαν,
καὶ μόλις ἐν ἡμέραις τρισὶν κακοπαθῆσας διήγαγε τὰ
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impossible he had to abandon this project. 55. The state of matters was altogether peculiar and unusual. The new snow which had fallen on the top of the old snow remaining since the previous winter, was itself yielding, both owing to its softness, being a fresh fall, and because it was not yet very deep, but when they had trodden through it and set foot on the congealed snow beneath it, they no longer sunk in it, but slid along it with both feet, as happens to those who walk on ground with a coat of mud on it. But what followed on this was even more trying. As for the men, when, unable to pierce the lower layer of snow, they fell and then tried to help themselves to rise by the support of their knees and hands, they slid along still more rapidly on these, the slope being exceedingly steep. But the animals, when they fell, broke through the lower layer of snow in their efforts to rise, and remained there with their packs as if frozen into it, owing to their weight and the congealed condition of this old snow. Giving up this project, then, Hannibal encamped on the ridge, sweeping it clear of snow, and next set the soldiers to work to build up the path along the cliff, a most toilsome task. In one day he had made a passage sufficiently wide for the pack-train and horses; so he at once took these across and encamping on ground free of snow, sent them out to pasture, and then took the Numidians in relays to work at building up the path, so that with great difficulty in three days he managed to
θηρία. καὶ τάδε συνεβαίνει κακῶς ύπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ δια-
9 τεθείσαν· τῶν γαρ Ἀλπεων τὰ μὲν ἀκρα καὶ τὰ
πρὸς τὰς υπερβολὰς ἀνήκοντα τελέως ἀδενδρα καὶ
ψιλὰ πάντ᾽ ἔστι διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς ἐπιμένειν τὴν χιόνα
καὶ θέρους καὶ χεμώνος, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπὸ μέσην τὴν παρ-
ώρειαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν μεροῖν ύλοφόρα καὶ δεν-
δροφόρα καὶ τὸ ὀλὸν οὐκήσμι᾽ ἔστων.

56 Ἀννίβας δὲ συναθροίσας ὠμοί πάσαν τὴν δύνα-
2 μαν κατέβαινε, καὶ τριτάιος ἀπὸ τῶν προειρήμενων
κρημνῶν διανύσας ὑπατο τῶν ἐπιπέδων, πολλοὺς
μὲν ἀπολωλεκὼς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὑπὸ τε τῶν πολε-
μῶν καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐν τῇ καθόλου πορεία, πολ-
λοὺς δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν κρημνῶν καὶ τῶν υδραυλικῶν κατὰ
τὰς Ἀλπεῖς οὐ μόνον ἄνδρας, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ὑποὺς
καὶ ὑποζύγια. τέλος δὲ τὴν μὲν πάσαν πορείαν ἐκ
Καυνῆς πόλεως ἐν πέντε μηνὶ ποιησάμενος, τὴν δὲ
tῶν Ἀλπεων υπερβολὴν ἡμέραις δεκαπέντε, κατήρε
τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ τὸ τῶν
4 Ἰππόμβρων ἔθνος, ἔχων τὸ διασφολόμενον μέρος τῆς
μὲν τῶν Λυβῶν δυνάμεως πεζοὺς μυρίους καὶ δια-
χιλίους, τῆς δὲ τῶν Ἰβηρῶν εἰς ὀκτακισχίλιους, ἴτ-
πεῖς δὲ τοὺς πάντας οὐ πλείους ἑξακισχίλιους, ὡς
αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ στήλῃ τῇ περὶ τοῦ πλῆθους ἐχούσῃ τὴν
ἐπιγραφῆν ἐπὶ Λακωνὶς διασαφεί.
5 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καροῦς, ὡς ἐπὰνω προεῖπα,
Πόπλιος ἀπολελουπὼς τὰς δυνάμεις Γναῖῳ τάδελφῳ,
akai παρακεκληκὼς αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι τῶν ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ
πραγμάτων καὶ πολεμεῖν ἐρρωμένως Ἀσδρουβά,
6 κατέπλευσε μετ᾽ ὀλίγων αὐτὸς εἰς Πίσας. ποιησά-
μενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ Τυρρηνίας, καὶ παραλαβὼν
tὰ παρὰ τῶν ἐξαπελέκεων στρατόπεδα τὰ προκαθή-
μενα καὶ προσπολεμοῦντα τοῖς Βοίοις, ἤκε πρὸς τὰ
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get the elephants across, but in a wretched condition from hunger; for the summits of the Alps—and the parts near the top of the passes are all quite treeless and bare owing to the snow lying there continuously both winter and summer, but the slopes half-way up on both sides are grassy and wooded and on the whole inhabitable.

56. Hannibal having now got all his forces together continued the descent, and in three days' march from the precipice just described reached flat country. He had lost many of his men by the hands of the enemy in the crossing of rivers and on the march in general, and the precipices and difficulties of the Alps had cost him not only many men, but a far greater number of horses and sumpter-animals. The whole march from New Carthage had taken him five months, and he had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, and now, when he thus boldly descended into the plain of the Po and the territory of the Insubres, his surviving forces numbered twelve thousand African and eight thousand Iberian foot, and not more than six thousand horse in all, as he himself states in the inscription on the column at Lacinium relating to the number of his forces.

About the same time, as I stated above, Publius Scipio, leaving his forces with his brother Gnaeus with orders to conduct operations in Spain and vigorously combat Hasdrubal, arrived by sea at Pisa with a small following. Marching through Etruria and taking over from the Praetors the frontier legions which were engaged with the Boii, he reached
perὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἐπείχε τοὺς πολεμίοις, σπεύδων συμβαλεῖν εἰς μάχην.

57 Ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐπειδή καὶ τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀμφοτέρων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἡγάγομεν, πρὸ τοῦ τῶν ἀγώνων ἀρξασθαι βραχέα βουλόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀμυδόντων τῇ πραγματείᾳ

2 διελθεῖν. ἦσος γὰρ δὴ τινὲς ἐπιζητήσουσι πῶς πεποιημένοι τὸν πλείστον λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ Διβύνην καὶ κατ᾽ Ἰβηρίαν τόπων οὕτε περὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ Ἡρακλέους στῆλας στόματος οὕδεν ἐπὶ πλείων εἰρήκαμεν οὕτε περὶ τῆς ἐξωθημάτως καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ

3 συμβαίνοντων ἰδιωμάτων, οὐδὲ μὴν περὶ τῶν Βρεττανικῶν νῆσων καὶ τῆς τοῦ καττίπερου κατασκευῆς, ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγυριεῶν καὶ χρυσεῶν τῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ὑπὲρ ὅν οἱ συγγραφεῖς ἀμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸν πλείστον διατίθενται λόγον.

4 Ἡμεῖς δ᾽ οὐχὶ νομίζοντες ἄλλοτριον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ἱστορίας διὰ τοῦτο παρελείπομεν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν ὦ βουλόμενοι παρ᾽ ἕκαστα διασπᾶν τὴν διήγησιν οὐδ᾽ ἀποπλανᾶν ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματικῆς ὑποθέσεως τοὺς φιληκούντας, δεύτερον δὲ κρίνοντες οὐ διερρυμένην οὐδ᾽ ἐν παρέγγειλι ποιήσασθαι τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν μνήμην, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἱδίαν καὶ τόπον καὶ καιρὸν ἀπονεμομέναις τῷ μέρει τούτῳ καθ᾽ ὄσον οἷοι τ᾽ ἐσμὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξηγήσα-}

5 θέσεως, οὐ τοῖς τετράρχεις οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἑβδης, εἰ δέ τινας τόπους ἐρχόμενοι τοιοῦτος παραλείπομεν τοῦτο τῷ μέρος διὰ τὰς προερημένας αἰτίας.

6 διὸπερ οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἑβδης, εἰ δέ τινας τόπους ἐρχόμενοι τοιοῦτος παραλείπομεν τοῦτο τῷ μέρος διὰ τὰς προερημένας αἰτίας.

7 εἰ δὲ τινὲς πάντως ἐπιζητοῦσι κατὰ τόπον καὶ κατὰ μέρος τῶν τοιούτων ἄκουειν, ἦσος ἄγνοοι παραπλησίων τι πάσχοντες τοῖς λίχνοις τῶν δειπνητῶν.

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the plain of the Po, and encamping there, waited for the enemy, being anxious to give him battle.

57. Now that I have brought my narrative and the war and the two generals into Italy, I desire, before entering upon the struggle, to say a few words on what I think proper to my method in this work. Some readers will perhaps ask themselves why, since most of what I have said relates to Africa and Spain, I have not said a word more about the mouth of the Mediterranean at the Pillars of Hercules, or about the Outer Sea and its peculiarities, or about the British Isles and the method of obtaining tin, and the gold and silver mines in Spain itself, all matters concerning which authors dispute with each other at great length. I have omitted these subjects not because I think they are foreign to my history, but in the first place because I did not wish to be constantly interrupting the narrative and distracting readers from the actual subject, and next because I decided not to make scattered and casual allusions to such matters, but assigning the proper place and time to their special treatment to give as true an account of all as is in my power. No one then need be surprised when in the course of my history I reach such localities, if I avoid for the reason here stated any description of them. But if there be any who insist on such descriptions of each place that may be mentioned, they are perhaps unaware that they are much in the case of gourmands at a supper party

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8 καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πάντων ἀπογενόμενοι τῶν παρακειμένων οὔτε κατὰ τὸ παρόν οὐδενὸς ἀληθινῶς ἀπολαύσοι τῶν βρωμάτων οὔτε εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὦφελιμον ἡς αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνάδοσιν καὶ τροφὴν κομίζουται, πάν δὲ τούναντίον, οἱ τε περὶ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιοῦντες οὔτε τῆς παρανύκτικα διαγωγῆς ἀληθινῶς οὔτε τῆς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὦφελείας στοχάζονται δεόντως.

58 Διότι μὲν οὖν εἰ καὶ τὶ τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν ἀλλο, καὶ τούτῳ προσδεῖ λόγον καὶ διορθώσεως ἀληθινότερα, προφανεῖ εἰκ πολλῶν, μάλιστα δἐ έκ τούτων. σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων, εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, τῶν πλείστων συγγραφέων πεπειραμένων μὲν ἐξηγεισθαί τὰς ἱδιότητας καὶ θέσεις τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐσχάτιας τόπων τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένης, εἰ πολλοίς δὲ τῶν πλείστων διημαρτηκότων, παραλείπειν μὲν οὐδαμῶς καθηκεί, ῥητεύον δὲ τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐκ παρέργου καὶ διερρυμμένως, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἐπιστάσεως, καὶ ῥητεύον οὐκ ἐπιτιμώντας οὐδ’ ἐπιπλήττοντας, ἐπαινοῦντας δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ διορθομένους τὴν ἀγνοιαν αὐτῶν, γνωσκούντας ὅτι κακεῖνοι τῶν νόν καιρῶν ἐπιλαβόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς εἰρημένων εἰς διόρθωσιν ἀν καὶ μετάθεσιν ἢγαγον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ προγεγονότι χρόνῳ σπανίος ἀν εὑροὶ τις τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ἐπιβεβλημένους πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐσχατιὰς διὰ τὸ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἀδύνατον. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ κατὰ θάλατταν τότε κινοῦνται καὶ δυσεξαρίθμητοι, πολλαπλάσιοι δὲ τούτων οἱ κατὰ γῆν. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τις ἡ κατ’ ἀνάγκην ἡ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐξικούτο πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἦνυε τὸ προκειμένου. δυσχερὲς μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον τινῶν αὐτόπτητη γενέσθαι.
who taste everything on the table and neither truly enjoy any dish at the moment nor digest any enough to derive beneficial nourishment from it in the future. So those who act in the same way about reading do not properly attain either present entertainment or future benefit.

58. That no part of history requires more circumspection and more correction by the light of truth than this is evident from many considerations and chiefly from the following. While nearly all authors or at least the greater number have attempted to describe the peculiarities and the situation of the countries at the extremities of the known world, most of them are mistaken on many points. We must therefore by no means pass over the subject, but we must say a word to them, and that not casually and by scattered allusions, but giving due attention to it, and in what we say we must not find fault with or rebuke them, but rather be grateful to them and correct them when wrong, knowing as we do that they too, had they the privilege of living at the present day, would correct and modify many of their own statements. In old times, indeed, we find very few Greeks who attempted to inquire into the outlying parts of the world, owing to the practical impossibility of doing so; for the sea had so many perils that it is difficult to enumerate them, and the land ever so many more. Again, even if anyone by his own choice or by the force of circumstances reached the extremity of the world, that did not mean that he was able to accomplish his purpose. For it was a difficult matter to see many things at all closely with one's own eyes, owing to
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dià τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐκβεβαρβαρώσθαι, τοὺς δ’ ἐρήμους εἶναι τόπους, ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον τὸ περὶ τῶν ὁραθέντων διὰ λόγου τι γνῶναι καὶ μαθεῖν διὰ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἔξηλλαγμένον. ἔαν δὲ καὶ γνῶ τις, ἔτι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ δυσχερέστερον τὸ τῶν ἐυραικῶτων τινὰ μετρίω χρῆσθαι τρόπῳ καὶ καταφρονήσαντα τῆς παραδοξολογίας καὶ τερατεῖας εαυτοῦ χάρων προτιμήσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ μηδὲν τῶν πάρεξ ὑότων ἡμῖν ἀναγγείλαι. διὸπερ οὐ δυσχεροῦσ, ἀλλ’ ἀδυνατοῦ σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης κατὰ γε τοὺς προγεγονότας καὶ ροὺς τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἱστορίας ύπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων, οὐκ εἰ τι παρέλιπον οἱ συγγραφεῖς ἡ διημαρτον, ἐπιτιμᾶν αὐτοῖς ἄξιον, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἔγνωσάν τι καὶ προεβίβαζαν τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν περὶ τούτων ἐν τοιούτως καρποῖς, ἔπαινεν καὶ θαυμάζειν αὐτοὺς δίκαιον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ’ ἡμῖς τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου δυναστείαν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τόπων διὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ὑπεροχῆν σχεδὸν ἀπάντων πλωτῶν καὶ πορευτῶν γεγονότων, ἀπολειμμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἀνδρῶν τῆς περὶ τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς πράξεις φιλοτιμίας, ἐκ δὲ τούτων πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀφορμὰς εἰληφότων εἰς τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν καὶ φιλομαθεῖν περὶ τῶν προειρημένων, δέον ἂν εἰη καὶ βέλτιον γινώσκειν καληθυνότερον ύπὲρ τῶν πρότερον ἀγνοομένων. ὅπερ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ τῇ πειρασμοθα ποιεῖν, λαβόντες ἀρμόζοντα τόπον ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, τοὺς τῇ φιλοπειστοῦντας ὀδοσχερέστερον βουλήσο- μεθα συνεπιστήσαι περὶ τῶν προειρημένων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πλεῖον τούτου χάρων ὑπεδεξάμεθα τοὺς κινδύνους [καὶ τὰς κακοπαθείας] τοὺς συμβάντας ἡμῖν ἐν πλάνῃ τῇ κατὰ Διβύνη καὶ κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν, ἐτὶ δὲ 140
some of the countries being utterly barbarous and others quite desolate, and it was still more difficult to get information about the things one did see, owing to the difference of the language. Then, even if anyone did see for himself and observe the facts, it was even still more difficult for him to be moderate in his statements, to scorn all talk of marvels and monsters and, preferring truth for its own sake, to tell us nothing beyond it. 59. As, therefore, it was almost impossible in old times to give a true account of the regions I speak of, we should not find fault with the writers for their omissions or mistakes, but should praise and admire them, considering the times they lived in, for having ascertained something on the subject and advanced our knowledge. But in our own times since, owing to Alexander’s empire in Asia and that of the Romans in other parts of the world, nearly all regions have become approachable by sea or land, since our men of action in Greece are relieved from the ambitions of a military or political career and have therefore ample means for inquiry and study, we ought to be able to arrive at a better knowledge and something more like the truth about lands which were formerly little known. This is what I myself will attempt to do when I find a suitable place in this work for introducing the subject, and I shall then ask those who are curious about such things to give their undivided attention to me, in view of the fact that I underwent the perils of journeys through Africa, Spain, and Gaul, and of voyages on
Γαλατίαν καὶ τὴν ἔξωθεν ταύτας ταῖς χώραις συγ-
8 κυροῦσαν θάλατταν, ἵνα διορθωσάμενοι τὴν τῶν
προγεγονότων ἁγνοιαν ἐν τούτοις γνώριμα ποιή-
σωμεν τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ ταύτα τὰ μέρη τῆς οἰκου-
μένης.
9 Νῦν δὲ ἀναδραμόντες ἐπὶ τὴν παρέκβασιν τῆς
διηγήσεως πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν τοὺς γενομένους
ἐκ παρατάξεως ἐν Ἱταλίᾳ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχη-
δονίοις ἁγώνας.

60 Τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅσον ἔχων
'Αννίβας ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ἰταλίαν, ἦδη δεδηλώκαμεν.
2 μετὰ δὲ τὴν εἰσβολὴν καταστρατοπεδεύσας ὑπὸ αὐ-
τὴν τὴν παρὼρειαν τῶν Ἀλπεων τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς
3 ἀνελάβαμεν τάς δυνάμεις. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀναβάσεων καὶ καταβάσεων, ἐτὶ δὲ τραχυτήτων τῶν
κατὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, δεινῶς τεταλαπωρήκει τὸ σύμ-
παν αὐτῷ στρατόπεδον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων
σπάνει καὶ ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων ἀθεραπευσάις κα-
κῶς ἀπῆλλατε. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ καθυφεῖνθ' ἐαυτοὺς
δλοσχέρως διὰ τὴν ἐνδεεαν καὶ συνεχειαν τῶν πό-
νων. οὔτε γὰρ διακομίζεων εἰς τοσοῦτας μυράδας
diα τοιοῦτων τόπων δαιμιλή τὰ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴ
οἰοί τῷ ἤσαν, ἃ τε καὶ παρεκόμιζον ἁμι τῇ τῶν
ὑποζυγίων καταφθορᾶ, καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείστα συν-
5 απώλυτο. διόπερ ὁμήχας ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ
dιαβάσεως, πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους καὶ τρισ-
μυρίους ἔχων, ἐπεις δὲ πλείους ὀκτακισχιλίων,
σχεδόν ποὺ τὴν ἡμίσειαν τῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ
6 ἐπάνω προείπον, ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς διεφθειρεν. οἱ
γε μὴν σῳδέντες καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθανείαις καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ
dιαθέσει διὰ τὴν συνεχειαν τῶν προεηρμένων πό-
7 νων οἷον ἀποτεθηρωμένοι πάντες ἦσαν. πολλὴν
the seas that lie on the farther side of these countries, mostly for this very purpose of correcting the errors of former writers and making those parts of the world also known to the Greeks.

But now returning to the point at which I digressed from my narrative I shall attempt to describe the battles between the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.

60. I have already stated the strength of Hannibal's army when he entered Italy. Once arrived there he at first encamped at the very foot of the Alps to refresh his forces. For his men had not only suffered terribly from the toil of ascent and descent of the passes and the roughness of the road but they were also in wretched condition owing to the scarcity of provisions and neglect of their persons, many having fallen into a state of utter despondency from prolonged toil and want of food. For it had been impossible to transport over such ground a plentiful supply of provisions for so many thousand men, and with the loss of the pack-animals the greater part of what they were carrying perished. So that while Hannibal started from the passage of the Rhone with thirty-eight thousand foot and more than eight thousand horse he lost in crossing the passes, as I said above, about half his whole force, while the survivors, owing to the continued hardships they had suffered, had become in their external appearance and general condition more like beasts than men. Hannibal, therefore, made every provision
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οὖν ποιούμενος πρόνοιαν Ἄννιβας τής ἐπιμελείας αὐτῶν ἀνεκτάτο καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἁμα καὶ τὰ σώματα
8 τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ὑπποι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προσανειληφνίας ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως, τῶν
Ταυρίνων, οἱ τυγχάνονσι πρὸς τῇ παρωρείᾳ κατοικοῦντες, στασιαζόντων μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἰνσομβρας,
9 ἀπιστοῦντων δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτοὺς εἰς φιλίαν προκαλεῖτο καὶ συμμαχίαν
οὐχ ὑπακούόντων δὲ, περιστρατοπεδεύσας τὴν βαρ-ρυτάτην πόλιν ἐν τρισὶν ἴμέραις ἑξεπολύρκησε.
10 κατασφάξας δὲ τοὺς ἐναντιωθέντας αὐτῷ τοιούτων ἐνεργάσατο φόβον τοῖς σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσι τῶν
βαρβάρων ὡστε πάντας ἐκ χειρὸς παραγινθεῖσαι,
11 διδόντας αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πίστιν. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλήθος τῶν τὰ πεδία κατοικοῦντων Κελτῶν ἐσποῦ-
δαζε μὲν κοινωνεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τῶν πραγμά-
tων κατὰ τὴν ἕξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολῆν. παρηλλαχότων δὲ
tῶν Ἑρωμαίκων στρατοπέδων ἦδη τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ διακεκλεικότων, ἡσυχίαν ἤγουν. τινὲς δὲ
12 καὶ συστρατεύειν ἡγαγκάζοντο τοῖς Ἑρωμαίοις. εἰς
α βλέπων Ἄννιβας ἔκρυνε μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλὰ προ-
ἀγειν εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν καὶ πράττειν τι πρὸς τὸ θαρ-
ρῆσαι τοὺς βουλομένους μετέχειν σφίσι τῶν αὐτῶν
ἐλπίδων.

61 Προθείμενος δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀκούων
ηδὴ διαβεβηκέναι τὸν Πάδον μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων
καὶ σύνεγγυς εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡπίστει τοῖς
2 προσαγγελλομένοις, ἐνθυμούμενος μὲν ὅτι πρότερον
ἡμέρας ὀλίγαις αὐτῶν ἀπέλυσε περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδα-
νοῦ διάβασιν, καὶ συλλογιζόμενος τὸν τε πλοῦν τὸν
ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας εἰς Τυρρηνίαν ὡς μακρός καὶ δυσ-
3 παρακόμιστος εἰη, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὴν πορείαν
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for carefully attending to the men and the horses likewise until they were restored in body and spirit. After this, his forces having now picked up their strength, when the Taurini who live at the foot of the mountains quarrelled with the Insubres and showed no confidence in the Carthaginians, he at first made overtures for their friendship and alliance, but on their rejecting these he encamped round their chief city and reduced it in three days. By massacring those who had been opposed to him he struck such terror into the neighbouring tribes of barbarians that they all came in at once and submitted to him. The remaining Celtic inhabitants of the plain were impatient to join the Carthaginians, as had been their original design, but as the Roman legions had advanced beyond most of them and cut them off, they kept quiet, some even being compelled to serve with the Romans. Hannibal, in view of this, decided not to delay, but to advance and try by some action to encourage those who wished to take part in his enterprise.

61. Such was the purpose he had in view when the news reached him that Publius had already crossed the Po and was quite near at hand. At first he refused to believe it, reflecting that he had left him only a few days previously near the crossing of the Rhone and that the coasting voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was long and difficult, and learning further by inquiry that the road through
ΤΗΣ ΙΤΑΛΙΑΣ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑΣ "ΑΛΠΕΩΝ ΩΣ ΠΟΛΛΗ ΚΑΙ ΔΥΣ-
ΔΙΟΔΟΣ ΥΠΑΡΧΕΙ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΟΙ. ΠΛΕΙΩΝΩΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ
ΣΑΦΕΣΤΕΡΩΣ ΑΕΙ ΠΡΟΣΑΓΓΕΛΛΟΝΤΩΝ, ΘΑΥΜΑΖΕ ΚΑΙ
ΚΑΤΕΠΕΠΛΗΚΤΟ ΤΗΝ ΌΛΗΝ ΕΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΝ
ΤΟΥ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΥ. ΤΟ ΔΕ ΠΑΡΑΠΛΗΣΙΟΝ ΣΥΝΕΒΑΙΝΕ ΠΑ-
ΣΧΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΡΙΟΥΝ. ΤΑΣ ΜΕΝ ΓΑΡ ΑΡΧΑΣ ΟΥΔΈ
ΕΠΙΒΑΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ ΤΗΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΩΝ "ΑΛΠΕΩΝ ΉΛΠΙΣΕ ΠΟΡΕΙΑ ΤΟΝ
'ΑΝΝΙΒΑΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΝ ΑΛΛΟΦΥΛΟΙΣ' ΕΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΛΗ-
ΣΑΙ, ΚΑΤΑΦΘΑΡΗΣΕΙΣΙΑΙ ΠΡΟΔΗΛΩΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΥΠΕΛΑΜΒΑΝΕ.
ΔΙΟΠΕΡ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΩΝ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΙΣ, ΩΣ ΕΠΙΨΗ-
ΝΕΤΟ ΚΑΙ ΣΕΣΩΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΟΡΚΕΙΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΉΘΗ ΤΙΝΑΣ
ΠΟΛΕΙΣ ΕΝ 'ΙΤΑΛΙΑ, ΚΑΤΕΠΕΠΛΗΚΤΟ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΛΜΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ
ΠΑΡΑΒΟΛΟΝ ΤΑΝΔΡΟΣ. ΤΟ ΔΕ ΑΥΤΟ ΣΥΝΕΒΑΙΝΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ
ΕΝ ΤΗ 'ΡΩΜΗ ΠΕΠΟΝΘΕΝΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣΠΙΤΩΝΤΩΝ.
ΑΡΤΙ ΓΑΡ ΤΗΣ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΑΣ ΦΗΜΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΛΗΓΟΎΣΗΣ ΥΠΕΡ
ΤΩΝ ΚΑΡΧΙΣΩΝ ΟΤΙ ΖΑΚΑΝΘΑΝ ΕΙΛΗΦΑΣΙ, ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣ
ΤΑΥΤΗΝ ΒΕΒΟΥΛΕΥΜΕΝΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΕΝΝΟΙΑΝ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ
ΕΝΑ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΩΝ ΕΞΑΠΕΣΤΑΛΚΟΣΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΛΙ-
ΒΥΝ, ΩΣ ΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΚΑΡΧΙΣΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΟΡΚΗΣΟΝΤΑ,
ΤΟΝ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΔΕ ΕΙΣ 'ΙΒΕΡΙΑΝ, ΩΣ ΠΡΟΣ 'ΑΝΝΙΒΑΝ ΕΚΕΙ
ΔΙΑΠΟΛΕΜΗΣΟΝΤΑ, ΠΑΡΗΝ ΑΓΓΕΛΙΑ ΔΙΟΤΙ ΠΑΡΕΣΤΙΝ 'ΑΝ-
ΝΙΒΑΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΟΡΚΕΙ ΤΙΝΑΣ ΉΘΗ ΠΟ-
ΛΕΙΣ ΕΝ 'ΙΤΑΛΙΑ. ΔΙΟΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΔΟΧΟΥ ΦΑΝΕΝΤΟΣ ΑΥ-
ΤΟΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΓΝΩΜΕΝΟΥ, ΔΙΑΤΑΡΑΧΘΕΝΤΕΣ ΠΑΡΑΧΡΗΜΑ ΠΡΟΣ
ΤΟΝ ΤΕΒΕΡΙΟΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΛΙΛΥΒΑΙΟΝ ΕΞΑΠΕΣΤΕΛΛΟΝ, ΔΗ-
ΛΟΥΝΤΕΣ ΜΕΝ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑΝ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΙΩΝ, ΟΪΜΕΝΟΙ ΔΕ
ΔΕΙΝ ΑΦΕΜΕΝΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΚΕΜΕΝΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΠΟΥΔΗΝ ΒΟΗ-
ΘΕΙΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΙΔΙΟΙΣ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΣΩΝ. ΔΕ ΤΕΒΕΡΙΟΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΕΝ
ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΣΤΟΛΟΥΣ ΠΑΡΑΝΤΙΚΑ ΣΥΝΑΘΡΟΙΣΑΣ ΕΞΕΠΕΜΠΕΙ,
ΠΑΡΑΓΓΕΙΛΑΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΛΟΥΝ ΩΣ ΕΠΙ ΟΙΚΟV-
ΤΑΣ ΔΕ ΠΕΞΙΚΑΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ ΕΞΩΡΚΙΣΕ ΔΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΧΙΛΙΑΡ-
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Italy from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps was likewise very long and not suited for the march of troops. But when more messengers continued to arrive bringing the same news in a more definite form, he was struck with amazement at the whole project of the Consul and the way he had carried it out. Publius had very much the same feeling; for at first he had never expected that Hannibal would even attempt to cross the Alps with foreign forces, and if he ventured on it he thought that certain destruction awaited him. So that, his anticipations being such, when he heard that Hannibal was safe and was already besieging towns in Italy he was amazed too at his daring and venturesomeness. In Rome itself the intelligence had much the same effect. The stir created by the last news of the Carthaginians—that they had captured Saguntum—had only just subsided, measures had been taken to meet this situation by sending one Consul to Libya who was to besiege Carthage itself, and the other to Spain to fight, as they thought, with Hannibal there; and now news came that Hannibal was in Italy with his army and already laying siege to some cities. The thing therefore seemed altogether astounding to them, and in great alarm they sent urgent orders to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, informing him of the arrival of the enemy and bidding him abandon his present project and hasten to the help of his own country. Tiberius at once collected the crews of his fleet and dispatched it with orders to make for home. From his soldiers he exacted through the Tribunes an oath that they would all be
χων, τάξας ἡμέραν ἐν ἡ δεῖσει πάντας ἐν Ἀρμινίῳ
11 γενέσθαι κοιταίοις. αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶ πόλις παρὰ τὸν
'Αδριαν ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι κεμένη τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον
12 πεδίων ὡς ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας. πανταχόθεν δὲ τοῦ
κινήσεως ἄμα γινομένου, καὶ τῶν συμβαίνοντων
πάσι παρὰ δόξαν προσπέπτοντων, ἣν παρ' ἐκάστους
ἐπίστασις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐκ ἐυκαταφρόνητος.

62 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον ἡδὴ συνεγγύζοντες
ἀλλήλοις Ἀσνίμας καὶ Πόπλιος ἐπεβάλλοντο παρα-
καλεῖν τὰς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεις, ἐκάτερος προθέμενος
2 τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς παρόνι καιροῖς. Ἀσνίμας μὲν
οὖν διὰ τοιούτῳ τυχὸς ἐνεχείρει τρόπου ποιεῖσθαι
3 τὴν παραλειψιν. συναγαγὼν γὰρ τὰ πλῆθος παρα-
ήγαγε νεανίσκους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, οὕς εἰλήφει
κακοποιοῦντας τὴν πορέαν ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς
4 δυσχωρίαις. τούτους δὲ κακῶς διετίθετο, παρα-
σκευαζόμενος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. καὶ γὰρ δεσμοὺς εἰ-
χον βαρεῖς καὶ τῶν λιμῶν συνέσχηντο καὶ ταῖς πλη-
5 γαῖς αὐτῶν τὰ σωμάτα διέφθαρτο. καθὼς οὖν
τούτους εἰς τὸ μέσον προεῖθηκε πανοπλίας Γαλατι-
κάς, οἵας εἰσώθαισιν οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν, ὅταν μονο-
μαχεῖν μέλλωσι, κατακοσμεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτους
ἐπποιος παρέστησε καὶ σάγους εἰσήγησε λυτύπελεις.
6 κάπετα τῶν νεανίσκων ἦρετο τίνες αὐτῶν βού-
λοντας διαγωνίσασθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐφ' ὃ τῶν
μὲν νυκήσατα τὰ προκεὶμενα λαμβάνειν ἀθλά, τὸν
δὲ ἤττηθέντα τῶν παρόντων ἀπηλλάχθαι κακῶν,
7 τελευτήσατα τὸν βίον. πάντων δ' ἀναβοηθάντων
ἀμα καὶ δηλούντων ὅτι βούλονται μονομαχεῖν, κλη-
ρώσασθαι προσετάξε, καὶ δύο τοὺς λαχόντας καθ-
οπλισμένους ἐκέλευσε μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
8 παραυτίκα μὲν οὖν ἀκούσαντες οἱ νεανίσκοι ταῦτα,
at Ariminum on a certain day before bed-time. This is a city on the Adriatic at the southern edge of the plains of the Po. So that as there was great stir and activity all round, and as the news that arrived was what nobody expected, there was on both sides that intense concern for the future which an enemy cannot afford to neglect.

62. Hannibal and Publius were now near each other, and they both thought it proper to address their troops in a manner suitable to the occasion. The device by which Hannibal tried to encourage his men was as follows. Muster the troops; he brought forward certain young men from among the prisoners he had taken molesting his march in the difficult part of the Alpine pass. He had purposely, with a view to the use he was going to make of them, ill-used them: they wore heavy fetters, they had suffered much from hunger, and their bodies were disfigured by the marks of blows. Placing them in the middle of the meeting he exhibited some Gaulish suits of armour, such as their kings are wont to deck themselves with when about to engage in single combat. In addition to these he placed there some horses and had some rich military cloaks brought in. He then asked the young men which of them were willing to do combat with each other, the prizes exhibited being destined for the victor, while the vanquished would be delivered by death from his present misery. When all shouted out with one voice that they were willing to fight, he ordered them to draw lots, and the two on whom the lot fell to arm themselves and do combat. The young men, the moment they heard this, lifted up their hands
καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἔξαιροντες, εὐχοντο τοῖς θεοῖς, σπεύ-
9 δὼν ἔκαστος αὐτὸς γενέσθαι τῶν λαχόντων. ἔπει
d' ἐδηλώθη τὰ κατὰ τὸν κλήρον, ἦσαν οἱ μὲν εἰ-
ληχώτες περιχαρεῖς, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι τούναντιον. γενο-
mένης δὲ τῆς μάχης οὐχ ἦττον ἐμακάριζον οἱ περι-
λειπόμενοι τῶν αἰχμαλώτων τὸν τεθνεῶτα τοῦ νε-
vικηκότος, ὡς πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κακῶν ἐκεῖνοι
μὲν ἀπολελυμένουν, σφᾶς δ' αὐτοὺς ἀκριθῶ ὑπο-
μένοντας. ἦν δὲ παραπλήσια καὶ περὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς
tῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡ διάληψις. ἐκ παραθέσεως γὰρ
θεωρουμένης τῆς τῶν ἀγομένων καὶ ζῶτων ταλαι-
pωρίας, τούτους μὲν ἥλεουν, τὸν δὲ τεθνεῶτα πάν-
tες ἐμακάριζον. Ἀννίβας δὲ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων
τῆς προκειμένης διάθεσιν ἐνεργασάμενος ταῖς τῶν
2 δυνάμεως ψυχαῖς, μετὰ ταῦτα προελθὼν αὐτὸς τοῦ-
tου χάριν ἐφ' παρεισάγεν τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, ἐν
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων ἐναργῶς θεασά-
μενοι τὸ συμβαίνον βέλτιον ὑπὲρ τῶν σφίσι παρ-
3 ὅντων βουλεύοντας πραγμάτων. εἰς παραπλήσιον
γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀγώνα καὶ καὶ καὶ τὴν τύχην συγ-
κεκλεικέναι καὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς νῦν ἄθλα προ-
tεθείκεναι. δεῖν γὰρ ἡ νικάν ἡ θυσίας ἡ τοῖς
ἐχθροῖς ὑποχειρίους γενέσθαι ζῶντας. εἶναι δ' ἐκ
μὲν τοῦ νικῶν ἅθλον οὐχ ἰπποῦ καὶ σάγους, ἀλλὰ
tὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων γενέσθαι μακαρωτάτους,
4 κρατήσαντας τῆς Ῥωμαιῶν εὐδαιμονίας, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
μαχομένους τι παθεῖν διαγωνιζόμενους ἐως τῆς
ἐσχάτης ἀναπνοῆς ὑπὲρ τῆς καλλίστης ἐλπίδος μετ-
alλάξαι τῶν βίων ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ, μηδενὸς κακοῦ
5 λαβόντας πείραν, τοῖς δ' ἠττωμένοις καὶ διὰ τὴν
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἐπιθυμιάν ὑπομένουσι φεύγειν ἡ κατ'
ἀλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἐλομένοις τὸ ζῆν παντὸς κακοῦ
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and prayed to the gods, each eager to be himself one of the chosen. When the result was announced, those on whom the lot had fallen were overjoyed and the rest mournful and dejected, and after the combat was over the remaining prisoners congratulated the fallen champion no less than the victor, as having been set free from many and grievous evils which they themselves were left alive to suffer. The sentiment of most of the Carthaginians was identical; for looking on the misery of the other prisoners as they were led away alive, they pitied them on comparing their fate with that of the dead whom they all pronounced to be fortunate. 63. When Hannibal had by this means produced the disposition he desired in the minds of his troops, he rose and told them that he had brought the prisoners before them designedly in order that clearly seeing in the person of others what they might themselves have to suffer, they should thence take better counsel at the present crisis. "Fortune," he said, "has brought you to a like pass, she has shut you in on a like listed field of combat, and the prizes and prospects she offers you are the same. For either you must conquer, or die, or fall alive into the hands of your foes. For you the prize of victory is not to possess horses and cloaks, but to be the most envied of mankind, masters of all the wealth of Rome. The prize of death on the battle-field is to depart from life in the heat of the fight, struggling till your last breath for the noblest of objects and without having learnt to know suffering. But what awaits those of you who are vanquished and for the love of life consent to fly, or who preserve their lives by any other means, is to have every evil and every mis-
7 καὶ πάσης ἀτυχίας μετασχεῖν. οὐδένα γὰρ οὕτως ἀλάγιστον οὔδὲ νωθρὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, διὸ μνημο-νεύων μὲν τοῦ μήκους τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς διήνυσμένης ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων, μνημονεύων δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους τῶν μεταξὺ πολεμίων, εἰδὼς δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ποταμῶν ὄψιν διεπέρασεν, ἐλπίσαι ποτὲ ἄν ὅτι φεύ-γων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφίξεται. διόπερ ὥστε δεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀποκεκομμένης καθὸλου τῆς τουαῦτης ἐλπί-δος, τὴν αὐτὴν διάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς πραγμάτων ἦπερ ἀρτίως ἐποιοῦντο περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων συμπτωμάτων. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐκείνων τῶν μὲν νικήσαντα καὶ τεθνεώτα πάντες ἐμακάριζον, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἥλεον, οὕτως ὥστε δεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς διαλαμβάνειν, καὶ πάντας ἔναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγάνακας, μᾶλιστα μὲν νικη-σοντας, ἂν δὲ μὴ τοῦτ' ἢ δυνατὸν, ἀποθανοῦμε-νοὺς. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἠττημένους ἐλπίδα κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον ἦξίου λαμβάνειν ἐν νῦ. τοῦτω γὰρ χρησάμενων αὐτῶν τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ τῇ προθέσει ταύτη καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἁμα καὶ τὸ σφίξεσθαι προδήλως σφίσι συνεξακολουθήσεως. πάντας γὰρ τοὺς ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἡ κατ' ἀνάγκην τουαῦτη προθέσει κεχρη-μένους οὐδέποτε διεξεύθησα τοὺς κρατεῖν τῶν ἀντι-σαξαμένων. ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους συμ-βαίνῃ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐλπίδα ταύτης ὑπάρχειν, δ νῦν ἐστὶ περὶ Ῥωμαίους, ὡστε φεύγουσι πρόδηλον εἶναι τοῖς πλείστοις τῆς σωτηρίας, παρακεκομμένης αὐτοῖς τῆς οἰκείας, δὴλον ὡς ἀνυπόστατος γίνοιτ' ἂν ἢ τῶν ἀπηλπικότων τόλμα. τῶν δὲ πολλῶν ἀπο-δεχομένων τὸ τε παράδειγμα καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καὶ λαμβανόντων ὁρμὴν καὶ παράστασιν οὐν 'ὁ παρακλῶν ἐπούδασε, τότε μὲν ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς.
fortune for their lot. There is not one of you so dull and unreflecting as to hope to reach his home by flight, when he remembers the length of the road he traversed from his native land, the numbers of the enemies that lie between, and the size of the rivers he crossed. I beg you, therefore, cut off as you are entirely from any such hope, to take the same view of your own situation that you have just expressed regarding that of others. For as you all accounted both the victor and the fallen fortunate and pitied the survivors, so now should you think about yourselves and go all of you to battle resolved to conquer if you can, and if this be impossible, to die. And I implore you not to let the hope of living after defeat enter your minds at all. If you reason and purpose as I urge upon you, it is clear that victory and safety will follow; for none ever who either by necessity or choice formed such a resolve have been deceived in their hope of putting their enemies to flight. And when the enemy have the opposite hope, as is now the case with the Romans, most of them being sure of finding safety in flight as their homes are near at hand, it is evident that the courage of those who despair of safety will carry all before it.” The object-lesson and the speech were well received by the troops, in whom they produced the enthusiasm and self-confidence that the speaker desired, and after commending
διαφηκε, τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἀναζυγην ἁμα τῷ φωτὶ παρήγγειλε.

64 Πόπλιος δὲ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τὸν Πάδον
ποταμὸν ἤδη πεπεραιωμένος, τὸν δὲ Τίκωνον κρί-
νων εἰς τοὺς προσθεῖν διαβαίνειν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπι-
τηθείοις γεφυροποιεῖν παρήγγειλε, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς
δυνάμεις συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει. τὰ μὲν αὖν πολλὰ
tῶν λεγομένων ἤν περὶ τε τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξιώ-
ματος καὶ τῶν προγονικῶν πράξεων, τὰ δὲ τοῦ
παρεστῶτος καιροῦ τοιάδε. ἐφὶ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μη-
δεμιῶν μὲν εἰληφότας πειρᾶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρὸντος
tῶν ὑπεναντίων, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο γινώσκοντας ὅτι
μέλλουσι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους κινδυνεύειν, ἀναμφι-

4 σβήτητον ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ νυκάν ἐλπίδα, καὶ καθὸλου

δεινὸν ἠγείροθαί καὶ παράλογον, εἰ τολμᾶσι Καρχη-

dόνιοι Ῥωμαίους ἀντοφθαλμεῖν, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἠτείμησακ, πολλοῦς δ' ἐξεννοχότες φόρους,

μόνον δ' οὐχὶ δουλεύοντες αὐτοῖς ἡδή τοσοῦτος

5 χρόνους. ὅταν δὲ, χωρὶς τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ τῶν

νῦν παρὸντων ἄνδρῶν ἔχωμεν ἐπὶ ποσοὶ πειρᾶν

ὅτι [μόνον] οὐ τολμῶσι κατὰ πρόσωπον ἴδειν ἡμᾶς

tίνα χρή διάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος

τὸς ὀρθῶς λογίζομενος; καὶ μὴν οὔτε τοὺς ἰππεῖς

συμπεσότας τοῖς παρ' αὐτῶν ἰππεῖσι περὶ τὸν

Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν ἀπαλλάξαι καλῶς, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς

ἀποβαλόντας αὐτῶν φυγεῖν αἰσχρῶς μέχρι τῆς ἱδίας

7 παρεμβολῆς, τὸν τε στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σύμ-

πασαν δύναμιν, ἐπιγνώσας τὴν παροικίαν τῶν

ἡμετέρων στρατιωτῶν, φυγὴ παραπλησίαν ποιή-

σαθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, καὶ παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν προ-

αίρεσιν διὰ τὸν φόβον κεχρησθαι τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἀλπεων

8 πορείᾳ. παρεῖναι δὲ καὶ νῦν ἐφη τὸν Ἀυνιβαν,

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them he dismissed them, ordering them to be ready to start at daybreak.

64. At about the same date Publius Scipio, who had already crossed the Po and had decided to advance across the Ticinus, ordered those qualified for that task to build a bridge and, summoning a meeting of the rest of his forces, addressed them. Most of what he said related to the exalted position of their country and the achievements of their ancestors; what concerned the present situation was as follows. He said that even if they had had no recent experience of the enemy, the knowledge alone that they were going to fight against Carthaginians should give them unshaken hope of victory. They should regard it as altogether an outrageous and surprising thing that Carthaginians should dare to face Romans, by whom they had been so often beaten, to whom they had paid so much tribute, and whose slaves almost they had been for so many years. "But now," he went on to say, "when apart from this we can judge more or less by our own experience that these actual men here on the spot do not venture to look us in the face, what should our opinion be as to the future, if we estimate chances correctly? Why! not even their cavalry when they met ours near the Rhone came off well, but after losing many of their number fled disgracefully to their own camp, upon which their general and all his forces, as soon as they knew our soldiers were coming, made a retreat more resembling a flight, and contrary to their original intention chose the route through the Alps from pure fear of us. Hannibal has now arrived,"
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κατεθαρκότα μὲν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως,
τὸ δὲ περιλεπόμενον ἀδύνατον καὶ δύσχρηστον
ἐχοντα διὰ τὴν κακουχίαν· ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵπ-
πῶν τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπολωλεκτά, τοὺς δὲ λοι-
ποὺς ἢχρεωκότα διὰ τὸ μὴκος καὶ τὴν δυσχέρειαν
9 τῆς ὁδοῦ. δ' ἄν ἐπιδεικνύειν ἐπειράτο διότι μόνον
10 ἐπιφανήναι δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις. μάλιστα δ' ἦξιον
θαρρεῖν αὐτοὺς βλέποντας εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ παρου-
σίαν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἂν ἀπολιπών τὸν στόλον καὶ
tὰς ἐν Ἑβηρία πράξεις, ἐφ' ἂς ἀπεστάλη, δεῦρο
μετὰ τοιαύτης ἐλθεῖν σπουδῆς, εἰ μὴ καὶ λίαν ἐκ
τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἔωρα τὴν πράξειν ταύτην ἀναγκαίαν
μὲν οὕσαν τῇ πατρίδι, πρόδηλον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ τὴν
11 νίκην ὑπάρχουσαν. πάντων δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ
λέγοντος πίστιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγομένων ἀλή-
θειαν ἐκθύμωσ ἐχοντων πρὸς τὸ κινδυνεύειν, ἄπο-
δεξάμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν ὀρμήν διαφῆκεν, προσπαρα-
κάλεσας ἐτοίμους εἶναι πρὸς τὸ παραγγελλόμενον.

65 Τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα προῆγον ἁμφότεροι
παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς μέρους,
ἐξοντες εὐώνυμον μὲν οἱ 'Ῥωμαῖοι, δεξιόν δὲ τὸν
2 ροῦν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι. γνώντες δὲ τῇ δευτέρᾳ διὰ
tῶν προνυμενῶν ὅτι σύνεγγυς εἰσὶν ἀλλήλων,
3 τότε μὲν αὐτοῖς καταστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐμειναν. τῇ
δ' ἐπαύριον πᾶσαν τὴν ἱππὸν ἀναλαβόντες ἁμφό-
tεροι, Πόπλιος δὲ καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τοὺς ἄκοντιστάς,
προῆγον διὰ τοῦ πεδίου, σπεύδοντες κατοπτέονα
4 τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἁμα δὲ τῷ πλησιάζειν αὐ-
τοῖς καὶ συνιδεῖν τῶν κοινοτῶν ἐξαρόμενον, εὐ-
5 θέως συνετάπτοντο πρὸς μάχην. δ' μὲν οὖν Πό-
πλιος, προθέμενος τοὺς ἄκοντιστάς καὶ τοὺς ἁμα
τούτους Γαλατικοὺς ἱππεῖς, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐν μετ-
he said, "but he has lost most of his army and the rest are weak and useless owing to hardship; he has lost most of his horses too, and those he has left he has rendered fit for nothing by the length and difficulty of his march." From all this he tried to convince them that they had only to show themselves to the enemy. He bade them above all be encouraged by his own presence, for never would he have abandoned his fleet and the Spanish expedition on which he was dispatched, and made such haste to reach Italy, had it not been evident to him that he was doing a necessary service to his country and that victory was a matter of certainty. When all the troops, owing to the authority of the speaker, and the truth of what he said, showed themselves most ardent for a battle, he commended their alacrity and dismissed them, bidding them hold themselves in readiness to execute his orders.

65. Next day they both advanced along the Po on the bank nearest the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their left and the Carthaginians on their right. Learning on the following day from their scouts that they were near each other, they both encamped where they were and remained there for the present. But next morning both generals took the whole of their cavalry, and Publius his javelineers also, and advanced through the plain with the object of reconnoitring each other's forces. Upon their approaching each other and seeing the clouds of dust they at once got into order for action. Publius, placing his javelineers and the Gaulish cavalry which was with them in front and the rest
6 ὡς τω καταστήσας, προήει βάδην. δὲ δ’ Ἀννίβας τὴν μὲν κεχαλιωμένην ἵππον καὶ πάν τὸ στάσιμον αὐτῆς κατὰ πρόσωπον τάξας ἀπήντα τοῖς πολεμίοις, τοὺς δὲ Νομαδικοὺς ἰππεῖς ἀφ’ ἐκατέρου τοῦ κέρα-
7 τος ἦτοιμακε πρὸς κύκλωσιν. ἀμφοτέρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἱγεμόνων καὶ τῶν ἰππέων φιλοτίμως διακεί-
μένων πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, τουαύτην συνεβη γενέ-
σθαι τὴν πρώτην συμπτωσιν ὡστε τοὺς ἄκοντος τὰς ἐγνώμονας μὴ φθάσαι τὸ πρῶτον ἐκβαλόντας βέλος, φεύγεις δὲ ἐγκλίναντας ευθέως διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων ὑπὸ 
τὰς παρ’ αὐτῶν ἱλας, καταπλαγέντας τὴν ἐπιφορὰν καὶ περιδεεὶς γενομένους μὴ συμπατηθῶσιν υπὸ 
8 τῶν ἐπιφεομένων ἰππέων. οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ πρόσ-
ωπον ἄλληλοις συμπεσόντες ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐποί-
9 οὐν ἰσόρροπον τὸν κίνδυνον· ὅμω γὰρ ἦν ἰππο-
μαχία καὶ πεζομαχία διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρα-
10 καταβαίνοντων ἀνδρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ. τῶν δὲ 
Νομάδων κυκλωσάντων καὶ κατόπων ἐπιπεσόντων, 
οἱ μὲν πεζακοντοῦν τὸ πρῶτον διαφυγόντες τὴν 
συμπτωσιν τῶν ἰππέων τότε συνεπατήθησαν υπὸ 
11 τοῦ πλῆθους καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς τῶν Νομάδων· οἱ 
δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαμαχόμενοι πρὸς 
τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπολωλε-
kότες, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους τῶν Καρχηδονίων διεφθαρ-
kότες, συνεπιθεμένων ἀπ’ οὐρὰς τῶν Νομάδων, 
ἐτράπησαν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ σποράδες, τινὲς δὲ περὶ 
τὸν ἱγεμόνα συστραφέντες.

66 Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν ἀναζευξα προσήγε διὰ τῶν πε-
δίων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Πάδου γέφυραν, σπεύδων φθά-
2 σαι διαβιβάσας τὰ στρατόπεδα. θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς 
μὲν τόπους ἐπιστέδους ὅντας, τοὺς δὲ ὑπεναντίους 
ἐπικρατοῦντας, αὐτὸν δὲ βαρυνομένου υπὸ τοῦ
behind, advanced slowly. Hannibal, putting his bridled cavalry and all the heavier part of it in front, led them to meet the enemy, having his Numidian horse ready on each wing to execute an outflanking movement. Both of the leaders and their cavalry were so anxious to join battle that at the opening of the action the javelineers had no time to discharge their first volley, but gave way at once and retired through the gaps between the troops of their own cavalry, in terror of the impending charge and fearful of being trodden under foot by the horsemen who were bearing down on them. The cavalry met front to front and for some time maintained an evenly balanced contest, the engagement being both a cavalry and infantry one, owing to the number of men who dismounted during its progress. When, however, the Numidians outflanked the Romans and took them in the rear, the javelineers on foot who had at first escaped from the charge of the cavalry were now ridden down by the numbers and force of the Numidians, while the cavalry, who from the outset had been facing the Carthaginians, after suffering heavy loss and inflicting still greater on the enemy, being now attacked by the Numidians also in the rear, broke into flight, most of them scattering in every direction but a few gathering closely round the Consul.

66. Publius now broke up his camp and advanced through the plain to the bridge of the Po, hastening to get his legions across before it was too late. For since the country was all flat, since the enemy was superior in cavalry, and since he himself was
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τραύματος, εἰς ἀσφαλὲς ἔκρινε δεῖν ἀποκαταστήσαι
3 τὰς δυνάμεις. Ἀνώβας δὲ μέχρι μὲν τῶν ὑπέλαβε
τοῖς πεζοῖς στρατοπέδους αὐτοὺς διακινδυνεύειν·
συνιδὼν δὲ κεκινηκότας ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς, ἐὼς
μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ποταμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τούτῳ γεφύ-
ρας ἠκολουθεῖ, καταλαβὼν δὲ τὰς μὲν πλείστας
τῶν σαινίδων ἀνεσπασμένας, τοὺς δὲ φυλάττοντας
τὴν γέφυραν ἐπὶ περὶ τοῦ ποταμὸν ὑπολειπομένους,
τούτων μὲν ἐκρατησάς ἐγένετο, σχεδὸν ἐξακοσίων
5 ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἀκούων ἤδη
πολὺ προειληφέναι, μεταβαλόμενος αὖθις εἰς τάναν-
tία παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, σπεῦ-
dων ἐπὶ τόπον ἐυγεφύρωτων ἀφικέσθαι τοῦ Πάδου.
καταλύσας δὲ δευτεράδος καὶ γεφυρώσας τοῖς πο-
tαμίοις πλοίοις τὴν διάβασιν Ἀσδρούβα μὲν ἐπι-
έταξε διακομίζεων τὸ πλῆθος, αὐτὸς δὲ διαβὰς εὐ-
θέως ἐχρημάτιζε τοῖς παραγεγονόσι προσβενταῖς
7 ἀπὸ τῶν σύνεγγυς τόπων. ἀμα γὰρ τῷ γενέσθαι τὸ
προτέρημα πάντας ἐσπευδὸν οἱ παρακείμενοι Κελτοὶ
κατὰ τὴν ἑξ ἁρχῆς πρόθεσιν καὶ φίλοι γίνεσθαι
καὶ χορηγεῖν καὶ συστρατεύειν τοῖς Καρχηδόνιοις.
ἀποδεξάμενος δὲ τοὺς παρόντας φιλανθρώπως καὶ
κομμασάμενος τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ πέραν, προῆγε
παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν, τὴν ἐναντίαν ποιούμενος τὴ
πρόσθεν παρόδῳ· κατὰ ῥοῦν γὰρ ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πο-
9 ρείαν, σπεῦδων συνάβαι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. δὲ
Πόπλιος, περαιωθεὶς τὸν Πάδον καὶ στρατοπεδεύ-
σας περὶ πόλιν Πλακεντίαν, ἦτις ἢν ἀποκία 'Ρω-
μαίων, ἀμα μὲν αὐτὸν ἑθεράπευε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
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severely wounded, he decided to place his forces in safety. Hannibal had at first supposed that the Romans would risk an infantry engagement, but on seeing that they had moved out of their camp, followed them as far as the bridge over the first river, but finding most of the planking of it torn up, but the force set to guard it still remaining at their post by the river side, he took them prisoners to the number of about six hundred, and on hearing that the rest of the Romans were far in advance of him he now wheeled round and marched in the opposite direction up the Po with the object of reaching a place where it was easy to bridge it. After two days' march he halted and, constructing a bridge of boats, ordered Hasdrubal to see to the passage of the army and he himself crossing at once gave a hearing to the envoys who had arrived from the districts round. For immediately upon his success, all the neighbouring Celts hastened, as had been their wish from the outset, to make alliance with the Carthaginians, to provide them with supplies and to send them contingents. He received them all courteously, and being now joined by his troops from the opposite bank, he advanced along the Po in the opposite direction to his previous march; for now he marched down stream with the object of encountering the enemy. Meanwhile Publius, having crossed the Po and encamped at Placentia, a Roman colony, where he occupied himself with the cure of himself and the other wounded, and

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\[a\] i.e. the Ticino. Livy wrongly makes it to be the bridge of boats over the Po. The engagement took place near Victumulae, the modern Vigerano, on the right bank of the Ticino.
τραυματίας, ἀµα δὲ τὰς δυνάµεις εἰς ἀσφαλεῖς ἀπ-
10 ηρείσθαι νοµίζων,  negó τὴν ἡσυχίαν. Ἀννίβας δὲ
παραγενόµενος δευτεραῖος ἀπὸ τῆς διαβάσεως ἐγγὺς
tῶν πολεµίων, τῇ τρίτῃ παρέταξε τὴν δύναµιν ἐν
11 συνὸµε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. οὐδενὸς δὲ σφίσων ἀντ-
exάγοντος, κατεστρατοπέδευσε λαβὼν περὶ πεν-
tήκοντα στάδια τὸ μεταξὺ διάστηµα τῶν στρατο-
πεδῶν.

67 Οἱ δὲ συστρατευόµενοι Κελτοὶ τοῖς Ἀρωµαῖοις,
θεωροῦντες ἐπικυδεστέρας τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων
ἐπίδας, συνταξάµενοι πρὸς ἄλλης, καὶρὸν ἐπ-
etήρουν πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν, μένοντες ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν
2 ἐκαστοῖς σκηναῖς. δειπνοποιησµένων δὲ καὶ κατα-
κοµισθέντων τῶν ἐν τῷ χάρακι, παρελθεὶν ἐάσαυ-
tες τὸ πλεῖον μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς καθωπλισµένοι
περὶ τὴν ἐωθικὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιτίθενται τοῖς σύν-
3 εγγὺς τῶν Ἀρωµαίων παραστρατοπεδεύσουσι. καὶ
πολλοὺς µὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ κατ-
etραυµάτωσιν. τέλος δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτεµόντες
τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἀπεχώρουν πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδο-
νίους, ὅντες πεζοὶ µὲν εἰς δισχίλιους, ἵππεῖς δὲ
4 µικρῷ λείποντες διακοσίων. Ἀννίβας δὲ φιλο-
φρόνως ἀποδεξάµενος αὐτῶν τὴν παρουσίαν, τούτους
µὲν εὐθέως παρακαλέσας καὶ δωρεὰς ἐκάστους τὰς
ἀρµοζούσας ἐπαγγελµάµενος ἐξέπεµβεν εἰς τὰς αὐ-
tῶν πόλεις, δηλὼσοντας µὲν τὰ πεπραγµένα τοῖς
πολίταις, παρακαλέσοντας δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ συµ-
5 µαχίαν. ἦδει γὰρ ὅτι πάντες κατ' ἀνάγκην αὐτῷ
κοινωνήσουσι τῶν πραγµάτων, ἐπιγνώστη τὸ γεγο-
νός ἕκ τῶν σφετέρων πολιτῶν παρασπούνδηµα κατὰ
6 τῶν Ἀρωµαίων. ἀµα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν Βοιῶν παρα-
geγονότων, καὶ τοὺς τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐγχειριζόντων
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BOOK III. 66.9 - 67.6

...thinking that his forces were now firmly established in a safe position, made no move. But two days after his crossing Hannibal appeared close at hand and next day drew up his army in full view of the enemy. Upon their refusing his challenge, he encamped at a distance of about fifty stades from the Roman position.

67. The Celtic contingents in the Roman army, seeing that the prospects of the Carthaginians were now brighter, had come to an understanding with each other, and while all remaining quiet in their tents were waiting for an opportunity to attack the Romans. All in the entrenched camp had had their supper and retired to rest, and the Celts, letting the greater part of the night go by, armed themselves about the morning watch and fell upon the Romans who were encamped nearest to them. They killed or wounded many, and finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, went over to the Carthaginians, being in number about two thousand foot and rather less than two hundred horse. They were gladly welcomed on their arrival by Hannibal, who at once, after addressing some words of encouragement to them and promising suitable gifts to all, sent them off to their own cities to announce to their countrymen what they had done and urge them to join him. For he was now quite sure that all would take his part on learning of this act of treachery to the Romans on the part of their own countrymen. When at the same time the Boii came to him and delivered up
αυτώ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν διάδοσιν τῆς χώρας ὑπὸ 'Ρω-
μαίων ἔξαπεσταλμένους, ὥς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐκυρίευσαν
τὸν πολέμου, παρασπονδύσαντες, καθάπερ ἐπάνω
7 προεῖπον, ἀποδεξάμενος Ἀννίβας τὴν εὐνοιαν αὐ-
tῶν, ὑπὲρ μὲν τῆς φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας ἐθετο πρὸς
tοὺς παρόντας πίστεις· τοὺς γε μὴν ἄνδρας αὐτοῖς
ἀπέδωκε, παραγείλας τηρεῖν, ἵνα παρὰ τούτων
κομίσωνται τοὺς αὐτῶν ὀμήρους κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
πρόθεσιν.
8 Πόλιος δὲ σχετικράξων ἐπὶ τῷ γεγονότι παρα-
спονδύματι, καὶ συλλογισάμενος ὡς σὰρκι πᾶλαι τῶν Κελ-
tῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀλλοτρίως διακειμένων, τούτων
ἐπιγεγονότων πάντας τους πέριξ Γαλάτας συμβούλευ-
tαι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπονεύειν, ἔγγον δεῖ
9 εὐλαβήθηναι τὸ μέλλον. διὸ περ ἐπιγεγονένης τῆς
νυκτὸς ὑπὸ τὴν ἐσθίνην ἄναξεύξας, ἐποεῖτο τὴν
πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν καὶ τοὺς τοῦτων
συνάπτοντας γεωλόφους, πιστεύων τῇ τε τῶν τῶν
68 ὄχυροτητὶ καὶ τοῖς παροκουσάς τὸν συμμάχων. Ἀν-
nίβας δὲ τὴν ἀναξυγήν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνοὺς, παραυτικά
μὲν τοὺς Νομαδικούς ἵππεῖς ἔξαπεστέλλε, μετ’ οὐ
πολὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους, τοῦτοι δὲ ἐκ ποδὸς τὴν δύνα-
2 μὲν ἐξων αὐτὸς εἰπέτο κατόπων. οἱ μὲν οὖν Νομα-
des eis ἔρημον τὴν στρατοπεδείαν ἐμπεσόντες ταῦ-
3 τὴν ἐνεπίμπρασαν. δὲ δὴ καὶ σφόδρα συνήνεγκε
toίς 'Ρωμαίοις, ὡς εἰπέρ οὕτω κατὰ πόδας ἀκολο-
thήσαντες συνήθιζαν ταῖς ἀποσκευαῖς, πολλοὺς ἃν
αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις συνέβη
4 διαφθαρῆαι. νῦν δ’ οἱ πλείους ἔφθασαν διαβάντες
τὸν Τρεβίαν ποταμὸν· τῶν δὲ καταλείπθεντων ἐπὶ
tῆς οὐραγίας οἱ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, οἱ δὲ ζώντες
ἐάλωσαν ὑπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων.
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to him the three Roman officials charged with the partition of their lands, whom, as I mentioned above, they had originally captured by treachery, Hannibal welcomed their friendly advances and made a formal alliance with them through the envoys. He gave the three Romans, however, back to them, advising them to keep them in order through them to get their own hostages back, as had been their original design.

Publius was much concerned at this act of treachery, and taking into consideration that as the Celts had been disaffected for some time, now with this additional incentive all the Gauls round about would go over to the Carthaginians, decided to take precautions for the future. In consequence he broke up his camp that same night a little before daybreak and marched towards the river Trebia and the hills in its neighbourhood, relying on the natural strength of the country and the loyalty of the neighbouring allies. 68. Hannibal, on being apprised of their departure, at once sent off his Numidian horse, and shortly afterwards the rest of his cavalry, and himself with his army followed close behind. The Numidians, finding the camp deserted, stopped to set fire to it, which proved of great advantage to the Romans, for had the cavalry at once followed them up and overtaken the baggage-train they would have suffered great loss in the flat country. As it was, most of them succeeded in crossing the Trebia, but those who were left behind in the extreme rear were either cut to pieces or captured by the Carthaginians.
5 Πόπλιος μὲν οὖν διαβάς τὸν προειρημένον πο-
ταμὸν ἐστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τοὺς πρώτους λόφους,
6 καὶ περιλαβὼν τάφρων καὶ χάρακι τὴν παρεμβολὴν
ἀνεδέχετο μὲν τὸν Τεβέριον καὶ τὰς μετ᾽ ἐκείνου
δυνάμεις· ἐθεράπευε δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐπιμέλειας, σπουδάζων,
εἰ δύνατο κοινωνήσαι τοῦ μέλλοντος κυδύνου.
7 Ἀννίβας δὲ περὶ τετταράκοντα σταδίους ἀποσχὼν
8 τῶν πολεμίων, αὐτὸν κατεστρατοπέδευσε. τὸ δὲ
τῶν Κελτῶν πλῆθος τὸ τὰ πεδία κατοικοῦν, συν-
εξεστηκὸς ταῖς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίσει, δαιμόλως
μὲν ἔχορήγη τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις, ἑτοι-
μον δ᾽ ἦν παντὸς κοινωνεῖν ἔργον καὶ κυδύνου
τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν.
9 Οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ 'Ῥώμῃ, προσπεπτωκότων τῶν κατὰ
τὴν ὕπομαχίαν, ἐξενίζοντο μὲν τῷ τὸ συμβεβηκός
eἷναι παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν, οὐ μὴν ἦπορουν γε
σκῆψεων πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς ἦτταν εἶναι τὸ
10 γεγονός, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἠτίωντο τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ
προπέτειαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τῶν Κελτῶν ἑθελοκάκησιν,
στοχαζόμενοι διὰ τῆς τελευταίας ἀποστάσεως
11 καθόλου δὲ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων ἀκεραῖων
 ὄντων ἀκεραίους εἶναι διελάμβανον τὰς ὑπέρ τῶν
12 ὀλιγος ἐλπίδασ. οὖθεν καὶ συνάψαντος τοῦ Τεβερίου
 καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ ἐκείνου στρατοπέδων, καὶ διαπερνο-
 μένων διὰ τῆς 'Ῥώμης, ἐξ ἐπιφανείας ἐδόξαζον
13 κριθῆσεθαι τὴν μάχην. ἀθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν
 στρατιωτῶν κατὰ τὸν ὄρκον εἰς Ἀρίμωνον, ἀναλαβὼν
 αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατηγὸς προῆγε, σπεύδων συνάψαι τοῖς
14 περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον. συμμιᾶσας δὲ καὶ καταστρατο-
 δεύσας παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ταῖς οἰκείαις δυνάμεις, τὸ μὲν
πλῆθος ἀνελάμβανε τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὡς ἦν ἐκ Δυλυ-
βαίου τετταράκοντα συνεχῶς ἡμέρας πεπεξοπορηκό-
Publius, crossing the Trebia, encamped on the first hills he reached and fortifying his camp with a trench and palisade awaited the arrival of Tiberius and his forces. In the meantime he attended carefully to the treatment of his wound, as he was anxious to be able to take part in the coming battle. Hannibal encamped at a distance of about forty stades from the enemy. The numerous Celtic population of the plain, enthusiastically taking up the cause of the Carthaginians, kept the camp furnished with abundance of provisions and were ready to take their part in any of Hannibal's operations or battles.

When the news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome they were surprised that it had not resulted as they would have expected, but were in no want of pretexts to convince themselves that it was not a defeat, some of them putting it down to the Consul's rashness and some to wilful poltroonery on the part of the Celts, assuming this from their subsequent desertion. But on the whole, as their infantry forces were still unimpaired, their trust in final success was likewise undiminished. So that when Tiberius and his legions arrived and marched through the city, the general opinion was that they had only to show themselves to decide the battle. On the soldiers, as they had pledged themselves by oath, assembling at Ariminum, the Consul put himself at their head and advanced with all speed to join Publius. When he had done so he encamped with his own forces near Scipio's, to refresh his men after their forty days' continuous march from Lilybaeum to Ariminum.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

tων εἰς Ἀρίμηνον· τάς δὲ παρασκευάς ἐποιεῖτο πά-

15 σας ὃς πρὸς μάχην, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιμελῶς συνήδρευε
τῷ Ποσπλῶ, τὰ μὲν ἥδη γεγονότα πυνθανόμενος,
περὶ δὲ τῶν παρόντων συνδιανοούμενος.

69 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτούς καιροὺς Ἀννίβας πραξι-

κοπήσας πόλιν Κλαστίδιον, ἐνδόντος αὐτῶ τοῦ πε-
πιστευμένου παρὰ Ῥωμαίων, ἀνδρὸς Βραντεσίου,
2 κατέσχε. γενόμενος δὲ κύριος τῆς φρουρᾶς καὶ τῆς
τοῦ σιτοῦ παραθέσεως, τούτῳ μὲν πρὸς τὸ παρὸν
ἐχρήσατο, τοὺς δὲ παραληφθέντας ἂνδρας ἀβλαβεῖς
3 μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ προῆγε, δείγμα βουλόμενος ἐκφέρειν
τῆς σφετέρας προαίρεσεως πρὸς τὸ μὴ δεδιώτας
ἀπελπίζειν τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῦ σωτηρίαν τοὺς ὑπὸ
4 τῶν καιρῶν καταλαμβανόμενοις. τὸν δὲ προδότην
ἐτύμησε μεγαλείως, ἐκκαλέσασθαι σπουδάζων τοὺς
ἐπὶ πραγμάτων ταπτομένοις πρὸς τὰς Καρχηδονίων
ἐλπίδας.

5 Μετὰ δὲ ταύτα συνθεωρήσας των Ἐκλ-

τῶν, οἱ κατώκους μεταξὺ τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τοῦ Τρεβία
ποταμοῦ, πεποιημένους μὲν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλιάν,
διαπεμπόμενος δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, καὶ πεπει-
σέμονυς τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τὴν παρ’ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφά-
6 λειαν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξειν, ἐξαποστέλλει πεζοὺς μὲν δισ-
χιλίους, ἵππεις δὲ Κελτοὺς καὶ Νομάδας εἰς χιλίους,
7 προστάξας ἐπιδραμεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν. τῶν δὲ
πραξάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν καὶ πολλὴν περιβαλομέ-

νων λειαν, εὐθέως οἱ Κελτοὶ παρῆσαν ἐπὶ τὸν χά-
8 ρακα τῶν Ῥωμαίων, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοήθειν. Τε-

βέριος δὲ καὶ πάλαι ζητῶν ἀφορμὴν τοῦ πρᾶττεν
τι, τότε λαβῶν πρόφασιν ἐξαπέστειλε τῶν μὲν ἐπ-

πέων τὸ πλείστον μέρος, πεζοὺς δὲ σὺν τούτους
9 ἀκοπτιστάς εἰς χιλιοὺς. σπουδὴ δὲ τούτων προσ-

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Meanwhile he made all preparations for a battle and had many close conferences with Scipio, ascertaining the truth about what had occurred, and discussing the present situation with him.

69. At about the same time the town of Clastidium was betrayed to Hannibal by a native of Brundisium, to whom the Romans had entrusted it, the garrison and all the stores of grain falling into his hands. The latter he used for his present needs, but he took the men he had captured with him without doing them any hurt, wishing to make a display of leniency, so that those who were overtaken by adversity should not be terrified and give up hope of their lives being spared by him. He conferred high honours on the traitor, as he was anxious to win over those in positions of authority to the Carthaginian cause.

After this, on observing that some of the Celts who lived between the Trebia and the Po had made alliance with himself, but were negotiating with the Romans also, under the idea that thus they would be safe from both, he dispatched two thousand foot and about a thousand Celtic and Numidian horse with orders to raid their country. On his orders being executed and a large amount of booty secured, the Celts at once came into the Roman camp asking for help. Tiberius had long been on the look-out for some ground justifying an active step and now that he had this pretext sent out the greater part of his cavalry and about a thousand javelineers on foot. Making all dispatch they met the enemy
ΤΗΕ ΗΙΣΤΟΡΙΕΣ ΟF ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΣ

μιξάντων πέραν τοῦ Τρεβία καὶ διαμαχομένων τοῖς πολεμίους ὑπὲρ τῆς λείας, ἐτράπησαν οἱ Κέλτοι σὺν τοῖς Νομάσι καὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησον ἐπὶ τὸν έαυτῶν

10 ἐποιοῦντο χάρακα. ταχὺ δὲ συννόησαντες τὸ γινόμενον οἱ προκαθήμενοι τῆς τῶν Καρχηδονίων παρεμβολῆς ἐντεῦθεν ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις ἐβοήθουσι τοῖς πιεζομένοις. οὐ γενομένου τραπέντες οἱ Ῥωμαιοὶ πάλιν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν εἰς τὴν έαυτῶν παρεμβολὴν. Τεβέριος δὲ συνορῶν τὸ γινόμενον, πάντας ἐπαφηκε τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς. τοῦτοι δὲ συμπέσοντος, αὕτης ἐγκλίναντες οἱ Κέλτοι πρὸς τὴν έαυτῶν ἀσφάλειαν ἀπεχώρουν. οδὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ἀπαράσκευος ὄν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ ὀλα, καὶ νομίζων δεῖν μηδέποτε χωρὶς προθέσεως μηδὲ ἐκ πάσης ἀφορμῆς ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ὀλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους, όπερ εἶναι φατέον ἡγεμόνος ἐργον ἁγαθοῦ, τότε μὲν ἐπέσχε τοὺς παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ συνεγγίσαντας τῷ χάρακι, καὶ στῆναι μὲν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἡνάγκασε, διώκειν δὲ καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐκώλυσε, διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν καὶ σαλπιγκτῶν ἀνακαλούμενος. οἶ δὲ Ῥωμαιοὶ βραχὺν ἐπισχόντες χρόνον ἄνελυσαν, ὀλίγους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀποβαλόντες, πλεῖος δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διεφθαρκότες.

70 Ὅ δὲ Τεβέριος μετεωρισθεὶς καὶ περιχαρῆς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ προτερῆματι, φιλοτίμως εἶχε πρὸς τὸ 2 τῆς ταχίστην κρίναι τὰ ὀλα. προέκειτο μὲν οὖν αὐτῶ κατὰ τὴν ἴδιαν γνώμην χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι, διὰ τὸ τὸν Πόπλιον ἀρρωστεῖν. ὡμοὶ δὲ βουλόμενος προσλαβέσθαι καὶ τὴν τοῦ συνάρχοστος γνώμην, 3 ἐπουεῖτο λόγους περὶ τούτων πρὸς αὐτὸν. Ὅ δὲ Πόπλιος τὴν ἐναντίαν εἶχε διάληψιν περὶ τῶν ἐν- 4 εστῶτων τὰ γὰρ στρατόπεδα χειμασκήσαντα βελ-

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beyond the Trebia and on their disputing possession of the booty with them the Celts and Numidians gave way and began to retire on their own camp. Those in command of the advanced posts outside the Carthaginian camp soon understood what had happened and sent out a covering force to support the fugitives, upon which the Romans in their turn were put to flight and fell back on their camp. Tiberius on seeing this ordered out all his remaining cavalry and javelineers, and when these had joined the rest, the Celts again gave way and retreated to a position of safety. The Carthaginian general, as he was not at this time prepared for a general battle, and took the view that a decisive engagement should never be undertaken on any chance pretext and without a definite purpose—as we must pronounce to be the part of a good general—made the men in retreat halt and face about when they approached the camp, but he would not allow them to advance and engage the enemy, calling them back by his officers and buglers. The Romans after waiting for a short time retired after losing a few of their own number, but inflicting a larger loss on the Carthaginians.

70. Tiberius, elated and overjoyed by his success, was all eagerness to bring on a decisive battle as soon as possible. He was, it is true, at liberty to act as he thought best owing to the illness of Scipio, but wishing to have his colleague's opinion he spoke to him on the subject. Scipio's view of the situation was just the opposite. He considered
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τίω τὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν ὑπελάμβανε γενήσεσθαι, τὴν τε τῶν Κελτῶν ἀθεσίαν οὐκ ἐμμενεῖν ἐν τῇ πόστει, τῶν Καρχηδόνων ἀπραγούντων καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἀναγκαζομένων ἄγεν, ἀλλὰ καινοτομήσει τὰ πάλιν κατ’ ἑκείνων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος ἀληθεύνῃ παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἥλπιζῃ τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμασι. διὸ καὶ τοιοῦτος χρώμενος λογισμὸς μένειν ἥξιον τὸν Τεβέριον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπο-κεμένων. ὁ δὲ προειρημένος ἦδος τοῖς ἐκαστὰ τού-των ἀληθινῶς λεγόμενα καὶ δεόντως, ὅπου δὲ τῆς φιλοδοξίας ἐλαυνόμενος καὶ καταπιστεύων τοῖς πράγμασι παραλόγως ἔσπευδε κρίναι δι’ αὐτὸ τά ὀλα καὶ μῆτε τὸν Πόπλιον δύνασθαι παρατυχεῖν τῇ μάχῃ μῆτε τοὺς ἐπικαθεσταμένους στρατηγοὺς φθάσαι παραλαβόντας τὴν ἀρχὴν. οὕτως γὰρ ὡς τὸ χρόνος. διόπερ οὗ τῶν τῶν πραγμάτων καιρὸν ἐκλεγόμενος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ὕδιον, ἐμελλέ τοῦ δεόντος σφαλῆσεσθαι προφανῶς.

9 'Ὁ δ' Ἀννίβας, παραπλησίον ἔχων ἐπινοίας Ποπλίῳ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων, κατὰ τούτων ἔσπευδε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, θέλων μὲν πρῶτον ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς τῶν Κελτῶν ὄρμαις, δεύτερον ἀνασκήτους καὶ νεοσυλλόγους συμ-βαλεῖν τοῖς τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στρατοπέδωδοι, τρίτον ἀδυνατοῦντος ἐτι τοῦ Ποπλίου ποιῆσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον πράττειν τι καὶ μὴ προτε-σθαί διὰ κενῆς τὸν χρόνον. τῷ γὰρ εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν καθέντι χώραν στρατόπεδα καὶ παραδόχους ἐγχει-ροῦντι πράγμασιν εἰς τρόπος ἐστίν οὕτος σωτηρίας, τὸ συνεχῶς καινοποιεῖν ἀεὶ τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἑλπίδας.

12 'Ἀννίβας μὲν οὖν, εἰδὼς τὴν ἐσομένην ὀρμήν.
that their legions would be all the better for a winter’s drilling, and that the notoriously fickle Celts would not remain loyal to the Carthaginians if the latter were kept in forced inaction, but would throw them over in their turn. Besides he hoped himself when his wound was healed to be of some real service in their joint action. On all these grounds therefore he advised Tiberius to let matters remain as they were. Tiberius was quite conscious of the truth and cogency of all these reasons, but, urged on by his ambition and with an unreasonable confidence in his fortune, he was eager to deliver the decisive blow himself and did not wish Publius to be able to be present at the battle, or that the Consuls designate should enter upon office before all was over—it being now nearly the time for this. Since, then, he did not choose the time indicated by circumstances, but his own time, his action was bound to be mistaken.

Hannibal’s view of the situation was very much the same as Scipio’s; so that he on the other hand was anxious to force a battle on the enemy, wishing in the first place to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts while still fresh, secondly to encounter the Roman legions while still newly-levied and undrilled, thirdly to fight the battle before Scipio had recovered, but most of all to be up and doing and not let the time slip away resultlessly. For when a general has brought his army into a foreign country and is engaged in such a risky enterprise, his only hope of safety lies in constantly keeping alive the hopes of his allies.

Such, then, was the purpose of Hannibal, who
71 τοῦ Τεθερίου, πρὸς τούτοις ἤν. πάλαι δὲ συνευρακώς μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τόπον, ἐπὶ πέδον μὲν καὶ ψιλὸν, εὐφυὴ δὲ πρὸς ἐνέδραν διὰ τῷ βείθρον ἐχον ὄφρων, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἀκάνθας καὶ βάτους συνεχείς ἐπιπεφυκότας, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῷ στρατεύῳ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐμελλε δὲ εὐχερῶς λήσειν· οἱ γὰρ 'Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὑλώδεις τόπους ὑπόπτως ἔχον διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κέλτους ἀεὶ τιθέναι τὰς ἐνέδρας ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις χωρίοις, τοῖς δὲ ἐπὶ πέδους καὶ ψιλοῖς ἀπεπίστευνον, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὸ λαθεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παθεῖν τοὺς ἐνεδρεύσαντας εὐφυέστεροι τυγχάνουσιν οὔτε τῶν ὑλώδων, διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι μὲν ἐκ πολλοῦ προορᾶν πάντα τοὺς ἐνεδρεύοντας, εἶναι δὲ ἐπιπροσθῆσεις ἑκανας ἐν τοῖς πλεῖστοις τόποις. τὸ γὰρ τυχὸν βείθρον μετὰ βραχείας ὄφρων, ποτὲ δὲ κάλαμοι καὶ πτέρεις καὶ τι γένος ἀκανθῶν, οὐ μόνον πεζοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἴππεις ἐνίοτε δύναται κρύπτειν, ἐὰν βραχέα τις προνοηθῇ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐπίσημα τῶν ὅπλων ὑπτα τιθέναι πρὸς τὴν γῆν, τὰς δὲ περι-κεφαλαίας ὑποτιθέναι τοῖς ὅπλοις. πλὴν δὲ γε τῶν Ἀρχηγοῦν στρατηγὸς κονολογηθεῖς Μάγωνι τάς-δελφὶς καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγωνοσ, συγκατατημένων αὐτῷ πάντων ταῖς ἐπιβο-λαίς, ἀμα τῷ δειπνοποιήσασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον ἀνακαλεσάμενοι Μάγωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν, οὐντα νέον μὲν, ὠρμῆς δὲ πλήρη καὶ παιδομαθὴ περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, συνέτησε τῶν ἵππων ἀνδρᾶς ἐκατὸν καὶ πεζοῦς τοὺς ὑσους. ἐτὶ δὲ τῆς ἤμερας οὐς ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ στρατοπέδου σημανάμενος τοὺς εὐρωστο-τάτους παρηγγέλκει δειπνοποιησάμενος ἤκειν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ σκήνῃ. παρακαλέσας δὲ καὶ παραστήσας
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knew that Tiberius was sure to be aggressively inclined. 71. He had long ago noticed a place between the two camps, flat indeed and treeless, but well adapted for an ambuscade, as it was traversed by a water-course with steep banks densely overgrown with brambles and other thorny plants, and here he proposed to lay a stratagem to surprise the enemy. It was probable that he would easily elude their vigilance; for the Romans, while very suspicious of thickly-wooded ground, which the Celts usually chose for their ambuscades, were not at all afraid of flat and treeless places, not being aware that they are better adapted than woods for the concealment and security of an ambush, because the men can see all round them for a long distance and have at the same time sufficient cover in most cases. Any water-course with a slight bank and reeds or bracken or some kind of thorny plants can be made use of to conceal not only infantry, but even the dismounted horsemen at times, if a little care be taken to lay shields with conspicuous devices inside uppermost on the ground and hide the helmets under them. The Carthaginian general now consulted with his brother Mago and the rest of the staff about the coming battle, and on their all approving of his plan, after the troops had had their supper, he summoned Mago, who was still quite young, but full of martial enthusiasm and trained from boyhood in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred men from the cavalry and the same number of infantry. During the day he had ordered these men, whom he had marked as the most stout-hearted in his army, to come to his tent after supper. After addressing
τούτως τὴν πρέπουσαν ὅρμην τῷ καίρῳ, παρήγγελε δέκα τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους ἑκαστὸν ἐπιλεξάμενον ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων τάξεων ἢκειν εἰς τινα τόπον ὃν ἦδει τῆς στρατοπεδείας. τῶν δὲ πραξάντων τὸ συνταχθὲν, τούτους μὲν ὅντας ἰππεῖς χιλίους καὶ πεζοὺς ἄλλους τοσούτους ἐξαπέστειλε νυκτὸς εἰς τὴν ἐνέδραν, συστήσας ὅδηγοὺς καὶ τάδελφῳ διαταξάμενος περὶ τοῦ καίρου τῆς ἐπιθέσεως· αὐτὸς δ᾿ ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἰππεῖς συναγαγὼν, ὅντας φερεκάκους διαφερόντως, παρεκάλεσε καὶ τινὰς δωρεὰς ἐπαγγελμένοις τοῖς ἀνδραγαθίσας προσέταξε πελάσαντας τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων χάρακι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐπιδιωβάνειν τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ προσακροβολιζόμενον κυνεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους, βουλόμενος ἀναρίστους καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀπαρασκεύοντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠγεμόνας ἀδροίσας ὀμοίως παρεκάλεσε πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, καὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι παρῆγγειλε καὶ περὶ τῆν τῶν ὁπλῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππῶν γίνεσθαι θεραπεῖαν.

72 Ὅ δ᾿ Ἐθέρειος ἀμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐγγίζοντας τοὺς Νομαδικοὺς ἰππεῖς παρατίκα μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπον ἐξαπέστελλε, προστάξας ἔχεσθαι καὶ συμπλέκει 2 κεσθαί τοῖς πολεμίοις. ἔξης δὲ τούτως ἐξέπεμψε τοὺς πεζακούστας εἰς ἔξακισχίους· ἐκίνει δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ὡς ἐξ ἐπιφανείας κριθησομένων τῶν ὀλον, ἐπαιρόμενος τῷ τε πλήθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῷ γεγονότι τῇ προτεραιᾷ 3 περὶ τοὺς ἰππεῖς ἐνιμμηχάματι· οὕσης δὲ τῆς ἔρας περὶ χειμερινᾶς τροπᾶς καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας νυφτῶδους καὶ ψυχρᾶς διαφερόντως, τῶν δ᾿ ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππῶν σχῆδον ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπάντων ἀναρίστων ἐκ-176
them and working up their zeal to the required pitch, he ordered each of them to pick out ten of the bravest men from his own company and to come to a certain place in the camp known to them. They did as they were bidden and in the night he sent out the whole force, which now amounted to a thousand horse and as many foot, to the ambuscade, furnishing them with guides and giving his brother orders about the time to attack. At daybreak he mustered his Numidian horsemen, all men capable of great endurance, whom he ordered, after having addressed them and promised certain gifts to those who distinguished themselves, to ride up to the enemy's camp, and crossing the river with all speed to draw out the Romans by shooting at them, his wish being to get the enemy to fight him before they had breakfasted or made any preparations. He then collected the other officers and exhorted them likewise to battle, and he ordered the whole army to get their breakfasts and to see to their arms and horses.

72. Tiberius, when he saw the Numidian horse approaching, sent out at first only his cavalry with orders to close with the enemy. He next dispatched about six thousand javeliners on foot and then began to move his whole army out of the camp, thinking that the mere sight of them would decide the issue, so much confidence did his superiority in numbers and the success of his cavalry on the previous day give him. The time of year was about the winter solstice, and the day exceedingly cold and snowy, while the men and horses nearly all left the camp without having had their morning meal.
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πεπορευμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀρμῆ καὶ προθυμίᾳ
4 τὸ πλῆθος περιήν ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς τοῦ Τρεβία
ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως, καὶ προσαναβεβηκότος τῷ ἰεύ-
ματι διὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ γενόμενον ἐν τοῖς ūπέρ
τὰ στρατόπεδα τόποις ὦμβρον, μόλις ἔως τῶν μα-
5 σθῶν οἱ πεζοί βαπτιζόμενοι διέβαινον. ἐξ ὃν ἐκακο-
πάθει τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑπὸ τὸν πιθώνας καὶ τῆς
ἔνδειας, ὥς ἀν ἡδή καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας προβαινούσῃ.
8 οὐ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, κατὰ σκηνὰς βεβρωκότες καὶ
πεπωκότες, καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἤτοι μακότες, ἡλείφοντο
7 καὶ καθωπλίζοντο περὶ τὰ πυρὰ πάντες. Ἀνίβας
δὲ τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιτηρῶν, ἀμα τῷ συνιδεῖν διαβεβη-
κότας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους τὸν ποταμὸν προβαλόμενος
ἐφεδρείαν τοὺς λογχοφόρους καὶ Βαλιαρεῖς, ὄντας
8 εἰς ὀκτακισχύλους, ἔζηγε τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ προ-
αγαγὼν ὡς ὄρτῳ στάδια πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας τοὺς
μὲν πεζοὺς ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθείαν παρενέβαλε, περὶ δια-
μυρίους ὄντας τὸν ἄριθμόν, Ἰβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς
9 καὶ Λίβνας, τοὺς δ’ ἵππεῖς διελών ἐφ’ ἐκάτερον
παρέστησε τὸ κέρας, πλείους ὄντας μυρίων σὺν τοῖς
παρὰ τῶν Κελτῶν συμμάχους, τὰ δὲ θηρία μερίσας
10 πρὸ τῶν κεράτων, δι’ ἀμφοτέρων προεβάλετο. Τε-
βέριος δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τοὺς μὲν ἵππεῖς
ἀνεκαλείτο, θεωρῶν οὐκ ἔχοντας ὁ τι χρῆσονται
τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὸ τοὺς Νομάδας ἀποχωρεῖν μὲν
εὐχερῶς καὶ σποράδην, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ πάλιν ἐκ μετα-
βολῆς τολμηρῶς καὶ θρασέως· τὸ γὰρ τῆς Νομαδι-
11 κῆς μάχης ἵδιον ἐστὶ τούτῳ· τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς παρεν-
ἐβαλε κατὰ τὰς εἰθισμένας παρ’ αὐτοῖς τάξεις, ὄντας
τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους εἰς μυρίους ἐξακισχύλους, τοὺς
12 δὲ συμμάχους εἰς δισμυρίους. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον στρα-
τόπεδον παρ’ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰς ὀλοσχερεῖς ἐπιβολὰς
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At first their enthusiasm and eagerness sustained them, but when they had to cross the Trebia, swollen as it was owing to the rain that had fallen during the night higher up the valley than where the armies were, the infantry had great difficulty in crossing, as the water was breast-high. The consequence was that the whole force suffered much from cold and also from hunger, as the day was now advancing. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, who had eaten and drunk in their tents and looked after their horses, were all anointing and arming themselves round their fires. Hannibal, who was waiting for his opportunity, when he saw that the Romans had crossed the river, threw forward as a covering force his pikemen and slingers about eight thousand in number and led out his army. After advancing for about eight stades he drew up his infantry, about twenty thousand in number, and consisting of Spaniards, Celts, and Africans, in a single line, while he divided his cavalry, numbering, together with the Celtic allies, more than ten thousand, and stationed them on each wing, dividing also his elephants and placing them in front of the wings so that his flanks were doubly protected. Tiberius now recalled his cavalry, perceiving that they could not cope with the enemy, as the Numidians easily scattered and retreated, but afterwards wheeled round and attacked with great daring—these being their peculiar tactics. He drew up his infantry in the usual Roman order. They numbered about sixteen thousand Romans and twenty thousand allies, this being the strength of their complete army for decisive operations, when
13 ἐκατέρος οἱ καρπὸι συνάγωσι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἔπιπεις ἐφ’ ἐκάτερον θείς τὸ κέρας, ὄντας εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἔπιηε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις σοβαρῶς, ἐν τάξει καὶ βάδην ποιοῦμενος τὴν ἔφοδον. ἦδη δὲ σύνεγγυς ὄντων ἄλληλοις, συνεπλέκησαν οἱ προκείμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων εὔζωνοι. τοῦτον δὲ συμβάντος, οἱ μὲν Ὁρμαίοι κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἠλλυτοῦτο, τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ὑπερδέξιον γίνεσθαι συνέβαινε τὴν χρείαν, ἀτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Ὁρμαίων πεζακοντιστῶν κακοπαθοῦντων εἴ οἴρθου καὶ προεμένων τὰ πλείστα βῆλι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας συμπλοκὴν, τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων βελῶν ἡχρωμένων αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς νοτίδος παραπλήσια δὲ τούτους συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἔπιπεις γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὸ σύμπαν αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδον. περὶ γε μὴν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ὑπῆρχε τάναντα τούτων ἀκμαίοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι καὶ νεαλεῖς ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ δέον εὐχρήστως καὶ προθύμως εἶχον. διὸ περ ἄμα τῷ δὲξασθαὶ διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων τοὺς προκωδυνεῦοντας καὶ συμπεσεῖν τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὄπλων ἄλληλοι, οἱ μὲν ἔπιπεῖς οἱ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐθέως ἀπ’ ἀμφοῖν τῶν κεράτων ἔπιεξον τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ὡς ἀν τῷ πλῆθει πολὺ διαφέροντες καὶ ταῖς ἀκμαῖς αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἔπιπων διὰ τὴν προερχέσθαι ἀκεραίοτητα περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον. τοῖς δὲ Ὁρμαίοις τῶν ἔπειων ὑποχωρησάντων καὶ ψυλλωθέντων τῶν τῆς φάλαγγος κεράτων, οἴ τε λογχοφόροι τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τοῦ τῶν Νομίδων πλῆθος, ὑπεραιρέοντες τοὺς προτεταγμένους τῶν ἱδίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ κέρατα προσπίπτοντες τοῖς Ὁρμαίοις, πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ διειργάζοντο καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ πρόσωπον οὐκ.
the Consuls chance to be united. Afterwards placing his cavalry, numbering about four thousand, on each wing he advanced on the enemy in imposing style marching in order at a slow step. 73. When they were nearly at close quarters, the light-armed troops in the van of each army began the combat, and here the Romans laboured under many disadvantages, the efficiency of the Carthaginians being much superior, since the Roman javeliners had had a hard time since daybreak, and had spent most of their missiles in the skirmish with the Numidians, while those they had left had been rendered useless by the continued wet weather. The cavalry and the whole army were in much the same state, whereas just the opposite was the case with the Carthaginians, who, standing in their ranks fresh and in first-rate condition, were ready to give efficient support wherever it was required. So when the skirmishers had retired through the gaps in their line and the heavy-armed infantry met, the Carthaginian cavalry at once pressed on both flanks of the enemy, being greatly superior in numbers and in the condition of themselves and their horses, having, as I explained above, started quite fresh. When the Roman cavalry fell back and left the flanks of the infantry exposed, the Carthaginian pike-men and the Numidians in a body, dashing past their own troops that were in front of them, fell on the Romans from both flanks, damaging them severely and preventing them
8 εἶτων. οἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς βαρέσιν ὀπλοῖς, παρ’ ἀμφοῖν τὰς πρώτας ἐχοντες καὶ μέσας τῆς ὀλῆς παρεμβολῆς τάξεις, ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἔμαχοντο συστάδην, ἐφά- 74 μιλλον ποιούμενοι τὸν κίνδυνον. ἐν δὲ καιρῷ διανα- στάντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Νομάδων, καὶ προσ- πεσόντων ἀφνῷ κατὰ νότου τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις περὶ τὰ μέσα, μεγάλην ταραχὴν καὶ δυσχρηστίαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις. τέλος δὲ ἀμφότερα τὰ κέρατα τῶν περὶ τὸν Τεθέριον πιεζούμενα κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων, πέριξ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἐπιφανείας ὑπὸ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἑτράπησαν καὶ συνεωθοῦντο κατὰ τὸν διωγμὸν πρὸς τὸν 3 ὑποκείμενον ποταμὸν. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, οἱ κατὰ μέσον τὸν κίνδυνον ταχθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων, οἱ μὲν κατόπιν ἐφεστῷτες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέ- δρας προσπεσόντων ἀπολλυόντες καὶ κακῶς ἐπασχον, 4 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας χώρας ἐπαναγκασθέντες ἐκράτησαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ μέρους τινὸς τῶν Λιβύων, καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀποκτείναντες διέκοψαν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τάξιν. θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων κερατῶν ἐκπεπεσμένους, τὸ μὲν ἐπιβοηθεῖν τοῦτοις ὅτι πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἐαυτῶν ἀπιέναι παρεμβολὴν ἀπέγνωσαν, ὑφορώμενοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἴππων, κυλυόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορᾶν καὶ συστροφὴν τοῦ κατὰ κεφαλήν 6 ὀμβρου. τηροῦντες δὲ τὰς τάξεις ἀθρόοι μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς Πλακεντίαν, οὕτε οὐκ 7 ἐλάττως μυρίων. τῶν δὲ λουπῶν οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐφθάρησαν ὑπὸ τε τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἴππων, οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῶν ἴππων, πρὸς τὸ προειρημένον 8
from dealing with the enemy in their front. The heavy-armed troops on both sides, who occupied the advanced centre of the whole formation, maintained for long a hand-to-hand combat with no advantage on either side. 74. But now the Numidians issued from their ambuscade and suddenly attacked the enemy’s centre from the rear, upon which the whole Roman army was thrown into the utmost confusion and distress. At length both of Tiberius’ wings, hard pressed in front by the elephants and all round their flanks by the light-armed troops, turned and were driven by their pursuers back on the river behind them. After this, while the rear of the Roman centre was suffering heavy loss from the attack of the ambuscade, those in the van, thus forced to advance, defeated the Celts and part of the Africans, and after killing many of them broke through the Carthaginian line. But seeing that both their flanks had been forced off the field, they despaired of giving help there and of returning to their camp, afraid as they were of the very numerous cavalry and hindered by the river and the force and heaviness of the rain which was pouring down on their heads. They kept, however, in close order and retired on Placentia, being not less than ten thousand in number. Of the remainder the greater part were killed near the river by the elephants and cavalry, but the few infantry who escaped and most of the
σύστημα ποιούμενον τήν ἀποχώρησιν, ἀνεκομί-
9 οθησαν ἀμα τούτοις εἰς Πλακεντίαν. τὸ δὲ τῶν
Καρχηδονίων στρατόπεδου, ἐως τοῦ ποταμοῦ κατα-
διώξαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὡπο δὲ τοῦ χειμώνος οὐκέτι
δυνάμενον πορρωτέρων προβαίνειν, ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν
10 εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν. καὶ πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ μάχῃ
περιχαρείς ἦσαν, ὡς καταρθωκότες· συνέβαινε
γὰρ ὅλγους μὲν τῶν Ἰβηρών καὶ Λιβύων, τοὺς δὲ
πλεῖον ἄπολωλέναι τῶν Κελτῶν· ὡπο δὲ τῶν
ὀμβρῶν καὶ τῆς ἐπιγυμναίης χιόνος οὕτως διετί-
θεντο δεινῶς ὡστε τὰ μὲν θηρία διαφθαρῆναι πλὴν
ἐνός, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ
τῶν ἔπιπων διὰ τὸ ψύχος.

75 ὦ δὲ Τεβέριος, εἰδὼς μὲν τὰ συμβεβηκότα, βου-
λόμενος δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἑπικρύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ
Ῥώμῃ τὸ γεγονός, ἐπεμψε τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας ὅτι
μάχης γενομένης τὴν νίκην αὐτῶν ὁ χειμῶν ἀφεὶ-
2 λετο. οἰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι παρατίκα μὲν ἑπίστευον τοῖς
προσπιτουσί· μετ' ὧν πολὺ δὲ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς
μὲν Καρχηδονίους καὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν τὴν αὐτῶν
τηρεῖν καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς πάντας ἀπονευκέναι πρὸς
3 τὴν ἐκείνων φιλίαν, τοὺς δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν ἀπολεο-
pότας τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀνακεχυρικέ-
ναι καὶ συνθροίσθαι πάντας εἰς τὰς πόλεις, καὶ
χορηγεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις ἐκ θαλάττης ἀνὰ τὸν
Πάδον ποταμὸν, καὶ λίαν σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν τὰ γεγο-
4 νότα περὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. διὸ καὶ παραδόξου φα-
νέτος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πράγματος περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς παρα-
σκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγνώντο καὶ περὶ φυλακῆσαν τῶν
προκειμένων τόπων, πέμπτον σας Ἐσσαδόνα καὶ
Σικελίαν στρατόπεδα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰς Τάραντα
προφυλακαί καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τόπων εἰς τοὺς εὐκαὶ-
184
cavalry retreated to join the body I just mentioned and with them got safely into Placentia. The Carthaginian army, after pursuing the enemy as far as the river, being unable to advance further owing to the storm, returned to their camp. They were all highly elated at the result of the battle, regarding it as a signal success; for very few Africans and Spaniards had been killed, the chief loss having fallen on the Celts. They suffered so severely, however, from the rain and the snow that followed that all the elephants perished except one, and many men and horses also died of the cold.

75. Tiberius, though well knowing the facts, wished as far as possible to conceal them from those in Rome, and therefore sent messengers to announce that a battle had taken place and that the storm had deprived him of the victory. The Romans at first gave credence to this news, but when shortly afterwards they learnt that the Carthaginians still kept their camp and that all the Celts had gone over to them, but that their own forces had abandoned their camp and retreated from the field and were now all collected in cities, and getting their supplies up from the sea by the river Po, they quite realized what had been the result of the battle. Therefore, although they were much taken by surprise, they adopted all manner of steps to prepare for the war and especially to protect exposed points, dispatching legions to Sardinia and Sicily and sending garrisons to Tarentum and other suitable
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rous. παρεσκεύασαν δὲ καὶ ναῦς ἑξῆκοντα πεντήρεις.
5 Γνάιος δὲ Σερούλιος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος, οὔπερ ἔτυχον ὑπατοὶ τὸτε καθεσταμένοι, συνῆγον τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ κατέγραφον τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς στρατό-
8 πεδα. παρῆγον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς τὰς μὲν εἰς Ἀρίμων, τὰς δὲ εἰς Τυρρηνίαν, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦτος
7 ποιησόμενοι τοὺς τόπους τὴν ἔξοδον. ἔσπευσαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἰέρωνα περὶ βοηθείας, ὡς καὶ πεν-
tακοσίως αὐτοῖς ἐξαπέστειλε Κρήτας καὶ χιλίους πελτοφόρους. πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς
8 ῥητόμαζον. τὸτε γὰρ εἰς φοβερώτατοι Ἡρωναῖοι καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ’ ἱδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιστή
φόβος ἀλήθινος.

76 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καυροὺς Γνάιος Κορνήλιος ὁ καταλειφθεὶς ὑπὸ τάδελφοῦ Ποπλίου στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προ-
eίπον, ἀναχθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ στομάτων παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, προσέσχε τῆς Ἰβηρίας πρὸς τοὺς
2 κατὰ τὸ καλοῦμενον Ἐμπόριον τόπους. ἀρξάμενος δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποβάσεις ἐποιεῖτο, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπει-

70 7ούντας ἐπολιορκεῖ τῶν τὴν παραλίαν κατοικοῦν-
tων ἔως Ἰβηρίους ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δὲ προσδεχομένους ἐφιλανθρώπει, τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ποιούμενος περὶ
3 αὐτῶν προμήθειαν. ἀσφαλισάμενος δὲ τοὺς προσ-

72 κεχωρηκότας τῶν παραθάλασσων προῆγε παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν μεσο-
4 γαῖαν. πολὺ γὰρ ἥδη καὶ τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἡθοῖκει τῶν Ἰβηρίων. ἀμα δὲ προϊόν ἂς μὲν προσήγετο,
5 τὰς δὲ κατεστρέφετο τῶν πόλεων. τῶν δὲ Καρχη-
dονίων, οὐδὲ ἔχων ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀπελεύθη τῶν τόπων Ἀινων, ἀντιστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτοῖς περὶ πόλων

70 προσαγορευομένην Κίσσαν, συμβαλὼν ὁ Γνάιος ἐκ 186
places, and getting ready also a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, the Consuls designate, were busy mustering the allies and enrolling their own legions, sending depots of supplies at the same time to Ariminum and Etruria which they meant to be their bases in the campaign. They also applied for help to Hiero, who sent them five hundred Cretans and a thousand light infantry, and on all sides they made active preparations. For the Romans both in public and in private are most to be feared when they stand in real danger.

76. During this time Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who, as I said, had been left by his brother Publius in command of the naval forces, sailing from the mouths of the Rhone with his whole fleet to the place in Spain called Emporium, and starting from there made a series of landings, reducing by siege the towns on the coast as far as the Ebro, which refused his advances, but bestowing favours on those which accepted them and taking all possible precautions for their safety. After securing all the sea-board places which had submitted to him he advanced with his whole army into the interior, having now got together also a considerable force of Iberian allies. He won over some of the towns on the line of his march and subdued others, and when the Carthaginians who had been left to guard this district under the command of Hanno encamped opposite to him near a city called Cissa, Gnaeus
καὶ νικήσας τῇ μάχῃ πολλῶν μὲν χρημάτων ἐγένετ' ἐγκρατίας, ὡς ἂν ἀπάσης τῆς ἀποσκευῆς τῶν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ὀρμησάντων παρὰ τούτους ἀπολελειμμένης, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἐντὸς Ἰβηρος ποταμοῦ συμμάχους ἐποίησατο καὶ φίλους, ἐωγρία δὲ τὸν τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν Ἀννωνα καὶ τῶν τῶν Ἰβηρῶν Ἀνδοβάλην ἔλαβε. τούτου δὲ συνέβαινε τύραννον μὲν εἰναι τῶν κατὰ τὴν μεσόγαιαν τόπων, εὐνου ὁ δὲ διαφερόντως ἄει ποτὲ Καρχηδονίων τῶν τοιαύτως. ταχὺ δὲ συνεῖς τὸ γεγονὸς Ἀσδρούβας, ἢκε παραβοηθῶν διαβᾶς τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμόν. καὶ καταμάθων ἀπολελειμμένους τους ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἐβαθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρηκότως ἀναστρεφομένους διὰ τὸ προτέρημα τῶν πεζίκων στρατεύσεων, παραλαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ δυνάμεως πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὅκτακισιλίους (ἐπείς δὲ περὶ χιλίους), καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐσκεδασμένους κατὰ τῆς χώρας τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, πολλῶς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτευε, τους δὲ λοιποὺς ἴνα γίναςτε σφυγεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἀναχωρήσας, καὶ διαβᾶς αὕτης τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμόν, ἐγένετο περὶ παρασκευήν καὶ φυλακήν τῶν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ τόπων, ποιοῦμενος τὴν παραχεμασίαν ἐν Καινῆ πόλει. ὡς δὲ Γνάος συνάντας τῷ στόλῳ, καὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῖς ἑθισμοὺς κολάσας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἠδὴ συναγαγὼν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὴν τε πεζίν καὶ τὴν ναυτικήν στρατιάν ἐν Ταρράκων τὴν παραχεμασίαν ἐποιεῖτο. διαδόμενος δὲ τὴν λείαν ἰοσ τοῖς στρατιώταις μεγάλην εὔνοιαν καὶ προθυμόν τε ἐνειργάσατο πρὸς τὸ μέλλον. μασίν ἐποιεῖτο. διαδόμενος δὲ τὴν λείαν ἰοσ τοῖς στρατιώταις μεγάλην εὔνοιαν καὶ προθυμόν τε ἐνειργάσατο πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.
defeated them in a pitched battle, possessing himself of a large amount of valuable booty—all the heavy baggage of the army that had set out for Italy having been left under their charge—securing the alliance of all the tribes north of the Ebro and taking prisoners the Carthaginian general Hanno and the Iberian general Andobales. The latter was despot of all central Iberia and a strenuous supporter of the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal soon got news of the disaster and crossing the Ebro came to the rescue. Learning that the crews of the Roman ships had been left behind and were off their guard and unduly confident owing to the success of the land forces, he took with him about eight thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry from his own force, and finding the men from the ships scattered over the country, killed a large number of them and compelled the remainder to take refuge on board their vessels. He then retreated, and recrossing the Ebro busied himself with fortifying and garrisoning the places south of the Ebro, passing the winter in New Carthage. Gnaeus, on rejoining the fleet, inflicted the customary penalty on those responsible for what had happened, and now uniting his land and sea forces went into winter quarters at Tarraco. By dividing the booty in equal shares among his soldiers he made them very well disposed to him and ready to do their best in the future.

77. Such was the state of matters in Spain. In 217 B.C. the early spring Gaius Flaminius with his army
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μένος ἀναλαβὼν τὰς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεις προῆγε διὰ τῆς Τυρρηνίας, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸ τῆς τῶν 2 Ἀρρητίνων πόλεως, Γναίος δὲ Σερούλιος τούμπαλν ὁς ἐπὶ Ἀρμίνου, ταύτη παρατηρήσων τῆν εἰσβολήν 3 τῶν ὑπεναντίων, Ἄννιβας δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν τῇ Κελτικῇ τούς μὲν Ρωμαίους τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης αἰχ- 4 μαλῶτων ἐν φυλακῇ συνείχε, τὰ μέτρια τῶν ἐπι- τηδείων διδόνετο, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πάσῃ φιλανθρωπίᾳ διεξήγε, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει, φάσκων οὐκ ἔκεινος ἥκεν πολεμήσων, ἀλλὰ Ἐρμαίοις ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων. 5 διόπερ ἐφή δείν αὐτοὺς, ἔδω ὀρθῶς φρονῶσι. 6 ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὐτῶν φιλίας. παρείναι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνακτησόμενος Ἰταλώ- ταις. ὅμως δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἢν ὑπὸ Ἐρμαίων ἀπολογεκότες ἐκαστοὶ τυγχάνοντες, σω- 7 νασώσων. ταῦτα δ’ εἴπων ἀφήκε πάντας χωρίς λύτρων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, βουλόμενος ἀμα μὲν προ- καλεῖσθαι διὰ τοιούτου τρόπου πρῶς αὐτὸν τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἢμα δ’ ἀπαλλοτριοῦν 8 τῆς πρὸς Ἐρμαίους εὐνοίας, ἐρεθίζειν δὲ τοὺς δοκοῦντας πόλεων ἡ λιμέσων ἠλαττώσθαι τι διὰ τῆς Ἐρμαίων ἀρχῆς.

78 Ἕξχρησατο δὲ τινὶ καὶ Φουνικικῷ στρατηγήματι 2 τοιούτῳ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν. ἄγωνιῶν γὰρ τὴν ἀθείαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς συντάσσωσ, κατεσκευάσατο περιθέτως τρίχας, ἀρμο- ζούσας ταῖς κατὰ τὰς ὀλοσχερεῖς διαφορὰς τῶν ἡλι- 3 κῶν ἐπιπρεπείαις, καὶ ταύταις ἐχρήτο συνεχῶς μετατιθέμενος. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἔσθητας μετ- 4 ελάμβανε τὰς καθηκούσας αἰε ταῖς περιθεταῖς. δι’ 190
advanced through Etruria and encamped before Arretium, while Gnaeus Servilius advanced as far as Ariminum to watch for the invasion of the enemy from that side. Hannibal, who was wintering in Cisalpine Gaul, kept the Roman prisoners he had taken in the battle in custody, giving them just sufficient to eat, but to the prisoners from the allies he continued to show the greatest kindness, and afterwards called a meeting of them and addressed them, saying that he had not come to make war on them, but on the Romans for their sakes and therefore if they were wise they should embrace his friendship, for he had come first of all to re-establish the liberty of the peoples of Italy and also to help them to recover the cities and territories of which the Romans had deprived them. Having spoken so, he dismissed them all to their homes without ransom, his aim in doing so being both to gain over the inhabitants of Italy to his own cause and to alienate their affections from Rome, provoking at the same time to revolt those who thought their cities or harbours had suffered damage by Roman rule.

78. During this winter he also adopted a truly Punic artifice. Fearing the fickleness of the Celts and possible attempts on his life, owing to his establishment of the friendly relations with them being so very recent, he had a number of wigs made, dyed to suit the appearance of persons differing widely in age, and kept constantly changing them, at the same time also dressing in a style that suited the wig, so that not only those who had seen him
5 Θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς Κελτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν πολέμων ἐν τῇ παρ' αὐτῶν χώρα λαμβάνειν τὴν τριβήν, σπεύδοντας δὲ καὶ μετεώρους ὄντας εἰς τὴν πολέμιαν, προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς 'Ρωμαίους ὀργήν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὰς ωφελείας, ἐκρυε τὴν ταχιστὴν ἀναζευγνύειν καὶ συνεκπληροῦν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὀρμάς. διόπερ ἁμα τῇ τὴν ὄραν μεταβάλλειν, πυνθανόμενος τῶν μάλιστα τῆς χώρας δοκοῦντων ἐμπερεῖν, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἐμβολάς τὰς εἰς τὴν πολέμιαν μακρὰς εὐρισκεῖ καὶ προδήλους τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔλων εἰς Τυρρηνίαν φέροντα, δυσχερῆ μὲν, σύντομον δὲ καὶ παράδοξον

7 φανησομένην τοῖς περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον. ἀεὶ δὲ πως οἰκεῖος ὧν τῇ φύσει τούτου τοῦ μέρους, ταύτῃ προέθετο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν. διαδοθεῖσθαι δὲ τῆς φήμης ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ διότι μέλλει διὰ τῶν ἔλων ἀγενί αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατηγὸς, πᾶς τις εὐλαβῶς εἰχε πρὸς τὴν πορείαν, υφορῶμενος βάραθρα καὶ τοὺς λιμνώδεις τῶν τόπων. 'Αννίβας δ' ἐπιμελῶς ἐξητακώς τεναγώδεις καὶ στερεοὺς ὑπάρχοντας τοὺς κατὰ τὴν δίοδον τόπους, ἀναζεύζας εἰς μὲν τὴν πρωτοπορείαν θηκε τοὺς Λίβνας καὶ τοὺς 'Ἰβηριας καὶ πάν τὸ χρῆσμοντο κέροις τῆς σφετέρας δυνά- μεως, συγκαταμίξας αὐτοὺς τὴν ἀποσκευὴν, ἵνα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν εὐπορῶσι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέλλον εἰς τέλος ἀφροτίστως εἰχε περὶ παντῶς τοῦ σκευοφόρου, λογιζόμενος ὡς ἐὰν ἀψήται τῆς πολε- μίας, ἴττηθεὶς μὲν οὐ προσδημητεῖ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, κρατῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπαίθρων οὐκ ἀπορήσει τῶν ἐπι-
BOOK III. 78.4 – 79.2

but for a moment, but even his familiar found difficulty in recognizing him.

Observing that the Celts were dissatisfied at the prosecution of the war in their own territory, but were eagerly looking forward to an invasion of that of the enemy, professedly owing to their hatred of the Romans, but as a fact chiefly in hope of booty, he decided to be on the move as soon as possible and satisfy the desire of his troops. As soon, then, as the weather began to change he ascertained by inquiring from those who knew the country best that the other routes for invading the Roman territory were both long and obvious to the enemy, but that the road through the marshes to Etruria was difficult indeed but expeditious and calculated to take Flaminius by surprise. As he was by nature always inclined to such expedients, he decided to march by this road. When the news spread in the camp that the general was going to lead them through marshes, everyone was very reluctant to start, imagining that there would be deep bogs and quagmires. 79. But Hannibal had made careful inquiries, and having ascertained that the water on the ground they would have to pass over was shallow and the bottom solid, broke up his quarters and started, placing in the van the Africans and Spaniards and all the most serviceable portion of his army, intermingling the baggage train with them, so that for the present they might be kept supplied with food. For as regards the future he did not trouble himself about the pack-animals at all, as he calculated that on reaching the enemy's country he would, if defeated, have no need of provisions, and if he gained command of the open country

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3 τηδείων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐπέβαλε τοὺς
4 Κελτοὺς, ἐπὶ δὲ πάσι τοὺς ἰππεῖς. ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ
τῆς οὐραγίας τῶν ἄδελφων ἀπέλιπε Μάγωνα τῶν τε
λοιπῶν χάρις καὶ μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν μαλα-
kías καὶ φυγοποιίας, ὥς ἐὰν κακοπαθοῦντες τρέ-
pωνται πάλιν εἰς τοῦπίσω, κωλὺ ἄν τῶν ἰππεῶν
5 καὶ προσφέρῃ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἰθη-
ρεῖς καὶ Λίβυκες δὴ ἀκεράιων τῶν ἐλών ποιούμενοι
τὴν πορείαν μετρῶς κακοπαθοῦντες ἢμνον, ἀτε καὶ
φερέκακοι πάντες ὄντες καὶ συνῆθεις ταῖς τοιαύταις
6 ταλαιπωρίαις. οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ δυσχέρᾳ μὲν εἰς τοὺμ-
προσθεὶ τοὺς προύθανων, τεταραγμένων καὶ διατετα-
μένων εἰς βάθος τῶν ἐλών, ἐπιπόνως δὲ καὶ ταλαι-
pώρως ὑπέμενον τὴν κακοπάθειαν, ἀπειροῦ πάσης
7 τῆς τοιαύτης ὄντες κακουχίας. ἐκβιώνοντο δὲ πάλιν
ἀπονεύοντας εἰς τοῦπίσω διὰ τοὺς ἑθεστώτας αὐτοῖς
8 ἰππεῖς. πάντες μὲν οὖν ἐκακοπάθουν, καὶ μάλιστα
diὰ τὴν ἄγρυπνίαν, ὥς ἂν ἔξης ἡμέρας τέτταρας
καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας συνεχῶς διὰ ὑδατος ποιούμενοι
τὴν πορείαν. διαφερόντως γιὰ ἡμὲν ἐπόνων καὶ
9 κατεβθείρονθ' ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς οἱ Κελτοὶ. τῶν
δ' ὑποχυγίων αὐτοῦ τὰ πλείστα πίπτοντα διὰ τοὺς
πηλοὺς ἀπώλλυτο, μίαν παρεχόμενα χρείαν ἐν τῷ
10 πεσεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώπωσ. καθεξόμενοι γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῶν
καὶ τῶν σκεῦων σωρηδὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἱγρὸν ὑπερεῖχον,
καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βραχὺ μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς
11 ἀπεκομίστῳ. οὐκ ὁλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰππῶν τὰς
ὄπλας ἀπέβαλον διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς διὰ τῶν
12 πηλῶν πορείας. Ἀνείβας δὲ μόλις ἐπὶ τοῦ περι-
λεισθέντος θηρίου διεσώθη μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπω-
ρίας, ὑπεραλήθης ὡν διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς ἐπενεχθε-
σῆς οὖθαλμίας αὐτῶ, δι' ἡν καὶ τέλος ἐστερήθη τῆς
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would be in no want of supplies. Behind the troops I mentioned he placed the Celts and in the extreme rear his cavalry, leaving his brother Mago in charge of the rear-guard. This course he took for various reasons, but chiefly owing to the softness and aversion to labour of the Celts, so that if, owing to the hardships they suffered, they tried to turn back Mago could prevent them by falling on them with his cavalry. The Spaniards and Africans for their part, as the marshes were still firm when they marched over them, got across without suffering seriously, being all inured to fatigue and accustomed to such hardships, but the Celts not only progressed with difficulty, the marshes being now cut up and trodden down to some depth, but were much fatigued and distressed by the severity of the task, being quite unused to suffering of the kind. They were prevented, however, from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All the army, indeed, suffered much, and chiefly from want of sleep, as they had to march through water for three continuous days and nights, but the Celts were much more worn out and lost more men than the rest. Most of the pack-animals fell and perished in the mud, the only service they rendered being that when they fell the men piled the packs on their bodies and lay upon them, being thus out of the water and enabled to snatch a little sleep during the night. Many of the horses also lost their hooves by the continuous march through the mud. Hannibal himself on the sole remaining elephant got across with much difficulty and suffering, being in great pain from a severe attack of ophthalmia, which finally led to the
80 Διαπεράσας δὲ παραδόξως τοὺς ἑλώδεις τόπους, καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ τὸν Φλαμίνιον στρατοπεδεύοντα πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀρρητῶν πόλεως, τὸτε μὲν αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς ἑλεσί κατεστρατοπέδευσε, βουλόμενος τὴν τε δύναμιν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ πολυπραγμονήσας τὰ περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ τοὺς προ-κειμένους τῶν τόπων. πυθανόμενος δὲ τὴν μὲν χώραν τὴν πρόσθεν πολλῆς γέμευν ὡφελείας, τὸν δὲ Φλαμίνιον ὀχλοκόπον μὲν καὶ δημαγωγὸν εἶναι τέλειον, πρὸς ἀληθῶν δὲ καὶ πολεμικῶν πραγμά-των χειρισμὸν ὑπὲρφη, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατα-
4 πεπιστευκέναι τοὺς σφετέρους πράγμασιν, συνελογίζετο διὸτι παραλλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκείνων στρατοπεδείαν καὶ καθέντος εἰς τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν τόπους, τὰ μὲν ἀγωνιῶν τὸν ἐπιτωθασιμὸν τῶν ὀχλῶν οὐ δυνήσεται περιορᾶν δημομενήν τὴν χώραν, τὰ δὲ κατηγορίως παρέστατο προχείρως εἰς πάντα τόπον ἐπόμενος, σπουδάζων δὲ αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὸ προτέρημα καὶ μὴ προσδέξασθαι τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ τὴν ἵσθην ἀρχήν ἔχοντος. εὖ δὲν πολλοὺς αὐτὸν ὑπελάμβανε παραδώσεως καροῦς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν. πάντα δὲ ἐμφρόνως ἐλογίζετο ταῦτα καὶ πραγματι-
κῶς, οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄλλως εἰπεῖν, ὡς εἰ τις οἴεται κυριώτερὸν τι μέρος εἶναι στρατηγίας τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν προάρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἥγεμο-
2 νος, ἀγνοεῖ καὶ τετύφωται. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν κατ' ἄνδρα καὶ ζυγὸν ἄγωνισμάτων δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα νικᾶν συνθεωρεῖν πῶς δυνατὸν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τί γυμνὸν ἡ ποιὸν ἐξοπλοῦν μέρος φαίνεται τῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν, οὔτως χρῆ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων 196
loss of one eye as he had no time to stop and apply any treatment to it, the circumstances rendering that impossible.

80. Having thus almost beyond expectation crossed the marshes, and, finding that Flaminius was encamped in Etruria before the city of Arretium, he pitched his camp for the present at the edge of the marshes, with the view of refreshing his forces and getting information about the enemy and about the country in front of him. On learning that this country promised a rich booty, and that Flaminius was a thorough mob-courtier and demagogue, with no talent for the practical conduct of war and exceedingly self-confident withal, he calculated that if he passed by the Roman army and advanced into the country in his front, the Consul would on the one hand never look on while he laid it waste for fear of being jeered at by his soldiery; and on the other hand he would be so grieved that he would be ready to follow anywhere, in his anxiety to gain the coming victory himself without waiting for the arrival of his colleague. From all this he concluded that Flaminius would give him plenty of opportunities of attacking him. 81. And all this reasoning on his part was very wise and sound. For there is no denying that he who thinks that there is anything more essential to a general than the knowledge of his opponent's principles and character, is both ignorant and foolish. For as in combats between man and man and rank and rank, he who means to conquer must observe how best to attain his aim, and what naked or unprotected part of the enemy is visible, so he who is in command must try to
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προεστῶτας σκοπεῖν οὐχ ὃποὺ τι τοῦ σώματος γυ-μὸν, ἀλλὰ ποῦ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐχείρωτόν τι παραφαί-νεται τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων ἤγερμόνος. ἐπειδὴ πολλοὶ
μὲν διὰ ῥαβδύμαιν καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν αργίαν οὐ μόνον
tὰς κοινὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἱδίους κατα-
5 προϊένταν βίους ἁρδην. πολλοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν πρὸς
tὸν οἶνον ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδ᾽ ὑπνώσαν δύνανται χωρὶς
6 ἄλλοιώσεως καὶ μέθης, ἐνοὶ δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν ἀφρο-
dισίων ὀρμίς καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἐκπλήξιν οὐ μόνον
pόλεις καὶ βίους ἀναστάτους πεποίηκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
7 τὸ ζῆν αὐτῶν ἀφήρηται μετ᾽ αἰσχύνης. καὶ μὴν
dειλία καὶ βλακεία κατ᾽ ἱδίαν μὲν αὐτοῖς ὀνείδος
ἐπιφέρει τοῖς ἔχουσι, περὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν ὄλων ἥγε-
mόνα γενομένη κοινὸν ἔστι καὶ μέγιστον συμπτω-
8 μάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀπράκτους ποιεῖ τοὺς ὑπο-
tαττομένους, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ κινδύνους ἐπιφέρει
9 τοὺς μεγίστους τοῖς πεποστευκόσι. προπέτεια γε
μὴν καὶ θρασύτης καὶ θυμὸς ἄλογος, ἔτι δὲ κενοδοξία
καὶ τύφος, εὐχείρωτα μὲν τοῖς ἔχθροῖς, ἐπισφαλέ-
στατα δὲ τοῖς φίλοις. πρὸς γὰρ πᾶσαν ἐπιβούλην,
10 ἐνέδραν, ἀπάτην ἔτοιμος ὁ γε τοιοῦτος. διὸπερ εἰ
τις δύνατο συννοεῖν τὰ περὶ τοὺς πέλας ἀμαρτή-
ματα καὶ τηδέ που προσέναι τοῖς ὑπενντίοις, ἡ
μαλίστα καὶ δὴ ὅν εὐχείρωτος ἐσθ᾽ ὁ προεστῶς
τῶν πολεμίων, τάχιστ᾽ ἀν τῶν ὄλων κατακρατοῖ. 11
καθάπερ γὰρ νεώς ἕαν ἀφέλη τῶν κυβερνήτην,
tὸ ὀλον αὐτανδρί σκάφος ὑποχείριον γίνεται τοῖς
ἔχθροῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕαν τὸν προεστώτα
[πόλεμον] δυνάμεως χειρώσηται τις κατὰ τὰς ἐπι-
βολὰς καὶ συλλογισμοὺς, αὐτανδρί γίνεται πολ-
λάκις κρατείν τῶν ἀντιταττομένων.
12 "Α δὴ καὶ τότε προϊόδεμος καὶ συλλογισάμενος

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see in the enemy's general not what part of his body is exposed, but what are the weak spots that can be discovered in his mind. For there are many men who, owing to indolence and general inactivity, bring to utter ruin not only the welfare of the state but their private fortunes as well; while there are many others so fond of wine that they cannot even go to sleep without fuddling themselves with drink; and some, owing to their abandonment to venery and the consequent derangement of their minds, have not only ruined their countries and their fortunes but brought their lives to a shameful end. But cowardice and stupidity are vices which, disgraceful as they are in private to those who have them, are when found in a general the greatest of public calamities. For not only do they render his army inefficient but often expose those who confide in him to the greatest perils. Rashness on the other hand on his part and undue boldness and blind anger, as well as vaingloriousness and conceit, are easy to be taken advantage of by his enemy and are most dangerous to his friends; for such a general is the easy victim of all manner of plots, ambushes, and cheater. Therefore the leader who will soonest gain a decisive victory, is he who is able to perceive the faults of others, and to choose that manner and means of attacking the enemy which will take full advantage of the weaknesses of their commander. For just as a ship if deprived of its pilot will fall with its whole crew into the hands of the enemy, so the general who is his opponent's master in strategy and reasoning may often capture his whole army.

And in this case too, as Hannibal had correctly
'Αννίβασ περὶ τῶν ἑναντίων ἡγεμόνοις οὐ διεσφάλη τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. ὥς γὰρ θάττον ποιησάμενος ἀναξιγγὴν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Φαισόλαν τῶπων καὶ μικρὸν ὑπεράρας τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαιῶν στρατοπεδείαν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν προκειμένην χώραν, 2 εὐθέως μετέωρος ἢν ὁ Φλαμύνιος καὶ θυμοῦ πλήρης, δοξάζων ἑαυτόν ὑπὸ τῶν ἑναντίων καταφρονεῖσθαι. 3 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πορθομένης τῆς χώρας, καὶ πανταχόθεν τοῦ κατοικοῦ σημαίνουσας τὴν καταφθορὰν αὐτῆς, ἐσχετλιαζόμενο καὶ τὸ γνώμενον. 4 διὸ καὶ τῶν ὁιόμενων δεῖν μὴ προχείρως ἐπακολούθειν μηδὲ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, φυλάττεσθαι δὲ καὶ προσέχειν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππεῶν, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐτερον ὑπατον προσλαβεῖν καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοῖς στρατοπέδους ὅμοιο ποιῆσον τῶν 5 κάιδυνον, οὐχ ὅλον προσεἰχε τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἀλλ’ 6 οὐδ’ ἀνείχετο τῶν ἀποφαινομένων ταῦτα, παρεκάλει δ’ αὐτοῦς ἐν νῷ λαμβάνειν τὶ λέγειν εἰκός τοῖς ἐν τῇ πατρίδι τῆς μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης σχεδὸν ἐως πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην, αὐτῶν δὲ κατόπιν τῶν 7 πολεμίων ἐν Ῥωμηνίᾳ στρατοπεδεύοντος. τέλος δὲ ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, ἀναξεύξας προῆγε μετὰ τῆς δυναμεώς, οὐ καίρων, οὐ τόπον προορώμενος, μόνον δὲ σπεύδων συμπέσειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὡς προδήλου 8 τῆς νίκης αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχοῦσης τῇ λυκούτουν γὰρ προενεββελῆκε κατελπισμὸν τοῖς ὀχλοῖς ὡστε πλείους εἶναι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα φερόντων τοὺς ἐκτὸς παρεπομένους τῆς ῥφελείας χάρων, κομίζοντας ἀλύσεις καὶ πέδας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην παρασκευὴν. 9 "Ο γε μὴν ’Αννίβασ ἥμα μὲν εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν ὃς πρὸς τὴν Ῥώμην προῆι διὰ τῆς Ῥωμηνίας, εὖ- 200
foreseen and reckoned on the conduct of Flaminius, his plan had the success he expected. 82. For as soon as he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae and advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp invaded the country in front of him, Flaminius swelled with fury and resentment, thinking that the enemy were treating him with contempt. And when very soon they began to lay waste the country, and the smoke rising from all quarters told its tale of destruction, he was still more indignant, regarding this as insufferable. So that when some of his officers gave it as their opinion that he should not instantly pursue and engage the enemy, but remain on his guard and beware of their numerous cavalry, and when they especially urged him to wait until his colleague joined him and to give battle with all their united legions, he not only paid no attention to the advice, but could not listen with patience to those who offered it, begging them to consider what would be said in Rome if, while the country was laid waste almost up to the walls, the army remained encamped in Etruria in the rear of the enemy. Finally, with these words, he broke up his camp, and advanced with his army, utterly regardless of time or place, but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as if victory were a dead certainty. He had even inspired the people with such confident hopes that the soldiery were outnumbered by the rabble that followed him for the sake of the booty, bringing chains, fetters, and other such implements.

Hannibal in the meantime while advancing on Rome through Etruria, with the city of Cortona and
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όνυμον μὲν πόλιν ἔχων τὴν προσαγορευμένην Κυρτώνων καὶ τα ταύτης ὀρη, δεξιάν δὲ τὴν Ταρ-
10 σμένην καλομένην λίμνην· ἀμα δὲ προάγων ἐπιρρόλει καὶ κατέφθειρε τὴν χώραν, βουλόμενος
11 ἐκκαλέσασθαι τὸν θυμὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν Φλαμύνων ἦδη συνάπτοντα καθεστά, τόπους
δὲ εὐφυεῖς συνεδρώησε πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, ἐγίνετο
83 πρὸς τὸ διακινδυνεύειν. ὄντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν δίοδον αὐλῶνος ἐπιπέδου, τούτου δὲ παρὰ μὲν τάς εἰς
μήκος πλευρὰς ἐκατέρας βουνοὺς ἠχοντος ψηλοὺς καὶ συνεχεῖς, παρὰ δὲ τὰς εἰς πλάτος κατὰ μὲν τὴν
ἀντικρύ λόφον ἑπικείμενον ἐρυμυνὸν καὶ δύσβατον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπ’ οὐράς λίμνην τελείως στενὴν ἀπο-
λειποσκο πάροδον ὡς εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν
2 παρώρειαν, διελθὼν τὸν αὐλῶνα παρὰ τὴν λίμνην,
τὸν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον τῆς πορείας λόφον αὐτὸς
κατελάβετο, καὶ τοὺς "Ιβηρας καὶ τοὺς Λίβνας
3 ἔχων ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευσε, τοὺς δὲ Βαλια-
ρείς καὶ λογχοφόρους κατὰ τὴν πρωτοπορείαν
ἐκπεριάγον ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐν δεξία βουνοὺς τὸν παρὰ
τὸν αὐλῶνα κειμένων, ἐπὶ πολὺ παρατείνας ὑπ-
4 ἑστελε, τοὺς δ’ ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ὁμοίως
τῶν εὐωνύμων βουνῶν κύκλω περιαγγών παρεξ-
έτεινε συνεχεῖς, ὥστε τοὺς ἑσάχατος εἶναι κατ’
αὐτὴν τὴν ἐισόδου τὴν παρὰ τε τὴν λίμνην καὶ τὰς
παρωρείας φέρουσαν εἰς τὸν προερημένον τόπον.
5 'Ο μὲν οὖν 'Αννίβας, ταῦτα προκατασκευασάμενος
τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ περιελήφως τὸν αὐλῶνα ταῖς ἐν-
6 ἔδραις, τὴν ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν. ὁ δὲ Φλαμύνως εἶπετο
7 κατόπιν, σπεύδων συνάψαι τῶν πολεμίων· κατ-
εστρατοπεδευκώς δὲ τῇ πρωτεραιᾳ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ
λίμνῃ τελείως ὅψε τῆς ὤρας, μετὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἡμέρας
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its hills on his left and the Thrasymene lake on his right, continued to burn and devastate the country on his way, with the view of provoking the enemy. When he saw Flaminius already approaching him and had also observed a position favourable for his purpose, he made his plans for battle. 83. The road led through a narrow strip of level ground with a range of high hills on each side of it lengthwise. This defile was overlooked in front crosswise by a steep hill difficult to climb, and behind it lay the lake, between which and the hill side the passage giving access to the defile was quite narrow. Hannibal coasting the lake and passing through the defile occupied himself the hill in front, encamping on it with his Spaniards and Africans; his slingers and pikemen he brought round to the front by a detour and stationed them in an extended line under the hills to the right of the defile, and similarly taking his cavalry and the Celts round the hills on the left he placed them in a continuous line under these hills, so that the last of them were just at the entrance to the defile, lying between the hillside and the lake.

Having made all these preparations during the night and thus encompassed the defile with troops waiting in ambush, Hannibal remained quiet. Flaminius was following close on his steps impatient to overtake him. He had encamped the night before at a very late hour close to the lake itself; and next
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ἐπιγενομένης, εὐθέως ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθινὴν ἦγε τὴν πρωτοπορείαν παρὰ τὴν λίμνην εἰς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐλώνα, βουλόμενος ἐξάπτεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων.

84 οὖνς δὲ τὴς ἡμέρας ὑμιχλώδους διαφερόντως, Ἀν-

νίβας ἀμα τῷ τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῆς πορείας εἰς τὸν αὐλώνα προσδέξασθαι καὶ συνάπτειν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄδη τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων πρωτοπορείαν, ἀποδοῦσα τὰ συνήθης καὶ διαπεμψάμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις, συνεπεξερείς πανταχόθεν ἀμα τοῖς πολε-

2 μίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν Φλαμίνιον παραδόξου γενο-

μένης αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἔτι δὲ δυσσυνόπτου τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα περιστάσεως ὑπαρχοῦσης, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου καταφερομάχων καὶ προσπιτῶντων, οὐχ οἶν παρα-

βοηθεῖν ἐδύναντο πρὸς τι τῶν δεομένων οἱ ταξιαρ-

χοι καὶ χιλιάρχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συννόη-

3 σαι τὸ γινόμενον. ἀμα γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον,

οἱ δ' ἄπ' οὐρᾶς, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων αὐτοῖς προσ-

4 ἐπιπτον, διὸ καὶ συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς πορείας σχῆματι κατακοπῆα, μὴ δυναμένους αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν εἰ προδεδομένους ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀκρισίας. ἔτι γὰρ διαβολεύο-

6 μενοὶ τὶ δὲι πράττειν ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως. ἐν ὃ καρῇ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστοῦμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοῖς ὅλοις προσπεσόντες τυνές τῶν παραδόξων ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως. ἐν ὃ καρῇ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστοῦμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοῖς ὅλοις προσπεσόντες τυνές τῶν παραδόξων ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως. ἐν ὃ καρῇ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστοῦμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοῖς ὅλοις προσπεσόντες τυνές τῶν παραδόξων ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως. ἐν ὃ καρῇ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστοῦμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοῖς ὅλοις προσπεσόντες τυνές τῶν παραδόξων ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως. ἐν ὃ καρῇ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστοῦμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοῖς ὅλοις προσπεσόντες τυνές τῶν παραδόξων ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως. ἐν ὃ καρῇ καὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον αὐτὸν δυσχρηστοῦμενον καὶ περικακοῦντα τοῖς ὅλοις προσπεσόντες τυνές τῶν παραδόξων ἀπόλλυντο παραδόξως.
day as soon as it was dawn he led his vanguard along the lake to the above-mentioned defile, with the view of coming in touch with the enemy. 84. It was an unusually misty morning, and Hannibal, as soon as the greater part of the enemy's column had entered the defile and when the head was already in contact with him, giving the signal for battle and sending notice to those in the ambuscades, attacked the Romans from all sides at the same time. The sudden appearance of the enemy took Flaminius completely by surprise, and as the condition of the atmosphere rendered it very difficult to see, and their foes were charging down on them in so many places from higher ground, the Roman Centurions and Tribunes were not only unable to take any effectual measures to set things right, but could not even understand what was happening. They were charged at one and the same instant from the front, from the rear, and from the flanks, so that most of them were cut to pieces in marching order as they were quite unable to protect themselves, and, as it were, betrayed by their commander's lack of judgement. For while they were still occupied in considering what was best to do, they were being slaughtered without realizing how. Flaminius himself, who was in the utmost dismay and dejection, was here attacked and slain by certain Celts. So there fell in the valley about fifteen thousand of the Romans, unable either to yield to circumstances, or to achieve anything, but deeming it, as they had been brought up to do, their supreme duty not to fly or quit their ranks. Those again who had been shut in between the hillside and the lake perished
σχρώς, ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ταλαιπώρως διεφθείροντο. 9 συνωθούμενοι [μὲν] γὰρ εἰς τὴν λίμνην οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν παράστασιν τῆς διανοίας ὁμοίωτες ἐπὶ τὸ νῆσοςαραίσας σὺν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς ἀπεπνύγνοτο, τὸ δὲ πολὺ πλῆθος μέχρι μὲν τοῦ δυνατοῦ προβαίνον εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἔμειν τὰς κεφαλὰς αὐτὰς ὑπὲρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑπερίσχον.

10 ἐπιγενομένων δὲ τῶν ὕππεων, καὶ προδήλου γενόμενης ἀπολείας, ἐξαίροντες τὰς χείρας καὶ δεόμενοι ξωγρείν καὶ πᾶσαν προϊέμενον φωνὴν τὸ τελευταῖον οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, τυνὲς δὲ παρακαλέσαντες 

11 αὐτοὺς διεφθάρμασαν. ἐξαισχύλιοι δὲ ἰσως τῶν κατὰ τὸν αὐλώνα τοὺς κατὰ πρόσωπον νυκήσαντες παραβοθεῖν μὲν τοῖς ἱδίοις καὶ περίστασαν τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἡδυνάτους, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν συνοράν τῶν γυνομένων, καίτερ μεγάλην δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὰ ὀλα 

12 παρέχεσθαι χρείαν ἢ ἔτι δὲ τοῦ πρόσθεν ὄρεγόμενοι, προῆγον πεπεισμένοι συμπεσεῖσθαι τισιν, ἔως ἐλαθοῦν ἐκτεσόντες πρὸς τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους. 

13 γενόμενοι δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρῶν, καὶ τῆς ὄμμηλης ἤθη πεπτωκυίας, συνέντες τὸ γεγονός ἀτύχημα, καὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ὄντες ἐτὶ δυνατοὶ διὰ τὸ τοῖς ὁλοῖς ἐπικρατεῖν καὶ πάντα προκατέχειν ὢν τοὺς πολεμίους, συστραφέντες ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τινὰ κώμην Τυρρηνί 

14 νίδα. μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ἀποσταλέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ μετὰ τῶν Ἰβηρῶν καὶ λογχοφόρων Μαάρβα καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντος τὴν κώμην, ποικίλης αὐτοῖς ἀπορίας περιεστώσης, ἀποθέμενοι τὰ ὄ. ἧ παρέδοσαν αὐτοὺς ὑποσπόνδους, ὡς τευχόμενοι τῆς σωτηρίας. 

15 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν ὄλων κίνδυνον τὸν γενόμενον ἐν Τυρρηνίᾳ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις 

85 τοῦτον ἐπετελέσθη τὸν τρόπον. Ἄννιβας δὲ, πρὸς 206
in a shameful and still more pitiable manner. For when they were forced into the lake in a mass, some of them quite lost their wits and trying to swim in their armour were drowned, but the greater number, wading into the lake as far as they could, stood there with only their heads out of the water, and when the cavalry approached them, and death stared them in the face, though lifting up their hands and entreating to be spared in the most piteous terms, they were finally dispatched either by the horsemen or in some cases by begging their comrades to do them this service. About six thousand of those in the defile, who had defeated the enemy in their front, were unable to render any assistance to their own army or to get to the rear of their adversaries, as they could see nothing of what was happening, although they might have been of very material service. They simply continued to press forward in the belief that they were sure to meet with someone until they found themselves isolated on the high ground and on reaching the crest of the hill, the mist having now broken, they perceived the extent of the disaster, but were no longer able to help, as the enemy were now completely victorious and in occupation of all the ground. They therefore retired in a body to a certain Etruscan village. After the battle, on Maharbal being sent by the general with the Spaniards and pikemen to surround the village, finding themselves beset by a complication of dangers they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives being spared.

Such was the result of the battle in Etruria between the Romans and Carthaginians. 85. Hannibal, when the prisoners who had surrendered
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αὐτὸν ἐπαναχθέντων τῶν ὑποσπόνδων, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἅλλων αἰχμαλώτων, συναγαγὼν πάντας, ὄντας πλείους τῶν μυρίων καὶ πεντακισχιλίων, πρῶτον μὲν διεσάφησεν ὅτι Μαάρβας ὤικ ἐνί κύριος ἀνευ τῆς αὐτοῦ γνώμης διδοὺς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς ὑποσπόνδοις, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κατηγορίαν ἐποίησατο Ἀρμαίων. λήξας δὲ τούτων, ὃσοι μὲν ἦσαν Ἀρμαίοι τῶν ἑαλωκότων, διεδωκεν εἰς φυλακὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τάγματα, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ἀπέλυσε χωρίς λύτρων ἀπαντας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τάμονος τὸν αὐτόν ὄν καὶ πρόσθεν λόγον ὅτι πάρεστι πολεμήσων ὄικ Ἰταλιώταις, ἀλλὰ Ἀρμαίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἰταλιώτῶν ἐλευθερίας. τὴν δὲ ἔκατον δύναμιν ἀνελάμβανε, καὶ τῶν νεκρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους ἐβασεν, ὄντας εἰς τριάκοντα τὸν ἀριθμὸν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἰς χιλίους καὶ πεντακισίους ἔπεσον, ὡν ἦσαν οἱ πλείους Κελτοῖ.

ταῦτα δὲ πράξας διενοεῖτο μετὰ ταῦδε λεοφόν καὶ τῶν φίλων ποῦ καὶ πώς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὀρμήν, εὐθαρσῆς ὡν ἦδη περὶ τῶν ὅλων.

Εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἀρμήν προσπεσόντος ἦδη τοῦ γεγονότος ἀτυχήματος, στέλλεσθαι μὲν ἡ ταπεινωῦ τὸ συμβεβηκός οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἱδνάτου διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς συμφορᾶς, λέγειν δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡγακάζοντο τὰ γεγονότα, συναθροίσαι τῶν δὴ μοι εἰκλησίας. διόπερ ἦμα τῷ τὸν στρατηγὸν εἰπεῖν τοῖς ὀχλοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμβόλων ὅτι Λειτόμεθα μάχη μεγάλη, τηλικαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι διατροφὴν ὅστε τοῖς παραγενομένοις ἐφ᾽ ἐκατέρω τῶν καιρῶν πολλῷ μείζον τότε φανήσετι τὸ γεγονός ἢ παρ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρόν. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἰκότως συνέβη. πολλῶν γὰρ χρόνων ἄπειροι 208
on terms as well as the others were brought to him, assembled the whole body, more than fifteen thousand in number, and after informing them in the first place that Maharbal had no authority without consulting him to promise the former their safety, launched out into an invective against the Romans, and at the end of it distributed such of the prisoners as were Romans among his troops to keep guard over, and setting all the allies free, sent them to their homes, adding, as on a previous occasion, that he was not come to fight with the Italians, but with the Romans for the freedom of Italy. He now allowed his own troops to rest and paid the last honours to those of the highest rank among the fallen, about thirty in number, his whole loss having been about fifteen hundred, most of them Celts. After this he consulted with his brother and friends as to where and how it was best to deliver his attack, being now quite confident of final success.

On the news of the defeat reaching Rome the chiefs of the state were unable to conceal or soften down the facts, owing to the magnitude of the calamity, and were obliged to summon a meeting of the commons and announce it. When the Praetor therefore from the Rostra said, "We have been defeated in a great battle," it produced such consternation that to those who were present on both occasions the disaster seemed much greater now than during the actual battle. And this was quite natural; for since for many years they had had no
καὶ τοῦ δῆματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ὑπάρχοντες τῆς ὁμολογουμένης ἡττης οὐ μετρίως οὐδὲ κατὰ σχῆμα ἔσορον. οὐ μὴν ἢ γε σύγκλητος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐμενε λογισμοῦ, καὶ διενεκτὸ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πῶς καὶ τὶ πρακτέον ἐκάστους εἴη.

86 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς τῆς μάχης καιροὺς Γναῖος Σερούλιος ὁ προκαθήμενος ὑπάτως ἐπὶ τῶν κατ’ Ἀρμιμον
tόπων, οὕτω δ’ εἰσὶν ἐπὶ τῆς παρὰ τοῦ Ἀδρίαν
πλευρᾶς, οὕς συνάπτει τὰ Γαλατικὰ πεδία πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήν Ἰταλίαν, οὐ μακρὰν τῆς εἰς θάλατταν ἐκβο-
λῆς τῶν τοῦ Πάδου φτωμάτων, ἀκούσας εἰσβεβλη-
kότα τὸν Ἀνύβαν εἰς Τυρρηνιὰν ἀντιστρατοπεδεῖν
τῷ Φλαμνίῳ, πᾶσι μὲν ἐπεβάλετο τοὺς στρατοπέδους
ἀυτὸς συνάπτειν. ἄδυνατῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς
βάρος, Γάιον Κεντήμιον κατὰ σπουδὴν δοὺς τετρα-
κυσχιλίους ἐπεῖς προεξαπέστειλε, βουλόμενος, εἰ
dέουνθ’ οἱ καιροὶ, πρὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ παρουσίας τούτους
catataxein. ’Ανύβας δὲ, μετὰ τὴν μάχην προσ-
αγγελθείσας αὐτῷ τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων βοηθείας, ἐξ-
apostellei Μαάρβαν, ἔχοντα τοὺς λογχοφόρους καὶ
ti méros tōn ἐπτέων. οὐ καὶ συμπεσόντες τοῖς περὶ
tōn Γάιον ἐν αὐτῇ μὲν τῇ πρῶτῃ συμπλοκῇ σχεδὸν
tous ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν διεφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς
eis tina λόφων συνδιώξαντες τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἥμερα
pántas ἔλαβον ὑποχείρους. ἐν δὲ τῇ ‘Ρώμῃ, τρι-
taias οὕσης τῆς κατὰ τὴν μάχην προσαγγελίας,
kai máliosta tōte tōn πάθους κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὡς
an eĩ φλεγμαίνοντος, ἐπιγενομένης καὶ ταύτης τῆς
peripeteias, ou mōnon to πλήθος, allia kai tēn sγ-
7 klhton autēn synēbh diatrapēnai. diō kai paréntes
tēn kai ἐνιαυτὸν ἀγωγὴν τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆν
experience of the word or fact of avowed defeat, they could not bear the reverse with moderation and dignity. This was not, however, the case with the Senate, which remained self-possessed, taking thought for the future as to what should be done by everyone, and how best to do it.

86. At the time of the battle Gnaeus Servilius, the Consul in command in the district of Ariminum (the district that is on the coast of the Adriatic where the plain of Cisalpine Gaul joins the rest of Italy not far from the mouth of the river Po), hearing that Hannibal had invaded Etruria and was encamped opposite Flamininus, formed the project of joining the latter with his whole army, but as this was impossible owing to the weight of his forces he dispatched Gaius Centenius at once in advance, giving him four thousand horse, intending them, if the situation were critical, to press on and arrive before himself. When, after the battle, news reached Hannibal of the approach of these reinforcements, he sent off Maharbal with the pikemen and part of the cavalry. Encountering Gaius, they killed about half of his force in their first attack, and pursuing the others to a hill, made them all prisoners on the following day. Three days after the news of the great battle had reached Rome, and just when throughout the city the sore, so to speak, was most violently inflamed, came the tidings of this fresh disaster, and now not only the populace but the Senate too were thrown into consternation. Abandoning therefore the system of government by
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aìresu των ἀρχόντων, μειζόνως ἐπεβάλλοντο θουλιέςσαὶ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, νομίζοντες αὐτοκράτορος δεῖσθαι στρατηγοῦ τὰ πράγματα καὶ τοὺς περιεστῶτας καιροὺς.

8 Ἀνυίβας δὲ, κατατεθαρηκὼς τοῖς ὀλοίς ἥδη, τὸ μὲν συνεγνίζειν τῇ 'Ῥώμῃ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἀπεδοκίμασεν. τὴν δὲ χῶραν ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθει, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν 'Αδρίαν. διανύσας τε τὴν τε τῶν Ομβρων καλομεῖνην χῶραν καὶ τὴν τῶν Πικέντων ἦκε δεκαταίος πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν 'Αδρίαν τόπους, πολλῆς μὲν λείας γεγονός ἐγκρατῆς, ὡστε μήτ' ἄγειν μήτε φέρειν δύνασθαι τὸ στρατόπεδον τὰς ὁφελείας, πολὺ δὲ πλήθος ἀν-

11 θρώπων ἀπεκταγκὼς κατὰ τὴν διόδον. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν πόλεων καταλήμεσι, καὶ τὸ τε παράγειμα τι δεδομένον ἣν φονεύειν τοὺς ὑποπίπτοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις, ταῦτα δὴ ἔποιει διὰ τὸ προ-

87 ὑπάρχον αὐτῷ μῆσος ἐμφυτὸν πρὸς Ἄρμαῖος. ἐν ὦ καιρῷ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παρὰ τὸν 'Αδρίαν ἐν χώρᾳ πρὸς πάντα τὰ γεννήματα διαφεροῦσθη μεγά-

λῆν ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀναλήψεως καὶ θεραπείας τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐχ ἦττον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰπ-

2 πων. ὡς ἄν γὰρ ὑπαίθρου τῆς παραχεμασίας γε-

γεννημένης ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Γαλατίαν τόποις ὑπὸ τε τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἀνήλευσιας, ἔτι δὲ τῆς μετὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ἐλῶν πορείας καὶ ταλαιπωρίας, ἔπεγεγόνει σχεδὸν ἀπασί τοῖς ἱπποῖς, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδρά-

σιν ὁ λεγόμενος λιμόψωρος καὶ τουαύτη καχεξία.

3 διὸ γενόμενος ἐγκρατῆς χῶρας εὐδαιμονος ἐσωματο-

ποίησε μὲν τοὺς ἱπποῖς, ἀνεκτήσατο δὲ τὰ τε σώ-

ματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν. μετακαθ-

ώπλισε δὲ τοὺς Λίβνας εἰς τὸν Ἄρμαϊκον τρόπον 212
BOOK III. 86. 7 – 87. 3

magistrates elected annually they decided to deal with the present situation more radically, thinking that the state of affairs and the impending peril demanded the appointment of a single general with full powers.

Hannibal, now fully assured of success, dismissed the idea of approaching Rome for the present, but began to ravage the country unmolested, advancing towards the Adriatic. Passing through Umbria and Picenum he reached the coast on the tenth day, having possessed himself of so large an amount of booty that his army could not drive or carry it all off and having killed a number of people on his road. For, as at the capture of cities by assault, the order had been given to put to the sword all adults who fell into their hands, Hannibal acting thus owing to his inveterate hatred of the Romans. 87. He now encamped near the Adriatic in a country abounding in all kinds of produce, and paid great attention to recruiting the health of his men as well as of his horses by proper treatment. In consequence of the cold from which they had suffered while wintering in the open in Gaul, combined with their being unable to get the friction with oil to which they were accustomed, and owing also to the hardships of the subsequent march through the marshes, nearly all the horses as well as the men had been attacked by so-called “hunger-mange” and its evil results. So that, now he was in occupation of such a rich country, he built up his horses and restored the physical and mental condition of his men. He also re-armed the Africans in the Roman fashion with select weapons,
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ἐκλεκτοίς ὁπλοῖς, ὡς ἂν γεγονός κύριος τοσούτων σκύλων. ἐξαπέστειλε δὲ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐν τῷ καὶ-
ρῷ τούτῳ καὶ τοὺς διασαφήσωτας εἰς τὴν Καρχη-
δόνα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων τότε γὰρ πρῶτον ἦσατο
θαλάττης, ἀφ’ οὗ τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἐποίησατο τὴν εἰς
Ἰταλίαν. ἐφ’ οἷς ἀκούσαντες μεγαλείως ἐχάρησαν
οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πολλὴν ἐποιοῦντο στούδην καὶ
πρόνοιαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπικουρεῖν
καὶ τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασι.

Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ δικτάτορα μεὸν κατέστησαν Κόιντον
Φάβιον, ἄνδρα καὶ φρονήσει διαφέροντα καὶ 
φευ-
κότα καλῶς. ἔτι γοῦν ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς
οἱ ταύτης τῆς οἰκίας Μάξιμοι, τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ μέγι-
στοι, διὰ τὰς ἀκείνου τάνδρος ἐπιτυχίας καὶ πράξεις.

ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἐξει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπά-
των. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρω δώδεκα πελέκεις

ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτῳ δ’ εἰκοσὶ καὶ τέταρτας, κακεῖ-
νοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς
τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, οὕτως δ’ ἐστὶν αὐτο-
κράτωρ στρατηγός, ὁ διασταθεῖτος παραχρήμα

dialύέσθαι συμβαίνει πάσας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμη

πλήν τῶν δημάρχων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ-
των ἐν ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν ποιησόμεθα τὴν δια-
στολήν. ἀμα δὲ τῷ δικτάτορι κατέστησαν ἵππαρ-
χὴν Μάρκον Μινύκιον. οὕτος δὲ τέτακται μὲν ὑπὸ
tὸν αὐτοκράτορα, γίνεται δ’ οἶον εἰ διάδοχος τῆς

ἀρχῆς ἐν τοῖς ἑκείνου περισσαμοίς.

Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ βραχὺ μεταθεὶς τὴν παρεμβο-
λὴν ἐνδιέτριβε τῇ παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν χώρα, καὶ τοὺς
μὲν ἔππους ἐκλούων τοῖς παλαισὶ οὕνοις διὰ τὸ

πλῆθος ἐξεθεράπευσε τὴν καχείαν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν

ψύραν, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς μὲν

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being, as he now was, in possession of a very large quantity of captured arms. He also sent at this time messengers to Carthage by sea with the news of what had happened, this being the first time he had come in touch with the sea since he invaded Italy. The news was received with great rejoicing by the Carthaginians, who hastened to take steps to support in every possible manner the two campaigns in Italy and in Spain.

The Romans had appointed as Dictator Quintus Fabius, a man of admirable judgement and great natural gifts, so much so that still in my own day the members of this family bear the name of Maximus, "Greatest," owing to the achievements and success of this man. A dictator differs from the Consuls in these respects, that while each of the Consuls is attended by twelve lictors, the Dictator has twenty-four, and that while the Consuls require in many matters the co-operation of the Senate, the Dictator is a general with absolute powers, all the magistrates in Rome, except the Tribunes, ceasing to hold office on his appointment. However, I will deal with this subject in greater detail later. At the same time they appointed Marcus Minucius Master of the Horse. The Master of the Horse is subordinate to the Dictator but becomes as it were his successor when the Dictator is otherwise occupied.

88. Hannibal now shifting his camp from time to time continued to remain in the country near the Adriatic, and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which there was abundance, he thoroughly set right their mangy condition. In like manner he
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τραυματιάς ἐξυγίασε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς εὐεκτάς παρεσκεύασε καὶ προθύμως εἰς τὰς ἐπιφερομένας χρείας.
3 διελθὼν δὲ καὶ καταβηθείρας τὴν τε Πραιτεττιανήν καὶ τὴν 'Αδριανήν ἔτι δὲ τὴν Μαρρουκίνην καὶ Φρεντανήν χώραν, ὁρμησε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν
4 εἰς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν. ἦς διηρημένης εἰς τρεῖς ὁμομοίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσαγορευομένων Δαυνίων <τῶν
de Πενεκτίων>, τῶν δὲ Μεσσαπίων, εἰς πρώτην
5 ἐνέβαλε τὴν Δαυνίαν. ἀρξάμενος δὲ ταύτης ἀπὸ Δουκαρίας, οὕσης ἀποκίας 'Ῥωμαίων, ἐπόρθει τὴν
6 χώραν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταστροφοπεδέυσας περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Οἰβώνιον ἔπετρεξε τὴν Ἀργυριππανὴν καὶ πάσαν ἀδειάς ἐλεγλάτει τὴν Δαυνίαν.
7 Ἐν δὲ καρῷ καὶ Πάβιος μετὰ τὴν κατάστασιν θύσας τοὺς θεοὺς ἐξώρμησε μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καροῦ καταγραφέντων τεττάρων στρατοπέ-
dων. συμμίξας δὲ ταῖς ἀπ’ Ἀρμίνου βοηθούσας δυνάμεις περὶ τὴν Ναρυίαν, Γνάιον μὲν τὸν ὑπάρ-
χοντα στρατηγὸν ἀπολύσας τῆς κατὰ γῆν στρατεύας ἐξαπέστειλε μετὰ παραπομπῆς εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἐν-
teλάμενος, ἐὰν τι κατὰ θάλασσαν κινῶνται Καρχη-
dόνου, βοθηείν ἂεὶ τοῖς ὑποπτίπτουσι καρῷς, αὐτὸς
dὲ μετὰ τοῦ συνάρχοντος παραλαβὼν τὰς δυνάμεις ἀντεστροφοπεδέυσε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις περὶ τὰς
Αίκας καλούμενας, ἀπέχων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ
πεντήκοντα στοιχίων.
89 Ἀρνίβας δὲ συνεῖς τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Πάβιον, καὶ βουλόμενος ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς
ὑπενεντόσι, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν καὶ συνεγγίασα
tῶν Ῥωμαίων χάρακι παρετάξατο. χρόνον
dὲ τινὰ μείνας, οὐδενὸς ἐπεξίοντος αὐθίς ἀνεχώρησεν
2 εἰς τὴν ἐαυτὸν παρεμβολήν. ὁ γὰρ Πάβιος δι-
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completely cured his wounded, and made the rest of his men sound in body and ready to perform cheerfully the services that would be required of them. After passing through and devastating the territories of Praetutia, Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana he marched on towards Iapygia. This province is divided among three peoples, the Daunii, Peucetii and Messapii, and it was the territory of the Daunii that Hannibal first invaded. Starting from Luceria, a Roman colony in this district, he laid waste the surrounding country. He next encamped near Vibo and overran the territory of Argyripa and plundered all Daunia unopposed.

At the same time Fabius on his appointment, after sacrificing to the gods, also took the field with his colleague and the four legions which had been raised for the emergency. Joining near Narnia the army from Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus the Consul of his command on land and sent him with an escort to Rome with orders to take the steps that circumstances called for should the Carthaginians make any naval movements. Himself with his Master of the Horse taking the whole army under his command, he encamped opposite the Carthaginians near Aecae about six miles from the enemy.

89. When he learnt that Fabius had arrived, Hannibal, wishing to strike such a blow as would effectually cow the enemy, led his forces out and drew them up in order of battle at a short distance from the Roman camp, but after waiting some time, as nobody came out to meet him, he retired again to his own camp. For Fabius, having determined not

* Otherwise Arpi.
εγνωκὼς μήτε παραβάλλεσθαι μήτε διακινδυνεύειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα τῆς ἄσφαλείας τῶν ὑποτατμομένων, ἔμενε βεβαιῶς ἐπὶ τῆς διαλή-
3 ψεως ταύτης. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς κατεφρονεῖτο καὶ παρεῖχε λόγον ὡς ἀποδεδειλικώς καὶ καταπεπληγ-
μένος τὸν κίνδυνον, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντας ἦναγκασε παρομολογήσαι καὶ συγχωρεῖν ὡς οὔτε νουνεχέστε-
ρον οὔτε φρονιμότερον οὐδένα δυνατὸν ἢν χρῆσθαι
4 τοῖς τότε περιεστώσι καιροῖς. ταχὺ δὲ καὶ τὰ πράγ-
ματα προσεμαρτύρησε τοῖς λογισμοῖς αὐτοῦ. καὶ
5 τοῦτ’ εἰκότως ἐγένετο. τὰς μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑπεναντίων
dυνάμεις συνέβαινε γεγυμνάσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης
ηλικίας συνεχῶς ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἤγεμόνι οἰς χρή-
σθαι συντεθραμμένως σφίσαι καὶ παιδομαθεῖ περὶ τᾶς
6 ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρείας, νευκηκέναι δὲ πολλὰς μὲν
ἐν Ἰβηρία μάχας, διὸ δὲ Ἡρωμαίοις ἔξης καὶ τοὺς
συμμάχους αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀπεγνωκότας πάν-
tα μὲν ἔχειν ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν ἐν τῷ νικᾷ.
7 περὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἡρωμαίων στρατιὰν τάναντία τοῦ-
8 τοῖς ὑπῆρχε. διὸπερ εἰς μὲν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων
κίνδυνον οὐχ οἶδος τ’ ἦν συγκαταβαίνειν, προδήλου
τῆς ἐλαττώσεως υπαρχοῦσης. εἰς δὲ τὰ σφέτερα προ-
tερήματα τοῖς λογισμοῖς ἀναχωρήσας ἐν τούτοις
9 διέτριβε καὶ διὰ τούτων ἔχειρίζε τὸν πόλεμον. ἢν
dὲ τὰ προτερήματα Ἡρωμαίων ἀκατάτριπτα χορήγια
καὶ χειρῶν πλήθος. διὸπερ κατὰ τοὺς ἔξης χρό-
nους ἀντιπαρῆγε τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄει καὶ τοὺς εὐκαί-
rους προκατελάμβανε τόπους κατὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.
2 ἔχων δὲ κατὰ νότον τὰς χορηγίας ἀφθόνους, οὐδὲ-
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to expose himself to any risk or to venture on a battle, but to make the safety of the army under his command his first and chief aim, adhered steadfastly to this purpose. At first, it is true, he was despised for this, and gave people occasion to say that he was playing the coward and was in deadly fear of an engagement, but as time went on, he forced everyone to confess and acknowledge that it was impossible for anyone to deal with the present situation in a more sensible and prudent manner. Very soon indeed facts testified to the wisdom of his conduct, and this was no wonder. For the enemy's forces had been trained in actual warfare constantly from their earliest youth, they had a general who had been brought up together with them and was accustomed from childhood to operations in the field, they had won many battles in Spain and had twice in succession beaten the Romans and their allies, and what was most important, they had cast to the winds everything else, and their only hope of safety lay in victory. The circumstances of the Roman army were the exact opposite, and therefore Fabius was not able to meet the enemy in a general battle, as it would evidently result in a reverse, but on due consideration he fell back on those means in which the Romans had the advantage, confined himself to these, and regulated his conduct of the war thereby. These advantages of the Romans lay in inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men. 90. He, therefore, during the period which followed continued to move parallel to the enemy, always occupying in advance the positions which his knowledge of the country told him were the most advantageous. Having always a plentiful store of pro-
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ποτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἤφει προνομεύειν οὐδὲ χωρὶς ζεσθαί καθάπαξ ἐκ τοῦ χάρακος, ἀθροὺς δ' ἂεὶ καὶ συνεστραμμένους τηρῶν ἐφίδρευε τοῖς τόποις καὶ

3 καρποῖς. καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀποσπωμένους ἀπὸ τῆς ἱδίας παρεμβολῆς ἐπὶ τὰς προνομὰς διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ὑποχειρίους ἐλάμβανε καὶ κατέφθειρε

4 τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ. ταῦτα δ' ἐποίει, βουλόμενος ἀμα μὲν ἀφ' ὁρισμένου πλήθους ἐλαττοῦν ἂεὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀμα δὲ τὰς τῶν ἱδίων δυνάμεων ψυχὰς προηττημένας τοῖς ὀλοίς διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος προτερημάτων κατὰ βραχὺ σωματοποιεῖν καὶ προσανα-

5 λαμβάνειν. εἰς ὀλοσχερῇ δὲ κρίσιν εἰς ὀμολόγου

6 συγκαταβαίνειν οὐδαμῶς οἰς τ' ἢν. οὐ μήν Μάρκω

γε τῷ συνάρχοντι τούτων οὐδὲν ἤρεσκε. σύμψησιν

δὲ τοὺς ὁχλοὺς ποιών αὐτὸν τὸν μὲν Φάβιον κατελά-

λεῖ πρὸς πάντας, ὡς ἁγεννῶς χρώμενον τοῖς πράγ-

μασι καὶ νυθρώς, αὐτὸς δὲ πρόθυμος ἢν παραβάλ-

λεσθαι καὶ διακινδυνεύειν.

7 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνωι καταφθείραντες τοὺς προει-

ρημένους τόπους ὑπερέβαλον τὸν Ἀπεννίνον, καὶ

κατάραντες εἰς τὴν Σαυνίτιν χώραν, οὐδὰν εὐδαί-

μονα καὶ πολλῶν χρόνων ἀπολέμητον, ἐν τοιαύτῃ

περιουσίᾳ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ᾧσαν ὡστε μῆτε χρωμέ-

νους μῆτε καταφθείραντας ἀνύειν δύνασθαι τὰς

8 λείας. κατέδραμον δὲ καὶ τὴν Οὐενεομεντανήν,

Ῥωμαίων ἀποκιάν ὑπάρχουσαν. εἰλον δἐ καὶ πόλιν

Τελεσίαν, ἀτείχοντον οὔσαν καὶ πολλῆς καὶ παντοδα-

9 πῆς ἀποσκευὴς γέμουσαν. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι κατόπιν

μὲν εἰπόντο συνεχῶς, μῶς καὶ δυεῖν Ἦμερῶν ὄδὸν

ἀπέχοντες, ἐγγίζειν γε μὴν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς

10 πολεμίως οὐχ οἴοι τ' ᾧσαν. διόπερ Ἀννίβας, ὅρων

τῶν Φάβιον φυγομαχοῦντα μὲν προδήλως, τοῖς δ' 220
visions in his rear he never allowed his soldiers to forage or to straggle from the camp on any pretext, but keeping them continually massed together watched for such opportunities as time and place afforded. In this manner he continued to take or kill numbers of the enemy, who despising him had strayed far from their own camp in foraging. He acted so in order, on the one hand, to keep on reducing the strictly limited numbers of the enemy, and, on the other, with the view of gradually strengthening and restoring by partial successes the spirits of his own troops, broken as they were by the general reverses. He was, however, not at all disposed to respond to the enemy’s challenge and meet him in a set battle. But all this much displeased his colleague Marcus, who, echoing the popular verdict, ran down Fabius to all for his craven and slow conduct of the campaign, while he himself was most eager to risk a battle.

The Carthaginians, after ravaging the country I mentioned, crossed the Apennines and descended into the territory of the Samnites, which was very fertile and had not for long been visited by war, so that they had such abundance of provisions that they could not succeed either in using or in destroying all their booty. They also overran the territory of Beneventum, a Roman colony, and took the city of Telesia, which was unwalled and full of all manner of property. The Romans continued to hang on their rear at a distance of one or two days’ march, refusing to approach nearer and engage the enemy. Hannibal, consequently, seeing that Fabius, while obviously wishing to avoid a battle, had no inten-
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οὗτος οὖν ἐκχωροῦντα τῶν ὑπαίθρων, ἄρμησε τολ-
μηρῶς εἰς τὰ περὶ Καπῦνη πεδία, καὶ τούτων εἰς
τὸν προσαγορευόμενον Φάλερνον τόπον, πεπει-
σμένος διειν θάτερον, ἢ μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους
ἀναγκάσειν ἢ πᾶσι δήλον ποιήσειν ὃτι κρατεῖ τῶν
ὀλων καὶ παραχωροῦσι Ρωμαίοι τῶν ὑπαίθρων αὐ-
τοῖς. οὐ γενομένου καταπλαγείσας ἥλπιζε τὰς πό-
λεις ὁμησεῖν πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ Ρωμαίων ἀπόστασιν.
13 ἐς γὰρ τότε δυσὶ μάχαις ἦδη λειλεμμένων αὐτῶν
οὐδεμία πόλις ἀπέστη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πρὸς
Καρχηδόνιος, ἀλλὰ διετήρουν τὴν πίστιν, καίπερ
14 ἐναι πάσχονσαι κακῶς. ἐξ ὅν καὶ παρασημῆναι
ἀν τις τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ καταξίωσι παρὰ τοῖς
συμμάχοις τοῦ Ρωμαίων πολιτεύματος.

91 Οὔ μὴν ἄλλος ὁ γὰρ Ἀννίβας εἰκότως ἐπὶ τούτους
2 κατήντα τοὺς λογισμοὺς. τὰ γὰρ πεδία τὰ κατὰ
Καπῦνην ἐπιφανεστάτα μὲν ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰτα-
λίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἄρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ κάλλος καὶ διὰ
tὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν κεῖσθαι τῇ θαλάττῃ καὶ τοῦτος
χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐμπορίοις, εἰς ὃ σχεδὸν ἐκ πάσης τῆς
οἰκουμένης κατατρέχουσιν οἱ πλέοντες εἰς Ἰταλίαν.
3 περιέχουσι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας καὶ καλλιότατος
4 πόλεις τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐν αὐτοῖς. τὴν μὲν γὰρ παρα-
lιαν αὐτῶν Σενουεσανοῦ καὶ Κυμαίοι καὶ Δικαι-
arχίται νέμονται, πρὸς δὲ τούτως Νεαπόλιται, τε-
5 λευταίοι δὲ τὸ τῶν Νουκερίνων ἔθνος. τῆς δὲ
μεσογαίου τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους Καληνοῦ καὶ
Τιανίται κατουκοῦν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἔω καὶ μεσημβρίαν
6 Δαύνοι καὶ Νωλανοί. κατὰ μέσα δὲ τὰ πεδία κεῖ-
σθαι συμβαίνει τὴν πασῶν ποτὲ μακαιρωτάτην γε-
7 γονυίαν πόλιν Καπῦνην. ἐπιεικέστατος δὲ καὶ παρὰ
tοῖς μυθογράφοις δὲ περὶ τούτων τῶν πεδίων λέγε-
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tion of withdrawing altogether from the open country, made a bold dash at Falernum in the plain of Capua, counting with certainty on one of two alternatives: either he would compel the enemy to fight or make it plain to everybody that he was winning and that the Romans were abandoning the country to him. Upon this happening he hoped that the towns would be much impressed and hasten to throw off their allegiance to Rome. For up to now, although the Romans had been beaten in two battles, not a single Italian city had revolted to the Carthaginians, but all remained loyal, although some suffered much. From which one may estimate the awe and respect that the allies felt for the Roman state.

91. Hannibal, however, had sufficient reason for reckoning as he did. The plain round Capua is the most celebrated in all Italy, both for its fertility and beauty, and because it is served by those sea-ports at which voyagers to Italy from-nearly all parts of the world land. It also contains the most celebrated and finest cities in Italy. On the coast lie Sinuessa, Cyme, and Dicaearchea, and following on these Naples and finally Nuceria. In the interior we find on the north Cales and Teanum and east and south Caudium and Nola, while in the very middle of the plain lies Capua, once the wealthiest of cities. The mythical tale concerning this plain,

* The text has Daunii.
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ταί λόγοι· προσαγορεύεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα Φλεγραία, καθάπερ καὶ ἑτέρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν πεδίων· θεοὺς γε μὴν μάλιστα περὶ τούτων ἠρικέναι διὰ τὸ 8 κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν. ἂμα δὲ τοῖς προε- ρημένοις ὄχυρα δοκεῖ καὶ δυσέμβολα τελέως εἶναι τὰ πεδία· τὰ μὲν γὰρ θαλάττη, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ὄρεσι μεγάλους πάντη καὶ συνεχείς περιέχεται, δι’ ὧν εἰσ- βολαὶ τρεῖς ὑπάρχουσι μόνον ἐκ τῆς μεσογαίας, 9 στενὰ καὶ δύσβατοι, μία μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Σαυνίτιδος, ἡ δὲ κατάλοιπος 10 ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἰρπίνους τόπων. διότερε ἐμελ- λον εἰς ταύτα καταστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐσπερ εἰς θέατρον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καταπλήξεσθαι μὲν τῷ παραλόγῳ πάντας, ἐκθεατρεῖν δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους φυγομαχοῦντας, αὕτω δ’ ἐξ ὁμολόγου φανήσεσθαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων κρατοῦντες.

92 Ἀννίβας μὲν ὄσιν τοιούτοις χρησάμενος λογι- σμοῖς, καὶ διελθὼν ἐκ τῆς Σαυνίτιδος τὰ στενὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἐρμιανόν καλούμενον λόφον, κατεστρα- τοπέδευσε παρὰ τὸν Ἀθυρνον ποταμόν, δς σχε- 2 δὸν δίχα διαφεὶ τὰ προερημένα πεδία. καὶ τὴν μὲν παρεμβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς Ῥώμην μέρους ἐἶχε, ταῖς δὲ προνομαίς πᾶν ἐπιτρέχων ἐπορθεῖ τὸ πε- 3 δίον ἀδεώς. Φάβιος δὲ κατεπέληκτο μὲν τὴν ἐπι- βολὴν καὶ τὸλμαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, τοσοῦτῳ δὲ 4 μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν κεκριμένων ἔμενεν. ὥ δὲ συνάρ- χων αὐτοῦ Μάρκος καὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὸ στρατό- πεδον χιλιάρχου καὶ ταξιάρχου νομίζοντες ἐν καλῷ τούς πολεμίους ἀπειληφέναι, σπεύδεων ὥστο δεῖν καὶ συνάπτειν εἰς τὰ πεδία καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν τὴν
and other celebrated plains which like it are called Phlegraean, has indeed much semblance of probability; for it was quite natural that they should have been a special cause of strife among the gods owing to their beauty and fertility. Besides the above advantages the whole plain of Capua is strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach, being completely surrounded on one side by the sea and for the greater part by lofty mountain-ranges, through which there are only three passes from the interior, all of them narrow and difficult, one from Samnium, the second from Latium, and the third from the country of the Hirpini. The Carthaginians, then, by quartering themselves in this plain made of it a kind of theatre, in which they were sure to create a deep impression on all by their unexpected appearance, giving a spectacular exhibition of the timidity of their enemy and themselves demonstrating indisputably that they were in command of the country.

92. Such being Hannibal's anticipations, he left Samnium and traversing the pass near the hill called Eribianus encamped beside the river Athyrnus, which approximately cuts this plain in half. Establishing his camp on the side of the river towards Rome he overran and plundered the whole plain unmolested. Fabius, though taken aback by the audacity of this stroke on the part of the enemy, continued all the more to adhere to his deliberate plan. But his colleague Marcus and all the tribunes and centurions in his army, thinking they had caught Hannibal famously, urged him to make all haste to reach the plain and not allow the finest part of

a Otherwise Volturnus.
5 ἐπιφανεστάτην χώραν δηομένην. Φάβιος δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ συνάψαι τοῖς τόποις ἔσπευδε καὶ συνυπεκρίνετο τοῖς προθύμοις καὶ φιλοκινδύνως διακεκριμένος, ἐγγίζας δὲ τῷ Φαλέρνῳ ταῖς μὲν παρωρείαις ἐπιφανεμονοῦντες ἀντιπαρῆγγε τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὡστε μὴ δοκεῖν τοῖς αὐτῶν συμμάχοις ἐκχυρεῖν τῶν ὑπαί‐
7 ὑμῶν, εἰς δὲ τὸ πεδίον οὗ καθεῖ τῇν δύναμιν, εὐ‐
λαβοῦμενος τοὺς ὀλοσχερεῖς κυνῆσις διὰ ταῖς προειρημέναις αἰτίαις καὶ διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἐπικρατεῖν παρὰ πολὺ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

8 Ἀνύβας δὲ ἐπειδὴ καταπειράσας τῶν πολεμίων καὶ καταφθείρας πάν τὸ πεδίον ἔθροισε λεῖας ἀπλετον πλῆθος, ἐγινετο πρὸς ἀναζυγήν, βουλό‐
μενος μὴ καταφθεῖραι τὴν λείαν, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἀπερείσαθα τόπον, ἐν ὦ δυνῆσται ποιήσομαι καὶ τὴν παραχειμασίαν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον κατὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐωχίαν, ἀλλὰ συνεχῶς δαυὶλειαν ἔχῃ τῶν ἐπιτη‐
10 δεῖων τὸ στρατόπεδον. Φάβιος δὲ καὶ κατανόων αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ὅτι προχειρίζεται ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπάνοδον ἤπερ ἐποιήσατο καὶ τὴν εἰσοδον, καὶ θεω‐
ρῶν τοὺς τόπους στενοὺς ὄντας καὶ καθ’ ὑπερβο‐
11 λήν εὐφυεὶς πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν, ἐπ’ αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς διεκ‐
βολῆς περὶ τετρακυχλίους ἐπέστησε, παρακαλέσας χρῆσασθαι τῇ προθύμῃ σὺν καιρῷ μετὰ τῆς τῶν τόπων εὐφυίας, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἐχὼν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐπὶ τινα λόφον ὑπερδεξίον πρὸ τῶν στε‐
νῶν κατεστρατοπέδευσε. παραγενομένων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων, καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις ὑπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν παρώρειαν, τὴν μὲν λείαν αὐτῶν ἡλπισεν ἀδηρίτως περισυρεῖν, ὡς δὲ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τοῖς ὀλοὶς πέρας ἐπιθήσειν διὰ τὴν τῶν ἑκατέρων. καὶ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τοὺ‐
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the country to be devastated. Fabius did bestir himself to reach the district, sharing in so far the view of the more eager and venturesome spirits, but when he came in view of the enemy on approaching Falernum, while moving along the hills parallel to them so as not to appear to the allies to be abandoning the open country, he did not bring his army down into the plain, avoiding a general action both for the above-mentioned reasons and because the Carthaginians were obviously much his superiors in cavalry.

Hannibal, having thus done his best to provoke the Romans by laying the whole plain waste, found himself in possession of a huge amount of booty and decided to withdraw, as he wished not to waste the booty, but to secure it in a place suitable for his winter quarters, so that his army should not only fare sumptuously for the present, but continue to have abundance of provisions. Fabius, divining that his plan was to retire by the same pass by which he had entered, and seeing that owing to its narrowness the place was exceedingly favourable for delivering an attack, stationed about four thousand men at the actual pass, bidding them act at the proper time with all spirit, while availing themselves fully of the advantage of the ground. He himself with the greater part of his army encamped on a hill in front of the pass and overlooking it. 93. When the Carthaginians arrived and made their camp on the level ground just under the hill, Fabius thought that at least he would be able to carry away their booty without their disputing it and possibly even to put an end to the whole campaign owing to the great advantage his position gave him. He was in fact
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tous ἐγίνετο τοῖς διαβουλίοις, διανοούμενος πὴ καὶ
πῶς χρῆσται τοῖς τόποις καὶ τίνες καὶ πόθεν πρῶ-
3 τον ἔγχειρήσουσι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. Ἀ νυῖβας δὲ,
tαῦτα πρὸς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν παρασκευαζομέ-
νων τῶν πολεμίων, συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ τῶν εἰκό-
tων, ὡς ἐδωκε χρόνου οὐδ' ἀναστροφὴν ταῖς ἐπι-
4 βολαίς αὐτῶν, ἀνακαλεσάμενος δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν λει-
tουργῶν τεταγμένον Ἀ σδροῦβαν παρῆγγειλε λαμ-
pάδας δεσμεύων ἐκ τῆς ἔθρας καὶ παντοδαπῆς ὕλης
κατὰ τάχος ὡς πλείστας, καὶ τῶν ἐργατῶν βοῶν
ἐκλέγαιν' ἐκ πάσης τῆς λείας τοὺς εὐρωστοτάτους
5 εἰς δισχιλίους ἅθροίσαι πρὸ τῆς παρεμβολῆς. γενο-
mένου δὲ τοῦτο, συναγαγὼν ὑπὲδειξε τοῖς λειτουρ-
γοῖς ὑπερβολὴν τινα μεταξὺ κεμμένην τῆς αὐτοῦ
στρατοπεδείας καὶ τῶν στενῶν, δι' ὃν ἐμελλε ποι-
εῖσαι τὴν πορείαν, πρὸς ἢν ἐκέλευε προσελάυνειν
tοὺς βοῶς ἐνεργῶς καὶ μετὰ βίας, ὅταν δοθῇ τὸ
6 παράγγελμα, μέχρι συνάψωσι τοῖς ἄκροις. μετὰ δὲ
τοῦτο δειπνοποιησάμενοι ἀναπαύονται καθ' ὄραν
7 παρῆγγειλε πᾶσιν. ἀμα δὲ τῷ κλίναι τὸ τρίτον μέ-
ρος τῆς νυκτὸς εὐθέως ἐξῆγε τοὺς λειτουργούς, καὶ
προσδεῖν ἐκέλευσε πρὸς τὰ κέρατα τοῖς βουσὶ τᾶς
8 λαμπάδας. ταχὺ δὲ τοῦτο γενομένου διὰ τὸ πλῆ-
θος, ἀνάψαι παρῆγγειλε πᾶσας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν βοῦς
ἐλαύνειν καὶ προσβάλλειν πρὸς τὰς ἁκρωρείας ἐπι-
9 ἑταξε, τοὺς δὲ λογχοφόρους κατόπιν ἐπιστήσατο τοὔ-
τοις ἐως μὲν τίνος συνεργεῖν παρεκελεύετο τοῖς
ἐλαύνουσιν, ὅταν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀπαξ ὀρμὴν λάβῃ
tὰ ἔδα, παρατρέχοντας παρὰ τὰ πλάγια καὶ συγ-
κρούονται ἀμα τῶν ὑπερδεξίων ἀντέχεσθαι τόπων
καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν τὰς ἁκρωρείας, ἵνα παρα-
βοηθῶσι καὶ συμπλέκωνται τοῖς πολεμίους, ἐάν που
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entirely occupied in considering at what point and how he should avail himself of local conditions, and with what troops he should attack, and from which direction. But while the enemy were making these preparations for next day, Hannibal, conjecturing that they would act so, gave them no time or leisure to develop their plan, but summoning Hasdrubal, who was in command of the Army Service, ordered him to get as many faggots as possible of any kind of dry wood made promptly and to collect in the front of the camp about two thousand of the strongest plough oxen among all the captured stock. When this had been done, he collected the army servants and pointed out to them a rise in the ground between his own camp and the pass through which he was about to march. For this eminence he ordered them to drive the oxen whenever they received the word as furiously as they could till they reached the top. He next ordered all his men to get their supper and retire to rest early. When the third watch of the night was nearly over he led out the army servants and ordered them to bind the fagots to the horns of the oxen. This was soon done as there were plenty of hands, and he now bade them light all the fagots and drive the oxen up to the ridge. Placing his pikemen behind these men, he ordered them to help the drivers up to a certain point, but as soon as the animals were well started on their career, to run along on each side of them and keep them together, making for the higher ground. They were then to occupy the ridge, so that if the enemy advanced to any part of it, they
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10 συναντώσι πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον αὐτὸς ἀναλαβὼν πρῶτα μὲν τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὁπλῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς ἵππεις, ἐξῆς δὲ τὴν λείαν, ἐπὶ δὲ πάσι τοὺς Ἰβηρας καὶ Κελτοὺς,

94 ἢκε πρὸς τὰ στενὰ καὶ τὰς διεκβολὰς. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς στενοῖς φυλάττοντες, ἀμα τῷ συνιδεῖν τὰ φῶτα προσβάλλοντα πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, νομίζοντες ταύτη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὀρμὴν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, ἀπολιπόντες τὰς δυσχωρίας παρεβοθοῦν τοῖς ἀκροῖς. ἐγγίζοντες δὲ τοῖς βουσίν ἦποροῦντο διὰ τὰ φῶτα, μεῖζόν τι τοῦ συμβαίνοντος καὶ δευτέρον ἀναπλάττοντες καὶ προσδοκώντες.

3 ἐπιγενομένων δὲ τῶν λογχοφόρων, οὐτοὶ μὲν βραχεῖα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀκροβολισάμενοι, τῶν βοῶν αὐτοῖς ἐμπυττόντων, ἔμειναν διαστάντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκρῶν ἀμφότεροι, καὶ προσανεῖχον καραδοκοῦντες τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς ἁμέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι γνώναι τὸ γνώμενον. Φάβιος δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπορούμενος ἐπὶ τῷ συμβαίνοντι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποητὴν ὁισσάμενος δόλον εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἔξ ἀρχής ὑπόθεσιν οὐδαμῶς κρίνων ἐκκυβεῦειν οὐδὲ παραβάλλεσθαι τοῖς ὀλοίς, ἤγε τὴν ἁμερίσματι ἐπὶ τῷ

5 χάρακι καὶ προσεδέχετο τὴν ἡμέραν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἀννίβας, προχωροῦντων αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν, τὴν τε δύναμιν διεκόμισε διὰ τῶν στενῶν μετ’ ἀσφαλείας καὶ τὴν λείαν, λεοπότων τοὺς τόπους τῶν παραφυλαττόν τῶν τὰς δυσχωρίας. ἀμα δὲ τῷ φωτὶ συνιδόν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀκροῖς ἄντωκαθημένους τοῖς λογχοφόροις, ἐπαπέστειλε τινας τῶν Ἰβηρῶν· οἱ καὶ συμμίκαρστες κατέβαλον μὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰς χιλίους, ράδιος δὲ τοὺς παρὰ σφῶν εὐζώνους ἐκδεξάμενοι κατεβιβασαν. 230
might meet and attack him. At the same time he himself with his heavy-armed troops in front, next them his cavalry, next the captured cattle, and finally the Spaniards and Celts, made for the narrow gorge of the pass. 94. The Romans who were guarding the gorge, as soon as they saw the lights advancing up the slope, thinking that Hannibal was pressing on rapidly in that direction, left the narrow part of the pass and advanced to the hill to meet the enemy. But when they got near the oxen they were entirely puzzled by the lights, fancying that they were about to encounter something much more formidable than the reality. When the pike-men came up, both forces skirmished with each other for a short time, and then when the oxen rushed in among them they drew apart and remained on the heights waiting until day should break, not being able to understand what was the matter. Fabius, partly because he was at a loss to know what was occurring, and as Homer says, deeming it to be a trick,1 and partly because he adhered to his former resolve not to risk or hazard a general engagement, remained quiet in his camp waiting for daylight. Meanwhile Hannibal, whose plan had been entirely successful, brought his army and all his booty safely through the gorge, those who had been guarding the difficult passage having quitted their post. When at daybreak he saw the Romans on the hill drawn up opposite his pikemen, he sent there some Spaniards as a reinforcement. Attacking the Romans they killed about a thousand and easily relieved and brought down their own light infantry.

1 Odyssey, x. 232.
7 Ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ Φαλέρνου πολεμίου τὴν ἕξοδον, λοιπὸν ἦδη στρατοπεδεύων ἀσφαλῶς κατεσκέπτετο καὶ προνοεῖτο περὶ τῆς χειμασίας ποὺ καὶ πῶς ποιήσεται, μέγαν φόβον καὶ πόλην ἀπορίαν παρεστακὼς ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς 8 κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀνθρώποις. Φάβιος δὲ κακῶς μὲν ἥκουεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὡς ἀνάνδρως ἐκ τοιούτων τόπων προέμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, οὐ μὴν 9 ἀφίστατο γε τῆς προθέσεως. καταναγκασθεὶς δὲ μετ’ ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἐπὶ τινας ἀπελθεῖν θυσίας εἰς τὴν 'Ρώμην, παρέδωκε τῷ συνάρχοντι τὰ στρατό- πεδα, καὶ πολλὰ χωρίζομενοι ἐνετείλατο μὴ τοσαύτην ποιεῖσθαι σπουδὴν ύπὲρ τοῦ βλάψαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἡλίκην ύπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν αὐτοῦς παθεῖν δει- 10 νον. ὥν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἐν νῷ τιθέμενος Μάρκος ἐτί λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα πρὸς τῷ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ τῷ διακυνδυνεύειν ὅλος καὶ πᾶς ἦν. 95 Ἡ τή μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοιαύτην εἰσε τὴν 2 διάθεσιν. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καίρους ταῖς προ- ειρημέναις πράξεσιν Ἅρδρούβας ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἴθρησκίας στρατηγοὺς, κατηρτικῶς ἐν τῇ παραχειμασίᾳ τὰς ὑπὸ τάδελφοι καταλειμφείσας τριάκοντα ναῦς, καὶ δέκα προσπεπληρωκὼς ἄλλας, ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας ἀνήχθη τετταράκοντα ναυσὶ καταφρά- κτοις ἐκ Καυνῆς πόλεως, προχειρισάμενος Ἅμιλκαν 3 τοῦ στόλου ναύαρχον. ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὴν πεζῆν ἐκ τῆς παραχειμασίας ἱθρουκὼς δύναμιν ἀνέξευξε. καὶ ταῖς μὲν ναύσι παρὰ τὴν χέρσον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, τοῖς δὲ πεζοῖς τὴν πορείαν παρὰ τὸν αἰγαλῶν, σπεύδων ἀμφοτέραις ἀμα ταῖς δυνάμεις καταζευξα 4 πρὸς τὸν Ἰβηρια ποταμόν. Γνάως δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς συλλογιζόμενοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 232
Hannibal, having thus effected his retirement from Falernum, remained now safely in camp and began to take thought where and how he should establish his winter quarters. He had spread great terror and perplexity through all the cities and peoples of Italy. Fabius, though generally reproached for his craven conduct in letting the enemy escape from such a situation, still did not abandon his policy. But a few days afterwards he was compelled to leave for Rome to perform certain sacrifices and handed over his legions to his Master of the Horse, enjoining on him strictly, in taking leave, not to attach so much importance to damaging the enemy as to avoiding disaster for himself. Marcus, instead of paying any attention to this advice, was, even while Fabius was tendering it, entirely wrapped up in the project of risking a great battle.

95. Such was the position of affairs in Italy. Contemporaneously with these events Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian commander in Spain, after fitting out during the winter the thirty ships his brother had left him, and manning ten others, put out at the beginning of summer from New Carthage with his fleet of forty decked ships, appointing Hamilcar his admiral. At the same time he collected his troops from their winter quarters and took the field. His fleet sailed close to the shore and his army marched along the beach, his object being to halt with both forces near the Ebro. Gnaeus, conjecturing that this was the plan of the Carthaginians, first of all
ἐπεβάλετο <κατὰ γῆν καὶ> κατὰ θάλατταν ἐκ τῆς
5 παραχεμασίας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπάντησιν. ἂκούων
dὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς
παρασκευῆς, τὸ μὲν κατὰ γῆν ἀπαντῶν ἀπεδοκί-
μασε, συμπληρώσας δὲ πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ναῦς,
καὶ λαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ πεζικοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἐπιτη-
δειοτάτους ἄνδρας πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβατικὴν χρεῖαν ἀν-
ήχθη, καὶ κατήρε δευτεραῖος ἐκ Ταρράκωνος εἰς τοὺς
6 περὶ τὸν 'Ιβηρα ποταμὸν τόπους. καθορμοθεῖς δὲ
tῶν πολεμίων ἐν ἀποστήματι περὶ τοὺς ὑγιδηκοντα
σταδίους, προαπέστειλε κατασκευομένας δύο ναῦς
ταχυπλούσας Μασσαλιτικάς· καὶ γὰρ προκαθ-
ηγοῦντο καὶ προεκινδύνευον οὕτω καὶ πᾶσιν ἀπο-
7 τόμως σφίσι παρείχοντο τὴν χρεῖαν. εὐγενῶς γὰρ,
εἰ καὶ τινες ἑπερευ, κεκουνωνήκασι 'Ρωμαίοις πραγ-
μάτων καὶ Μασσαλιωταί, πολλάκις μὲν καὶ μετὰ
tαῦτα, μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ τὸν Ἀννιβιακὸν πόλεμον.
8 διασαφοῦντων δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκοπὴν ἐκπεμ-
φθέντων ὦτι περὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ ποταμοῦ συμβαί-
νει τῶν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὄρμεών στόλων, ἀνήγετο
κατὰ σπουδὴν, βουλόμενος ἄφνων προσπεσεῖν τοῖς
πολεμίωσ. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, σημειά-
των αὐτοῖς τῶν σκοπῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸν ἐπιπλοῦν
τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀμα τὰς πεζικὰς ἐξέτασσον δυνά-
μεις παρὰ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν, καὶ τοῖς πληρώμασι παρ-
2 ἡγγέλλων ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν
'Ρωμαίων σύνεγγυς ὄντων, σημεῖντες πολεμικὸν
ἀνήγοντο, κρίναντες ναυμαχεῖν. συμβαλόντες δὲ
tοῖς πολεμίωσ βραχὺν μὲν τινα χρόνον ἀντεποιή-
σαντο τῆς νίκης, μετ' οὗ πολὺ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κλίνειν
3 ὁμηρίζαν. ἡ γὰρ ἐφεδρεία τῶν πεζῶν ἡ περὶ τὸν
αἰγιαλὸν οὐχ οὕτως αὐτοὺς ὄνησε θάρσος παριστά-
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designed to quit his winter quarters and meet them both by land and sea, but on learning the strength of their forces and the extensive scale of their preparations he renounced the project of meeting them by land, and manning thirty-five ships and embarking on them as marines the men from his army most suited for this service, appeared off the Ebro two days after sailing from Tarraco. Anchoring at a distance of about eighty stades from the enemy he sent on two swift Massaliot ships to reconnoitre, for these used to head the line both in sailing and in battle, and there was absolutely no service they were not ready to render. Indeed if any people have given generous support to the Romans it is the people of Marseilles both on many subsequent occasions and especially in the Hannibalic War. When the scouts reported that the enemy’s fleet was anchored off the mouth of the river, he weighed anchor and advanced rapidly, wishing to fall upon them suddenly. 96. Hasdrubal, to whom his look-out men had given early notice of the approach of the enemy, drew up his land forces on the beach and ordered his crews to embark. The Romans being now close at hand, he gave the signal for battle, having decided on a naval action. The Carthaginians on meeting the enemy contested the victory only for a short time and then began to give way. For the covering military force on the beach did not benefit them so much by the confidence it inspired as it
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νουσα πρὸς τὸν κύνδυνον ὡς ἐξῆλθε τὴν ἐλπίδα

4 τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτοίμην παρασκευάζουσα. πλὴν δύο
μὲν αὐτάνδρους ἤνας ἀποβαλόντες, τετάραυ τῶν 
τῶν παρασῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιβάτας, ἐσφυγγόν ἐκκλη-

5 ναντες εἰς γῆν. ἐπικειμένων δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαιῶν αὐ-
τοὺς ἐκθύμως, τἀ τὸν ναὸς ἐξέβαλον εἰς τὸν αὐ-
γιαλόν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀποπηθήσαντες ἐκ τῶν πλοῖων

6 ἐσφυγνοῦν πρὸς τοὺς παρατεταγμένους. οἱ δὲ Ῥω-
μαιοι τολμηρῶς συνεγγύσαντες τῇ γῇ, καὶ τὰ δυνά-
μενα κινεῖσθαι τῶν πλοίων ἀναδημάμενοι, μετὰ χα-
ρᾶς ὑπερβαλλούσης ἀπέπλευον, νευκηκότες μὲν ἐς
ἐφόδου τοὺς ὑπεναιτίους, κρατοῦντες δὲ τῆς θα-
λάττης, εἰκοσί δὲ καὶ πεντέντα ναύς ἔχοντες τῶν
πολεμίων.

7 Τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Ἰδηρίαν ἀπὸ τοὺς ἐπικυνδεστέρας εἰλήφει τοῖς Ῥωμαιοῖς τὰς ἐλπίδας

8 διὰ τὸ προειρημένον κατόρθωμα. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδό-
νοι, προσπεσόντος αὐτοὺς τοῦ γεγονότος ἔλαττωμα-
τος, παραχρήμα πληρώσαντες ἐβδομήκοντα νήσος
ἐξαπέστειλαν, κρύπταντες ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι πρὸς πάσας

9 τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης. αἰ τὸ μὲν
πρῶτον εἰς Σαρδόν, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ
Πίσας τόπους τῆς Ἰταλίας προσέβαλον, πεπεισμέ-


10 τῶν 'Αννίβαν. ταχὺ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαιῶν ἀναχθέντων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥώμης ἐκατον εἰκοσὶ σκά-
φει πεντηκοῦσι, πυθόμενοι τὸν ἀνάπλουν, οὕτω

11 μὲν αὐθίς ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Σαρδόνα, μετὰ δὲ

12 ταύτα πάλιν εἰς Καρχηδόνα. Γνάιος δὲ Σερούλιος,

13 ἔχων τὸν προειρημένον στόλον, ἔστοι τῶι ὕπ-

14 κολούθει τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, συνάψειν πεπεισμένος,
damaged them by ensuring an easy and safe retreat. After losing two ships with all their crews and the oars and marines of four others, they fell back on the shore. On the Romans pursuing them vigorously they ran their ships aground and leaping out of them took refuge with the troops. The Romans very boldly approached the shore, and taking in tow such ships as were in a condition to float, sailed off in high spirits, having beaten the enemy at the first onslaught, established their supremacy at sea and possessed themselves of five and twenty of the enemy's ships.

Owing to this success the prospects of the Romans in Spain began thenceforth to look brighter. But the Carthaginians, on the news of their defeat, at once manned and dispatched seventy ships, regarding the command of the sea as necessary for all their projects. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisa in Italy, the commander believing they would meet Hannibal there, but on learning that the Romans had at once put to sea from Rome itself with a hundred and twenty quinqueremes to attack them, they sailed back again to Sardinia and thence to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, the commander of this Roman fleet, followed up the Carthaginians for a certain distance, believing he would overtake them, but on being left a long way behind, he gave up the chase. He first of all put in at
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τῆς Σικελίας Διλυβαίων προσέχε· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καταπλεύσας τῆς Διβύης ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Κερκυνητῶν νῆσον, καὶ λαβὼν παρ’ αὐτῶν χρήματα τοῦ μὴ πορθῆσαι τὴν χώραν, ἀπηλλάγη. κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἀνάπλουν γενόμενος κύριος νῆσον Κοσσύρου, καὶ φρούραν εἰς τὸ πολισμάτων εἰσαγαγών, αὐθις εἰς τὸ Διλυβαῖον κατῆρε. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὕτως μὲν αὐτοῦ συνορμίσας τὸν στόλον μετ’ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτὸς ἀνεκομίσθη πρὸς τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις.

97 Οἱ δ’ ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου, πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός προτέρημα διὰ τοῦ Γναίου περὶ τὴν ναυμαχίαν, καὶ νοµίζουσιν χρήσιμον εἶναι, μάλλον δ’ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ μὴ προσέθειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐνίστασθαι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὔξειν, προχειρισάμενοι ναῦς εἴκοσι καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπιστήσαντες Πόπλιον Σκιτίων, κατὰ τὴν ἐκ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, ἔξαπέστελλον μετὰ σπουδῆς πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν Γναίον, κοινὴ πράξοντα μετ’ ἐκείνου τὰ 2 κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. πάνω γὰρ ἡγουνίων μὴ κρατήσαντες Καρχηδόνιοι τῶν τόπων ἐκείσων, καὶ περιποιοῦσαντες χορηγίας ἀφθόνους καὶ χείρας, ἀντιποιοῦσαντες μὲν τῆς θαλάττης ὀλοσχερέστερον, συνεπίθωντα δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, στρατόπεδα πέμποντες καὶ χρήματα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν.

3 διόπερ ἐν μεγάλῳ τιθεμένοι καὶ τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον, ἐξαπέστειλαν τὰς τε ναῦς καὶ τὸν Πόπλιον. διὸ καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἰβηρίαν καὶ συμμίξας τά- δελφῷ μεγάλην παρέιχε χρείαν τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγ- 5 μασιν. οὔδεποτε γὰρ πρῶτον θαρρῆσαντες δια- βῆναι τὸν Ἰβηρα ποταμὸν, ἀλλ’ ἀσμενίζοντες τῇ τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε φιλία καὶ συμμαχία, τότε διέβησαν καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐθάρρησαν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῶν πέ- 238
Lilybaeum in Sicily and afterwards sailed to the African island of Cercina, which he quitted after receiving from the inhabitants a sum of money on condition of his not laying the country waste. On his return voyage he possessed himself of the island of Cossyrus, and leaving a garrison in the small town returned to Lilybaeum. After laying up his fleet in harbour there, he very shortly went off to join the land forces.

97. The Senate on hearing of Gnaeus Scipio's success in the naval battle, thinking it advantageous or rather imperative not to neglect the affairs of Spain but to keep up the pressure on the Carthaginians and increase their forces, got ready twenty ships, and placing them, as they had originally decided, under the command of Publius Scipio, dispatched him at once to join his brother Gnaeus and operate in Spain together with him. For they were very apprehensive lest the Carthaginians should master that country, and, collecting abundance of supplies and soldiers, make a more serious effort to regain the command of the sea and thus support the invasion of Italy by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Treating this war, then, also as of great moment they dispatched Publius with his fleet, and on reaching Iberia and joining his brother he rendered great service in their joint operations. For the Romans, who had never before dared to cross the Ebro, but had been content with the friendship and alliance of the peoples on its north bank, now crossed it, and for the first time ventured to aim at acquiring dominion on the other side,
6 Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καταπληξάμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὴν διά-
βασιν οἱκοῦντας τῶν Ἰβήρων ἥκον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ζα-
κανθαίων πόλιν, ἀποσχόντες στάδιους ὡς τετταρά-
κοντα περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱερὸν κατεστρατοπέ-
7 δευσάν, λαβόντες τόπον εὐφυῶς κείμενον πρὸς τε
τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκ
8 θαλάττης χορηγίαν· ὅμοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς συνεβαίνει καὶ
tὸν στόλον ποιεῖσθαι τὸν παράπλουν. ἔνθα δὴ
98 γίνεται τις πραγμάτων περιτέτεια τούὸδε. καθ' ὦς καὶ τὸν Ἀνυίβας ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν εἰς Ἰτα-
λίαν, ὃς πόλεως ἡπιστήσει τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβη-
ρίαν, ἔλαβε παρὰ τούτων ὃμηρα τοὺς νεῖσι τῶν
ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν· οὗς πάντας εἰς τὴν Ζακαν-
θαίου ἀπέθετο πόλιν διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ διὰ
tὴν τῶν ἀπολειπομένων ἐπὶ αὐτῆς ἀνδρῶν πίστιν.
2 ήν δὲ τις ἄνηρ Ἰβήρ, Ἀβίλυξ ὄνομα, κατὰ μὲν τὴν
dόξαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου περίστασιν οὔδενὸς δεύτε-
ρος Ἰβήρων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὐ-
νοιαν καὶ πίστιν πολὺ τι διαφέρειν δοκῶν τῶν ἀλ-
3 λῶν. οὗτος θεωρῶν τὰ πράγματα, καὶ νομίσαι
ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐλπίδας, συν-
elογίσατο παρ' ἐαυτῷ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὁμήρων προ-
4 δοσίας συλλογισμοῦ Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν. πει-
θεῖς γὰρ διὸτι σύναται μέγας γενέσθαι παρὰ Ῥω-
μαίοις προσενεγκάμενος ἐν καιρῷ πίστιν ἃμα καὶ
χρείαν, ἐγίνετο πρὸς τῶ παρασπονδύσας τοὺς Καρ-
χηδονίους ἐγχειρίσατο τοὺς ὁμήρους τοὺς Ῥωμαίους.
5 θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Ἐώςτορα τῶν Καρχηδονίων
strateγοῦν, ὅσ ἀπεστάλη μὲν ὑπ' Ἀσδρούβου κω-
λύσων τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν τὸν ποταμὸν, οὐ
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chance also greatly contributing to advance their prospects in the following manner.

When after overawing the Iberian tribes dwelling near the crossing of the Ebro they reached Saguntum, they encamped at a distance of about five miles from the town near the temple of Venus, choosing a place well situated both as regards security from the enemy and facility for obtaining supplies from the sea, since their fleet was coasting down together with them. 98. Here a remarkable development of events occurred. When Hannibal was starting on his march for Italy he took as hostages from those cities in Iberia on which he did not rely the sons of their principal men, and all these he placed in Saguntum owing to the strength of the place and the loyalty of the officers he left in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian named Abilyx, second to none in Iberia in rank and wealth and with the reputation of being more devoted and loyal to the Carthaginians than anyone else. Reviewing the situation and thinking that the prospects of the Romans were now the brightest, he reasoned with himself in a manner thoroughly Spanish and barbarian on the question of betraying the hostages. For, being convinced that if he both rendered the Romans a timely service and gave them proof of his good faith, he would become very influential with them, he formed the scheme of playing the traitor to the Carthaginians and handing over the hostages to the Romans. The Carthaginian general, Bostar, whom Hasdrubal had sent to oppose the Romans if they tried to cross the Ebro, but who
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θαρρήσας δὲ τούτο ποιεῖν, ἀνακεχωρηκώς ἐστρατο-πέδευε τῆς Ζακάνθης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς θάλασσαν μέρεσι, τούτον μὲν ἄκακον ὄντα τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πρᾶον τῇ
6 φύσει, πιστῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείμενον, ποι-εῖται λόγους ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμήρων πρὸς τὸν Βώστορα, φάσκων, ἐπειδῆ διαβεβήκασι Ἱωμαῖοι τὸν ποταμόν, οὐκέτι δύνασθαι Καρχηδονίους φόβῳ συνέχει τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἐβηρίαν, προσδεῖον δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τῆς
7 τῶν ὑποταττομένων εὐνοίας. νῦν οὖν ἡγγυκότων Ἱωμαίων, καὶ προσκαθεξομένων τῆς Ζακάνθης, καὶ κινδυνεύσεως τῆς πόλεως, ἕαν ἐξαγαγὼν τοὺς ὁμή-ρους ἀποκαταστήσῃ τοῖς γονεύσι καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκλύσειν μὲν αὐτὸν τῶν Ἱωμαίων τὴν φιλοτιμίαν τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζειν ἐκεῖνος
8 πράξαι, κυριεύοντας τῶν ὁμήρων ἐκκαλέσσεθαι δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἐβηρῶν πάντων πρὸς Καρχηδονίους εὐ-νοιαν, προϊδόμενον τὸ μέλλον καὶ προνοθέντα τῆς τῶν ὁμήρων ἀσφαλείας. τὴν δὲ χάριν αὐξήσεων ἔφη πολλαπλασίαν, αὐτὸς γενόμενος χειριστής τοῦ πράγ-ματος. ἀποκαθιστάνων γὰρ εἰς τὰς πόλεις τοὺς παίδας οὐ μόνον τὴν παρ’ αὐτῶν εὐνοιαν ἐπιστά-σεθαι τῶν γεννησάντων, ἄλλα καὶ παρὰ τῶν πολ- λῶν, ὑπὸ τὴν ὁμὴν τιθείς διὰ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος τὴν Καρχηδονίων πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους αἴρεσιν καὶ με-γαλοψυχίαν. προσδοκᾶν δ’ αὐτὸν ἐκέλευσε καὶ ὅ-ρων πλῆθος ἓδει παρὰ τῶν τὰ τέκνα κομιζομένων· παραδόξως γὰρ ἐκάστους ἐγκρατεῖς γινομένους τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἁμιλλαν ποιήσεσθαι τῆς εἰς τὸν κύ-ριον τῶν πραγμάτων εὐνεγεσίας. παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις ἔτερα καὶ πλείω πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον

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had not ventured to do so, had now retreated and encamped between Saguntum and the sea. Abilyx, perceiving that he was of a guileless and mild disposition and placed full confidence in himself, approached him on the subject of the hostages, saying that now the Romans had once crossed the river it was no longer possible for the Carthaginians to control the Iberians by fear, but that present circumstances required the goodwill of all the subject peoples. So now, when the Romans had approached and were encamped close to Saguntum and the city was in danger, if he brought the hostages out and restored them to their parents and cities, he would in the first place frustrate the ambitious project of the Romans, who were bent on taking just the same step if they got the hostages into their hands, and further he would elicit the gratitude of all the Iberians to the Carthaginians by thus foreseeing the future and taking thought for the safety of the hostages. This act of grace, he said, would be very much enhanced, if Bostar would let him take the matter in hand personally. For in restoring the children to the cities not only would he gain him the goodwill of their parents but that of the mass of the people, by thus bringing actually before their eyes this evidence of the magnanimous conduct of Carthage toward her allies. He told Bostar also that he could count on numerous presents to himself from those to whom their children were returned; for each and all, on thus unexpectedly receiving back their dearest, would vie with each other in heaping benefits on the author of the measure. By these and more words to the like effect he persuaded
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dialektheis épeise toû Bóstora sugkatasthêsi toûs
99 legeoménoiv. kai tôte mèn épánvalthe, tæzâmeneos hèmè-
raû, ë paréstai meta tûn épitthèdeiwv prós tìn aná-
2 kómièin tûn paídoiwv. paragenethèis ðe nuktoû èpi
tû tûn 'Rhômaiwn stratatôpedon, kai sugmiûxei tûs
tûn sugstrataneuménon èkeinou 'Ibèrrou, diá tûtôn
3 eisulthhe pró toûs stratetegous. èklogiûmoineos ðe
dia plêuônôv tûn èsoiêmen tûn kai metáptwos
prós aútoûs tûw 'Ibèrrou, èan ègkrateiès gênwnetai
tûn òmèrôn, èptugugialato paradôswen aútoûs tûs
4 paídoiwv. tûw ðe peri tônu Póplion ùperbolh pro-
thèmos dekamênon tûn ðlpiða kai megálalos èpi-
ischnuménov òwraôs, tûte mèn èis tûn idían àp-
hlalàghi, sugbhêmenos òmèran kai kairow kai tôpon, èn
5 ò deisxai toûs èkdezhoménon aútoû ùpoméneiv. metà
dè tauta paralabwv toûs èpitthèdeous tûw filiow
èke prós tòn Bóstora, kai paradôventwv aútoû
tûw paídoiwv èk tûs Zàkânths, nuktoû poushâmeneos
ûn èxodou, òs òhelwv lathèin, paraporeueîxos tûn
xàrika tûw pòleiwv èke prós tônu tetaghêmôn
kairow kai tôpon kai pàntas ènvekhirâse tûs òmè-
6 rous toûs èrêmous toû 'Rhômaiwv. òi ðe peri tônu
Póplion ètihmaîan te diapherontws tônu 'Ablînva kai
prós tûn àpokatástasen tûn òmèrôn èis tás pa-
trídas èxôshanto toûtw, sugbemèzontes tôus èpithe-
7 deîous. òs èpisthíneuménon tàs pòleis kai dia tûs
tûw paídoiwv àpokatastáseseis tûdeis ùpò tûn òbîn
tûn tôw 'Rhômaiwv praxûta kai megaloûfychîan parà
 tônu Kàrkhëdoníewn àpisthîan kai bârûthta, kai prosp-
paratîtheis tûn aútoû metáðwseiv, pîllous 'Ibèrrou
8 parôrâmhsse pró toû tôw 'Rhômaiwv filiav. Bò-
stwv ðe pâdikûteron ë káta tûn òlîkian dôxas
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Bostar to assent to his proposal. 99. For the present he left to return home, fixing the day on which he would come with his followers to escort the children. At night he went to the Roman camp, and having found some of the Iberians who were serving in the army, gained access through them to the generals. Pointing out at some length how the Iberians if they recovered their hostages would with one impulse go over to the Romans, he undertook to give up the children to them. Publius, to whom the prospect was exceedingly welcome, having promised him a great reward, he now left for his own country, having fixed a day and agreed on the hour and place at which those who were to take over the hostages should await him. After this, taking his most intimate friends with him, he came to Bostar; and on the children being handed over to him from Saguntum, he sallied out from the town by night as if to keep the matter secret, and marching along the enemies' entrenched camp reached the appointed place at the appointed hour and delivered all the hostages to the Roman generals. Publius conferred great honours on Abilyx, and employed him in the restoration of the hostages to their respective countries, sending certain of his friends with him. Going from city to city, and bringing, by the repatriation of the children, the gentleness and magnanimity of the Romans into manifest contrast with the suspiciousness and harshness of the Carthaginians, at the same time exhibiting the example of his own change of sides, he induced many of the Iberians to become allies of Rome. Bostar was judged in thus handing over the hostages
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9 τοὺς τούτους ἐπεπτώκει κινδύνους. καὶ τότε μὲν ἥδη τὴν ὁρᾶσα κατεπειγούσῃ διέλυν ἔις παραχει-
μασίαν ἀμφότεροι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἵκανον τινος ἐκ τῆς
tύχης γεγονότος συνεργήματος τοῖς 'Ῥωμαίοις τοῖς
περί τοὺς παίδας πρὸς τὰς ἐπικειμένας ἐπιβολὰς.

100 Καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν. ὁ
dὲ στρατηγὸς Ἰονίδας, οἶκεν ἀπελίπομεν, πυν-
θανόμενος παρὰ τῶν κατασκόπων πλείστον ὑπάρχειν
σῖτον ἐν τῇ περὶ τὴν Λουκαρίαν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον
Γερούνιον χῶρα, πρὸς δὲ τὴν συναγωγὴν εὐφυῖας

2 ἔχειν τὸ Γερούνιον, κρίνας ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παρα-
χειςσίαν, προῆγε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν παρὰ
τὸ Λίβυρνον ὅρος ἐπὶ τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους.

3 ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς τὸ Γερούνιον, ὃ τῆς Λουκαρίας
ἀπέχει διακόσια στάδια, τᾶς μὲν ἅρχας διὰ λόγων
τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας εἰς φιλίαν προκαλεῖτο καὶ πίστεις
ἐδίδο τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος,

4 πολυρκεῖν ἐπεβάλετο. ταχὺ δὲ γενόμενος κύριος,
tοὺς μὲν οἰκήτορας κατέφθειρε, τὰς δὲ πλείστας
οἰκίας ἀκεραίους διεφύλαξε καὶ τὰ τείχη, βουλόμε-
nος συνεδρίους χρήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν παραχειαν.

5 τὴν δὲ δύναμιν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως παρεμβιλῶν άχυ-

6 ρώσατο τάφρῳ καὶ χάραι τὴν στρατοπεδείαν. γε-

νόμενος δ' ἀπὸ τούτων, τὰ μὲν δύο μέρη τῆς δυνά-

μεως ἐπὶ τὴν συνελλογιῶν ἐξέπεμπ τοστάξας καθ'

ἐκάστην ἡμέραν τακτὸν ἀναφέρει πέσον ἐκαστὸν
τοῖς ἴδιοις ἐπιβολῆν τοῦ τάγματος τοῖς προκεχειρ-

7 σμένους ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ταύτην, τῷ δὲ τρήτῳ

μέρει τὴν τὲ στρατοπεδείαν ἐτήρει καὶ τοῖς συνολο-

8 γούσι παρεφήδρευε κατὰ τόπους. οὐσίς δὲ τῆς μὲν

χῶρας τῆς πλείστης εὐεφόδου καὶ πεδιάδος, τῶν δὲ

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to the enemy to have acted more like a child than became his years, and was in serious danger of his life. For the present both sides, as the season was now advanced, broke up their forces for the winter; chance in this matter of the children having materially contributed to assist the projects the Romans had in view.

100. Such was the position of affairs in Spain. Hannibal, whom we left in Italy looking out for winter quarters, learning from his scouts that there was plenty of corn in the country round Luceria and Geronium, and that the best place for collecting supplies was Geronium, decided to winter there and advanced to this district, marching past Mount Libynus. On reaching Geronium, which is two hundred stades from Luceria, he at first sent messages to the inhabitants asking for their alliance and offering pledges of the advantages he promised them, but as they paid no attention to them he began the siege. He soon took the city, upon which he put the inhabitants to the sword, but kept the walls and most of the houses uninjured, intending to use them as corn magazines for the winter. He encamped his army before the town, fortifying his camp with a trench and palisade. When he had completed this he sent two divisions of his army out to gather corn, ordering each to bring in each day for its own use the quantity imposed by those in charge of the commissariat. With the remaining third he guarded the camp and covered the foraging parties here and there. As most of the country was flat and easy to overrun, and the foragers were one
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συναγόντων ὃς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀναριθμήτων, ἢτι δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἀκμαζούσης πρὸς τὴν συγκομιδὴν, ἀπλετον συνέβαινε καθ’ ἐκάστην ἦμέραν ἀθροίζεσθαι τοῦ σίτου τὸ πλῆθος.

2 ποτε τοῦς Καρχηδονίοις. ἀκούσας δὲ τὸ μὲν Γε- 
ρούνιον τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἡδὴ κατέχειν, τὴν 
δὲ χώραν σιτολογεῖν, πρὸ δὲ τῆς πόλεως χάρακα 
βεβλημένους στρατοπεδεύειν, ἐπιστρέφας ἐκ τῶν 
ἀκρωρειών κατέβαινε κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία κατα-

3 τείνουσαν ράχιν. ἀφικόμενος δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν ἁκραν, ἡ 
κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Λαρινάτιδος χώρας, προσαγορεύε-

tαι δὲ Καλήνη, κατεστρατοπέδευεν περὶ ταύτην, 
πρόχειρος ὡν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου συμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς 

4 πολεμίοις. Ὁ Ἀννίβας δὲ θεωρῶν ἐγχύζοντας τοὺς 
πολεμίους, τὸ μὲν τρίτον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνασ 
σιτολογεῖν, τὰ δὲ δύο μέρη λαβὼν καὶ προελθὼν ἀπὸ 

5 τῆς πόλεως ἐκκαίδεκα σταδίους πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, 
ἐπὶ τινος βουνοῦ κατεστρατοπέδευε, βουλὸμενος 
ἀμα μὲν καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀμα δὲ 

6 τοῖς σιτολογοῦσι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρασκευάζειν.

7 μετὰ δὲ ταύτα γεωλόφον τινὸς ὑπάρχωντος μεταξὺ 

τῶν στρατοπέδων, ὃς εὐκαίρως καὶ σύνεγγυς ἐπέ- 
κειτο τῇ τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολῆ, τούτον ἐτί νυκτὸς 

εξαποστείλας περὶ δισχίλιος τῶν λοχοφόρων κατε- 

8 λάβετο. οὕς ἐπιγενομένης τῆς ἡμέρας συνιδὼν 
Μάρκος ἔσχιγγε τοὺς εὐζώνους καὶ προσέβαλε τῷ 

λόφῳ. γενομένου δ’ ἀκροβολισμοῦ νεανίκου, τέλος 

ἐπεκράτησαν οἱ Ρωμαίοι, καὶ μετὰ ταύτα τὴν ὅλην 

στρατοπεδείαν μετεβίβασαν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν τόπον.

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might say infinite in number, and the weather was very favourable for fetching in the grain, an enormous quantity was collected every day.

101. Minucius on taking over the command from Fabius at first followed the Carthaginians along the hills, always expecting to encounter them when attempting to cross. But on hearing that Hannibal had already occupied Geronium, and was foraging in the district, and had established himself in a fortified camp before the city, he turned and descended from the hills by a ridge that slopes down to the town. Arriving at the height in the territory of Larinum called Calena he encamped there, being eager at all hazards to engage the enemy. Hannibal, seeing the approach of the Romans, left the third part of his army to forage, and taking the other two-thirds advanced sixteen stades from the town and encamped on a hill with the view of overawing the enemy and affording protection to the foragers. There was a certain hillock between the two armies, and observing that it lay close to the enemy's camp and commanded it, he sent two thousand of his pikemen in the night to occupy it. Marcus, catching sight of them at daybreak, led out his light-armed troops and attacked the hill. A brisk skirmish took place in which the Romans were victorious, and afterwards they transferred their whole army to this hill.
8 Ο δ' Ἀννίβας ἐς μὲν τινος διὰ τὴν ἀντιστρατοπεδείαν συνείχε τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως ἐφ' 9 αὐτόν. πλειάδων δὲ γενομένων ἡμερῶν, ἡναγκάζετο τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν νομὴν τῶν θρεμμάτων ἀπομερίζειν, 10 τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τὴν σιτολογίαν, σπουδάζουν κατὰ τὴν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρόθεσιν μὴτε τὴν λείαν καταφθείραι τὸν τε σῖτον ὡς πλεῖστον συναγαγεῖν, ἵνα πάντων ἡ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν δαφύλεια τοὺς ἀνδραίῳ, μὴ χεῖρον 11 δὲ τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις καὶ τοῖς ἵπποις ἐίχε γάρ τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως ἐν τῷ τῶν ἤπεων τάγματι.

102 Καθ' ὁν δὴ καιρὸν Μάρκος, συνθεωρήσας τὸ πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπὶ τὰς προερημένας χρείας κατὰ τῆς χώρας σκεδασμένον, λαβὼν τὸν ἀκμαίοτατον καιρὸν τῆς ἡμέρας ἐξήγε τὴν δύναμιν, 2 καὶ συνεγγύσας τῇ παρεμβολῇ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰ μὲν βαρέα τῶν ὁπλῶν ἐξέταξε, τοὺς δ' ἱππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους κατὰ μέρη διελών ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς προ- 3 νομεύονσι, παραγγείλας μηδένα ζωγρεῖν. Ἀννίβας δὲ τούτου συμβάντος εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐνεπετῶκει με- γάλην: ὅτε γὰρ ἀντεξάγει τοῖς παρατατηγένοις ἁξίωτρο ήν ὅτε παραβοθεῖν τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας 4 διεσπαρμένοις. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς προνομεύοντας ἐξαποσταλέντες πολλοὺς τῶν ἐσκε- δασμένων ἀπέκτειναν. οἱ δὲ παρατατηγένοι τέλος εἰς τοῦτ' ἡλθον καταφρονήσεως ὡστε καὶ διασπάν τὸν χάρακα καὶ μόνον οὐ πολιορκεῖν τοὺς Καρχη- 5 δονίους. οδ' Ἀννίβας ἦν μὲν ἐν κακοῖς, ὄμως δὲ χειμαζόμενος ἔμενε, τοὺς πελάξοντας ἀποτρίβομενο 6 καὶ μόλις διαφυλάττων τὴν παρεμβολήν, ἐως Ἀσ- δρούβας ἀναλαβῶν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας συμπεφυγότας εἰς τὸν χάρακα τὸν περὶ τὸ Γερούνιον, ὄντας 250
Hannibal for a certain time kept the whole of his forces within the camp owing to the propinquity of the enemy; but after some days he was compelled to tell off a portion to pasture the animals, and send others to forage for corn, as he was anxious, according to his original plan, to avoid loss in the live stock he had captured and to collect as much corn as possible, so that for the whole winter there should be plenty of everything both for his men and also for the horses and pack-animals; for it was on his cavalry above all that he placed reliance.

102. Minucius, remarking that the greater number of the enemy were dispersed over the country on these services, chose the time when the day was at its height to lead out his forces, and on approaching the enemy’s camp, drew up his legionaries, and dividing his cavalry and light-armed infantry into several troops sent them out to attack the foragers, with orders to take no prisoners. Hannibal hereupon found himself in a very difficult position, being neither strong enough to march out and meet the enemy nor able to go to the assistance of those of his men who were scattered over the country. The Romans who had been dispatched to attack the foraging parties, killed numbers of them, and finally the troops drawn up in line reached such a pitch of contempt for the enemy that they began to pull down the palisade and very nearly stormed the Carthaginian camp. Hannibal was in sore straits, but notwithstanding the tempest that had thus overtaken him he continued to drive off all assailants and with difficulty to hold his camp, until Hasdrubal, with those who had fled from the country for refuge to the camp before Geronium, about four thousand
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7 εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, ἢκε παραβοηθῶν. τότε δὲ μι-
κρὸν ἀναθαρρήσας ἐπεξήλθε, καὶ βραχὺ πρὸ τῆς
στρατοπεδείας παρεμβαλὼν μόλις ἀπεστρέψατο τὸν
8 ἑνεστῶτα κύνδυνον. Μάρκος δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν ἐν τῇ
περὶ τὸν χάρακα συμπλοκῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκτε-
νας, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας διεθαρκώς, τότε
μὲν ἐπανῆλθε μεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλ-
9 λοντος. τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἐκλιπόντων τὸν χάρακα
tῶν Καρχηδόνιων, ἐπέβη καὶ κατελάβετο τὴν ἐκεί-
10 νον παρεμβολήν. ὁ γὰρ Ἅννίβας διαγωνιᾶσας τοὺς
Ῥωμαίους μὴ καταλαβόμενοι νυκτὸς ἔρημον ὄντα
tὸν ἐπὶ τῷ Γερουνίῳ χάρακα κύριοι γένωνται τῆς
ἀποσκευῆς καὶ τῶν παραθέσεων, ἐκρυνεν αὐτὸς ἀνα-
χωρεῖν καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν στρατοπεδείαν.
11 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καυρῶν οἱ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι
tαῖς προνομαίς εὐλαβέστερον ἔχρωντο καὶ φυλακτι-
κῶτερον, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίοι τάναντια θαρραλεύτερον
καὶ προπετέστερον.

103 Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, προσπεσόντος σφίσι τοῦ γε-
γονότος μειζόνως ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀλῆθειαν, περιχαρεῖς
ἤσαν διὰ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς προὔπαρχούσης
ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων δυσελπιστίας οἴον εἰ μεταβολὴν τινα
2 πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον αὐτοῖς προφαίνεσθαι, δεύτερον δὲ
καὶ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τὸν πρὸ τούτου χρόνον τὴν ἀπρα-
γίαν καὶ κατάπληξιν τῶν στρατοπέδων μὴ παρὰ τὴν
tῶν δυνάμεων ἀποδείξειν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ
3 προεστῶτος εὐλάβειαν γεγονέναι. διὸ καὶ τὸν μὲν
Φάβιον ἠτιῶντο καὶ κατεμέμφοντο πάντες ὡς ἀτόλ-
μως χρώμενον τοῖς καυρῶις, τὸν δὲ Μάρκον ἐπὶ το-
σοῦτον ὑψοῦν διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡστε τὸτε γενέσθαι
4 τὸ μηδέποτε γεγονός· αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ κάκεινον
κατέστησαν, πεπεισμένοι ταχέως αὐτὸν τέλος ἐπι-
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in number, came to succour him. He now regained a little confidence, and sallying from the camp drew up his troops a short distance in front of it and with difficulty averted the impending peril. Minucius, after killing many of the enemy in the engagement at the camp and still more throughout the country, now retired, but with great hopes for the future, and next day, on the Carthaginians evacuating their camp, occupied it himself. For Hannibal, fearful lest the Romans, finding the camp at Geronium deserted at night, should capture his baggage and stores, decided to return and encamp there again. Henceforth the Carthaginians were much more cautious and guarded in foraging, while the Romans on the contrary, foraged with greater confidence and temerity.

103. People in Rome, when an exaggerated account of this success reached the city, were overjoyed, partly because this change for the better relieved their general despondency, and in the next place because they inferred that the former inaction and disheartenment of their army was not the result of any want of courage in the soldiers, but of the excessive caution of the general. All therefore found fault with Fabius, accusing him of not making a bold use of his opportunities, while Marcus’s reputation rose so much owing to this event that they took an entirely unprecedented step, investing him like the Dictator with absolute power, in the belief that he would very soon put an end to the
θήσειν τοῖς πράγμασιν· καὶ δὴ δύο δικτάτορες ἐγε-γόνεσαν ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις, ὁ πρῶτον οὖν·
5 ποτε συνεβεβήκει παρὰ 'Ῥωμαίοις. τῷ δὲ Μάρκῳ
dιασαφηθείσης τῆς τε τοῦ πλήθους εὐνοίας καὶ τῆς
παρὰ τοῦ δήμου δεδομένης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶ, διπλασίως
παρωρμηθῆ πρὸς τὸ παραβάλλειαι καὶ κατατομάν
6 τῶν πολεμίων. ἦκε δὲ καὶ Φάβιος ἐπὶ τὰς δυνάμεις
οὐδὲν ἠλλωμένον ὑπὸ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἐτὶ δὲ
βεβαιότερον μένων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διαλύψεως.
7 θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Μάρκον ἐκπεφυσμένον καὶ πρὸς
πάντες ἀντιφιλονικοῦντα καὶ καθόλου πολὺν ὑντα
πρὸ τῷ διακινδυνεῖαι, αἱρέσων αὐτῶ προὔτεινε
τοιαύτην, ἡ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχὴν ἡ διελόμενον τὰς
dυνάμεις χρήσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις στρατοπέδους κατὰ
8 τὴν αὐτοῦ προάρσεων. τοῦ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἁσμένως
dεξαμένου τὸν μερισμόν, διελόμενοι τὸ πλήθος χω-
ρίς ἐστρατοπέδευσαν ἀλλήλων, ἀπέχοντες ὡς δώδεκα
104 στάδιον. Ἀννίβας δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄκουσὼν τῶν ἁλισκο-
μένων αἰχμαλώτων, τὰ δὲ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν πραττο-
μένων ὤνει τὴν τε τῶν ἡγεμόνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους
φιλοτιμίαν καὶ τὴν ὀρμήν καὶ τὴν φιλοδοξίαν τοῦ
2 Μάρκου. διόπερ οὐ καθ' αὐτοῦ, πρὸς αὐτοῦ δὲ
νομίσας εἶναι τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους,
ἐγνετο περὶ τὸν Μάρκον, σπουδάζων τὴν τόλμαν
ἀφελέσθαι καὶ προκαταλαβεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὀρμήν.
3 οὖσας δὲ τίνος ὑπεροχῆς μεταξὺ τῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς
τοῦ Μάρκου στρατοπεδείας δυναμένης ἐκατέρους
βλάπτειν, ἐπεβάλετο καταλαβεῖν ταύτην. σαφώς δὲ
γινώσκων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος κατορθώματος ὁτι
παρέσται βοηθῶν ἐκ χειρὸς πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπι-
4 βολῆν, ἐπινοεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ. τῶν γὰρ τόπων τῶν
περὶ τὸν λόφον ὑπαρχόντων ψιλῶν μὲν, πολλὰς δὲ
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war. So two Dictators were actually appointed for the same field of action, a thing which had never before happened at Rome. When Minucius was informed of his popularity at home and the office given him by the people's decree, he grew twice as eager to run risks and take some bold action against the enemy. Fabius now returned to the army wholly unchanged by recent circumstances, and adhering even more firmly than before to his original determination. Observing that Minucius was unduly elated and was jealously opposing him in every way and altogether strongly disposed to risk a battle, he offered for his choice, either that he should be in full command on alternate days, or that he should take half the army and use his own legions in any way he thought fit. Minucius having readily agreed to the division of the army, they divided it and encamped apart at a distance of about twelve stades from each other. 104. Hannibal, partly from what he heard from prisoners and partly from what he saw was going on, was aware of the rivalry of the two generals and of Marcus' impulsiveness and ambition. Considering, then, that the present circumstances of the enemy were not against him but in his favour, he turned his attention to Minucius, being anxious to put a stop to his venturesomeness and anticipate his offensive. There was a small eminence between his own camp and that of Minucius capable of being used against either of them, and this he decided to occupy. Well knowing that owing to his previous achievement Minucius would instantly advance to frustrate this project, he devised the following stratagem. The ground round the hill was treeless
παντοδαπᾶς ἔχοντων περικλάσεις καὶ κοιλότητας, ἐξέπεμψε τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς ἐπιτηδειοτάτας ὑποβολὰς ἀνὰ διακοσίους καὶ τριακοσίους, πεντακοσίους μὲν ἱππεῖς, ψυλός δὲ καὶ πεζός τοὺς πάντας εἰς πεντακισχίλιους. ἦν δὲ μὴ πρῶ κατοπτευθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς προνομᾶς ἐκπορευομένων, ἀμα τῷ διαναγάζειν κατελάμβανε τοῖς εὐζώνοις τὸν λόφον.
6 ὁ δὲ Μάρκος θεωρῶν τὸ γινόμενον, καὶ νομίζοντες ἐρμαῖον εἶναι, παραντίκα μὲν ἐξαπέστειλε τοὺς ψυλόσ, κελεύσας ἀγωνίζεσθαι καὶ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τοῦ τόπου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἱππεῖς, ἔξῆς δὲ τούτοις κατόπιν αὐτὸς ἔγει συνεχὴ τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὀπλῶν, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐκάστων ποιούμενος παραπλησίαν τὸν χειρισμὸν, ἀρτί δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας διαφανοῦσης καὶ πάντων ταῖς τε διανοίασι καὶ τοῖς ὀμμασὶ περιεσπαθμένων περὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ γεωλόφῳ κυνδυνεύσας, ἀνύποπτος ἢν ἢ τῶν ἐνεδρεύοντων ὑποβολῆ. τοῦ δ' Ἀννίβου συνεχῶς μὲν ἐπαποστέλλοντος τοὺς ἐν τῷ λόφῳ τοὺς βοηθήσοντας, ἔπομενος δὲ κατὰ πόδας αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, ταχέως συνέβη καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συμπεσεῖν ἄλληλοις. οὐ γενομένου, καὶ πιεζομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων εὐζώνων ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἱππέων, ἀμα μὲν οὕτω καταφεύγοντες εἰς τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὀπλῶν ἄνδρον ἐποίουν, ἀμα δὲ τοῦ συνθήματος ἀποδοθέντος τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις, πανταχόθεν ἐπιφαινομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων τούτων, οὐκέτι περὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους μόνον, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάν τὸ στράτευμα μέγας κύλινδος συνειστήκει τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον Φάβιος, θεωρῶν τὸ γινόμενον καὶ διαγωνισάς μὴ σφαλώσι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἔξῆς τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει τοῖς κυνδυ-
but had many irregularities and hollows of every description in it, and he sent out at night to the most suitable positions for ambuscade, in bodies of two or three hundred, five hundred horse and about five thousand light-armed and other infantry. In order that they should not be observed in the early morning by the Romans who were going out to forage, he occupied the hill with his light-armed troops as soon as it was daybreak. Minucius, seeing this and thinking it a favourable chance, sent out at once his light infantry with orders to engage the enemy and dispute the position. Afterwards he sent his cavalry too and next followed in person leading his legions in close order, as on the former occasion, operating exactly in the same manner as then. 105. The day was just dawning, and the minds and eyes of all were engrossed in the battle on the hill, so that no one suspected that the ambuscade had been posted. Hannibal kept constantly sending reinforcements to his men on the hill, and when he very shortly followed himself with his cavalry and the rest of his force, the cavalry on both sides soon came into action. Upon this, the Roman light infantry were forced off the field by the numbers of the Carthaginian horse, and, falling back on the legions, threw them into confusion, while at the same time, on the signal being given to those lying in ambush, they appeared from all directions and attacked, upon which not only the Roman light infantry but their whole army found itself in a most perilous position. It was now that Fabius, seeing the state of matters and seriously fearing a total disaster, came up in haste with his own army to
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6 νεύοντι. ταχύ δὲ συνεγγύσαντος αὐτοῦ, πάλιν ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ Ῥωμαίοι, καίπερ λευκότες ἤδη τὴν ὄλην τάξιν, αὖθις ἀθροιζόμενοι περὶ τὰς σημαίας ἀνεχώρουν καὶ κατέφευγον ύπὸ τὴν τούτων ἀσφαλείαν, πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπολελυκότες τῶν εὐξώνων, ἐτὶ δὲ πλείους ἐκ τῶν ταγμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀρνίβαν καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἀκεραιότητα καὶ σύνταξιν τῶν παραβεβοηθηκότων στρατοπέδων, ἀπέστησαν τοῦ διωγμοῦ καὶ τῆς μάχης. τοῖς μὲν οὖν παρ᾿ αὐτὸν γενομένου τὸν κίνδυνον ἦν ἐναργῆς ὅτι διὰ μὲν τὴν Μάρκου τόλμαν ἀπόλωλε τὰ ὀλα, διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐλαβείαν τοῦ Φαβίου σέσωσται καὶ πρὸ τοῦ καὶ νῦν· τοῖς δ᾿ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμη τότε ἐγένετο φανερὸν ὁμολογουμένως τὸ διαφέρει στρατιωτικῆς προπετείας καὶ κενοδοξίας στρατηγικῆ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμὸς ἔστως καὶ νοῦν·

10 εχῆς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαίοι, διδαχθέντες ύπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ βαλόμενοι χάρακα πάλιν ἑνα πάντες, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαν ὁμόσε, καὶ λοιπὸν ἦδη Φαβίω προσείχον τὸν νοῦν καὶ τοὺς ύπὸ τοῦτο

11 παραγγελλομένοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸν μὲν μεταξῦ τόπον τοῦ βουνοῦ καὶ τῆς σφετέρας παρεμβολῆς διετάφρευσαν, περὶ δὲ τὴν κορυφῆν τοῦ καταληθέντος λόφου χάρακα περιβαλόντες καὶ φυλακὴν ἐπιστήσαντες λοιπὸν ἦδη πρὸς τὴν χειμασίαν ἀσφαλῶς ἡτοιμάζοντο.

106 Τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀρχαισμῶν ὀρας συνεγγύσασθαι, εἰληφθεὶν στρατηγοὺς οἱ Ῥωμαίοι Λεύκων Ἀἰμίλιον καὶ Γάιον Τερέντιον. ὡς κατασταθέντων οἱ μὲν δικτάτορες ἀπέθεντο τὴν ἄρχῃν, οἱ δὲ προὔπαρχον τε ὑπατοῖ, Γναίων Σερούλιος καὶ Μάρκος Ῥηγοῦ λος ὦ μετὰ τὴν Φλαμνίον τελευτὴν ἐπικατασταθεῖς, 258
assist. On his approach the Romans again plucked up courage, although they had now entirely broken their ranks, and collecting round the standards retreated and took refuge under cover of Fabius' force after losing many of their light-armed troops, but still more of the legionaries and the very best men among them. Hannibal, being afraid of the legions, which, quite fresh and in admirable order, had come to the help of their comrades, abandoned the pursuit and brought the battle to a close. To those who were actually present at the action it was evident that all was lost by the rashness of Minucius, and that now, as on previous occasions, all had been saved by the caution of Fabius. And to those in Rome it became indisputably clear how widely the foresight, good sense, and calm calculation of a general differ from the recklessness and bravado of a mere soldier. The Romans, however, had received a practical lesson, and again fortifying a single camp, joined their forces in it, and in future paid due attention to Fabius and his orders. The Carthaginians dug a trench between the hill and their own camp, and erecting a stockade round the hill, which was now in their hands, and placing a garrison on it, made their preparations henceforth for the winter undisturbed.

106. The time for the consular elections was now 216 B.C. approaching, and the Romans elected Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro. On their appointment, the Dictators laid down their office, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who had been appointed after the death of Flaminius—were
τότε προειρισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀντιστράτηγοι, καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθριοι ἐξουσίαν, ἔχειρίζον κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γνώμην 3 τὰ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον, βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τῆς συγκλήτου, τὸ μὲν ἔλλειπον πλῆθος ἔτι τῶν στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν ὀλην ἐπίβο-
4 λὴν παραχρῆμα καταγράψαντες ἐξαπέστειλαν, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον διεσάφησαν ὁλοσχέρη μὲν κίν-
δυνον κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον συνιστασθαι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοὺ ὡς ἑνεργοτάτους ποιεῖ-
σθαί καὶ συνεχεστάτους χάριν τοῦ γυμνάζειν καὶ παρασκευάζειν εὐθαρσεῖς τοὺς νέους πρὸς τοὺς ὀλο-
5 σχερεῖς ἁγώνας, τῷ καὶ τὰ πρότερον αὐτοῖς συμ-
πτώματα δοκείν οὐχ ἡκιστα γεγονέναι διὰ τὸ νεο-
συλλόγοις καὶ τελέως ἀνασκήτους κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς 6 στρατοπέδοις. αὐτοὶ δὲ Λεύκιον μὲν Ποστούμιον, ἐξαπέλεκν ὄντα στρατηγὸν, στρατόπεδων δόντες εἰς Γαλατίαν ἐξαπέστειλαν, βουλομένου ποιεῖν ἀντι-
περίσπασμα τοῖς Κελτοῖς τοῖς μετ᾽ Ἀννίβου στρα-
7 τευμένοις. πρόνοιαν δ᾽ ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τῆς ἀνα-
κομιδῆς τοῦ παραχεμαζοντος ἐν τῷ Λυποβαίῳ στό-
lου, διεπέμψαντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ στρατηγοῖς 8 πάντα τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. οὐτοὶ μὲν ὀνὴν περὶ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τὰς λούτας ἐγίνοντο παρα-
9 σκευὰς ἐπιμελῶς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον, κομι-
σάμενοι τὰς παρὰ τῶν ὑπάτων ἔντολας, πάντα τὰ 10 κατὰ μέρος ἔχειρίζον κατὰ τὴν ἑκείνων γνώμην· διὸ καὶ τὸ πλεῖω γράφεσιν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν παρῆσομεν. ὁλο-
σχερεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἡ μνήμης ἄξιον ἄπλως οὔδεν ἐπρά-
χθη διὰ τὴν ἐντολὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καιροῦ περὶ-
11 στασιν, ἀκροβολισμοὶ δὲ μόνον καὶ συμπλοκαὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐγίνοντο πλείους, ἐν αἰς εὐδοκίμουν οἱ προ-
260
invested with proconsular authority by Aemilius, and taking command in the field directed the operations of their forces as they thought fit. Aemilius after consulting with the Senate at once enrolled the soldiers still wanting to make up the total levy and dispatched them to the front, expressly ordering Servilius on no account to risk a general engagement, but to skirmish vigorously and uninterruptedly so as to train the lads and give them confidence for a general battle; for they thought the chief cause of their late reverses lay in their having employed newly raised and quite untrained levies. The Consuls also gave a legion to the Praetor Lucius Postumius, and sent him to Cisalpine Gaul to create a diversion among those Celts who were serving with Hannibal, they took measures for the return of the fleet that was wintering at Lilybaeum and sent the generals in Spain all the supplies of which they had need. The Consuls and Senate were thus occupied with these and other preparations, and Servilius, on receiving orders from the Consuls, conducted all petty operations as they directed. I shall therefore not make further mention of these, for nothing decisive or noteworthy was done owing to these orders and owing to circumstances, but only numerous skirmishes and minor engagements took place in which the Roman commanders had the
εστῶτες τῶν Ῥωμαίων· καὶ γὰρ ἄνδρωδῳς καὶ νοον- 
εχῶς ἔδοκοιν ἐκαστὰ χειρίζειν.

107 Τὸν μὲν οὖν χειμῶνα καὶ τὴν ἔαρινὴν ὄραν δι-
ἐμειναν ἀντιστρατοπεδεύουντες ἀλλήλους· ἦδη δὲ πα-
ραδιδόντος τοῦ καρποῦ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐπετείων καρ-
πῶν χορηγίαν, ἐκίνη τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸ
2 Γερούνιον χάρακος Ἀννίβας. κρίνων δὲ συμφέρειν
τὸ κατὰ πάντα τρόπων ἀναγκάσαι μάχεσθαι τοὺς
πολεμίους, καταλαμβάνει τὴν τῆς Κάννης προσαγο-
3 ρενομένης πόλεως ἄκραν. εἰς γὰρ ταύτην συν-
έβαινε τὸν τε σῖτον καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς χορηγίας ἄθροι-
ζεσθαι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐκ τῶν περὶ Καννᾶς τόπων·
ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἀδεί πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατό-
4 πεδον παρακομίζεσθαι. τὴν μὲν οὖν πόλιν ἐτί πρό-
τερον συνέβαινε κατεσκάθαι· τῆς παρασκευῆς δὲ
καὶ τῆς ἄκρας τότε καταληφθεῖσας, οὐ μικρὰν συν-
έπεσε ταραχὴν γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυ-
5 νάμεις· οὐ γὰρ μόνον διὰ τὰς χορηγίας ἐδυσχρη-
στοῦντ’ ἐπὶ τῷ κατελήφθαι τὸν προειρημένον τό-
pον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὴν πέριξ εὐφύσος κεῖ-
6 σθαί χώραν. πέμπτοντες οὖν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην συν-
εχῶς ἐπυπάνων τί δεὶ ποιεῖν, ὡς εἶν ἐγνώσωι
τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐ δυνησόμενοι φυγομαχεῖν, τῆς
μὲν χώρας καταφθειρομένης, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων
7 πάντων μετεώρων ὄντων ταῖσ διανοίας. οἱ δ’ ἐβου-
λεύσαντο μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἐπισχεῖν ἐτὶ διεσά-
8 φήσαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπάτους ἔξαπέστελλον. συν-
έβαινε δὲ πάντας εἰς τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀποβλέπειν καὶ
πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπερείδεσθαι τὰς πλείστας ἑλπίδας
diὰ τε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ βίου καλοκάγαθιαν καὶ
diὰ τὸ μικροῖς πρότερον χρόνοις ἄνδρωδῶς ἀμα καὶ
262
advantage, their conduct of the campaign being generally thought to have been both courageous and skilful.

107. All through the winter and spring the two armies remained encamped opposite each other, and it was not until the season was advanced enough for them to get supplies from the year’s crops that Hannibal moved his forces out of the camp near Geronium. Judging that it was in his interest to compel the enemy to fight by every means in his power, he seized on the citadel of a town called Cannae, in which the Romans had collected the corn and other supplies from the country round Canusium, conveying hence to their camp from time to time enough to supply their wants. The city itself had previously been razed, but the capture now of the citadel and stores caused no little commotion in the Roman army; for they were distressed at the fall of the place not only owing to the loss of their supplies, but because it commanded the surrounding district. They continued, therefore, to send constant messages to Rome asking how they should act, stating that if they approached the enemy they would not be able to escape a battle, as the country was being pillaged and the temper of all the allies was uncertain. The Senate decided to give the enemy battle, but they ordered Servilius to wait, and dispatched the Consuls to the front. It was to Aemilius that the eyes of all were directed; and they placed their chiefest hope in him, owing to his general high character, and because a few years
συμφερόντως δοκεῖν κεχειρικέναι τὸν πρὸς Ἰλλυ-ριοῦς πόλεμον. προέθεντο δὲ στρατοπέδοις ὁκτὼ διακινδυνεύειν, δὲ πρότερον οὐδέποτ’ ἐγεγόνει παρὰ Ρωμαίοις, ἐκάστου τῶν στρατοπέδων ἔχοντος ἂν-δρας εἰς πεντακισχιλίους χωρίς τῶν συμμάχων. 10 Ρωμαίοι γὰρ, καθ’ ποι καὶ πρότερον εἰρήκαμεν, ἀεὶ ποτε τέτταρα στρατόπεδα προχειρίζονταί. τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον πεζοῦς μὲν λαμβάνει περὶ τετρακι-σιλίους, ἵππεις δὲ διακοσίους. ἔπαυ δὲ τις ὀλοσχε-ροστέρα προφαίνητα χρεία, τοὺς μὲν πεζοὺς ἐν ἔκαστῳ στρατόπεδῳ ποιούσι περὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τοὺς ἵππους δὲ συμμάχων τὸ μὲν τῶν πεζῶν πλῆθος πάρισον ποιοῦσι τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἵππων ὡς ἐπίπαν τριπλά-σιον. τοῦτω δὲ τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ δύο στρατόπεδα δόντες ἐκατέρω τῶν ὑπάτων 14 ἔξαποστέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις. καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖστους ἀγώνας δι’ ἔνδος ὑπάτου καὶ δύο στρατοπέδων καὶ τοῦ προειρημένου πλῆθους τῶν συμ-μάχων κρίνουσι, σπανίως δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς ἕνα καίρον 15 καὶ πρὸς ἑνα χρόνον κίνδυνον. τότε γε μὴν οὕτως ἐκπλαγεῖς ἢςαν καὶ κατάφοβοι τὸ μέλλων ὡς ὑν μόνον τέτταρις, ἄλλ’ ὁκτὼ στρατόπεδοι Ῥωμαϊκοῖς ὀμοῦ προήρητο διακινδυνεύειν. 108 Διὸ καὶ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς περὶ τῶν Ἀιμί-λιων, καὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν θέντες τὸ μέγεθος τῶν εἰς ἐκάστερον τὸ μέρος ἀποβησομένων ἐκ τῆς μάχης, ἐξαπέστειλαν, ἐντελόμενοι σὺν καὶ ἐκάνον τά 2 ὀλα γενναίως καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἄξιως. οἱ καὶ παρα-γενόμενοι πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ συναθροίσαντες τὰ πλήθη τῆς τε τῆς συγκλήτου γνώμην διεσά-φησαν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ παρεκάλουν τὰ πρέποντα 264
previously he was thought to have conducted the Illyrian war with courage and advantage to the state. They decided to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans, each legion consisting of about five thousand men apart from the allies. For, as I previously explained, they invariably employ four legions, each numbering about four thousand foot and two hundred horse, but on occasions of exceptional gravity they raise the number of foot in each legion to five thousand and that of the cavalry to three hundred. They make the number of the allied infantry equal to that of the Roman legions, but, as a rule, the allied cavalry are three times as numerous as the Roman. They give each of the Consuls half of the allies and two legions when they dispatch them to the field, and most of their wars are decided by one Consul with two legions and the above number of allies, it being only on rare occasions that they employ all their forces at one time and in one battle. But now they were so alarmed and anxious as to the future that they decided to bring into action not four legions but eight.

108. Therefore after exhorting Aemilius and putting before his eyes the magnitude of the results which in either event the battle would bring about, they dispatched him with orders to decide the issue, when the time came, bravely and worthily of his country. On reaching the army he assembled the soldiers and conveyed to them the decision of the Senate, addressing them in a manner befitting the
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τοῖς παρεστῶσι καυροῖς, ἐξ αὐτοπαθείας τού Δευ-
3 κὼν διατιθημένου τοὺς λόγους. ἤν δὲ τὰ πλείστα
tῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τοῦτον τείνοντα τὸν νοῦν, τὸν
ὕπερ τῶν νεωστὶ γεγονότων συμπτωμάτων. Ὁδε
γὰρ καὶ τῇδε που συνέβαινε διατετράφθαι καὶ
4 προσδείσθαι παρανέσεως τοὺς πολλοὺς. διόπερ
ἐπειράτο συνιστάνειν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἐν ταῖς προγεγέ-
νημέναις μάχαις ἐλαττωμάτων οὕς ἐν οὐδὲ δεύτε-
ρον, καὶ πλείω δὲ ἀν εὗροι τις αὐτία, δὴ ὁ τοιοῦ-
5 τον αὐτῶν ἐξέβη τὸ τέλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νῦν καιρῶν
οὐδεμία λειπεται πρόβασις, ἐὰν ἀνδρεῖς ὄσοι, τοῦ
6 μὴ νικῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς. τότε μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τοὺς
ἡγεμόνας ἀμφότερος οὐδέποτε συνιστάναι τοῖς
στρατοπέδοις, οὔτε ταῖς δυνάμεσι κεχρησθαι γεγε-
νυμασμέναις, ἀλλὰ νεοσυλλόγους καροταῖς παντῶς
7 δεινοῦ· τὸ τε μέγιστον, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοεῖσθαι
παρ' αὐτοῖς πρότερον τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους
ὡστε σχεδὸν μηδ' ἐωρακότας τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς
παρατάττεσθαι καὶ συγκαταβαίνειν εἰς τοὺς ὀλο-
8 σχερεῖς κυνήγουν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῶν Τρεβίαν
ποταμὸν σφαλέντες, ἐκ Σικελίας τῇ προτεραίᾳ
παραγενθέντες, ἀμα τῷ φωτὶ τῇ κατὰ πόδας
9 ἡμέρα παρετάξαντο· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ Τυρρηνίαν
ἀγωνισμένοις οὓς οἰον πρότερον, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν
αὐτῇ τῇ μάχῃ συνιδεῖν ἐξεγένετο τοὺς πολεμίους
10 διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀέρα γενόμενον σύμπτωμα. νῦν γε
μὴν πάντα τάναντια τοῖς προειρημένοις υπάρχει.
109 πρῶτον γὰρ ἡμέις ἀμφότεροι πάρεσμεν οὐ μόνον
αὐτοὶ κοινωνῆσοντες ἦμιν τῶν κυνήγουν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον ἔτους ἀρχοντὰς ἐτοί-
μους παρεσκευάκαμεν πρὸς τὸ μένειν καὶ μετέχειν
2 τῶν αὐτῶν ἀγώνων. ἡμεῖς γε μὴν οὐ μόνον ἐω-
266
occasion and in words that evidently sprang from his heart. The greater part of his speech was devoted to accounting for the former reverses, for it was particularly the impression created by these that made the men disheartened and in need of encouragement. He attempted therefore to impress upon them, that while not one or two but many causes could be found owing to which the previous battles resulted in defeat, there was at present, if they behaved like men, no reason at all left why they should not be victorious. "For then," he said, "the two Consuls never gave battle with their united armies, nor were the forces they disposed of well trained, but raw levies who had never looked danger in the face. But the most important consideration of all is that our troops were then so ignorant of the enemy that one might almost say they ventured on decisive battles with them without ever having set eyes on them. Those who were worsted at the Trebia had only arrived from Sicily the day before, a and at daybreak on the following morning went into action, while those who fought in Etruria not only had not seen their enemies before, but could not even see them in the battle itself owing to the condition of the atmosphere. But now all the circumstances are precisely the opposite of what they were then. 109. For in the first place we, the Consuls, are both present, and are not only about to share your perils ourselves but have given you also the Consuls of last year to stand by you and participate in the struggle. And you your-

a This is not consistent with the statement in Chapter 69.
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ράκατε τοὺς καθοπλισμούς, τὰς τάξεις, τὰ πλήθη τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαχόμενοι μόνον οὐ καθ' ἐκάστην ἥμεραν δεύτερον ἔναυτὸν ἤδη διατε-3 λείτε. πάντων οὖν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντίως ἐχόν-7 των ταῖς προγεγενημέναις μάχαις εἰκός καὶ τὸ τέλος 4 ἐναντίον ἐκβήσεσθαι τοῦ νῦν ἀγώνος. καὶ γὰρ ἄτο-7 πον, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀδύνατον, ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοῖς ἵσσους πρὸς ἰσος συμ-7 πίπτοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐπικρατεῖν, ὅμοι δὲ πάντας 5 παρατάξαμενοι, πλείουσ δύνας ἡ διπλασίας τῶν ἐ7 ἐπικρατηθήναι. διόπερ, ὥς ἄνδρες, πάν-10 τῶν ὑμῖν παρεσκευασμένων πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, ἐνὸς προσδεῖται τὰ πράγματα, τῆς ὑμετέρας βουλήσεως 5 καὶ προθυμίας, ὑπὲρ ἢς οὐδὲ παρακαλεῖσθαι πλεῖω 6 πρέπειν ὑμῖν ὑπολαμβάνω. τοῖς μὲν γε μισθοῦ 9 παρὰ ται στρατευμένοις ἴ τοῖς κατὰ συμμαχίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν πέλας μέλλουσι κινδυνεύειν, οἷς κατ' αὐ-7 τὸν τὸν ἀγώνα καιρός ἐστὶ δεινότατος, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων βραχείαν ἔχει διαφοράν, ἀναγκαίος 7 ὅ τῆς παρακλήσεως γίνεται τρόπος: οἷς δὲ, καθά-10 περ ὑμῖν νῦν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑτέρων, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων ὁ κίν-11 δυνος συνέστηκε, καὶ πολλαπλασία τὰ μετα ταῦτα 13 συμβαίνοντα τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἢ 14 κινδύνων, ὑπομνήσεως μόνον, παρακλήσεως δ' οὐ 12 προσδεί. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βούλωτο μέλισσα μὲν 9 νικᾶν ἀγωνιζόμενος, εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτ' εἴῃ δυνατόν, 7 τεθνάναι πρόσθεν μαχόμενος ἡ ζωὴν ἐπιδεῖν τὴν τῶν 8 προειρημένων ὑβριν καὶ καταφθοράν; διόπερ, ὥς 11 ἄνδρες, χωρὶς τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγομένων, αὐτοὶ λαμ-268
selves have not only seen how the enemy are armed, how they dispose their forces, and what is their strength, but for two years now you have been fighting with them nearly every day. As, therefore, all the conditions are now the reverse of those in the battles I spoke of, we may anticipate that the result of the present battle will likewise be the opposite. For it would be a strange or rather indeed impossible thing, that after meeting your enemies on equal terms in so many separate skirmishes and in most cases being victorious, now when you confront them with your united forces and out-number them by more than two to one you should be beaten. Therefore, my men, every measure having been taken to secure victory for you, one thing alone is wanting, your own zeal and resolution, and as to this it is not, I think, fitting that I should exhort you further. For those who in some countries serve for hire or for those who are about to fight for their neighbours by the terms of an alliance, the moment of greatest peril is during the battle itself, but the result makes little difference to them, and in such a case exhortation is necessary. But those who like you are about to fight not for others, but for yourselves, your country, and your wives and children, and for whom the results that will ensue are of vastly more importance than the present peril, require not to be exhorted to do their duty but only to be reminded of it. For what man is there who would not wish before all things to conquer in the struggle, or if this be not possible, to die fighting rather than witness the outrage and destruction of all that is dearest to him? Therefore, my men, even without these words of mine, fix your
βάνοντες πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λείπεσθαι καὶ τοῦ νικάν διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ συνεξακολουθοῦντα τοὺς, οὕτως ἐαυτοὺς παραστῆσαθε πρὸς τὴν μάχην ὡς τῆς πατρίδος οὐ κινδυνεύοντος νῦν αὗτοις τοῖς
10 στρατοπέδους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅλοις. τί γὰρ ἐτί προσθείσα
tois ὑποκειμένοις, ἐὰν ἄλλως πως τὰ παρόντα κρῆτι,
11 περιγενήσεται τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐκ ἔχει. πάσαι γὰρ τὴν ἀὐτῆς προθυμίαν καὶ δύναμιν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀπῆρεισταὶ, καὶ πάσαις τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχει τῆς σωτηρίας ἐν ὑμῖν.
12 δὲν ὑμεῖς αὐτὴν μὴ διαφεύγῃτε νῦν, ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε
μὲν τῇ πατρίδι τὰς ἀρμοζοῦσας χάριτας, φανερὸν δὲ
πάσων ἀνθρώπων ποιῆσαι διότι καὶ τὰ πρότερον
ἐλαττώματα γέγονεν οὐ διὰ τὸ Ῥωμαίους χείρος
ἀνδρας εἰναι Καρχηδονίων, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀπειρίαν τῶν
τότε μαχομένων καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν περιστά-
13 σεις. τότε μὲν οὗν ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτα παρακαλέσας
ὁ Δεύκιος διαφῆκε τοὺς πολλοὺς.

110 Τῇ δὲ ἐπαύριον ἀναζεύξαντες ἤγον τὴν δύναμιν
οὐ τοὺς πολεμίους ἥκουν στρατοπεδεύειν. δευτε-
ρατοί δὲ ἐπιβαλόντες παρενέβαλον, περὶ πεντήκοντα
2 σταδίων ἀποσχόντες τῶν πολεμίων. ὁ μὲν οὗν Δεύ-
κιος, συνθεασάμενος ἐπιπέδους καὶ ψιλοὺς ὄντας
τοὺς πέρικ τόπους, οὐκ ἐφ' ἐδών συμβάλλειν ἵππο-
κρατούντων τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλ' ἐπισπάσθαι καὶ
προάγειν μᾶλλον εἰς τόπους τοιούτους ἐν ὦς τὸ
πλέον ἐσται διὰ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων ἢ μάχη.
3 τοῦ δὲ Γαίον διὰ τὴν ἀπερίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐναντίας
ὑπάρχοντος γνώμης, ἣν ἀμφισβήτησις καὶ δυσχρη-
stía περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, ὁ πάντων ἐστὶ σφαλερῶ
4 τατον. τῆς δ' ἡγεμονίας τῷ Γαίῳ καθηκοῦσας εἰς
τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν διὰ τὸ παρὰ μίαν ἐκ τῶν ἐθι-
σμῶν μεταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοὺς ὑπάτους, ἀνα-
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eyes on the difference between defeat and victory and on all that must follow upon either, and enter on this battle as if not your country's legions but her existence were at stake. For if the issue of the day be adverse, she has no further resources to overcome her foes; but she has centred all her power and spirit in you, and in you lies her sole hope of safety. Do not cheat her, then, of this hope, but now pay the debt of gratitude you owe to her, and make it clear to all men that our former defeats were not due to the Romans being less brave than the Carthaginians, but to the inexperience of those who fought for us then and to the force of circumstances.” Having addressed the troops in these words Aemilius dismissed them.

110. Next day the Consuls broke up their camp and advanced towards the place where they heard that of the enemy was. Coming in view of them on the second day, they encamped at a distance of about five miles from them. Aemilius, seeing that the district round was flat and treeless, was opposed to attacking the enemy there as they were superior in cavalry, his advice being to lure them on by advancing into a country where the battle would be decided rather by the infantry. As Terentius, owing to his inexperience, was of the contrary opinion, difficulties and disputes arose between the generals, one of the most pernicious things possible. Terentius was in command next day—the two Consuls according to the usual practice commanding on alternate days—and he broke up his camp and
στρατοπεδεύσας προήγε, βουλόμενος ἑγγίσαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένου καὶ κωλύσοντος τοῦ Δευκίου. ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἐν-ξώνους καὶ τοὺς ἐππείς ἀπήντα, καὶ προσπεσών ἔτι κατὰ πορείαν οὕσι παραδόξως συνεπλέκετο, καὶ πο- λῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐποιεῖτο θόρυβον. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἐπιφορὰν ἐδέξαντο, προθέμενοι τινὰς τῶν ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀκούσιας καὶ τοὺς ἐππείς ἐπαφέντες ἐπροτέρουν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην συμπλοκὴν διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν Καρ-χιδονίοις μηδὲν ἐφεδρεύειν ἀξιόλογον, τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀναμεμμένας τοῖς εὐξώνοις ὁμόσε κιν- δυνεύειν τινὰς στείρας. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐπιγενομένης νυκτὸς ἐχωρίσθησαν ἄπε ἀλλήλων, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῖς Καρχιδονίοις ἐκβάσης τῆς ἐπιθέσεως. 

8 εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύρων ὁ Δεύκιος, οὕτε μάχεσθαι κρίνων οὕτε μὴν ἀπάγειν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν στρατιὰν ἔτι δυνάμενος, τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ μέρεσι κατοπτροπέδευσε παρὰ τὸν Ἀὐφίδον καλούμενον ποταμόν, δς μόνον διαρρέει τὸν Ἀπεννίνον· τούτῳ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὄρος συνεχές, δὶ διείργη τὸν Ἡλίαν ὑφαίστει, τὰς μὲν εἰς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος, τὰς δ᾽ εἰς τὸν Ἀ- δρίαν. δ᾽ οὐρόντα συμβαίνει τὸν Ἀὐφίδον τὰς μὲν πηγὰς ἐχειν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν κλίμασι τῆς Ἡτταλίας, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἐκβολὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν· 

9 

tὸ τὲ τρίτων πέραν, ἀπὸ διαβάσεως πρὸς τὰς ἀνα- 

tολάς, ἐβάλετο χάρακα, τῆς μὲν ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς 

10 

perse δέκα σταδίους ἀποσχόμ, τῆς δὲ τῶν ὑπενα- 

tῶν μικρῆ πλείου, βουλόμενος διὰ τοῦτων προ- 

cαθῆσαι μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς πέραν παρεμβολῆς προ- 

11 


vομενοντῶν, ἐπικείσθαι δὲ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Καρχι-


dονίων. 


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advanced with the object of approaching the enemy in spite of Aemilius’s strong protests and efforts to prevent him. Hannibal met him with his light-armed troops and cavalry and surprising him while still on the march disordered the Romans much. They met, however, the first charge by advancing some of their heavy infantry, and afterwards sending forwards also their javelineers and cavalry got the better in the whole engagement, as the Carthaginians had no considerable covering force, while they themselves had some companies of their legions fighting mixed with the light-armed troops. The fall of night now made them draw off from each other, the attack of the Carthaginians not having had the success they hoped. Next day Aemilius, who neither judged it advisable to fight nor could now withdraw the army in safety, encamped with two-thirds of it on the bank of the river Aufidus. This is the only river which traverses the Apennines, the long chain of mountains separating all the Italian streams, those on one side descending to the Tyrrhenian sea and those on the other to the Adriatic. The Aufidus, however, runs right through these mountains, having its source on the side of Italy turned to the Tyrrhenian Sea and falling into the Adriatic. For the remaining portion of his army he fortified a position on the farther side of the river, to the east of the ford, at a distance of about two miles from his own camp and rather more from that of the enemy, intending thus to cover the foraging parties from his main camp across the river and harass those of the Carthaginians.
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111 Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν θεωρῶν ὅτι καλεῖ τὰ πράγματα μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, εὑραβόμενος δὲ ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, κρίνας προσδείσθαι παρακλήσεως τὸν καιρὸν συνήγε τοὺς 2 πολλοὺς. ἀθροισθέντων δὲ, περιβλέψας κελεύσας πάντας εἰς τοὺς πέριξ τόπους, ἤρετο τί μείζον εὑ-
ξασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ τοὺς παρόντας ἐδύναντο καιροῦς, δοθείσης αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας, τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ
tῶν πολεμίων ἰπποκρατοῦντας εἰς τοιούτως τόπως
3 διακριθῆναι περὶ τῶν ὠλων. πάντων δὲ τὸ ῥήθην
ἐπισημηναμένων διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν, Τοῦτου τοὐ-
γαροῦν, ἡφι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐχετε χάρων
ἐκεῖνοι γάρ ἡμῖν συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν νίκην εἰς
4 τοιουτοὺς τόπους ἠχασι τοὺς ἔχθροὺς. δεύτερον δὲ
ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους συνηγακά-
σαμεν, οὐ γάρ ἐτι δύνανται τοῦτο διαφυγεῖν, καὶ
μάχεσθαι προφανῶς εἰς τοῖς ἤμετέρους προτερήμασι.
5 τὸ δὲ παρακαλεῖν ύμᾶς νῦν διὰ πλειώνων εὐθαρ-
σεῖς καὶ προθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον οὐδα-
6 μός μοι δοκεῖ καθήκειν. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρως
dιέκεισθε τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μάχης, ἐδει τοῦτο
ποιεῖν, καὶ μεθ᾽ ὑποδειγμάτων ἐγώ πρὸς υμᾶς πολ-
7 λούσ διεθέμεν λόγους· ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχές τροσ
μάχαις τηλικαύταις ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου νεικήκατε
Ῥωμαίους, ποῖος ἄν ἤτο λόγος ὑμῖν ἵσχυρότερον
8 παραστήσαι θάρσος αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; διὰ μὲν οὖν
τῶν πρὸ τοῦ κινδύνων κεκρατήκατε τῆς χώρας καὶ
tῶν ἐκ ταύτης ἀγαθῶν κατὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐπαγγε-
λίας, ἀφευστοῦντων ἡμῶν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸς υμᾶς
εἰρημένοις· ὃ δὲ νῦν ἀγῶν ἐνέστηκε περὶ τῶν πό-
9 λεων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀγαθῶν. οὐ κρατήσαντες
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Hannibal now seeing that it was imperative for him to give battle and attack the enemy, and careful lest his soldiers might be disheartened by this recent reverse, thought that the occasion demanded some words of exhortation and called a meeting of the men. When they were assembled he bade them all look at the country round, and asked them what greater boon they could in their present circumstances crave from the gods, if they had their choice, than to fight the decisive battle on such ground, greatly superior as they were to the enemy in cavalry. As they could see this for themselves they all applauded and, he continued: “In the first place then thank the gods for this; for it is they who working to aid you to victory have led the enemy on to such ground, and next thank myself for compelling them to fight, a thing they can no longer avoid, and to fight here where the advantages are manifestly ours. I do not think it at all my duty to exhort you at further length to be of good heart and eager for the battle, and this is why. Then, when you had no experience of what a battle with the Romans was, this was necessary, and I often addressed you, giving examples, but now that you have beyond dispute beaten the Romans consecutively in three great battles, what words of mine could confirm your courage more than your own deeds? For by these former battles you have gained possession of the country and all its wealth, even as I promised you, and not a word I spoke but has proved true; and the coming battle will be for the cities and their wealth. Your victory will make
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κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε παραχρῆμα πάσης Ἰταλίας, ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῶν νῦν πόνων, γενόμενοι συμπάθης ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς Ἄρωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας, ἤγεμόνες ἄμα καὶ δεσπόται πάντων γενήσεσθε διὰ ταύτης τῆς μάχης. Διόπερ οὐκέτι λόγων, ἀλλ' ἔργων ἐστιν ἡ χρεία· θεῶν γὰρ βουλομένων ὡσον οὕτω βεβαιῶσαι ὑμῖν πέπεισμαι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τούτως παραπλῆσιν διαλεχθέεις, προθύμως αὐτὸν ἐπισημαίνομένου τοῦ πλῆθους, ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ὁμορρή αἵρηκε, καὶ παραχρῆμα κατ' εστратοπέδευσιν, ποιοῦμενος τὸν χάρακα παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πλευρὰν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τῇ μείζονι στρατοπεδεύσει τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

112 Τῇ δ' ἐχομένῃ περὶ παρασκευὴν καὶ θεραπείαν παρήγγειλε γίνεσθαι πάσιν. τῇ δ' ἐξῆς παρὰ τῶν ποταμοῦ ἐξῆταττε τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ δῆλος ἦν μᾶς χεσθαί σπείδων τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. ὦ δὲ Δεύκιος, δυσαρεστούμενος μὲν τοῖς τόποις, ὅρων δ' ὅτι ταχέως ἀναγκασθῆσονται μεταστρατοπεδέυειν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι διὰ τὸν πόρισμὸν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, εἶχε τὴν ἡσυχίαν, ἀσφαλισάμενος ταῖς ἐφεδρείαις τὰς παρεμβολάς. Ἀννίβας δὲ χρόνον ἰκανὸν μείνα, οὐδενὸς ἀντεξίόντος, τὴν μὲν λοιπὴν δύναμιν αὕτις εἰς χάρακα κατέστησε, τοὺς δὲ Νομάδας ἐπαφῆκε τοῖς ὑδρευμένοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλάττωσιν παρεμβολῆς. τῶν δὲ Νομάδων ἔως πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν χάρακα προσπίπτοντος καὶ διακωλυόντων τὴν ὑδρείαν, ὦ τε Γαίος ἐτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτοις παρωξύνετο, τὰ τε πλῆθη πρὸς τὸν κύδωνον ὁμορρὴ εἶχε καὶ δυσχερῶς ἐφέρε τὰς ὑπερβάθεις. 5 βαρύτατος γὰρ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὃ τοῦ μέλεως γίνεται χρόνος· ὅταν δ' ἀπαξ κριθῇ, ὃ τι ἂν 276
you at once masters of all Italy, and through this one battle you will be freed from your present toil, you will possess yourselves of all the vast wealth of Rome, and will be lords and masters of all men and all things. Therefore no more words are wanted, but deeds; for if it be the will of the gods I am confident that I shall fulfil my promises forthwith."

After he had spoken further to this effect, the army applauded him heartily, whereupon he thanked them and acknowledging their spirit dismissed them, and immediately pitched his camp, placing his entrenchments by the same bank of the river with the larger camp of the enemy.

112. Next day he ordered all his troops to look to their persons and their accoutrements, and on the day following he drew up his army along the river with the evident intention of giving battle as soon as possible. Aemilius was not pleased with the ground, and seeing that the Carthaginians would soon have to shift their camp in order to obtain supplies, kept quiet, after securing his two camps by covering forces. Hannibal, after waiting for some time without anyone coming out to meet him, withdrew again the rest of his army into their entrenchments, but sent out the Numidians to intercept the water-bearers from the lesser Roman camp. When the Numidians came up to the actual palisade of the camp and prevented the men from watering, not only was this a further stimulus to Terentius, but the soldiers displayed great eagerness for battle and ill brooked further delay. For nothing is more trying to men in general than prolonged suspense, but when the issue has once been decided we make
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a shift to endure patiently all that men regard as the depth of misery.

When the news reached Rome that the armies were encamped opposite each other and that engagements between the outposts occurred every day, there was the utmost excitement and fear in the city, as most people dreaded the result owing to their frequent previous reverses, and foresaw and anticipated in imagination the consequences of total defeat. All the oracles that had ever been delivered to them were in men’s mouths, every temple and every house was full of signs and prodigies, so that vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions and litanies pervaded the town. For in seasons of danger the Romans are much given to propitiating both gods and men, and there is nothing at such times in rites of the kind that they regard as unbecoming or beneath their dignity.

113. Next day it was Terentius’ turn to take the command, and just after sunrise he began to move his forces out of both camps. Crossing the river with those from the larger camp he at once put them in order of battle, drawing up those from the other camp next to them in the same line, the whole army facing south. He stationed the Roman cavalry close to the river on the right wing and the foot next to them in the same line, placing the maniples closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of each many times exceed its front. The allied horse he drew up on his left wing, and in front of the whole force at some
5 ξώνους ἐν ἀποστάσει. ἦσαν δὲ σὺν τοῖς συμμάχοις 
πεξῶν μὲν εἰς ὅκτω μυριάδας, ἵππεῖς δὲ μικρῷ

6 πλείους τῶν ἐξακισχιλίων. Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν 
αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν πολιτάβλητο τῆς δυνάμεως, 
τῶν ὑπό τοῦ χάρακος καὶ πε-

7 τετο τοῖς πολεμίωισ. ἔτιθει δ' ἐπ' αὐτὸν μὲν τῶν 
πολιτῶν, ἐπὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων, τοὺς Ἰβηρίως καὶ Κελ-

τούς ἰππεῖσ ἀντίους τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἰππεῖσιν, 
συνεχεῖς δὲ τούτως πεξῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεις τῶν ἐν 
τοῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς Λιβύουν, ἐξῆς δὲ τοῖς 
εἰρημένοις Ἰβηρίως καὶ Κελτοὺς. παρὰ δὲ τούτων 
τοῦ λυπόν μέρος ἐθηκε τῶν Λιβύουν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ

8 δεξιού κέρως ἐπέταξε τοὺς Νομαδικους ἰππεῖσ. ἐπεὶ 
δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ μίαν εὐθείαν ἐξέτευε, μετὰ ταῦτα 
λαβών τὰ μέσα τῶν Ἰβηρίων καὶ Κελτῶν τάγματα 
προῆγε, καὶ τάλλα τούτως ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον παρ-

9 ἱστανε ζυγοῦντα, μηνοεῖσες ποιών τὸ κύρτωμα καὶ 

λεπτύνων τὸ τούτων αὐτῶν σχῆμα, βουλόμενοι ἐφ-

εδρείας μὲν τάξιν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τοὺς Λίβυας αὐτῶν 

ἐχειν, προκυνδυνεύσαι δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρίως καὶ Κελτοῖς.

114 Ἔν δ' ὁ καθοπλισμὸς τῶν μὲν Λιβύων Ῥωμαϊ-

κός, οὗς πάντας Ἀννίβας τοῖς ἐκ τῆς προγεγεν-

2 μένης μάχης σκύλους ἐκλέξας κατακεκοσμήκει: τῶν 

δ' Ἰβηρίων καὶ Κελτῶν ὁ μὲν θυρεὸς ἦν παραπλῆ-

3 σιος, τὰ δὲ ξίφη τῆς ἐναντίαν εἰχε διαθέσει: τῆς 

μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐλαττόν τὸ κέντρα τῆς καταφορᾶ 

μίαν εἰχε χρεῖον τῆς ἐκ καταφορᾶς, καὶ ταύτην εὖ 

4 ἀποστάσεως. ἐναλλάξ ἐδὲ ταῖς σπείραις αὐτῶν 

παρατεταγμένων, καὶ τῶν μὲν Κεγτῶν γυμνῶν, τῶν 

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distance he placed his light-armed troops. The whole army, including the allies, numbered about eighty thousand foot and rather more than six thousand horse. Hannibal at the same time sent his slingers and pikemen over the river and stationed them in front, and leading the rest of his forces out of camp he crossed the stream in two places and drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left close to the river he placed his Spanish and Celtic horse facing the Roman cavalry, next these half his heavy-armed Africans, then the Spanish and Celtic infantry, and after them the other half of the Africans, and finally, on his right wing, his Numidian horse. After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of the Spaniards and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Spaniards and Celts.

114. The Africans were armed in the Roman fashion, Hannibal having equipped them with the choicest of the arms captured in the previous battles. The shields of the Spaniards and Celts were very similar, but their swords were entirely different, those of the Spaniards thrusting with as deadly effect as they cut, but the Gaulish sword being only able to slash and requiring a long sweep to do so. As they were drawn up in alternate companies, the Gauls naked and the Spaniards in short tunics bordered with purple, their national dress, they
Δ' Ἰβήρων λινοῖς περιπορφύρους χιτωνίσκοις κεκοσμημένων κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, ἔστησον ἀμα καὶ καταπληκτικὴν συνεβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν πρόσοψιν.

5 ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἵππικῶν πλήθος τὸ σύμπαν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς μυρίους, τὸ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν οὐ πολὺ πλείους τετρακισθήρων σὺν τοῖς Κελτοῖς.

6 εἴχε δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων Αἰμίλιος, τὸ δ' εὐώνυμον Γάιος, τὰ δὲ μέσα Μάρκος καὶ Γνάιος

7 οἱ τῷ πρῶτον ἔστησαν στρατηγοῦντες. τῶν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον Ἀσδρούβας εἶχε, τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν Ἀννων· ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μέσους αὐτὸς ἦν Ἀντι-βας, ἔχων μεθ' εαυτοῦ Μάγνωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν. βλε

115 πούσης δὲ τῆς μὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξεως πρὸς με-

3 βαρβαρῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἦν κατὰ νόμους εἰς ἀναστροφῆς καὶ μεταβολῆς ὁ κίνδυνος, ἀλλ' εἰσάπαξ συμπεσόν-

4 τε μάχην καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἱππῶν παλαιότερον καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἐποίουν οὕτως μάχην ἀληθὴν καὶ

βατινοῦντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἱππῶν. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκράτησαν

οἱ παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπέκτειναν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, πάντων ἐκθύμως καὶ

γενναίως διαγωνισμένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἦλαυνον παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν φονεύοντες καὶ

προσφέροντες τὰς χειρὰς ἀπαραίτητας, τότε δὴ τὰ

πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα διαδεξάμενα τοὺς εὐξώνους συν-

5 ἐπεσεῖν ἄλληλοις. ἐπὶ βραχὺ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ῥιβήρων

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presented a strange and impressive appearance. The Carthaginian cavalry numbered about ten thousand, and their infantry, including the Celts, did not much exceed forty thousand. The Roman right wing was under the command of Aemilius, the left under that of Terentius, and the centre under the Consuls of the previous year, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius. Hasdrubal commanded the Carthaginian left, Hanno the right, and Hannibal himself with his brother Mago the centre. Since the Roman army, as I said, faced south and the Carthaginians north, they were neither of them inconvenienced by the rising sun.

115. The advanced guards were the first to come into action, and at first when only the light infantry were engaged neither side had the advantage; but when the Spanish and Celtic horse on the left wing came into collision with the Roman cavalry, the struggle that ensued was truly barbaric; for there were none of the normal wheeling evolutions, but having once met they dismounted and fought man to man. The Carthaginians finally got the upper hand, killed most of the enemy in the mellay, all the Romans fighting with desperate bravery, and began to drive the rest along the river, cutting them down mercilessly, and it was now that the heavy infantry on each side took the place of the light-armed troops and met. For a time the Spaniards...
καὶ τῶν Κελτῶν ἔμενον αἱ τάξεις καὶ διεμάχοντο 
τοὺς Ῥωμαίοις γενναίως· μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τῶν βάρει 
θλιβόμενοι κλίνοντες ὑπεκόρουσι εἰς τούτῳ, λύ· 
6 σαντες τὸν μηνίσκον. αἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων σπειρα 
κατὰ τὴν ἐκθύμιαν ἐπομενα τούτους διέκοψαν ῥα· 
δίως τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων τάξιν, ἀτε δὴ τῶν μὲν 
Κελτῶν ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταγμάνων, αὐτοὶ δὲ πεπυ· 
kwokótis ἀπὸ τῶν κεράτων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ τὸν 
7 κυνδυνεύοντα τόπον· οὐ γὰρ ἀμα συνέβαλε τὰ κε· 
rata καὶ τὰ μέσα συμπίπτειν, ἀλλὰ πρῶτα τὰ μέσα, 
διὰ τὸ τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐν μηνοειδεῖ σχήματε τεταγ· 
mévou polv προπετωκέναι τῶν κεράτων, ἀτε τοῦ 
μηνίσκου τὸ κύρτωμα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἔχοντος. 
8 πλην ἐπομενοὶ γε τούτους οἱ Ῥωμαίοι καὶ συντρέ· 
χοντες ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ τὸν εἰκοντα τόπον τῶν πο· 
λεμίων οὕτως ἐπὶ πολύ προεπεσον ἄν, ἐκ ἐκατέρου 
τοῦ μέρους κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἐπιφανειας 
τοὺς Λίβνας αὐτῶν γενέσθαι τοὺς ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι 
9 καθοπλισμοῖς· ὡς οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος 
κλίναντες ἐπὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ τὴν ἐμβολὴν ἐκ δόρατος 
ποιοῦμενοι παρίσταντο παρά πλευρὰν τοῖς πολε· 
10 μίοις, οἱ δ᾿ ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνίμων ἐπὶ δόρυ ποιοῦ· 
μενοι τὴν κλίσιν ἐξ ἀσπίδος ἐπιπαρενεβάλλον, αὐ· 
tοῦ τοῦ πράγματος ὁ δὲον ἦν ποιεῖν ὑποδεικνύτο. 
11 ἐς οὔ συνέβη κατὰ τὴν Ἀννίβου πρόσων μέσους 
ἀποληφθῆναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ τῶν Λίβνων κατὰ 
12 τὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς παράπτωσιν. οὔτοι μὲν οὖν 
οὐκέτι φαλαγγηδὸν, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ στεί· 
ρασ στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων προσ· 
petwokótas ἐπουσουν τὴν μάχην.

116 Δεύκιος δε, καίπερ ὃν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ 
κέρατος καὶ μετασχὼν ἐπὶ τί τοῦ τῶν ἰππέων 
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and Celts kept their ranks and struggled bravely with the Romans, but soon, borne down by the weight of the legions, they gave way and fell back, breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples, pursuing them furiously, easily penetrated the enemy's front, since the Celts were deployed in a thin line while they themselves had crowded up from the wings to the centre where the fighting was going on. For the centres and wings did not come into action simultaneously, but the centres first, as the Celts were drawn up in a crescent and a long way in advance of their wings, the convex face of the crescent being turned towards the enemy. The Romans, however, following up the Celts and pressing on to the centre and that part of the enemy's line which was giving way, progressed so far that they now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks. Hereupon the Africans on the right wing facing to the left and then beginning from the right charged upon the enemy's flank, while those on the left faced to the right and dressing by the left, did the same, the situation itself indicating to them how to act. The consequence was that, as Hannibal had designed, the Romans, straying too far in pursuit of the Celts, were caught between the two divisions of the enemy, and they now no longer kept their compact formation but turned singly or in companies to deal with the enemy who was falling on their flanks.

116. Aemilius, though he had been on the right wing from the outset and had taken part in the
2 ἄγωνος, ὃμως ἐτί τότε διεσώζετο. Βουλόμενος δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν παράκλησιν λόγους ἀκολούθως ἔπει αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἔργων, καὶ θεωρῶν τὸ συνέχον τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀγώνα κρίσεως ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις κείμενον, παριππεύων ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα τῆς ὀλίγης παρατάξεως ἀμα μὲν αὐτὸς συνεπλέκετο καὶ προσέφερε τὰς χεῖρας τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ἀμα δὲ παρεκάλει καὶ παράξευε τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ στρατῶν·

4 τὸ δὲ παραπλήσιον Ἀννίβας ἐποίει· καὶ γὰρ οὕτος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τούτου τοῖς μέρεσι ἐπέστη τῆς δυνάμεως.

5 Οἱ δὲ Νομάδες ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος προσπίπτοντες τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ἐπεφύσι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν εὐωνύμων τεταγμένους μέγα μὲν οὐτ' ἐποίουν οὗδὲν οὗτ' ἔπασχον διὰ τὴν ἴδιότητα τῆς μάχης, ἀπράκτους γε μὴν τοὺς πολεμίους παρεσκεύαζον, περιποιώντες καὶ πανταχόθεν προσπίπτοντες. ἔπει δ' οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, ἀποκτείναντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπείς πλὴν παντελῶς ὀλίγων, παρεβοήθησαν ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων τοῖς Νομάσι, τὸτε προϊδόμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν οὐ σύμμαχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς,

6 ἕκκλιναντες ἀπεχώρουν. ἐν δὲ καιρῷ πραγματικὸν δοκεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ φρόνιμον ἔργον Ἀσδρούβας· θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς Νομάδας τῷ τε πλήθει πολλοὺς ὄντας καὶ πρακτικωτάτους καὶ φοβερωτάτους τοῖς ἀπαξ ἔγκλιναι, τοὺς μὲν φεύγοντας παρέδωκε τοῖς Νομάσι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν πεζῶν μάχην ἥγειτο, σπεύδων παραβοηθῆσαι τοῖς Λίβυσιν. προσπεσῶν δὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαῖοις στρατοπέδοις κατὰ νότον, καὶ ποιούμενος ἐκ διαδοχῆς ταῖς ἀμα ἐμβολᾶς ἀμα κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους, ἐπέρρωσε μὲν τοὺς Λίβυας, ἐταπείνωσε δὲ καὶ κατέπληξε ταῖς ψυχαῖς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. 286
cavalry action, was still safe and sound; but wishing to act up to what he had said in his address to the troops, and to be present himself at the fighting, and seeing that the decision of the battle lay mainly with the legions, he rode along to the centre of the whole line, where he not only threw himself personally into the combat and exchanged blows with the enemy but kept cheering on and exhorting his men. Hannibal, who had been in this part of the field since the commencement of the battle, did likewise.

The Numidians meanwhile on the right wing, attacking the cavalry opposite them on the Roman left, neither gained any great advantage nor suffered any serious loss owing to their peculiar mode of fighting, but they kept the enemy’s cavalry out of action by drawing them off and attacking them from all sides at once. Hasdrubal, having by this time cut up very nearly all the enemy’s cavalry by the river, came up from the left to help the Numidians, and now the Roman allied horse, seeing that they were going to be charged by him, broke and fled. Hasdrubal at this juncture appears to have acted with great skill and prudence; for in view of the fact that the Numidians were very numerous and most efficient and formidable when in pursuit of a flying foe he left them to deal with the Roman cavalry and led his squadrons on to where the infantry were engaged with the object of supporting the Africans. Attacking the Roman legions in the rear and delivering repeated charges at various points all at once, he raised the spirits of the Africans and cowed and dismayed the Romans. It was here that
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9 ἐν ὥ καρφῷ καὶ Λεύκιος Αμιλίους περιπεσὼν βιαίος πληγαῖς ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ μετῆλλαξε τὸν βιόν, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῇ πατρίδι κατὰ τὸν λοιπὸν βιόν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἔσχατον καρφῶν, εἶ καὶ τις ἔτερος, 10 ποιήσας. οἳ δὲ Ῥωμαιοὶ, μέχρι μὲν ἐμάχχοντο κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς κεκυκλωκό- τας, ἀντεῖχον; αἰεὶ δὲ τῶν πέριξ ἀπολλυμένων, καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ συγκλεόμενοι, τέλος αὐτοῦ πάντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ Μάρκος καὶ Γνάιος, ἔπεσον, οἳ τὸ πρότερον ἔτος ὑπατοὶ γεγονότες, ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τῆς Ῥώ-
11 μῆς ἄξιοι γενόμενοι κατὰ τὸν κίδυνον. κατὰ δὲ τὸν τοῦτον φόνον καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν οἳ Νομάδες ἐπόμενοι τοῖς φεύγουσι τῶν ἐπείσων τοὺς μὲν πλεῖ-
στους ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ κατεκρήμνυσαν ἀπὸ τῶν
12 ἵππων. ὅλιγοι δὲ τινες εἰς Ὀινενοὺςιαν διέβυγον, ἐν οἷς ήν καὶ Γάιος Τερέντιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαιῶν στρατηγὸς, ἀνὴρ αἰσχρὰν μὲν τὴν φυγήν, ἀλυσιτελὴ δὲ τὴν ἀρχήν τὴν αὐτοῦ τῆς πατρίδι πεποιημένος.
13 Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ Κάνναν γενομένη μάχη Ῥω-
μαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων ἐπετελέσθη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, μάχη γεναιοτάτους άνδρας ἐξουσία καὶ τοὺς
2 νικήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ἠττηθέντας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτόν ἐγένετ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐξαισχυλῶν ἔπεισων ἐβδομήκοντα μὲν εἰς Ὀινευ-
σίαν μετὰ Γαίου διέβυγον, περὶ τριακοσίους δὲ τῶν
3 συμμάχων σποράδες εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἐσώθησαν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν πεζῶν μαχόμενοι μὲν ἐϊλωσαν εἰς μυρίους, οὐ δ’ ἐντὸς ὄντες τῆς μάχης, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ κυ-
δύνου τρισχίλιοι μόνον ἰσως εἰς τὰς παρακειμένας
4 πόλεις διέβυγον. οἳ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες, ὄντες εἰς ἐπτὰ μυριάδας, ἀπέθανον εὐγενῶς, τὴν μεγίστην χρείαν παρεσχημένου τοῖς Καρχηδονίους εἰς τὸ νικᾶν
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Lucius Aemilius fell in the thick of the fight after receiving several dreadful wounds, and of him we may say that if there ever was a man who did his duty by his country both all through his life and in these last times, it was he. The Romans as long as they could turn and present a front on every side to the enemy, held out, but as the outer ranks continued to fall, and the rest were gradually huddled in and surrounded, they finally all were killed where they stood, among them Marcus and Gnaeus, the Consuls of the preceding year, who had borne themselves in the battle like brave men worthy of Rome. While this murderous combat was going on, the Numidians following up the flying cavalry killed most of them and unseated others. A few escaped to Venusia, among them being the Consul Gaius Terentius, who disgraced himself by his flight and in his tenure of office had been most unprofitable to his country.

117. Such was the outcome of the battle at Cannae between the Romans and Carthaginians, a battle in which both the victors and the vanquished displayed conspicuous bravery, as was evinced by the facts. For of the six thousand cavalry, seventy escaped to Venusia with Terentius, and about three hundred of the allied horse reached different cities in scattered groups. Of the infantry about ten thousand were captured fighting but not in the actual battle, while only perhaps three thousand escaped from the field to neighbouring towns. All the rest, numbering about seventy thousand, died bravely. Both on this occasion and on former ones their numerous cavalry had contributed most to the victory of the Cartha-
καὶ τὸτε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τοῦ τῶν ἵππεων ὅχλου. καὶ δὴ λον ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις ὅτι κρείττὸν ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς τῶν πολέμων καρποὺς ἡμίσεις ἔχειν πε-ζοὺς, ἰπποκρατεῖν δὲ τοῖς ὀλοῖς, μᾶλλον ἡ πάντα
πάρισα τοῖς πολέμιοισ ἔχοντα διακινδυνεύειν. τῶν
dὲ μὲτ Ἀννίβου Κέλτων μὲν ἔπεσον εἰς τετρακισχυ-λίους, Ἰβηρες δὲ καὶ Λίβνες εἰς χιλίους καὶ πεντα-κοσίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ περί διακοσίους.

Οἰ δὲ ἡγυρθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐκτὸς ἐγένοντο
καὶ διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν. Δεύκιος ἀπέλιπτε μυρίους πεζοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ παρεμβολῆς, ἵνα εἶν μὲν Ἀννίβας ὀλυμφάρησας τοῦ χάρακος ἐκτάξῃ πᾶσι, παραπεσόντες οὐτοὶ κατὰ τὸν τῆς μάχης καίρον ἐγκρατείς γένονται τῆς τῶν πολέμων ἀποσκευῆς,

κύδυνος. εἶλωσαν δὲ τοιούτω τινὶ τρόπῳ. κατα-

λιπότος Ἀννίβου φυλακήν ἄρκοῦσαν ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρα-
κος, ἀμια τῷ κατάρξασθαι τὴν μάχην κατὰ τὸ συν-
tαχθὲν ἐπιλοίρκουν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι προσβάλλοντες τοὺς ἀπολειμμένους ἐν τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων χάρακι.

τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀντεἶχον ἡδὲ δ’ αὐτῶν πιεζο-

μένων, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς μάχης Ἀν-

νίβας ἐκρίνε, καὶ τὸτε παραβοηθῆσας καὶ τρεφαμε-


νος συνέκλεισε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς τὴν ἱδίᾳν παρεμ-

βολῆν, καὶ δισχίλιοις μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτευε, τῶν δὲ

λοιπῶν ἐγκρατῆς ἐγένετο ἡγυρία πάντων. ὅμως
dὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐρύματα συμ-

πεφευγότας ἐκπολυρκῆσαντες οἱ Νομάδες ἐπαν-

ῆγον, δοντας εἰς δισχίλιους τῶν εἰς φυγῆν τραπέν-

tων ἵππεων.

Βραβευθείσης δὲ τῆς μάχης τὸν προειρημένον 290
ginians, and it demonstrated to posterity that in times of war it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming force of cavalry than to be in all respects his equal. Of Hannibal's army there fell about four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans and two hundred cavalry.

The Romans who were made prisoners were not in the battle for the following reason. Lucius had left a force of ten thousand foot in his own camp, in order that, if Hannibal, neglecting his camp, employed his whole army in the field, they might during the battle gain entrance there and capture all the enemy's baggage: if, on the other hand, Hannibal, guessing this danger, left a strong garrison in the camp, the force opposed to the Romans would be reduced in numbers. The circumstances of their capture were more or less as follows. Hannibal had left an adequate force to guard his camp, and when the battle opened, the Romans, as they had been ordered, delivered an assault on this force. At first they held out, but as they were beginning to be hard pressed, Hannibal, who was now victorious in every part of the field, came to their assistance, and routing the Romans shut them up in their own camp. He killed two thousand of them and afterwards made all the rest prisoners. The Numidians also reduced the various strongholds throughout the country which had given shelter to the flying enemy and brought in the fugitives, consisting of about two thousand horse.

118. The result of the battle being as I have de-
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τρόπον, ἀκόλουθον εἰλήφει τὰ ὅλα κρίσιν τοῖς ὑπ᾿ ἀμφότερων προσδοκομένοις. Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης παραχρήμα τῆς μὲν λοιπῆς
3 παραλίας σχεδὸν πᾶσης ἦσαν ἐγκρατεῖς. Ταραντῖνοι τε γὰρ εὐθέως ἐνεχείριζον αὐτοὺς, Ἀργυριππανοὶ δὲ καὶ Καμπανῶν τινες ἐκάλουν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ἀπέβλεπον ἣδη τότε πρὸς Καρχηδό-
4 νίους· μεγάλας δ᾿ εἰχὸν ἐλπίδας εἰς ἐφόδου καὶ τῆς
5 Ῥώμης αὐτῆς ἔσεσθαι κύριοι. Ῥωμαῖοι γε μὴν τὴν Ἰταλιστῶν δυναστείαν παραχρήμα διὰ τὴν ἦτταν ἀπεγνώκεισαν, ἐν μεγάλους δὲ φόβους καὶ κινδύνους ἦσαν περὶ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρί-
6 δός ἐδάφους, ὅσον οὖπω προσδοκῶντες ἦσειν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν. καὶ γὰρ ὦσπερ ἐπιμετροῦσης καὶ συνεπαγωγιζομένης τοὺς γεγονόσι τῆς τύχης συνέβη μετ᾿ ὀλίγος ἥμερας, τοῦ φόβου κατέχοντος τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τὸν εἰς τὴν Γαλατίαν στρατηγὸν ἀπο-
7 σταλέντ’ εἰς ἐνέδραν ἐμπεσόντα παραδόξως ἀρδην ὑπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν διαφθαρῆαι μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως.
8 οὐ μὴν ἦ γε σύγκλητος οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπτε τῶν ἐνδε-
9 χομένων, ἀλλὰ παρεκάλει μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἡσφα-
7 λίζετο δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἐβουλεύετο δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων ἀνδρῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν διαφθαρῆαι μετὰ τῆς δυ
8 ναμεώς. τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐγένετο φάνε-
9 ρὸν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα συμβάντων· ὀμολογουμένως γὰρ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἦττηθέντων τότε καὶ παραχυρη-
9 σάντων τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀρετῆς, τῇ τοῦ πολιτεύ-
9 ματος ἰδιότητι καὶ τῷ βουλευομένης καλῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας δυναστείαν, νικήσαν-
9 τες μετὰ ταῦτα Καρχηδόνιος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς οἰκου-
9 μένης ἀπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο μετ᾿ ὀλίγους χρό-
9 νους.
10 Διὸσπερ ἦμεῖς ταύτην μὲν τὴν βύβλον ἐπὶ τούτων 292
scribed, the general consequences that had been anticipated on both sides followed. The Carthaginians by this action became at once masters of almost all the rest of the coast, Tarentum immediately surrendering, while Argyrippa and some Campanian towns invited Hannibal to come to them, and the eyes of all were now turned to the Carthaginians, who had great hopes of even taking Rome itself at the first assault. The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned all hope of retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and that of Rome, expecting Hannibal every moment to appear. It seemed indeed as if Fortune were taking part against them in their struggle with adversity and meant to fill the cup to overflowing; for but a few days afterwards, while the city was yet panic-stricken, the commander they had sent to Cisalpine Gaul was surprised by the Celts in an ambush and he and his force utterly destroyed. Yet the Senate neglected no means in its power, but exhorted and encouraged the populace, strengthened the defences of the city, and deliberated on the situation with manly coolness. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were now incontestably beaten and their military reputation shattered, yet by the peculiar virtues of their constitution and by wise counsel they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy and afterwards defeated the Carthaginians, but in a few years made themselves masters of the whole world.

I therefore end this Book at this point, having
τῶν ἔργων καταστρέψομεν, ἃ περιέλαβεν Ἰβηρικῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἡ τετταρακοστὴ πρὸς ταῖς ἐκατόν
11 ὁλυμπιάδι θηλώσαντες· ὅταν δὲ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις τὰς κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁλυμπιάδα γενομένας
dιεξόντες ἐπιστῶμεν τοῖς καίροις τούτοις, τὸ τῇ ἡδή προθέμενοι ψιλῶς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥωμαίων
12 πολιτείας ποιησόμεθα λόγον, νομίζοντες οὐ μόνον
pρὸς τὴν τῆς ἱστορίας σύνταξιν οἰκεῖαν εἶναι τὴν
περὶ αὐτῆς ἔξηγησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων
dιορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγάλα
συμβάλλεσθαι τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι καὶ πραγματικοῖς
tῶν ἀνδρῶν.
now described the events in Spain and Italy that occurred in the 140th Olympiad. When I have brought down the history of Greece in the same Olympiad to the same date, I shall pause to premise to the rest of the history a separate account of the Roman constitution; for I think that a description of it is not only germane to the whole scheme of my work, but will be of great service to students and practical statesmen for forming or reforming other constitutions.
1 Ἡ ἁτιὰ ὑ πρὸ ταῦτα βύβλῳ τὰς αἰτίας ἐδηλώσαμεν τοῦ δευτέρου συστάντος Ὀρμαῖοι καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πολέμου, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς εἰσβολῆς
2 τῆς εἰς Ἰταλίαν Ἀννίβου διήλθομεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτος ἐξηγησάμεθα τοὺς γενομένους αὐτοῖς ἄγωνας ἀλλὰ μέχρι τῆς μάχης τῆς περὶ τοῦ Αὐφίδου ποταμὸν καὶ πόλιν Κάνναν γενομένης.
3 νῦν δὲ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς διέξιμεν πράξεις τὰς κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καύρους ἐπιτελεσθείσας τοῖς προερχομένοις καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκατοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς
4 ὀλυμπιάδος, πρότερον ἀναμνήσαντες διὰ βραχέων τοὺς ἐνυγχάνοντος τῆς πραγματείας τῆς κατασκευῆς ἢν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βύβλῳ περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἐποιησάμεθα, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνων, διὰ τὸ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πολιτεύμα παράδοξον ἐπίδοσιν λαβεῖν εἰς τοὺς πρὸ ἡμῶν
5 καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς καύρους. ἄρξάμενοι γὰρ ἀπὸ Τισαμενοῦ τῶν Ὀρέστου παῖδων ἐνός, καὶ φήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ μὲν τούτου βασιλεύσαι κατὰ γένος ἤσσα εἰς Ὡγυγον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καλλίστη προαίρεσει χρησιμένους δήμοκρατικῆς πολιτείας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων
6 διασπασθῆναι κατὰ πόλεις καὶ κώμας, εξῆς δὲ 296
1. In the preceding Book after pointing out the causes of the second war between Rome and Carthage, I described the invasion of Italy by Hannibal, and the engagements which took place between the belligerents up to the battle on the river Aufidus at the town of Cannae. I shall now give an account of the contemporary events in Greece from the 140th Olympiad onwards, after briefly recalling to the minds of my readers the sketch I gave in my second Book of Greek affairs and especially of the growth of the Achaean League, the progress of that state having been surprisingly rapid in my own time and earlier. Beginning their history with Tisamenus, one of Orestes' sons, I stated that they were ruled by kings of his house down to the reign of Ogygus, after which they adopted a most admirable democratical constitution, until for a time their League was dissolved into cities and villages by the kings of Macedon. Next I went on to tell how they subse-

\[a\] Chapters 41-71.
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toútois ἐπεβαλόμεθα λέγεων πῶς αὕτις ἢρξαντο συμφρονεῖν καὶ πότε, καὶ τίνες αὐτοίς πρῶτοι
7 συνέστησαν. τοútois δ’ ἔπομενως ἐδηλώσαμεν τίνι τρόπῳ καὶ ποιὰ προαίρεσε προσαγόμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἐπεβάλοντο. Πελοποννησίους πάντας ὑπὸ
8 τὴν αὐτὴν ἄγεων ὀνομασίαν καὶ πολιτείαν. καθο-
λικῶς δὲ περὶ τῆς προερημενῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἀποφη-
νάμενοι, μετὰ ταύτα τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἔργῳ κατὰ
τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπιμαύνοντες εἰς τὴν Κλεομένους τοῦ
Ľακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως ἐκπτωσὺν κατηντησαμεν.
9 συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι δὲ τὰς ἐκ τῆς προκατασκευῆς
πράξεως ἐως τῆς Ἄντιγόνου καὶ Σελεύκου καὶ Πτο-
λεμαίου τελευτῆς, ἐπειδὴ περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς καυροὺς
πάντες οὗτοι μετήλλαξαν, λοιπῶν ἐπηγγειλάμεθα
tῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀρχὴν ποιήσασθαι τὰς
2 ἐξῆς τοῖς προερημένοις πράξεις, καλλίστην ὑπό-
στασιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες εἶναι ταύτην διὰ τὸ πρῶ-
tον μὲν τὴν Ἀράτου σύνταξιν ἐπ’ τούτους κατα-
στρέφειν τοὺς καυροὺς, οἷς συνάπτοντες τὴν διή-
γγησιν τὸν ἄκολουθον ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀποδι-
2 δόναι προηρήμεθα λόγον, δεύτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ
tοὺς χρόνους οὗτος συντρέχει τοὺς ἐξῆς καὶ τοὺς
πιπτοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὡστε τοὺς
μὲν καθ’ ἡμᾶς εἶναι τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας
ἡμῶν, ἐξ οὗ συμβαίνει τοῖς μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς παρα-
γεγονέναι τὰ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἔωρακότων ἀκηκοέναι.
3 τὸ γὰρ ἀνωτέρω προσλαμβάνει τοῖς χρόνοις, ὡς
ἀκοὴν ἐξ ἀκοῆς γράφειν, οὐκ ἐφαίνεθ’ ἡμῖν ἀσφα-
λεῖς ἔχειν οὔτε τὰς διαλῆψεις οὔτε τὰς ἀποφάσεις.
4 μάλιστα δ’ ἀπὸ τούτων ἡρξάμεθα τῶν καυρῶν διὰ
tὸ καὶ τὴν τύχην ὡσανεὶ κεκαινοποιηκέναι πάντα
tὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις
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quently began to reunite, and which were the first cities to league themselves, and following on this I pointed out in what manner and on what principle they tried to attract other cities and formed the design of uniting all the Peloponnesians in one polity and under one name. After a general survey of this design, I gave a brief but continuous sketch of events in detail up to the dethronement of Cleomenes, king of Sparta. Summarizing, next, the occurrences dealt with in my introductory sketch up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, which all took place about the same time, I announced that I would enter on my main history with the events immediately following the above period. 2. This I considered to be the best starting-point, because in the first place, Aratus’s book terminates just at this period and I had decided on taking up and carrying on the narrative of Greek affairs from the date at which he leaves off, and secondly because the period following on this date and included in my history coincides with my own and the preceding generation, so that I have been present at some of the events and have the testimony of eyewitnesses for others. It seemed to me indeed that if I comprised events of an earlier date, repeating mere hearsay evidence, I should be safe neither in my estimates nor in my assertions. But my chief reason for beginning at this date, was that Fortune had then so to speak rebuilt the world.
5 καίροις. Φίλιππος μὲν γὰρ ὁ Δημητρίου κατὰ φύσιν υἱός, ἕτε παῖς ὃν, ἀρτι παρελάμβανε τὴν
6 Μακεδόνων ἀρχήν. Ἀχαῖος δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τού
Ταύρου δυναστεύων οὐ μόνον προστασίαν εἶχε
7 βασιλικὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν. ὁ δὲ Μέγας ἐπικλη-
θεὶς ᾿Αντίοχος μικρὸις ἀνώτερον χρόνοις, τοῦ ᾿αδελ-
φοῦ Σελεύκου μετηλλαχῶτος, ἐτι κομιδὴ νέος ὃν
8 τὴν ἐν Συρία διεδέρκετο βασιλείαν. ᾿Αμα δὲ τοῦ-
τοις ᾿Αριαράθης παρέλαβε τὴν Καππαδοκῶν ἀρχήν.
9 ὁ δὲ Φιλοπάτωρ Πτολεμαῖος ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καίροις
τῶν κατ᾿ ᾿Αὐγουστον ἐγενόνει κύριος. Λυκόνγιος
δὲ Λακεδαμονίων μετ᾿ οὐ πολὺ κατεστάθη βασι-
λεύς. ᾿Ηρωντο δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι προσφάτως ἐπὶ τὰς
προειρημένας πράξεις στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ᾿Αναβαίν.
10 οὕτως δὲ τοιαύτης περὶ πάσας τὰς δυναστείας
καυσοποιίας ύπός ἐμελέτη πραγμάτων ἔσεσθαι
καυνὼν ἀρχή: τοῦτο γὰρ ἰὰ σὲ πέφυκε καὶ φιλεῖ
συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν. ὁ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέ-
11 σθαι. ῾Ρωμαιοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸν
προειρημένον ἐνεστῆσαντο πόλεμον, Ὀντίοχος δὲ
καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ᾿Αμα τοῦτοι τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Κοίλης
Συρίας, ᾿Αχαῖοι δὲ καὶ Φιλιππος τὸν πρὸς Αἰτω-
λοὺς καὶ Λακεδαμονίους, οὐ τὰς αἰτίας συνέβη
γενέσθαι τοιαύτας.

3 Αἰτωλοὶ πάλαι μὲν δυσχερῶς ἐφερον τὴν εἰρήνην
καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων ὑπαρχόντων δαπάνας ὡς ἀν
εἰθισμένοι μὲν ζήν ἀπὸ τῶν πέλας, δεόμενοι δὲ
πολλὴς χορηγίας διὰ τὴν ἐμφυτον ἀλαζονείαν, ᾿Η
δουλεύοντες ἀεὶ πλεονεκτικὸν καὶ θηριώδῃς ἔσοι
βίον, οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον, πάντα δὲ ἥγουμενοι πολέμια.

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For Philip, son of Demetrius, being still quite a boy, had inherited the throne of Macedonia, Achaeus, the ruler of all Asia on this side of the Taurus, had now not only the state, but the power of a king, Antiochus surnamed "The Great" who was still very young had but a short time previously, on the death of his brother Seleucus, succeeded him in Syria, Ariarathes at the same time had become king of Cappadocia, and Ptolemy Philopator king of Egypt, while not long afterwards began the reign of Lycurgus, king of Sparta. The Carthaginians also had but recently appointed Hannibal to be their general in the campaign I mentioned. Since therefore the personalities of the rulers were everywhere new, it was evident that a new series of events would begin, this being the natural and usual consequence. And such indeed was the case; for the Romans and Carthaginians now entered on the war I mentioned, Antiochus and Ptolemy on that for Coele-Syria, and the Achaeans and Philip on that against the Aetolians and Spartans.

3. The causes of the latter were as follows. The Aetolians had for long been dissatisfied with peace and with an outlay limited to their own resources, as they had been accustomed to live on their neighbours, and required abundance of funds, owing to that natural covetousness, enslaved by which they always lead a life of greed and aggression, like beasts of prey, with no ties of friendship but regarding everyone as an enemy. Nevertheless up to now,
2 οὖ μὴν ἄλλα τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον, ἔως Ὁλυμπίουνος
3 ἐξῆς, δεδώτες Μακεδόνας ἥγον ἰδιάν. ἔπειδὴ
d' ἐκεῖνος μετῆλλαξε τὸν βιον παίδα καταλιπὼν
Νικιδίππον, καταφρονήσαντες εξήτουν ἀφορμᾶς καὶ
προφάσεις τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἐπιπλοκῆς, ἀγό-
μενοι κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ἔδοξε ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ ταύτης
ἀρπαγάς, ἀμα δὲ καὶ νομίζοντες ἀξιόχρεως εἶναι
4 σφάς πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ὅντες δ'
ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς προθέσεως, βραχέα ταυτομᾶτον
σφίσι συνεργήσαντος ἔλαβον ἀφορμᾶς πρὸς τὴν
ἐπιβολὴν τοιαύτας.

5 Δωρίμαχος δ' Τριχώνεως ἦν μὲν ὕδως Νικο-
στράτου τοῦ παραπονδήσαντος τὴν τῶν Παμ-
βοιωτίων πανήγυριν, νέος δ' ὦν καὶ πλήρης
Ἀιτωλικῆς ὁρμῆς καὶ πλεονεξίας ἐξαπεστάλη
6 κατὰ κοινὸν εἰς τὴν τῶν Φιγαλέων πόλιν, ἣτις
ἔστι μὲν ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ, κεῖται δὲ πρὸς τοῖς
τῶν Μεσσηνίων ὄροις, ἐτύγχανε δὲ τότε συμπολι-
7 τευμένη τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς, λόγω μὲν παραφιλάξων
tὴν τε χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Φιγαλέων, ἔργω
δὲ κατασκοπὸν τάξιν ἔχων τῶν ἐν Πελοπόννησῳ
8 πραγμάτων. συνδραμόντων δὲ πειρατῶν καὶ παρα-
γενόμενων πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Φιγαλέαν, οὐκ
ἔχων τούτως ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου συμπαρασκευάζειν
ώφελείας διὰ τὸ μένειν ἐτι τότε τὴν κοινὴν ἐφήγη
τοῖς Ἑλλησ τὴν ὑπ’ Ὁλυμπίουνον συντελεσθεῖσαν,
9 τέλος ἀπορούμενος ἐπέτρεψε τοῖς πειραταῖς ληφζε-
σθαι τὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων θρέμματα, φίλων ὄντων
10 καὶ συμμάχων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἢδίκουν τὰ
περὶ τὰς ἐσχατιᾶς ποίμνη, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα προ-
βανούσης τῆς ἀπονοίας ἐνεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ
tῶν ἄγρων οἰκίας ἐκκόπτειν, ἀνυπονοήτως τὰς
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as long as Antigonus was alive, they kept quiet owing to their fear of Macedonia, but when that king died leaving Philip still a child to succeed him, they thought they could ignore this king and began to look out for pretexts and grounds for interfering in the affairs of the Peloponnese, giving way to their old habit of looking for pillage from that country and thinking they were a match for the Achaeans now the latter were isolated. Such being their bent and purpose, and chance favouring them in a certain measure, they found the following pretext for putting their design in execution.

Dorimachus of Trichonium was the son of that Nicostratus who broke the solemn truce at the Pamboeotian congress. He was a young man full of the violent and aggressive spirit of the Aetolians and was sent on a public mission to Phigalea, a city in the Peloponnese near the Messenian border and at that time in alliance with the Aetolian League; professedly to guard the city and its territory, but really to act as a spy on Peloponnesian affairs. When a recently formed band of brigands came to join him there, and he could not provide them with any legitimate pretext for plundering, as the general peace in Greece established by Antigonus still continued, he finally, finding himself at a loss, gave them leave to make forays on the cattle of the Messenians who were friends and allies of the Aetolians. At first, then, they only raided the flocks on the border, but later, growing ever more insolent, they took to breaking into the country houses, surprising the unsuspecting inmates by
11 νύκτας ἐπιφανώμενοι. τῶν δὲ Μεσσηνίων ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀγανακτοῦντο καὶ διαπρεσβευμένων πρὸς τὸν Δωρίμαχον τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς παρήκουε, βουλό- μενος τὰ μὲν ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ταττομένους, τὰ δ’ αὐτὸς ὠφελεῖσθαι μερίτης γινόμενος τῶν λαμ- 
12 βανομένων. πλεοναζοῦσης δὲ τῆς παρουσίας τῶν προσβειῶν διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν ἀδικημάτων, αὐτὸς ἦξεν ἐπὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην ἐφη δικαιολογη- σόμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. 
13 ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεγένετο, προσπορευμένων αὐτῶ 
τῶν ἡδικημένων τοὺς μὲν διέσυρε χλευάζων, τῶν 
δὲ κατανίστατο, τοὺς δ’ ἐξέπληττε λοιδορῶν. 
4 "Ετι δ’ αὐτοῦ παρεπιδημοῦντο ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, 
συνεγγύσαντες τῇ πόλει νυκτὸς οἱ πειρατοὶ καὶ 
προσβαλόντες κλίμακας ἐξέκοψαν τὸ Χυρῶνος 
καλοῦμενον ἑπαύλιον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμυνομένους 
ἀπέσφαξαν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς τῶν οἰκετῶν ἰήσαντε 
καὶ τὰ κτήμα μετ’ αὐτῶν ἀπῆγαγον. οἱ δὲ τῶν 
Μεσσηνίων ἑφοροὶ πάλαι μὲν ἐπὶ τε τοῖς γυναι- 
μένοις καὶ τῇ παρεπιδημίᾳ τοῦ Δωρίμαχου διαλ- 
γοῦντες, τότε δὲ καὶ προσενυφρίσθησαν δόξαντε, 
3 άνεκαλοῦντ’ αὐτὸν εἰς τὰς συναρχίας. ἐν δὲ καιρῷ 
Σκύρων, δς ἦν μὲν ἑφορὸς τότε τῶν Μεσσηνίων 
eυδοκίμει δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίων παρὰ τοῖς 
πολίταις, συνεβούλευε μὴ προτίθηκε τὸν Δωρίμαχον 
ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐὰν μὴ τὰ μὲν ἀπολωλότα πάντα 
tοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἀποκαταστήσῃ, περὶ δὲ τῶν 
τεθνεώτων δωσιδικοὺς παράσχῃ τοὺς ἡδικηκότας. 
4 πάντων δ’ ἐπισημηναμένων ὡς δίκαια λέγοντο 
tοῦ Σκύρωνος, διοργισθείς δ’ Δωρίμαχος εὐθείᾳς 
aυτοὺς ἐφη τελέως ὑπάρχειν, εἰ Δωρίμαχον οἰονται 
νῦν προπηλακίζειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτω- 
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night. When the Messenians grew indignant at this and sent envoys to Dorimachus to complain, he at first paid no attention, as he wished not only to benefit the men under him but himself also by taking his share of their captures. But when such embassies began to arrive more frequently, owing to the continuance of the outrages, he announced that he would come himself to Messene to plead his cause against those who accused the Aetolians, and on appearing there when the victims approached him, he ridiculed and jeered at some of them, attacked some by recrimination and intimidated others by abusive language.

4. While he was still staying in Messene the banditti approached the city by night, and with the aid of scaling-ladders broke into the farm called Chyron's, where after killing those who offered resistance they bound the rest of the slaves and carried them off together with the cattle. The Messenian Ephors, who had long been annoyed by all that took place and by Dorimachus' stay in the town, thought this was adding insult to injury and summoned him before their college. On this occasion Scyron, then one of the ephors, and otherwise highly esteemed by the citizens, advised them not to let Dorimachus escape from the city, unless he made good all the losses of the Messenians and delivered up to justice those guilty of murder. When all signified their approval of what Scyron said, Dorimachus flew into a passion, and said they were utter simpletons if they thought it was Dorimachus they were now affronting and not the Aetolian
λῶν· καὶ καθόλου δεινὸν ἥγειτο τὸ γινόμενον, καὶ κοινῆς αὐτοῦς ἑπιστροφῆς ἐφη τεῦξεθαί, καὶ § τοῦτο πείσεθαί δικαίως. ἣν δὲ τις κατ' ἐκεῖνος τοὺς καιροὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀσυρῆς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, τῶν ἐξημένων τὸν ἄνδρα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, ὁνομα Βαβύρτας, ὥς τις εἰ περιέθηκε τὴν καυσίαν καὶ χλαμύδα τοῦ Δωρύμαχου, μὴ οἶνον τ' εἶναι 6 διαγινώσκειν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξωμοίωτο κατὰ τε τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τάλλα μέρη τοῦ σῶματος τῷ προερήμενῳ καὶ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐλάνθανε τὸν Δωρύμαχον. 7 οὐ μιλοῦντος οὐν αὐτοῦ ἀνατακτικῶς τότε καὶ μάλα ὑπερηφάνως τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, περιοργισθεὶς ὁ Σκύρων "νομίζεις γὰρ ἡμῖν" ἐφη "σοῦ μέλεν 8 ἡ τῆς σής ἀνατάσεως, Βαβύρτα;" ρηθέντος δὲ τοῦτο παρατικά μὲν εἴξας ὁ Δωρύμαχος τῇ περιστάσει συνεχώρησε πάντων ἐπιστροφῆν ποιήσεθαι τῶν γεγονότων ἀδικημάτων τοῖς Μεσση- 9 νίοις, ἐπανελθὼν δ' εἰς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν οὕτω πικρῶς ἤνεγκε καὶ βαρέως τὸ ῥήθην ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἐχὼν εὐλογον πρόφασιν δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῖς Μεσση- νίοις εξέκαυσε τὸν πόλεμον. 5 Στρατηγὸς μὲν οὖν ὑπήρχε τῶν Αἰτωλῶν Ἀρί- στων· οὕτος δὲ διὰ τινας σωματικὰς ἀσθενείας ἀδύνατος ὄν πρὸς πολεμικὴν χρείαν, ἁμα δὲ καὶ συγγενῆς ὑπάρχον Δωρύμαχον καὶ Σκύρα, τράπον 2 τινὰ παρακεχωρήκει τοῦτῳ τῆς ὀλῆς ἀρχῆς. ὅ δὲ Δωρύμαχος κατὰ κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμα παρακαλέων τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς εἰς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων πόλε- μον διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν ἄξιαν λόγου πρόφασιν, ἀλλ' ὁμολογομένως ἐκ παρανομίας καὶ σκώμματος 3 γεγονέναι τὴν ὀρμήν· ἀφέμενος δὲ τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης ἰδίᾳ προετρέπετο τὸν Σκόπαν κοινωνησαί 306
League. He thought the whole affair altogether outrageous, and they would receive such public chastisement for it as would serve them right. There was at this time a certain lewd fellow at Messene, one of those who had in every way renounced his claim to be a man, called Babyrtas. If anyone had dressed this man up in Dorimachus' sun-hat and chlamys it would have been impossible to distinguish the two, so exact was the resemblance both in voice and in person, and of this Dorimachus was perfectly aware. Upon his speaking now in this threatening and overbearing manner, Scyron grew very angry and said, "Do you think we care a fig for you or your threats, Babyrtas?" Upon his saying this Dorimachus, yielding for the moment to circumstances, consented to give satisfaction for all damage inflicted on the Messenians, but on his return to Aetolia he continued to resent this taunt so bitterly, that without having any other plausible pretext he stirred up a war against Messene on account of this alone.

5. The Strategus of the Aetolians at this time was 221 B.C. Ariston. Being himself incapacitated for service in the field by certain bodily infirmities and being related to Dorimachus and Scopas, he had more or less ceded his whole office to the latter. Dorimachus did not venture to exhort the Aetolians by public speeches to make war on Messene, since he really had no valid pretext, but, as every body knew, his animus was due to his own lawless violence and his resentment of a jibe. So he desisted from any such plan, and took to urging on Scopas in private to join
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τῆς ἐπιβολῆς αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων, ὑποδεικνύων μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ Μακεδόνων ἀσφάλειαν διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τοῦ προεστῶτος (οὐ γὰρ εἶχε
4 πλεῖον ἐτῶν τὸτε Φίλιππος ἐπτακαίδεκα), παρα-
τιθείς δὲ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀλλοτριώτητα πρὸς
τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, ἀναμμηνήσκων δὲ τῆς Ἡλεῖων
πρὸς σφᾶς εὐνοίας καὶ συμμαχίας, εἰ δὲν ἀσφαλὴ
tὴν εἰσβολὴν τὴν εἰς τὴν Μεσσηνίαν ἐσομένην
5 αὐτοῖς ἀπέφαινεν. τὸ δὲ συνέχον τῆς Αἰτωλικῆς
προτροπῆς, ὑπὸ τὴν ὁψιν ἑτίθει τὰς ἐσομένας
ωφελείας ἕκ τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώρας, οὐσὶς
ἀπροοντοῦ καὶ διαμεμενκυίας ἀκεραίον μόνης
τῶν ἐν Πελοποννῆσῳ κατὰ τὸν Κλεομενικὸν πόλε-
6 μον. ἐπὶ δὲ πάσι τούτοις συνίσταντε τὴν ἔξακο-
λουθησοῦσαν εὐνοίαν σφὸς παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν
7 πλήθους. Ἀχαιοὺς δὲ, ἀν μὲν κωλύσωσί τὴν
dίὸδον, οὐκ ἔρειν ἐγκλήματα τοῖς ἀμνομένοις,
ἐὰν δὲ ἀγάγωσι τὴν ἡμιχίαν, οὐκ ἐμποδίειν αὐτοῖς
8 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν. πρὸς δὲ Μεσσηνίους προ-
φάσεως ὁκ ἀπορήσεων ἐφή· πάλαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς
ἀδικεῖν, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Μακεδόνιοι ἐπηγγελμένους
9 κοινωνῆς τῆς συμμαχίας. ταῦτα δὲ εἰσῶν καὶ
παραπλήσια τούτοις ἑτέρα πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθε-
σιν, τοιαύτην ὀρμὴν παρέστησε τὸν Σκόπα καὶ τοῖς
τοῦτον φίλιοι ὥστε οὐτε κοινὴ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν
προσδέξαμενοι σύνοδον οὐτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμ-
μεταδόντες, οὐδὲ μὴν ἄλλο τῶν καθηκόντων οὐδὲν
10 πράξαντες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς αὐτῶν ὀρμὰς καὶ κρίσεις
dιαλαβόντες ἁμα Μεσσηνίους Ἡπειρώταις Ἀχαιοῖς
Ἀκαρνασὶ Μακεδόσι πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν.

6 Καὶ κατὰ μὲν θάλαττα παραχρῆμα πειράτας
ἐξέπεμψαν, οἱ παρατυχόντες πλοῖοι βασιλικῷ τῶν
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him in his project against the Messenians, pointing out to him that they were safe as regards Macedonia owing to the youth of its ruler—Philip being now not more than seventeen—calling his attention to the hostility of the Lacedaemonians to the Messenians, and reminding him that Elis was the friend and ally of the Aetolians; from all which facts he deduced that they would be quite safe in invading Messenia. But next—this being the most convincing argument to an Aetolian—he pictured to him the great booty that they would get from Messenia, the country being without warning of invasion and being the only one in Greece that the Cleomenic war had spared. Finally he dwelt on the popularity they themselves would gain in Aetolia. The Achaeans, he said, if they opposed their passage, could not complain if the Aetolians met force by force, but if they kept quiet they would not stand in the way of the project. Against the Messenians they would have no difficulty in finding a grievance, for they had long been inflicting wrong on the Aetolians by promising to ally themselves with the Achaeans and Macedonians. By these arguments and others in the same sense, he made Scopas and his friends so eager for the enterprise that without waiting for the General Assembly of the Aetolians, without taking the Special Council into their confidence, without in fact taking any proper steps, but acting solely as their own passion and their private judgement dictated, they made war all at once on the Messenians, Epirots, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians.

6. By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who falling in with a ship of the royal Macedonian
ΤΗΣ ΗΛΕΓΙΑΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΚΥΘΗΡΑ ΤΟΤΟ ΤΕ ΕΙΣ ΑΙΤΩΛΙΑΝ ΚΑΤΑΔΥΑΝΤΕΣ ΑΥΤΑΝΔΡΟΝ, ΤΟΥΣ ΤΕ ΝΑΥΚΛΗΡΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΠΙΒΑΤΑΣ, ΣΥΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΝΑΥΝ ΑΠΕΔΟΝΤΟ.

2 ΤΗΣ Δ' ΗΠΕΙΡΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΑΛΙΑΝ ΕΥΠΟΡΘΟΝ, ΣΥΝΧΡΩ- 
ΜΕΝΟΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΑΔΙΚΙΑΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΛΗΝΩΝ 
ΝΑΥΝ. ΕΠΕΒΑΛΟΝΤΟ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ 'ΑΚΑΡΝΑΝΙΑΣ ΘΥ- 
ΡΙΟΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΑΒΕΣΘΑΙ. ΑΜΑ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΛΑΘΡΑ ΔΙΑ 
ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΟΥ ΤΙΝΑΣ ΠΕΜΒΑΝΤΕΣ ΕΝ ΜΕΣΗ ΤΗ 
ΤΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΟΛΙΤΩΝ ΧΩΡΑ ΚΑΤΕΣΧΟΝ ΤΟ ΚΑΛΟΜΕΝΟΝ 
ΩΧΥΡΩΜΑ ΚΛΑΡΙΟΝ, Ω ΛΑΦΥΡΟΠΩΛΕΙΩΝ ΧΡΗΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ 
ΔΥΗΓΟΝ ΕΝ ΤΟΤΩ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑΣ ΆΡΡΑΓΑΣ. ΟΥ ΜΗΝ ΑΛΛΑ 
ΤΟΤΟ ΜΕΝ ΤΙΜΟΞΕΝΟΣ ΔΕ ΤΩΝ 'ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΣ, 
ΠΑΡΑΛΑΒΩΝ ΤΑΥΡΙΩΝΑ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΝ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΩ 
ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ ὨΠ' 'ΑΝΤΙΓΟΝΟΥ ΚΑΤΑΛΕΙΜ- 
ΜΕΝΟΝ, ΕΞΕΠΟΔΡΙΟΡΧΗΣΕ ΤΕΛΕΩΣ ΕΝ ΟΛΙΓΑΙΣ ᾿ΗΜΕΡΑΙΣ.

5 Ο ΓΑΡ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ 'ΑΝΤΙΓΟΝΟΣ ΚΟΡΝΘΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΕΙΧΕ ΚΑΤΑ 
ΤΟ ΤΩΝ 'ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΣΥΝΧΩΡΗΜΑ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΛΕΟΜΕΝ- 
ΚΟΥΣ ΚΑΙΡΟΥΣ, 'ΟΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΤΑ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ ΕΛΩΝ 
ΟΥΚ ἈΠΟΚΑΤΕΣΤΗΣΕ ΤΟΙΣ 'ΑΧΑΙΟΙΣ ἈΛΛΑ ΣΦΕΤΕΡΙΣΑ- 
ΜΕΝΟΣ ΚΑΤΕΙΧΕ, ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΣ, ᾧΣ Γ' ἘΜΟΙ ΔΟΚΕΙ, ΜΗ 
ΜΟΝΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣΘΌΝ ΚΥΡΙΕΥΕΝ ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΟΝ, 
ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΜΕΣΟΓΕΙΑΝ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΠΑΡΑΦΥΛΛΑΤΕΝ ΔΙΑ 
7 ΤΗΣ ΕΝ 'ΟΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΥ ΦΡΟΥΡΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΗΣ. ΟΙ 
ΔΕ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΔΩΡΙΜΟΧΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΣΚΟΠΑΝ ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΗ- 
ΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΙΡΟΝ, ΕΝ Γ' ΛΟΙΠΟΣ ΗΝ ΤΙΜΟΞΕΝΟΥ ὪΝ 
ΘΛΙΓΟΣ ΕΠΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΆΡΧΗΣ, 'ΑΡΑΤΟΣ ΔΕ ΚΑΘΙΣΤΑΤΟ 
ΜΕΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΝΙΑΥΤΟΝ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΟΝΤΑ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΣ ὩΠ' 
8 ΤΟΝ 'ΑΧΑΙΩΝ, ΟΥΠΩ ΔΕ ΕΜΕΛΛΕ ΤΗΝ ΆΡΧΗΝ ΕΞΕΝ, 
ΣΥΝΑΘΡΟΙΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΠΑΝΔΗΜΕΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΙΤΩΛΟΥΣ ΕΠΙ ΤΟ 
ῬΙΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΠΑΡΑΣΚΕΥΑΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ ΠΟΡΘΜΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ 
ΚΕΦΑΛΛΗΝΩΝ ΕΤΟΙΜΑΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΝΑΥΣ, ΔΙΕΒΙΒΑΣΑΝ ΤΟΥΣ 
ΑΝΔΡΑΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΗΓΟΝ ΕΠΙ ΤΗΝ

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navy near Cythera brought her to Aetolia with all her crew, and there sold the officers, the troops, and the ship herself. Afterwards they pillaged the coast of Epirus, being aided in these outrages by the Cephallenian fleet. They also made an attempt to seize Thyrium in Acarnania. At the same time, sending a small force secretly through the Peloponnese, they occupied the fort called Clarium in the middle of the territory of Megalopolis, and continued to use it as a base for forays and a market for the sale of booty. This place, however, was shortly afterwards besieged and captured in a few days by Timoxenus, the Achaean Strategus, with the aid of Taurion, the officer left by Antigonus in charge of Peloponnesian affairs. I should explain that Antigonus continued to hold Corinth, which the Achaeans had given up to him, to further his purposes in the Cleomenic war, but that after storming Orchomenus he did not restore it to the Achaeans, but annexed and occupied it, wishing, as I think, not only to be master of the entrance into the Peloponnese, but to safeguard his interests in the interior by means of his garrison and arsenal at Orchomenus. Dorimachus and Scopas waited for the time when Timoxenus’ year of office had nearly expired, and Aratus, who had been appointed Strategus for the ensuing year by the Achaeans, would not yet be in office, and then, collecting the whole of the Aetolian forces at Rhium and preparing ferry-boats as well as the Cephallenian ships, they conveyed their men over to the Peloponnese and
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9 Μεσσηνίαν. ποιούμενοι δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῆς Πατρέων καὶ Φαραιέων καὶ Τριταίων χώρας ὑπεκρύνοντο μὲν βουλεύοντας μηδὲν ἄδικημα ποιεῖν
10 εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, οὐ δυναμένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς χώρας διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ὁθελείας ἀκρασίαν κακοποιοῦντες αὐτὴν καὶ λυματωμένοι διήσαν, μέχρι παρεγενήθησαν εἰς τὴν Φιγάλειαν.
11 ποιησάμενοι δὲ τὴν ὀρμήν ἐνεύθεν αἰφνιδίως καὶ θρασέως ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώραν, οὐτὲ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς ἐκ παλαιῶν χρόνων πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας οὐδὲ ἀντειόνον ποιησάμενοι πρόνοιαν οὔτε τῶν κατὰ κοινὸν ὄρισμένων δικαίων παρ’ ἄνθρωποις, ἀπαντά δ’ ἐν ἐλάττων θέμενοι τῆς σφετέρας πλεονεξίας ἀδεώς ἐπόρθουν, οὐ τολμῶντων ἐπεξείναι καθόλου τῶν Μεσσηνίων.

7 Οἵ δ’ Ἀχαιοί, καθηκούσης αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν νόμων συνόδου κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον, ἤκον εἰς Αἰγίνον.
2 συνελθόντες δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τῶν τε Πατρέων καὶ Φαραιέων ἀπολογιζόμενων τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν ἄδικημα κατὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν δίοδον, τῶν τε Μεσσηνίων παρόντων κατὰ προσβείαν καὶ δεομένων σφίσει βοήθειν
3 ἄδικουμένοις καὶ παρασπονδομένοις, διακούσαντες τῶν λεγομένων, καὶ συναγαγόμενοις μὲν τοῖς Πατρεῦσι καὶ Φαραιεύσι συμπάσχοντες δὲ ταῖς τῶν Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίας, μάλιστα δὲ νομίζοντες εἰναι δεινὸν εἰ μήτε συγχωρῆσαντο τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς μηδὲν τῇ δίοδον, μήτε καθάπαξ ἐπιβαλόμενοι παρατείθοιν, κατεστόλησαν ἐπιβηθούντες στρατοπέδῳ τῆς Ἀχαιας παρὰ τὰς συνθῆκας,
4 ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις παροξυνθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο βοήθειν
5 ἡ παρὰ τὸν ἀρχηγόν ἐπιστρατεύσαντος συμμαχίαν τοῖς Πατρεῦσι.
began to advance towards Messenia. On their march through the territory of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea, they pretended indeed not to wish to inflict any hurt on the Achaeans, but as the men could not keep their hands off the country, owing to their passion for pillaging, they went through it, spoiling and damaging, until they reached Phigalea. Thence by a bold and sudden rush they invaded Messenia, utterly regardless both of their long-existing alliance and friendship with the Messenians and of the established law of nations. Subordinating everything to their own selfish greed, they pillaged the country unmolested, the Messenians not daring to come out at all to attack them.

7. This being the time fixed by law for the meeting of their Federal Assembly, the Achaean deputies gathered at Aegium; and when the assembly met, the members from Patrae and Pharae gave an account of the injuries done to their country during the passage of the Aetolians, while an embassy from Messene arrived begging for help, as they had been treacherously and unjustly attacked. The Achaeans listened to these statements, and as they shared the indignation of the people of Patrae and Pharae, and sympathized with the Messenians in their misfortune, but chiefly since they thought it outrageous that the Aetolians without getting leave of passage from anyone and without making the least attempt to justify the action, had ventured to enter Achaea in arms contrary to treaty, they were so exasperated by all these considerations that they voted that help should be given to the Messenians.
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toις Μεσσηνίοις καὶ συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς
'Αχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ὃς ἂν τοῖς συνελθοῦσι
6 θητερομένοις δόξῃ, τούτ' εἶναι κύριον. ὃ μὲν
οὖν Τιμόξενος ὁ τότε ἐτὶ ὑπάρχων στρατηγὸς,
ὅσον οὔπω ληγούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀμα δὲ τοῖς
'Αχαιοῖς ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ ραθύμως αὐτοὺς ἐσχηκέ-
ναι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνα-
σίαν, ἀνεδύετο τῇ ἕξοδον καὶ καθόλου τὴν συν-
7 ἀγωγὴν τῶν ὀχλῶν: μετὰ γὰρ τὴν Κλεομένους
τοῦ Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως ἐκπτωσίν κάμνοντες
μὲν τοῖς προγεγονόσι πολέμοις, πιστεύοντες δὲ
τῇ παρούσῃ καταστάσει πάντες ὠλγυρῆσαν Πε-
λοπονήσιου τῆς περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ παρασκευῆς.
8 ὃ δ' Ἀρατὸς σχετιλάζων καὶ παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ
tῇ τολμῇ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν θυμικότερον ἔχρητο τοῖς
πράγμασιν, ἀτε καὶ προὐπαρχοῦσι αὐτοῖς ἀλ-
9 λοτρίπτητος ἐκ τῶν ἑπάνω χρόνων. διὸ καὶ
συνάγειν ἑσπευδὲ τοὺς 'Αχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις
10 καὶ συμβαλεῖν πρόθυμος ἄν τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς. τέλος
δὲ πένθ' ἡμέρας πρότερον τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτῶ
χρόνου παραλαβὼν παρὰ τοῦ Τιμόξενον τὴν
δημοσίαν σφραγίδα πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ἐγραφὲ
καὶ συνήγη τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων
11 εἰς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν. ὑπὲρ οὖ δοκεῖ μοι πρέ-
πον εἶναι βραχέα προεπεὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῆς
φύσεως.
8 Ἀρατός γὰρ ἦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τέλειος ἁνὴρ εἰς
2 τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον: καὶ γὰρ εἶπείν καὶ
dιανοηθήναι καὶ στέξει τὸ κριθὲν δυνατός, καὶ
μὴ ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς πολιτικὰς διαφορὰς πρᾶσις καὶ
φίλους ἐνδήσασθαι καὶ συμμάχους προσλαβεῖν
3 οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἐτὶ δὲ πράξεις ἀπάτας ἐπι-
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that the Strategus should call a general levy of the Achaean, and that this levy when it met should have full power to decide on what was to be done. Now Timoxenus, who was still Strategus, both because his term of office had very nearly expired, and because he had little confidence in the Achaean forces which had latterly much neglected their drilling, shrank from taking the field and even from levying the troops. For the fact is that ever since the fall of King Cleomenes of Sparta all the Peloponnesians, worn out as they were by the previous wars and trusting to the permanency of the present state of tranquillity, had paid no attention at all to preparations for war. But Aratus, incensed and exasperated by the audacity of the Aetolians, entered upon the business with much greater warmth, especially as he had a difference of long standing with that people. He therefore was in a hurry to call the levy of the Achaean and to take the field against the Aetolians, and at length receiving the public seal from Timoxenus five days before the proper date of his entering office, wrote to the different cities with orders that all citizens of military age should present themselves in arms at Megalopolis.

Before proceeding I think I should say a few words about Aratus owing to the singularity of his character. 8. He had in general all the qualities that go to make a perfect man of affairs. He was a powerful speaker and a clear thinker and had the faculty of keeping his own counsel. In his power of dealing suavely with political opponents, of attaching friends to himself and forming fresh alliances he was second to none. He also had a
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

boullas sunstheosathai kata twn polemwn kai taustas ep' telos angeinei dia tis autodi kako-
4 patheias kai tolmh deunostatos. enarh he de twv toiontvwn martrhia kai pleiw met evkfanh sti
tois istorhskosi kata meros peri te tis Sikuvwnos
kai Mantineias katalhpews kai peri tis Aitw-
lwn ek tis Pellenewn polews ekbolh, to de
megiston, peri tis ep' Akrokornthon praxeos.
5 de autos outhe ste twv upaithrwv antipouh-
sasathai boulyheh, nwhros met en taies epitolaious,
atoimos de ev taies epitolaious, ev obei de ou menon
6 to deinon. diw kai tropaian ev' auton bléptontwn
epilhres tei Pelleponnhsou, kai tithi ti tois
7 polemious aei poti ti evixeirwos. outhe a' twn
anthrwpon fusesi ou monon tois suymasen exousi
1 ti poleveides, eti de mallo touis psyhais, isste
ton auton andra men monon en tois diafereousi twn
energhmatwn pros a men evfwnos echein pros a
de evantw, alla kai peri tina twn omoeidwv
pollakis ton auton kai svnetwstaton einai kai
bradupton, omois de kai tolimprostaton kai
8 deilitaton. ou paraadoxa taustas ge, synhthe de
9 kai gnwrima tois boulomeneis svnefystanein. twes
men ghar en taies kunnhiais eisi tolmhrois pros
tas twn thrwn svnkatastaseis, oi de autoi
pros opla kai polemiouvs angeveis, kai tis ge
polemikhs xeias tis aut aundra men kai kat'
idian evxereis kai praktykoi, koinh de kai meta
10 polemikhs [eivwn] svntakews aprikostoi. Theita-
lwn goiun ispeis kat' ilhn men kai falaggeidou
anupostatos, xwris de paratakews pros kairo

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marvellous gift for devising coups de main, stratagems, and ruses against the enemy, and for executing such with the utmost personal courage and endurance. Of this we have many clear proofs, but the most conspicuous instances are the detailed accounts we possess of his seizure of Sicyon and Mantinea, his expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and first and foremost his surprise of the Acrocorinthus. But this very same man, when he undertook field operations, was slow in conception, timid in performance, and devoid of personal courage. The consequence was that he filled the Peloponnese with trophies commemorating his defeats, and in this respect the enemy could always get the better of him. So true is it that there is something multiform in the nature not only of men’s bodies, but of their minds, so that not merely in pursuits of a different class the same man has a talent for some and none for others, but often in the case of such pursuits as are similar the same man may be most intelligent and most dull, or most audacious and most cowardly. Nor is this a paradox, but a fact familiar to careful observers. For instance some men are most bold in facing the charge of savage beasts in the chase but are poltroons when they meet an armed enemy, and again in war itself some are expert and efficient in a single combat, but inefficient when in a body and when standing in the ranks and sharing the risk with their comrades. For example the Thessalian cavalry are irresistible when in squadrons and brigades, but slow and awkward when dispersed and
καὶ τῶν κατ’ ἄνδρα κυνδυνεύσαι δύσχρηστοι καὶ βραδεῖς. Ἀιτωλοὶ δὲ τούτων τάναντια.

11 Κρήτες δὲ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν πρὸς μὲν ἐνέδρας καὶ ληστείας καὶ κλοπὰς πολεμίων καὶ νυκτερινὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ πάσας τὰς μετὰ δόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος χρείας ἀνυπόστατοι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ὁμολόγου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον φαλαγ-γηθὸν ἔφοδον ἀγένεις καὶ πλάγιοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς· Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Μακεδόνες τάναντια τούτων.

12 ταῦτα μὲν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τοῦ μη διαπιστεῖν τοὺς ἀναγκυσκοντας τοῖς λεγομένοις, εὰν που περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄνδρῶν ἐναντίας ἀποφάσεις ποιώμεθα περὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

9 Αθροισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὀπλών εἰς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν κατὰ δόγμα τῶν Ἀχαίων (ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων παρεξήβημεν), καὶ τῶν Μεσσηνίων αὕθες ἐπιπορευθέντων ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ δεομένων μὴ περιδεῖν σφας οὕτω προφανῶς παρασπονδομένους, βουλομένων δὲ καὶ τῆς κοινῆς συμμαχίας μετασχεῖν καὶ σπευδόν-

3 τῶν ὀμοῦ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιγραφῆναι, περὶ μὲν τῆς συμμαχίας οἱ προσετέτως τῶν Ἀχαίων ἀπέλεγον, οὐ φάσκοντες δυνατὸν εἶναι χωρίς Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν συμμάχων οὐδένα προσλαβεῖν (ἐτι γὰρ ἐν-

6 ὅρκος ἐμενε πᾶσιν ἢ γεγενημένη συμμαχία δι- ἀντιγόνον κατὰ τοὺς Κλεομενίκους καίρους Ἀ-

5 Καρνάνσι Θετταλοῖς), ἐξελεύσεσθαι δὲ καὶ βοη-

8 Θησέως αὐτοῖς ἐφασαν, ἐὰν ὡμηρα δῶσιν οἱ παρα
gεγονότες τοὺς ἕαντῶν νεῖες εἰς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαι-
mονίων πόλιν χάριν τοῦ μη διαλυθῆσθαι πρὸς Ἀιτωλοὺς χωρίς τῆς τῶν Ἀχαίων βουλήσεως.
engaging the enemy single-handed as they chance to encounter them. The Aetolian horse are just the reverse. The Cretans both by land and sea are irresistible in ambuscades, forays, tricks played on the enemy, night attacks, and all petty operations which require fraud, but they are cowardly and down-hearted in the massed face-to-face charge of an open battle. It is just the reverse with the Achaeans and Macedonians. I say this in order that my readers may not refuse to trust my judgement, because in some cases I make contrary pronouncements regarding the conduct of the same men even when engaged in pursuits of a like nature.

9. When the men of military age had assembled in arms at Megalopolis in accordance with the decree of the Achaeans—it was at this point that I digressed from my narrative—and when the Messenians again presented themselves before the people, entreating them not to disregard the flagrant breach of treaty committed against them, and at the same time offering to join the general alliance and begging that they should at once be enrolled among the members, the Achaean magistrates refused the latter request on the ground that they were not empowered to receive additional members without consulting Philip and the rest of the allies. For the alliance was still in force which Antigonus had concluded during the Cleomenic war between the Achaeans, Epirots, Phocians, Macedonians, Boeotians, Acarnaneans, and Thessalians. They, however, agreed to march out to their assistance on condition that the envoys deposited in Sparta their own sons as hostages, to ensure that the Messenians should not come to terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans.
ΤΗΣ ΗΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

6 ἔστρατοπέδευον δὲ καὶ Λακεδαίμονι, κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν ἐξεληλυθότες, ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν Μεγαλοπολίτῶν ὀροὺς, ἐφεδρῶν καὶ θεωρῶν μᾶλλον ἡ

7 συμμάχων ἔχοντες τὰξιν. Ὁ Αρατός δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον τὰ πρὸς Μεσσηνίους διαπράξας ἔπεμπε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς, διασαφῶν τὰ δεδομένα καὶ παρακελεύομενος ἐπανάγειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώρας καὶ τῆς Ἀχαίας μὴ ψαύειν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, διότι χρῆσται τοῖς ἐπιβαίνονσιν ὡς πολεμίοις.

8 Σκόπας δὲ καὶ Δωρίμαχος ἀκούσαντες τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ γνώντες ἥθροουμένους τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς, ἤγοντο συμφέρειν σφίσι τότε τίθεσθαι τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις. παρανείκα μὲν οὖν ἐξαπέστελλον γραμματοφόρους εἰς τε Κυλλήνην καὶ πρὸς Ἀρίστωνα τὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγόν, ἀξιόντες κατὰ σπουδὴν αὐτοῖς ἀποστελλεῖν τὰ πορθεία τῆς Ἡλείας εἰς τὴν Φειάδα καλουμένην νῆσον.

9 αὐτὸι δὲ μετὰ δύο ἡμέρας ἀνέζευξαν γέμοντες τῆς λείας, καὶ προῆγγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡλείαν. ἀεὶ γὰρ ποτὲ τῆς τῶν Ἡλείων ἀντείχοντο φίλια Αἰτωλοί χάρων τοῦ διὰ τούτων ἐπιπλοκὰς λαμβάνειν πρὸς τὰς ἀρπαγὰς τὰς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ ληστείας.

10 'Ὁ δ' Ὁ Αρατός ἐπιμείνας δύο ἡμέρας, καὶ πιστεύσας εὐθὺς ὅτι πουσσοῖται τὴν ἐπάνω καθάπερ ὑπεδείκνυαν, τοὺς μὲν λοιποὺς Ἀχαίους καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαίμονικος διαφήκε πάντας εἰς τὴν 2 οἰκείαν, τρισχιλίους δὲ ἔχον πεζοὺς καὶ τριακοσίους ἵππεις καὶ τοὺς ἁμα τῶν Ταυρίωνι στρατιώτας προῆγγε τὴν ἐπὶ Πάτρας, ἀντιπαράγειν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς προαιρούμενος. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον πυθανόμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατόν ἀντιπαράγειν 320
should mention that the Spartans, too, had marched out according to the terms of the alliance, and were encamped on the borders of the territory of Megalopolis, in the position rather of reserves and spectators than of allies. Aratus having thus carried out his intentions regarding the Messenians, sent a message to the Aetolians informing them of the resolutions, and demanding that they should evacuate Messenia and not set foot in Achaea, or he would treat trespassers as enemies. Scopas and Dorimachus, having listened to this message and knowing that the Achaean forces were assembled, thought it best for the time to cede to this demand. They therefore at once sent dispatches to Ariston, the Aetolian Strategus at Cyllene, begging him to send them the transports as soon as possible to the island called Pheias off the coast of Elis. After two days they themselves took their departure loaded with booty and advanced towards Elis; for the Aetolians have always courted the friendship of the Eleans, as through them they could get in touch with the rest of the Peloponnese for purposes of foraying and raiding.

10. Aratus waited two days: and thinking foolishly that the Aetolians would return by the way they had indicated, dismissed to their homes all the rest of the Achaean and Lacedaemonian, and taking with him three thousand foot, three hundred horse, and Taurion’s troops, advanced in the direction of Patrae with the intention of keeping on the flank of the Aetolians. Dorimachus, on learning that Aratus was hanging on his flank and had not broken
4. Πόλεμον, τὴν μὲν λείαν ἀπέστειλαν ἐπὶ τὰ πλοῖα, συντήσαντες τοὺς ἴκανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὴν διακομιδὴν, προσενειλάμενοι τοῖς ἐκ-πεμπομένοις ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ Ῥίον ἀπαντᾷν ὡς
5. ἔντευθεν ποιησόμενοι τὴν ἐμβασιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον ἐφηδρευνὸν τῇ τῆς λείας ἐξαποστολή
περιέποντας, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα προῆγον ἐκ μεταβολῆς
6. ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ὀλυμπίας. ἀκούοντες δὲ τοὺς περὶ τὸν
Ταυρίωνα μετὰ τοῦ προειρημένου πλῆθους περὶ
tὴν Κλειτορίαν εἶναι, καὶ νομίζοντες οὐδὲν ὡς
dυνῆσόνται τῷ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ῥίου διάβασιν ἀνευ 
7. δύνου ποιῆσοντας καὶ συμπλοκῆς, ἔκριναν συμ-
φέρειν τοῖς σφέτεροις πράγμασιν ὡς τάχυστα συμ-
μίξα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατόν ἀκμῆν ὄλγους ὅσι
8. καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀνυπονοητοῦ, ὑπολαβόντες, ἂν
μὲν τρέψωνται τούτους, προκαταστύρατες τὴν
χώραν ἀσφαλῆ ποιῆσοντας τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ῥίου
dιάβασιν, ἐν δὲ μελέτα καὶ βουλεύεται συναθροῖ-
9. ζεσθαί πάλιν τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πλῆθος, ἂν δὲ
καταπλαγεῖτες φυγομαχῆσαι καὶ μὴ βούλωντας
συμβάλλειν οἱ περὶ τῶν Ἀρατον, ἀνευ κινδύνου
ποιῆσοντας τῇ ἀπόλυσιν, ὀπόταν αὐτοῖς δοκῆ
10. συμφέρειν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι χρησάμενοι
λογισμοῖς προῆγον, καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν περὶ
Μεθύδριον τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος,

11. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἤγεμόνες, συνέντες τὴν παρ-
ουσίαν τῶν Αιτωλῶν, οὕτως κακῶς ἔχρησαντο τοῖς
πράγμασιν ὡσθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ἀνοίας μὴ καταλιπεῖν.
2. ἀναστρέφοντες γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Κλειτορίας κατεστρατο
up all his force, fearful on the one hand lest he should attack them while occupied in embarking and eager also to stir up war, sent his booty off to the ships, under charge of a sufficient force of competent men to superintend the passage, ordering those in charge of the ships to meet him at Rhium where it was his intention to embark, while he himself at first accompanied the booty to protect it during its shipment and afterwards reversed the direction of his march and advanced towards Olympia. There he heard that Taurion with the forces I mentioned above was in the neighbourhood of Cleitor, and judging that, this being so, he would not be able to embark at Rhium in security and without an engagement, he thought it most in his interest to make all haste to encounter Aratus, whose army was still weak and who had no suspicion of his intention. He thought that if he defeated him, he could first ravage the country and then embark safely at Rhium, while Aratus was occupied in taking measures for again mustering the Achaeans, whereas, if Aratus were intimidated and refused a battle, he could safely withdraw whenever he thought fit. Acting therefore on these considerations he advanced and encamped near Methydrium in the territory of Megalopolis.

11. The Achaean commanders, when they became aware of the approach of the Aetolians, mismanaged matters to such an extent that it was impossible for anyone to have acted more stupidly. For, returning from the territory of Cleitor, they encamped near
3 πεδευσαν περὶ Καφύας, τῶν δ’ Αἰτωλῶν ποιομένων τὴν πορείαν ἀπὸ Μεθυδρίου παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ὁρχο-
μενίων πόλιν ἐξάγοντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τῷ τῶν
Καφνέων πεδίῳ παρενεβαλον, πρόβλημα ποιούμε-
νοι τοῦ δὲ αὐτοῦ βέοντα ποταμόν. οἱ δ’ Αἰτωλοὶ
καὶ διὰ τὰς μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας (ἥσαν γὰρ ἔτι
πρὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ τάφροι καὶ πλείους δύσβατοι)
καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐπίφασιν τῆς ἐπομότητος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν
πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ μὲν ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς ὑπεναν-
tίοις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀπεδείλιασαν,
5 μετὰ δὲ πολλῆς εὐταξίας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν πορείαν
ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐπὶ τὸν Ὀλύγυρτον, ἀσμε-
νίζοντες εἰ μὴ τις αὐτοῖς ἐγχειροῖ καὶ βιάζοτο
6 κινδυνεύειν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀρατοῦ, τῆς μὲν
πρωτοπορείας τῶν Ἀἰτωλῶν ἥδη προσβανοῦσης
πρὸς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, τῶν δὲ ἵππεων ὑπαγοῦντων
διὰ τοῦ πεδίου καὶ συνεγχιζόντων τῷ προσαγο-
ρευμένῳ. Πρόποδι τῆς παρωρείας, ἐξαποστέλλουσι
τοὺς ἵππες καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, Ἐπίστρατον
ἐπιστήσαντες τὸν Ἀκαρνάνα, καὶ συντάξαντες
ἐξάπτεσθαι τῆς ὑπαγίας καὶ καταπεράξειν τῶν
7 πολεμίων. καὶ τοῖς γε εἰ μὲν τὴν κινδυνεύτευν, οὐ
πρὸς τὴν ὑπαγίαν ἔχρην συμπλέκεσθαι διηνυκότων
ἡδὴ τῶν πολεμίων ὑμᾶς ὑμῖν τῶν ὑμῶν, πρὸς
dὲ τὴν πρωτοπορείαν εὐθέως ἐμβαλόντων εἰς τὸ
8 πεδίον: οὖτως γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἀγώνα συνέβη γενέσθαι
tὸν ὅλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις καὶ πεδίοις τόποις,
οὐ τοὺς μὲν Αἰτωλοὺς δυσχρηστοτάτους εἶναι
συνέβαινε διὰ τε τῶν καθοπλισμῶν καὶ τὴν ὀλην
σύνταξιν, τοὺς δὲ Ἀχαῖους εὐχρηστοτάτους καὶ
δυναμικωτάτους διὰ τὰν χαίρειν τῶν προειρημένων.
9 νῦν δὲ ἀφέμενοι τῶν οἰκείων τόπων καὶ καιρῶν
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Caphyae, and when the Aetolians began to march from Methydrium past Orchomenus, they led out the Achaean forces and drew them up in the plain of Caphyae, with the river which traverses it in their front. The Aetolians, both owing to the difficulties of the ground between the two armies—for besides the river there were several awkward ditches—and owing to the display of readiness for battle on the part of the Achaens, were afraid of attacking the enemy as they had intended, but marched in admirable order towards the heights by Olygyrtus, thinking themselves lucky if no one attacked them and forced them to fight. But Aratus, when the van of the Aetolians was already beginning to mount the heights, and while their cavalry were protecting their rear and approaching the spot at the foot of the hill called Propous, or Foothill, sent out his cavalry and light-armed infantry under the command of the Acarnanian Epistratus, ordering him to get into touch with the enemy’s rear and harass them. Now if he had decided to engage the enemy, he should not have attacked their rear after they had already got over the level ground, but their van the moment they entered the plain; for thus the whole battle would have been on flat ground, where the Aetolians are very inefficient, owing to their accoutrement and general tactics, while the Achaens, owing to their total difference in both these respects, are very capable and strong. But now neglecting to avail themselves of the time and place that suited
eis tâ tûn polemîon prôterîmatia sungkatê-

βησαν. tougaróûn akóloûthôn to télos ëxëbî toû
kivdûnon tais ëpibolaìs. ëxaptoimênòn gár tûn
eùzûnon tûrôiûtes òi tûn Aítwloûn ïppeiês tûn
tàzì anpeçôrun eis tîn parôreian, spenûntes
sûnâìsai tois par' autôn peçôis. òi ðe peri tûn
'Aratôn ouite katódûntes kalôs to gînoûmenon
ou't' eklogiôsâmênou deûntos to meta taûta sumphe-
sómoûn, ãma tû toûs ïppeiês ìdeîn ùpochôrûntas

3 ëlptisantès autôiûs feûgëin, toûs mên aûto tûn
kerâtwn thwraiktas ëxapésteilai, paraggeiântes
bûthêin kai súnâpantei toûs par' autôn eu-
zûois, autôi ð' ëpî kêras klûntes tûn dûamûn

4 ëgôn metà drômon kai spoudhês. òi ðe tûn Aítw-
loûn ïppeiês diamûsantès to pêdion, ãma tû
sûnâsai toûs peçôis autôi mên ùpô tûn parôreian ùpostetë-
lantes ëmënon, toûs ðe peçôus ëthrouzôn prôs tâ
plàgia kai parékâlou, ëtoûmous prôs tûn kranhû
anatrehûnton kai parabohûntôn aûi tûn ëk

tûs pôreias. ëpetî ð' èxoiromáxous ùpelabôn ènai
sphâs autôiûs kâtâ to plîthos, sputrapèntès
ènèbalon toûs proîmahemûn tûn 'Axaîkûn ëp-
péwûn kai ùlûwn' òntes ðe pleiûos kai poioûmenoi
tûn èñphodôn ñè ùperdèxiûn polûûn mên khroûn èkî-
dûnesan, télos ð' ètrèpsantô toûs sunkathêtûtases.

7 ën ðe tû toûtous ègklûntas feûgëin ði paraboph-
ðoûntes thwraiktai kâtû pôreiàn âtáktoûs epi-
parchenômenoi kai sporâdhn, ði mên èporoûntes
ëpî toûs gînoûmenoi, ði ðe sumpîpûntontes ãntûûs
tûs feûgônûi kâtû tûn ðûpochûrônûn, anastrôfeûn

8 ëngagkáztontô kai to paraplêsion pòleiûn. ñè ou
sûnèbainê toûs mûn êk tûs sunkatastûtasewûs

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them they yielded up every advantage to the enemy. In consequence the result of the battle was what naturally follows on such an opening. 12. For when the light-armed troops got in touch with them, the Aetolian cavalry retired to the foot of the hill in good order with the object of joining their infantry. But Aratus, who had neither observed well what was happening nor calculated properly what would follow, thinking, the moment he saw the cavalry retreating, that they were in flight, sent the cuirassed troops from his wings with orders to join and support his light-armed force, while he himself, forming his men in column, led them on at the double. The Aetolian horse, having traversed the plain, joined their infantry, and while halting there, themselves under the shelter of the hill, began to collect the infantry on their flanks by calling on them, the men on the march giving a ready ear to their shouts and running back and falling in to help. When they thought they were sufficiently strong, they formed up close and fell upon the leading lines of the Achaean horse and light infantry. As they were superior in number, and as they were charging from higher ground, after a somewhat lengthy struggle they at length put their adversaries to flight. When these gave way and ran, the cuirassed men who were hurrying up to help them, and kept arriving in no order and in batches, some of them being at a loss to know what was the matter and others coming into collision with the fugitives, were compelled to turn round and take to flight also. The consequence was that
ΤΗΣ ΟΔΗΓΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΑΙΤΩΛΟΥ, ΓΡΑΦΕΙΟΝ ΤΟῦ ΕΙΣ ΤΟῦ ΠΟΛΕΩΤΕΡΟΥ ΜΑΥΡΟΥ, ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑΚΛΥΣΗ ΤΟῦ ΚΑΙΡΟΥ ΑΠΟ ΠΕΡΙΟΙΚΟΥΝΤΩΝ ΨΥΧΩΝ, ΕΝ ΠΑΡΑΤΗΘΈΝΔΟΣ ΠΟΛΕΩΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΕΝΤΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ. ΑΥ преимущественно доказывает, что сильы айяталяв ков тый краун, поименован из тых икакой в них апокроти, проръ тых бараба тых оплыв, и тых аспеалей, и тых хе архис тазев, и тых мь ныхтом еуан тых аспеалей, и тых макрой онтас ен погера и кай диалемвяноус, ой мь онтав енйевоо диарреонтес атактвс епиймо санто тых апокроти, епъ тахс паракеменас.

9. Η φυγή καὶ σωτηρίος: συνθεσμοί δὲ καὶ τούτων λειτουργεῖας τὰς τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείας καὶ μακροῦ ὄντας ἐν πορείᾳ καὶ διαλειμένους, οί μὲν αὐτῶν εὐθέως διαρρέοντες ἀτάκτως ἐποίησαν τὴν ἀποκρότησιν ἐπὶ τὰς παρακειμένας πόλεις, οἱ δὲ συμπεπτοντες ἀντίοις τοῖς ἐπιφερομένους φαλαγγίταις οὐ προσεδόντο τῶν πολεμίων, αὐτοὶ δὲ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήττοντες ἡναγκάζουν.

10. Φεβερει τροποποίησιν. Ἐχρώντω δὲ τῇ φυγῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀποκρότησιν, ὡς προείπομεν, ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις: ο τῇ παπάς Ὁρθομενως αἰτεὶ τῷ Καβύις σύνεγγυς οὐδαί πολλοὶ ὄντασ. μὴ γὰρ τούτων συμβάντος ἀπαντεῖν ἄν εκκυνδύνεσαι διαφθαρῆναι παραλόγως.

11. Ὁ μὲν οὖν περὶ Καβύις γενόμενος κίνδυνος τούτων ἀπέβη τὸν τρόπον, οἱ δὲ Μεγαλοπολῖται συνέντευγοι τοῦ Αιτωλοῦ περὶ τὸ Μεθύριον ἔστησαν πολεμόν ὑποτεθέντως, ἦκον ἀπὸ σάλπυγγος πανδημεί βοηθοῦντες τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρας τῆς μάχης, καὶ μεθῆ ὡς ἔνωντων ἠλπισάν κινδυνεύσαν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, τούτως ἡναγκάζοντο βάπτειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχειρῶν τετελευτηκότας. ὁρυάντες δὲ τάφρον ἐν τῷ τῶν Καβύων πεδίῳ, καὶ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς, ἐκδεδευσάν μετὰ πάσης φιλοτιμίας τοὺς ἡρωικοτάς.
while those routed on the field were not above five hundred, the number of those in flight exceeded two thousand. The circumstances of the moment making it clear to the Aetolians what was to be done, they followed on the heel of the enemy with insolent and continued shouts. The retreat of the Achaeans was at first an honourable retirement, as it seemed, to a position of safety, since they imagined they were falling back on their heavy-armed troops whom they supposed to be still strong in their original position. But upon seeing that the latter also had quitted their strong position and were already far off and marching in a straggling line, some of them at once dispersed and fled in disorder to the neighbouring towns, while those who encountered the men of their own phalanx marching in the opposite direction, had no need of the enemy, but threw their comrades as well as themselves into a panic and forced them to headlong flight. They fled, as I said, to the towns, Orchomenus and Caphyae being quite near and affording refuge to many: for if this had not been the case the whole force would have run the risk of a destruction as complete as unexpected.

Such was the issue of the battle at Caphyae. 13. The Megalopolitans, on hearing that the Aetolians were encamped at Methydrium, summoned their whole levy by trumpet and arrived to help the day after the battle, so that they were compelled to bury, slain by the foe, the very men side by side with whom they had expected to stand and meet that foe in battle. Digging a trench in the plain of Caphyae, they collected the bodies and interred the unfortunates with all due honours.
4 Oi δ' Αιτωλοί παραδόξως δι' αυτῶν τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν πουήσαντες τὸ προτέρημα, λοιπὸν ἦσθη μετ' ἄσφαλείας διὰ μέσης Πελοποννήσου διήγεισαν. Εν οὖ καὶ τὸν τελευταῖον τῶν Πελληνέων πόλεως, κατασύραντες δὲ τὴν Σικυωνίαν χώραν, τέλος κατὰ τὸν ἴσθμὸν ἐποίησαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν.

5 Τὴν μὲν οὖν αὐτίνα καὶ τὴν ἄφοριμην ὁ συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος ἔσχεν ἐκ τούτων, τὴν δ' ἄρχην ἐκ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένου δόγματος ἀπάντων τῶν συμμάχων, ὁ συνελήφτης εἰς τὴν τῶν Κορυθίων πόλεως ἐπεκύρωσαν, διαπρεπεύσαντο τὸ διαβούλιον Φιλίππου τοῦ βασιλέως. το δὲ τῶν Ἀχαίων πλῆθος μετὰ τινὰς ἡμέρας ἀθροισθὲν εἰς τὴν καθήκουσαν συνόδον, πικρῶς διέκειτο καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατ' ἴδιαν πρὸς τὸν Ἀρατὸν ὡς τούτον ὁμολογούμενως αὐτίναν γεγονότα τοῦ προειρημένου συμπτώματος. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευμένων κατηγοροῦντων αὐτοῦ καὶ φερόντων ἀπολογισμοὺς ἐναργεῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡγανάκτει καὶ παρωξύνετο τὸ πλῆθος. ἔδοκεν γὰρ πρῶτον ἀμάρτημα προφανὲς εἶναι τὸ μηδὲπω τῆς ἄρχης αὐτῷ καθηκούσης προλαβόντα τῶν ἀλλότριων καὶρὸν ἀναδέχεσθαι τοιαύτας πράξεις ἐν αἷς συνήδει πολλάκις αὐτῶ 4 διεσφαλέως. δεύτερον δὲ καὶ μείζον ντούτο ὁ διαφείναι τοῦς Ἀχαίων ἀκμῆν ἐν μέσῳ Πελοποννήσου τῶν Αιτωλῶν ὑπαρχοῦσιν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ προδιεληφότα διότι σπεύδουσιν ἐπὶ περὶ τῶν Σκόπαν καὶ Δωρίμαχον κυνεῖν τὰ καθεστώτα καὶ συντα.

5 Ῥάζαι τὸν πόλεμον τρίτον δὲ τὸ συμβαλεῖν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις οὕτω μετ' ὁλίγων μηδεμίας κατεπειγοῦσις ἀνάγκης, δυνάμενον ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὰς 330
The Aetolians, having in this remarkable manner won a battle with their cavalry and light infantry alone, continued to advance henceforth in safety through the middle of the Peloponnese. After making an attempt on Pellene during their march and pillaging the territory of Sicyon, they finally withdrew by way of the Isthmus.

Such was the cause and origin of the Social War, its beginning being the resolution passed by all the allies, who assembling at Corinth under the presidency of King Philip, confirmed this measure.a

14. A few days afterwards the Achaean Federal Assembly held its regular general meeting, at which both the whole body and the individual members showed themselves very bitterly disposed towards Aratus as having indisputably caused the late disaster, and so when his political opponents accused him, producing clear proofs of his culpability, the Assembly became still more exasperated and embittered against him. For the general opinion was that he had manifestly erred in the first place in usurping his predecessor's office before the time in order to undertake the sort of enterprise in which to his own knowledge he had often failed. His second and graver error lay in his having disbanded the Achaean while the Aetolians were still in the very heart of the Peloponnese, especially as he had been previously aware that Scopas and Dorimachus were doing their best to disturb the existing settlement and stir up war. Thirdly, he had engaged the enemy with such a small force, when there was no urgent necessity to do so, as he might

a See Chapter 25.
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παρακεμένας πόλεις ἀποχωρήσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τότε συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις,
6 εἰ τοῦτο πάντως ἤγειτο συμφέρειν· τελευταίον καὶ μέγιστον τὸ προθέμενον καὶ συμβαλεῖν οὕτως εἰκῇ καὶ ἀσκόπτως χρήσασθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡστε παρέντα τὰ πεδία καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀπλιτῶν χρείαν δι' αὐτῶν τῶν εὐζώνων ταῖς παρωρείαις πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς ποιῆσασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, οἷς οὐδὲν ἦν τούτου
7 προνυγραίτερον οὐδὲ οἰκειότερον. οὐ μὴν ἄλλῳ ἁμι τῷ προελθόντα τὸν Ἀρατον ἀναμνήσαι μὲν τῶν προπεπολιτευμένων καὶ πεπραγμένων προτερον αὐτῷ, φέρειν δ' ἀπολογισμοὺς περὶ τῶν ἐγκαλουμένων ὡς οὐ γέγονεν αἰτίος τῶν συμβεβηκότων, αἰτεῖσθαι δὲ συγγνώμην εἰ καὶ τὶ παρεώρακε κατὰ τὸν γενόμενον κίνδυνον, οὔεσθαι δὲ δεῖν καὶ καθόλου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ πράγματα μὴ πικρῶς ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπίνως, οὕτως ταχέως καὶ μεγαλοφύχως μετεμελήθη τὸ πλήθος ὡστε καὶ τοὺς συνεπιτθεμένους αὐτῷ τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων ἐπὶ πολὺ δυσαρεστήσαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐξῆς πάντα βουλεύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν Ἀράτου γνώμην.
9 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν προτέραν ἐπεσεν ὀλυμπιάδα, τὰ δὲ ἔξης εἰς τὴν τετταρακοστὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑκατον. 15 ἢν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ταῦτα· πρεσβεύειν πρὸς Ἡπειρῶτας Βοιωτοὺς Φωκέας Ἀκαρνάνας
2 Φίλιππον, καὶ διασαφεῖν τίνα τρόπον Αἰτωλοῖ
παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας μεθ' ὁπλῶν ἢδη δι' εἰσβεβληκότες εἰσήσαν εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν, καὶ παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς βοηθεῖν κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας, προσδέξασθαι
3 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν· τὸν δὲ στρατηγὸν ἐπιλέξαι τῶν Ἀχαίων πεζοὺς μὲν

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have retired safely to the towns close at hand and reasssembled the Achaean forces before giving battle. But his fourth and greatest error was, that when he had decided to fight he managed matters so casually and inconsiderately, that neglecting to avail himself of the plain and make a proper use of his hoplites, he elected to fight on the hill, with only his light-armed troops, against Aetolians to whom nothing is more advantageous and familiar than such conditions. Nevertheless, when Aratus rose, and after reminding them of his conduct of affairs and achievements in the past, defended himself against the accusations, maintaining that he was not responsible for what occurred; and when he asked their pardon if he had possibly been guilty of any oversight in the battle, and said he thought that in general it was better to view facts in no spirit of bitterness, but with human charity: he produced such a rapid and generous revulsion of feeling in the Assembly, that they remained for long displeased with those of his political opponents who had joined in the attack on him, and as to the immediate future adopted Aratus' opinion in every matter. This took place in the previous Olympiad; what follows falls in the 140th.

15. The resolution passed by the Achaeans was as follows: To send embassies to the Epirots, Boeotians, Phocians, Acarnanians, and to Philip, pointing out how the Aetolians had twice, in direct breach of the treaty, entered Achaea in arms, and begging for assistance according to the terms of their alliance and also for the admission of the Messenians into the confederacy. The Strategus of the Achaeans
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πεντακισχιλίως ἵππεῖς δὲ πεντακοσίους, καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἐὰν ἐπιβαίνωσιν Διῶλοι

τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν· συντάξασθαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαίμονίους καὶ πρὸς Μεσσηνίους ὅσους δεύτερον παρ᾽ ἀμφότερον ἵππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς χρείας. δοξάσεις δὲ τούτων οἱ μὲν Ἀχαίοι φέροντες γενναίως τὸ γεγονός ὡστε τοὺς Μεσσηνίους ἐγκατελίπτον ὡστε τὴν αὐτῶν πρόθεσιν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους καθεσταμένους τὰς πρε-

6 σβείας ἐπετέλουσιν, ὃ δὲ στρατηγὸς τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαιας ἄνδρας ἐπέλεγε κατὰ τὸ δόγμα, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαίμονίους καὶ Μεσσηνίους συνετάττετο πεζοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἐκατέρων ὑπάρχειν διαχιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους ἵππεῖς δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι,

7 ὡστ' εἶναι τὸ πᾶν σύστημα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιγνωμένας χρείας πεζοὺς μὲν μυρίους ἵππεῖς δὲ χιλίους.

8 Οἱ δ᾽ Διῶλοι, παραγενομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς καθηκούσης ἐκκλησίας, συνελθόντες ἐβουλεύσαντο πρὸς τε Λακεδαίμονίους καὶ Μεσσηνίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας εἰρήνην ἁγεῖν, κακοπραγμονοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι φθείρειν καὶ λυμαίνεσθαι τοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συμμάχους· πρὸς αὐτοῖς δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς, εὰν μὲν ἀφιστῶνται τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων συμμαχίας, ἁγεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην, εἰ δὲ μή, πολεμεῖν, πράγμα πάντων ἀλογώτατον. ὡστε γὰρ αὐτοὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τῶν Μεσσηνίων, εὶ μὲν οὕτω πρὸς ἄλληλους φιλίαν ἁγιοῦν καὶ συμμαχίαν, τὸν πόλεμον τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπήγγελλον, εἰ δὲ ἔχθραν ἐλούντο πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους, τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς ἐποίουν κατὰ μόνας,

9 ὡστε μηδὲ ὑπὸ λόγον πίπτειν τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον αὐτῶν τῶν ἐγχειρημάτων.

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was to levy a force of five thousand foot and five hundred horse, and to go to the assistance of the Messenians, should the Aetolians invade their country. He was further to arrange with Sparta and Messene how many cavalry and infantry each state should contribute for the needs of the League. Having passed this resolution the Achaeans continued to bear their late reverse bravely, and neither abandoned the Messenians nor their own purpose. The ambassadors sent to the allies executed their instructions, and the Strategus enrolled in Achaea the number of men decided on, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians that they should each send two thousand five hundred foot and two hundred and fifty horse, so that the whole force available for the coming campaign amounted to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.

The Aetolians, when the time came for their regular annual Assembly to meet, voted to maintain peace with the Lacedaemonians, Messenians, and all the other states, with the mischievous design of corrupting and spoiling the allies of the Achaeans. As regards the Achaeans themselves they voted to be at peace with them if they abandoned the Messenian alliance, but if this alliance were maintained to go to war with them. Nothing could have been more unreasonable. For they were themselves allies of both the Achaeans and Messenians, and now if these two states remained in alliance with each other they threatened to declare war on the Achaeans, but they offered a separate peace to the Achaeans if they chose to be at enmity with the Messenians. So that no reasonable explanation can be given of their iniquity, so utterly wrong-headed were their designs.
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16 Οἱ δ’ Ἡπειρῶται καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων τοὺς μὲν Μεσσηνίους
2 εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν προσέλαβον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένους παραντίκα μὲν ἡγανάκτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλείον ἑθαύμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον τῶν εἰθαμένοιν δὲ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς
3 Αἰτωλοὺς. διόστερ οὐδ’ ὑργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλείον, ἀλλ’ ἐνεφίσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς· ὅτως ἡ συνεχής ἀδικία συγγνώμης τυγχάνει μᾶλλον τῆς σπασίον καὶ παράδοξον πονηρίας.
4 Αἰτωλοὶ γονὸν τούτῳ τῷ πρόπῳ χρώμενοι καὶ ληστεύοντες συνεχῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολέμους ἀνεπαγγέλτους φέροντες πολλοῖς, οὐδ’ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηχίουν τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλ’ καὶ προσε- χεύαζον εἰ τις αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἢ καὶ νὴ Δίᾳ τῶν μελλόντων.
5 οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσφάτως μὲν ἠλευθερωμένοι δι’ Ἀντιγόνον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φιλοτιμίας, ὁφείλοντες δὲ Μακεδόνι καὶ Φιλίππῳ μηδὲν ὑπεναντίων πράττειν, διαπεμψάμενοι λάθρα πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς φιλίαν δι’ ἀπορρήτων ἐθεντο καὶ συμμαχίας.
6 Ἡδὴ δ’ ἐπιλεγμένων τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν νεανίσκων καὶ συντεταγμένων ὑπὲρ τῆς βοσθείας τῶν Λακε- δαιμονίων καὶ Μεσσηνίων, Σκερδιλαίδας ὁμοῦ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος ἐπελεύσαν ἐκ τῆς Ἰλυ- ρίδος ἐνενήκοντα λέμβοις ἔξω τοῦ Δίσσου παρὰ τὰς πρὸς Ῥωμαίων συνθήκας. οἱ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῇ Πύλῳ προσμίξαντες καὶ ποιησάμενοι προσ-
8 βολὰς ἀπέπεσον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Δημήτριος μὲν ἐχων τοὺς πεντήκοντα τῶν λέμβων ὁμμησεν ἐπὶ νήσου, καὶ περιπλέεων τινὰς μὲν ἡργυρολόγει
16. The Epirots and Philip, after listening to the envoys, agreed to receive the Messenians into the alliance. They felt a momentary indignation at the proceedings of the Aetolians, but were not deeply shocked at them, as the Aetolians had not acted in a manner to surprise anyone, but simply as is their habit. Consequently their resentment was of brief duration, and they voted to remain at peace with the Aetolians. So true is it that persistent wrongdoing is more readily pardoned than occasional and startling acts of iniquity. The Aetolians at least, continuing to behave in this manner, constantly pillaging Greece and committing frequent acts of war without declaration, not only never thought it worth the trouble to defend themselves against complaints, but ridiculed anyone who called them to account for their past offences or even for their future designs. As for the Lacedaemonians, though they had been so recently set free through Antigonus, and through the spirited action of the Achaeans, and should not have in any way acted against the Macedonians and Philip, they sent privately to the Aetolians and made a secret alliance with them.

The Achaean levy had been enrolled, and the Lacedaemonians and Messenians had contracted to send their contingents, when Scerdilaïdas, together with Demetrius of Pharos, sailed from Illyria with a fleet of ninety boats and passed Lissus, thus breaking the treaty with Rome. They touched first at Pylos and made some attacks on it which failed. Demetrius now with fifty of the boats started for the islands, and sailing through the Cyclades pillaged or levied
9 τινὰς δ’ ἐπόρθει τῶν Κυκλάδων, Σκερδιλαίδας δὲ ποιούμενος τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπ’ οἴκου προσείχε πρὸς Ναύπακτον μετὰ τετταράκοντα λέμβων, πεισθεὶς Ἀμμανᾶ τῷ βασίλει τῶν Ἀθαμάνων, ὃς ἐτύγχανε κηδεστὶς ὑπάρχων αὐτοῦ, ποιησάμενος δὲ συνθήκας πρὸς Ἀιτωλοὺς δι’ Ἀγελάου περὶ τοῦ μερισμοῦ τῶν λαφύρων ὑπέσχετο συνεμβαλεῖν ὤμοσε τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν.

10 Συνθέμενοι δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Σκερδιλαίδαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀγελάον καὶ Δωρίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, πραττομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν Κυναιθέων πόλεως, συναθροίσαντες πανδημεί τοὺς Ἀιτωλούς ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Ἀχαιαν μετὰ τῶν Ἑλληρίων. Ἀριστων δ’ ὁ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν στρατηγὸς, οὐ προσποιούμενος οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων, ἤγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας, φάσκων οὐ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀλλὰ διατηρεῖν τὴν εἰρήνην, εὐθεῖς καὶ παιδικὸν πράγμα ποιῶν δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εὐήθη καὶ μάταιον εἰκός φαίνεσθαι τὸν τοιούτον, ὅταν ὑπολαμβάνῃ τοῖς λόγοις ἐπικρύψασθαι τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐναργεῖας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον διὰ τῆς Ἀχαιάτιδος ποιησάμενοι τὴν πορείαν ἢκον ἄφων πρὸς τὴν Κύναιθαν. συνέβανε δὲ τοὺς Κυναιθέως ὄντας Ἀρκάδας ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων [ἐν] ἀκαταπάντοις καὶ μεγάλαις συνεχῆσθαι στάσει, καὶ πολλὰς μὲν κατ’ ἄλληλων πεποιηθαί σφαγάς καὶ φυγάς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀρπαγάσων ὑπαρχόντων, ἔτι δὲ γῆς ἀναδασμοῦς, τέλος δ’ ἐπικρατήσαι τοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αἱρουμένους καὶ κατασχεῖν τὴν πόλιν, φυλακῆν ἔχοντας τῶν τείχων καὶ στρατηγὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐξ Ἀχαιάς.

6 τούτων δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντων, ὀλύγοις ἐμπροσθεν χρόνοις τῆς τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν παρουσίας διαπεμπομέ-
blackmail on some of them. Scerdilaïdas on his voyage home touched at Naupactus with his forty boats at the request of Amynas, the king of Athamania, who was his connexion by marriage. Here, having come to terms with the Aetolians through Agelaus about the division of the spoil, he promised to join them in invading Achaea.

Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas were negotiating for the betrayal to them of the city of Cynaetha, and having made this arrangement with Scerdilaïdas, they collected the Aetolian forces en masse and invaded Achaea with the Illyrians. 17. Meanwhile Ariston, the Aetolian Strategus, in pretended ignorance of what was going on, kept quiet in Aetolia, asserting that he was not making war on the Achaeans but keeping the peace; which was most foolish and childish on his part. For it is obvious that a man who thinks he can cloak by words the clear evidence of facts must be regarded as a foolish and futile person. Dorimachus, marching through Achaea, appeared suddenly before Cynaetha. The people of Cynaetha, who are Arcadians, had been for many years vexed by the never-ending and embittered strife of factions; there had been constant massacres, expulsions, robbery of goods, and confiscation of lands by the one party or the other, and now at length the Achaean party had the upper hand and were in possession of the city, the Achaeans furnishing them with a garrison to hold the walls and a military governor of the city. Such was the state of affairs, when a short time before the arrival of the Aetolians, upon the exiles sending frequent
νων τῶν φυγάδων πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ δεο-
μένων διαλυθῆναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ κατάγειν σφᾶς
7 εἰς τὴν οίκειαν, πεισθέντες οἱ κατέχοντες τὴν
πόλιν ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαίων ἔθνος, βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖσθαι
8 τὰς διαλύσεις. ἐπιχωρησάντων δὲ ἑτοίμως διὰ
tὸ πεπείσθαι σφίσιν ἀμφοτέρους ἐυνοήσεως, ἀτὲ
tῶν μὲν κατεχόντων τὴν πόλιν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαῖοῖς
ἐχόντων πάσας τὰς ἐλπίδας, τῶν δὲ καταπρευ-
μένων μελλόντων τυχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας διὰ τὴν
9 τῶν Ἀχαίων συγκατάθεσιν, οὕτως ἀποστείλαντες
tὴν παραβιακὴν καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
οἱ Κυναιθεῖς διέλυσαντο καὶ κατήγαγον τοὺς
φυγάδας, ὡς σχεδὸς εἰς τριακοσίους, λαβόντες
πίστεις τῶν παρ' ἀνθρώποις νομιζομένων τὰς
ισχυροτάτας. οἳ δὲ κατανοοῦσαντες οὐχ ὅσ
ἀτίας ἢ προφάσεως ἐπιγενομένης τοῦ δοκεῖν
ἀλλὰς διαφορὰς ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς των γεγενήσθαι,
tὸ δὲ ἑναντίον παραχρῆμα κατελθόντες εὐθέως
11 ἐπεβούλευον τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς σώσασι. καὶ μοι
dοκοῦσι, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἐπὶ τῶν σφαγῶν τοὺς
ὀρκοὺς καὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐδίδοσαν ἀλλήλοις, τότε
μάλιστα διανοεῖσθαι περὶ τε τῆς εἰς τὸ θεῖον καὶ
12 τοὺς πιστεύσαντας ἁσβείας. ἣμα γαρ τῶ μετα-
σχεῖν τῆς πολιτείας εὐθέως ἐπεσπώντο τοὺς Ἀἰ-
tωλοὺς καὶ τούτοις ἐπράττον τὴν πόλιν, σπεύδοντες
tοὺς σώσαντας ἢμα καὶ τὴν ἀρέσκαν ἀρδήν ἀπο-
λέσαι.

18 Τὴν δὲ πρᾶξιν τοιαύτα τῶν τόλμη καὶ τοιούτω
2 τρόπῳ συνεστήσαντο. πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατελη-
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messages to those in the city entreaty them to be reconciled and permit them to return home, the party in possession sent envoys to the Achaean League, wishing the reconciliation to be with their consent. The Achaean readily agreed, as they felt sure that they would thus gain the goodwill of both factions, since those who were masters of the city were entirely devoted to them and the home-coming exiles would owe their safe return to the consent of the League. Accordingly, the Cynaetheans dismissed the garrison and commandant from the city and recalled the exiles, who numbered about three hundred, exacting from them such pledges as are generally regarded among mankind as most binding. But these repatriated citizens, not because they had any cause or pretext subsequent to their readmission for suspecting that other contentions were imminent, but on the contrary from the very moment of their return, set about conspiring against their city and their preservers. I am even inclined to think that at the very instant when they were mutually pledging their faith by solemn oaths over the sacrifice, their minds were full of the impious project of breaking their faith to heaven and to those who trusted in them. For no sooner were they again associated in the government than they began to solicit the Aetolians and offer to betray the city to them, taking the safest and swiftest means of bringing to utter destruction those to whom they owed their safety and the city in whose lap they had been nourished.

18. The *coup de main* by which they executed their project was as follows. Some among the returned
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λυθότων τινες ἐγεγόνεισαν· ταύτην δὲ συμβαίνει τὴν ἀρχὴν κλείειν τὰς πύλας καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον κυριεύειν τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ'
3 ἡμέραν τὴν δίαιταν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀιτωλοὶ διεσκευασμένοι καὶ τὰς κλίμακας ἐτοίμας
4 ἐξοντες ἐπετήρουν τὸν καιρόν· οἱ δὲ πολεμαρχοῦν-
tes τῶν φυγάδων, κατασφάξαντες τοὺς συνάρχον-
5 τας ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶν, ἀνέωξαν τὴν πύλην. οὐ συμ-
βάντος τινες μὲν τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν διὰ ταύτης εἰς-
έπιττον, τινὲς δὲ τὰς κλίμακας προσερείναντες ἐβιάσατο διὰ τούτων καὶ κατελάμβανον τὸ τείχος.
6 οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντες ἐκπλαγεῖς ὄντες ἐπὶ τοῖς
συντελουμένοις, ἀπόρους καὶ δυσχρήστως εἶχον πρὸς τὸ συμβαίνον· οὐτὲ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῆς
πύλης εἰσπίπτοντας οἱ οἱ τ' ἦσαν βοηθεῖν ἀπερ-
σάστως διὰ τοὺς πρὸς τὰ τείχη προσβάλλοντας,
οὐδὲ μὴν τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐπαμύνεσιν διὰ τοὺς τῇ πύλῃ
7 βιαζομένους. οἱ δ' Ἀιτωλοὶ διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἴτιας
ταχέως ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι τῆς πόλεως τῶν
ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐν τούτῳ ἔπραξαν δικαιότατον·
πρώτους γὰρ τοὺς εἰσαγαγόντας καὶ προδόντας
αὐτοῖς τὴν πόλιν κατασφάξαντες διήρπασαν τοὺς
8 τούτων βίους. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐχρή-
σαντο πᾶσιν. τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐπισκηνώσαντες
ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἐξετοιχωρύχθησαν μὲν τοὺς βίους,
ἐστρέβλωσαν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν Κυναίθεων, οἷς
ἡπίστησαν ἕχειν κεκρυμμένον διάφορον ἡ κατα-
σκεύασμα ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν πλείων ἀξίων.
9 Τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον λυβησάμενοι τοὺς Κυναι-
θεῖς ἀνεστρατοπέδευσαν, ἀπολιπόντες φυλακήν τῶν
10 τειχῶν, καὶ προῆγον ὡς ἐπὶ Δούσων· καὶ παρα-
γενόμενοι πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερόν, δ' ἑκέται
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exiles held the office of Polemarch. It is the duty of these magistrates to shut the gates: they keep the keys in their custody until the gates are reopened and by day reside in the gate-houses. The Aetolians then lay in readiness with their scaling-ladders awaiting the moment for attack. The Polemarchs of the party which had been in exile, after murdering their colleagues at one of the gate-houses, opened the gate, upon which some of the Aetolians rushed in through it, while others, planting their ladders against the wall, took forcible possession of the fortifications by this means. All the inhabitants were seized with consternation at this and knew not what course to take in these difficult circumstances. For neither were their hands free to oppose those who were streaming in through the gate, owing to the attack on the walls, nor could they defend the walls properly owing to the forcing of the gate. For these reasons the Aetolians soon made themselves masters of the town, and thereupon, amid all their iniquities, performed one act of exemplary justice. For in the first place they killed and plundered the property of the traitors who had introduced them into the city. All the rest of the citizens were treated in the same way. Finally, they quartered themselves in the houses and thoroughly pillaged all the property, putting to the torture many of the Cynaetheans whom they suspected of having concealed money, plate, or other valuables.

After this cruel treatment of the Cynaetheans, they took their departure, leaving a garrison to guard the walls and advanced towards Lusi. On arriving at the temple of Artemis which lies between Cleitor
μὲν μεταξὺ Κλείτωρος καὶ Κυναῖθης, ἀσυλον δὲ νενόμισται παρὰ τοῖς Ἐλλησσον, ἀνετείνοντο διαρ-
πάσειν τὰ θρέμματα τῆς θεοῦ καὶ τάλλα τὰ περὶ
11 τὸν ναὸν. οἱ δὲ Λουσιάται νουνεχὼς δόντες τινὰ
tῶν κατασκευασμάτων τῆς θεοῦ, παρηγήσαντο
tὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἁσέβειαν [καὶ] τοῦ μηδὲν
12 παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον. οἱ δὲ δεξάμενοι, παραχρῆμα
ἀναξεύςαντες, προσεστρατοπέδευσαν τῇ τῶν Κλει-
tορίων πόλει.

19 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους ὁ τῶν
Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς Ἀρατὸς ἐξαπέστειλε μὲν
πρὸς Φίλιππον παρακαλῶν βοηθεῖν, συνῆγε δὲ
τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους, μετεπέμπτε τὸν Λακε-
dαιμονίων καὶ Μεσσηνίων τοὺς διαταγμένους
2 κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας. οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
παρεκάλουν τοὺς Κλειτορίους ἀποστάντας τῶν
Ἀχαιῶν αἴρεισθαι τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συμμαχίαν,
3 τῶν δὲ Κλειτορίων ἀπλῶς οὐ προσιμένους τοὺς
λόγους προσβολὰς ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ προσερείδοντες
τάς κλίμακας τοῖς τείχεσι κατεπιράζον τῆς
4 πόλεως. ἀμυνομένων δὲ γενναίως καὶ τολμηρῶς
tῶν ἐνδὸν εἴξαντες τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀνεστρα-
pέδευσαν, καὶ προαγάγοντες αὖθις ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν
Κύναιθαν, ὃμως τὰ θρέμματα τῆς θεοῦ περι-
5 σύραντες ἀπήγαγον. καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παρε-
dίδοσαν τοῖς Ἡλείοις τὴν Κύναιθαν· οὐ βουλο-
mένων δὲ προσδέξασθαι τῶν Ἡλείων ἐπεβάλοντο
μὲν δι' αὐτῶν κατέχει τῆν πόλιν, στρατηγὸν
6 ἐπιστησάντες Εὐριπίδαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν
deίσαντες ἐκ τῶν προσαγγελλομένων τῆς ἐκ
Μακεδονίας βοήθειαν, ἐμπρήσαντες τὴν πόλιν
ἀπηλλάγησαν, καὶ προῆγον αὐτὶς ὡς ἔπι τὸ Ῥίον,
and Cynaetha, and is regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to lift the cattle of the goddess and plunder the other property about the temple. But the people of Lusi very wisely induced them to refrain from their impious purpose and commit no serious outrage by giving them some of the sacred furniture. On receiving this they at once left the place and encamped before Cleitor.

19. Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had sent to Philip begging for help, was collecting the Achaean levy, and had sent for the contingent which the Messenians and Lacedaemonians had agreed to furnish.

The Aetolians in the first place invited the Cleitorians to abandon their alliance with the Achaeans and form one with themselves. When the Cleitorians absolutely refused to listen to them, they began an assault, and attempted to take the town by escalading. But on meeting with a gallant and determined resistance from the inhabitants they yielded to the force of circumstances, and breaking up their camp advanced again towards Cynaetha, raiding and driving off the sacred cattle in spite of having undertaken not to do so. At first they wished to hand over Cynaetha to the Eleans; but on the latter declining they decided to hold the town themselves, appointing Euripidas commandant. But afterwards, as they were afraid from the intelligence they received of a relief force coming from Macedonia, they burnt the city and withdrew, marching again
7 ταύτη κρίνοντες ποιεῖσθαι τὴν διάβασιν. ὃ δὲ Ταυρίων πυθανόμενος τὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν εἰσβολήν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Κύναιδαν πεπραγμένα, θεωρῶν δὲ τὸν Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον ἀπὸ τῶν νῆσων εἰς τὰς Κεγχρέας καταπεπλευκότα, παρεκάλει τούτον βοηθῆσαι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ δισθήσατα τοὺς λέμβους ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῇ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν διαβάσει.

8 ὁ δὲ Δημήτριος λυστελῆ μὲν οὖν εὐσχήμονα δὲ πεποιημένος τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν νῆσων ἐπάνωδον διὰ τὸν τῶν Ἐρδίων ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀνάπλουν, ἀσμείως υπήκουσε τῷ Ταυρίῳ, προσδεξαμένου ἐκείνου τὴν

9 εἰς τὴν ὑπέρβασιν τῶν λέμβων δαπάνην. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ὑπερισθήσασ, καὶ δυσὶ καθυστερήσας ἡμέρας τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν διαβάσεως, προκατασύρας τῶν τόποις τῆς παραλίας τῆς τῶν Αἰτω-

10 λῶν κατήχθη πάλιν εἰς τὴν Κόρινθον. Λακεδαι-

μόνοι δὲ τὸ μὲν πέμπειν τὰς βοηθείας κατὰ τὴν διάταξιν ἐνεκάκησαν, βραχεῖς δὲ τινὰς παντελῶς ἐπιεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς, στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ δοκεῖν

11 μόνον, ἐξέπεμψαν. Ἀρατος δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔχων πολιτικώτερον ἡ στρατηγικώτερον ὑπέρ

12 τῶν παρόντων ἐβουλεύσατο· μέχρι γαρ τούτου τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἤγε, προσανέχων καὶ μεμημένος τῆς προγεγενημένης συμφορᾶς, ἐὼς οὐ πάντα διαπραξάμενοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν προαιρέσεις οἱ περὶ τὸν Σκόπαν καὶ Δωρίμαχον ἐπανήλθον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, καίπερ διὰ τῶν ποιοῦμεν τὰς πορείας εὐπεθέτων καὶ στενῶν καὶ μόνου σαλ-

πιγκτοῦ δεομένων.

13 Κυναιθεῖς δὲ μεγάλαις ἀτυχήμασιν ὑπ’ Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσόντες ὀμος πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐδοξα ἡτυχηκέναι δικαίοτα ἡτυχηκέναι δικαίοτα. 346
to Rhium, whence they had decided to make the crossing. Taurion had learnt of the Aetolian invasion and the fate of Cynaetha; and seeing that Demetrius of Pharos had sailed back from the islands to Cenchreae, begged him to assist the Achaeans, and after conveying his boats across the Isthmus, to fall upon the Aetolians during their crossing. Demetrius, whose return from his expedition to the islands had been much to his advantage indeed, but somewhat ignominious, as the Rhodians were sailing to attack him, lent a ready ear to Taurion, who had engaged to meet the expense of transporting the boats. But having traversed the Isthmus and missed the crossing of the Aetolians by two days, he returned again to Corinth, after raiding some places on the Aetolian coast. The Lacedaemonians had culpably omitted to send the stipulated contingent of men, but dispatched quite an insignificant number of horse and foot to save appearances. But Aratus who had his Achaeans, displayed rather on this occasion the caution of a politician than the courage of a general; for he made no move, fearful of committing himself and mindful of his recent reverse, until Scopas and Dorimachus, having accomplished all they had purposed, returned home, and this although their march had taken them through narrow defiles, most advantageous for an attacking force and where a call of the bugle would have been sufficient.

20. The Cynaetheans, on whom the Aetolians had brought this terrible disaster, were, however, generally esteemed to have deserved their fate more
20 ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοινῇ τὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ἔθνος ἔχει τινὰ παρὰ πάσι τοῖς Ἑλλησσὼν ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ φήμην, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἱθείς καὶ βίους φιλοξενίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ θεῖον
2 εὐσέβειαν, ἄξιον βραχὺ διαπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς Κυναι-
θέων ἀγριότητος, πῶς οὗτε ὀμολογουμένως Ἀρ-
κάδες τοσοῦτο κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καρούς διήνεγκαν
τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὑμότητι καὶ παρανομία.
3 δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι, διότι τὰ καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαῖων
ἐπινεομένα καὶ ψυκκῶς συντεθεωρημένα περὶ
πάντας τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, ταῦτα δὴ
πρῶτοι καὶ μόνοι τῶν Ἀρκάδων ἐγκατελίπτον.
4 μουσικὴν γὰρ, τὴν ἀληθῶς μουσικὴν, πάσι
μὲν ἀνθρώποις ὕφελος ἄσκειν, Ἀρκάσι δὲ καὶ
5 ἀναγκαῖον. ὦ γὰρ ἡγητέον μουσικὴν, ὡς Ἐφορὸς
φησιν ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας,
οὔδαμῶς ἀρµόζοντα λόγον αὐτῷ ῥίψας, ἐπ᾽ ἀπάτης
6 καὶ γοητεία παρεισῆξαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν, οὐδὲ
tοὺς παλαιοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Δακεδαμονίων αὐλὸν
καὶ ῥυθμὸν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀντὶ σάλπιγγος εἰκῇ
7 νομιστέον εἰςαγαγεῖν, οὐδὲ τοὺς πρῶτους Ἀρκά-
δῶν εἰς τὴν ὅλην πολιτείαν τὴν μουσικὴν παρα-
lαβεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ῥώτε μὴ μόνον παιῶν οὐσὶν
ἀλλὰ καὶ νεανίσκοις γενομένους ἐως τριάκοντ᾽
ἐτῶν κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην σύντροφον ποιεῖν αὐτὴν,
8 τάλλα τοῖς βίοις οὗτας αὐστηροτάτους. ταῦτα
gὰρ πάσιν ἐστὶ γνώριμα καὶ συνήθη, διότι σχεδὸν
παρὰ μόνοις Ἀρκάσι πρῶτον μὲν οἱ παιδεῖς ἐκ
νηπίων ἄδεων ἐθίζονται κατὰ νόμους τοὺς ὕμνους
καὶ παιᾶνας, οἷς ἐκαστοὶ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς
9 ἐπιχωρίους ἤρωας καὶ θεοῦς ὕμνουσιν· μετὰ δὲ
than any men ever did. Since the Arcadian nation on the whole has a very high reputation for virtue among the Greeks, due not only to their humane and hospitable character and usages, but especially to their piety to the gods, it is worth while to give a moment's consideration to the question of the savagery of the Cynaetheans, and ask ourselves why, though unquestionably of Arcadian stock, they so far surpassed all other Greeks at this period in cruelty and wickedness. I think the reason was that they were the first and indeed only people in Arcadia to abandon an admirable institution, introduced by their forefathers with a nice regard for the natural conditions under which all the inhabitants of that country live. For the practice of music, I mean real music, is beneficial to all men, but to Arcadians it is a necessity. For we must not suppose, as Ephorus, in the Preface to his History, making a hasty assertion quite unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced by men for the purpose of deception and delusion; we should not think that the ancient Cretans and Lacedaemonians acted at haphazard in substituting the flute and rhythmic movement for the bugle in war, or that the early Arcadians had no good reason for incorporating music in their whole public life to such an extent that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty were compelled to study it constantly, although in other matters their lives were most austere. For it is a well-known fact, familiar to all, that it is hardly known except in Arcadia, that in the first place the boys from their earliest childhood are trained to sing in measure the hymns and paeans in which by traditional usage they celebrate the heroes and gods of each particular
ταῦτα τοὺς Φιλοξένου καὶ Τιμοθέου νόμους μανθάνοντες πολλὴ φιλοτιμία χορεύουσι κατ᾽ ἐναυτὸν τοῖς Διονυσιακοῖς αὐληταῖς ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, οἱ μὲν παῖδες τοὺς παιδικοὺς ἀγώνας οἱ δὲ νεανίσκοι

10 τοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν λεγομένους. ὁμοίως γε μὴν καὶ παρ᾽ ὀλον τὸν βίον τὰς ἀγωγὰς τὰς ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις οὐχ οὕτως ποιοῦνται διὰ τῶν ἐπεισ-άκτων ἀκροαμάτων ὡς ἐν ἀυτῶν, ἀνά μέρος

11 ἄδειν ἀλλῆλοις προστάττοντες. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀρνηθῆναι τι μὴ γινώσκειν οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ἰγοῦνται, τὴν γε μὴν ἀδικία οὐτ᾽ ἀρ-νηθῆναι δύνανται διὰ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πάντας μανθάνειν, οὐθ᾽ ὁμολογούντες ἀποτρίβεσθαι διὰ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς νομίζεσθαι τοῦτο.

12 καὶ μὴν ἐμβατήρια μετ᾽ αὐλοῦ καὶ τάξεως ἀσκοῦντες, ἐτί δ᾽ ὁρχήσεις ἐκπονοῦντες μετὰ κοινῆς ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ δαπάνης κατ᾽ ἐναυτὸν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἐπιδείκνυνται τοῖς αὐτῶν πολίταις οἱ νέοι. ταῦτα τὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πάλαι παρεισ-αγαγεῖν οὔ τρυφῆς καὶ περιουσίας χάριν, ἀλλὰ θεωροῦντες μὲν τὴν ἐκάστως αὐτοργίαν καὶ συλλήβδην τὸ τῶν βίων ἐπίστολον καὶ σκληρόν, θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν ἡθῶν αὐστηρίαν, ἦτις αὐτοῖς παρέπεται διὰ τὴν τοῦ περιέχοντος ψυχρό-τητα καὶ στυγνότητα τὴν κατὰ τὸ πλείστον ἐν τοῖς τόποις ὑπάρχουσαν, ὥς συνεξομοιοῦσθαι πε-2 φύκαμεν πάντες ἀνθρωποί κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην· οὐ γὰρ δι᾽ ἂλλην, διὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν αὐτίαν κατὰ τὰς ἐθνικὰς καὶ τὰς ὀλοσχερεῖς διαστάσεις πλεῖστον ἀλλῆλων διαφέρομεν ἡθεῖ τε καὶ μορφαὶς καὶ χρώμασιν, ἐτὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηθευμάτων τοῖς πλεί-
place: later they learn the measures of Philoxenus and Timotheus, and every year in the theatre they compete keenly in choral singing to the accompaniment of professional flute-players, the boys in the contest proper to them and the young men in what is called the men’s contest. And not only this, but through their whole life they entertain themselves at banquets not by listening to hired musicians but by their own efforts, calling for a song from each in turn. Whereas they are not ashamed of denying acquaintance with other studies, in the case of singing it is neither possible for them to deny a knowledge of it because they all are compelled to learn it, nor, if they confess to such knowledge can they excuse themselves, so great a disgrace is this considered in that country. Besides this the young men practise military parades to the music of the flute and perfect themselves in dances and give annual performances in the theatres, all under state supervision and at the public expense. 21. Now all these practices I believe to have been introduced by the men of old time, not as luxuries and superfluities but because they had before their eyes the universal practice of personal manual labour in Arcadia, and in general the toilsomeness and hardship of the men’s lives, as well as the harshness of character resulting from the cold and gloomy atmospheric conditions usually prevailing in these parts—conditions to which all men by their very nature must perforce assimilate themselves; there being no other cause than this why separate nations and peoples dwelling widely apart differ so much from each other in character, feature, and colour as well as in the most of their pursuits. The primitive
3 στοις. βουλόμενοι δὲ μαλάττειν καὶ κυρνὰν τὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐθάδες καὶ σκληροῦν, τὰ τε προ-
ειρήμενα πάντα παρεισήγαγον, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις
συνόδους κοινὰς καὶ θυσίας πλεῖστας ὄμοιως
ἀνδρᾶς καὶ γυναιξὶ κατείθυσαν, ἐτὶ δὲ χοροὺς
4 παρθένων ὀμοῦ καὶ παιδῶν, καὶ συμμέτρησαν πᾶν
ἐμιχανήσαντο, σπεύδοντες τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτέ-
ραμνὸν διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐθισμῶν κατασκευῆς ἔξημε-
5 ροῦν καὶ πραύνεω. ὥν Κυναίθεις ὀλυγωρήσαντες
εἰς τέλος, καὶ ταῦτα πλείστος δεόμενοι τῆς τοιαύτης
ἐπικουρίας διὰ τὸ σκληρότατον παρὰ πολὺ τῆς
'Αρκαδίας ἐξεν ἁέρα καὶ τόπων, πρῶς αὐτὰς δὲ
τὰς ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρατριβᾶς καὶ φιλοτμίας ὀρμή-
6 σαντες, τέλος ἀπεθηρωθῆσαν οὕτως ὡστε μηδὲν ἐν
ὅποια γεγονέναι τῶν 'Ελληνίδων πόλεων ἀσεβῆ-
7 ματα μείζονα καὶ συνεχέστερα. σημείων δὲ τῆς
Κυναίθεων ἀτυχίας περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ τῆς
tῶν ἄλλων 'Αρκάδων τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν ἐπιτη-
8 δευμάτων δυσαρεστήσεως: καθ' οὗς γὰρ καιροὺς
τὴν μεγάλην σφαγὴν ποιήσαντες Κυναίθεις ἐπρέ-
σβεναν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἰς ἄς πόλεις ποτὲ
'Αρκαδικὰς εἰσῆλθον κατὰ τὴν ὄδον, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι
9 παραχρήμα πάντες αὐτοὺς ἐξεκήρυξαν, Μαντινεῖς
δὲ μετὰ τὴν μεταλαγήν αὐτῶν καὶ καθαρμὸν
ἐποιήσαντο καὶ σφάγα περιήγεικαν τῆς τε πό-
λεως κύκλω καὶ τῆς χώρας πάσης.
10 Ταῦτα μὲν ὦν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω χάριν τοῦ μη διὰ
μίαν πόλιν τὸ κοινὸν ἥθος διαβάλλεσθαι τῶν
'Αρκάδων, ὄμοιως δὲ καὶ τοῦ μη νομίσαντας
ἐνίους τῶν κατοικοῦντων τὴν 'Αρκαδίαν περιουσίας
χάριν τὰ κατὰ μουσικὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀσκεῖσθαι
παρ' αὐτοῖς ὀλυγωρεῖν ἐγχειρῆσαι τοῦτον τοῦ
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Arcadians, therefore, with the view of softening and tempering the stubbornness and harshness of nature, introduced all the practices I mentioned, and in addition accustomed the people, both men and women, to frequent festivals and general sacrifices, and dances of young men and maidens, and in fact resorted to every contrivance to render more gentle and mild, by the influence of the customs they instituted, the extreme hardness of the national character. The Cynaetheans, by entirely neglecting these institutions, though in special need of such influences, as their country is the most rugged and their climate the most inclement in Arcadia, and by devoting themselves exclusively to their local affairs and political rivalries, finally became so savage that in no city of Greece were greater and more constant crimes committed. As an indication of the deplorable condition of the Cynaetheans in this respect and the detestation of the other Arcadians for such practices I may mention the following: at the time when, after the great massacre, the Cynaetheans sent an embassy to Sparta, the other Arcadian cities which they entered on their journey gave them instant notice to depart by cry of herald, but the Mantineans after their departure even made a solemn purification by offering piacular sacrifices and carrying them round their city and all their territory.

I have said so much on this subject firstly in order that the character of the Arcadian nation should not suffer for the crimes of one city, and secondly to deter any other Arcadians from beginning to neglect music under the impression that its extensive practice in Arcadia serves no necessary purpose. I
11 μέρος, ἓτι δὲ καὶ Κυναιθέων ἑνεκα, ἵνα ὁ ποτ' αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς εὐδοκήσῃ, μᾶλλον γὰρ μόνως ἄν λίξαιν τῆς τότε
12 περὶ αὐτοὺς γενομένης ἀγριότητος. ἦμεις δὲ ἐπειδὴ 
tὰ περὶ Κυναιθέων ὑποπίπτοντα δεδηλώκαμεν, 

22 Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα διεργασάμενοι κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἦκον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀσφαλῶς,
2 φιλιππος δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως βοηθῶν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς 
3 υπὲρ τῶν κοινῆς συμφερόντων. αὐτὸς δὲ ἄνα-
4 ἐμπεπτωκέναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. οἰ γὰρ Λακεδαι-
5 μόνοι συνήθεις οὐτε βασιλεύσεθαι καὶ πάντως τοῖς 
6 πολιτείαις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄρχας οἱ μὲν δύο τῶν 
7 ἐπαρκεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν Αἰτωλοὶ παρὰ τὴν
also spoke for the sake of the Cynaetheans themselves, in order that, if Heaven ever grant them better fortune, they may humanize themselves by turning their attention to education and especially to music; for by no other means can they hope to free themselves from that savagery which overtook them at this time. Having now said all that occurred to me on the subject of this people I return to the point whence I digressed.

22. The Aetolians, after these exploits in the Peloponnes, had returned home in safety, when Philip appeared at Corinth with an army to help the Achaean. As he arrived too late for this, he sent couriers to all the allies, begging them to send as soon as possible to Corinth representatives to discuss the measures necessary for the common service. He himself quitting Corinth advanced towards Tegea, as he had heard that intestine disturbances accompanied by massacres had broken out at Sparta. For the Lacedaemonians, who had been accustomed to be ruled by kings and to unconditional obedience to their rulers, now having recently gained their liberty though Antigonus and finding themselves without a king, began to fall into factions, as they all thought they should have an equal share of political power. At first two of the ephors did not pronounce for either side, but the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, as they were convinced that owing to his tender age Philip would not yet be able to control Peloponnesian affairs. But when, contrary to their expectation, the Aetolians made a hasty retreat from the Peloponnes, and Philip was even quicker in arriving from Macedonia, the three ephors in question, very suspicious
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εὲν τῶν δυεῖν Ἀδεμάντω διὰ τὸ συνειδέναι μὲν σφίσι πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, μὴ λίαν δὲ τοῖς γινο-
μένοις εὐδοκεῖν, ἡγομνῶν μὴ συνεγγύσαντος τοῦ
βασιλέως πάντα τὰ πραττόμενα πρὸς τὸν Φιλίππον
8 ἐξηγήσαται. δι' ᾧ δὴ συλλαλήσαντες τισὶ τῶν
νέων ἐκήρυττον εἰς τὸ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου τέμενος
μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων ἵνα τούς ἑν τοῖς ἥλικίας ὡς τῶν
9 Μακεδόνων ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν παραγνυμένων. ταχὺ
dὲ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον ἀθροισθέντων, δυσαρεστῶν
Ἀδεμάντως τοῖς γινομένοις ἐπειράτο προπορευ-
θεὶς παρακαλεῖν καὶ διδάσκειν διότι πρῶην ἔδει
τὰ κηρύγματα ταῦτα καὶ τοὺς ἀθροισμοῦς τοὺς
ἐν τοῖς ὄπλοις παραγγέλλειν, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν
tοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς πολεμίους ὄντας ἥκουσμεν τοῖς
ὁροῖς τῆς χώρας ἥμων συνεγγύζειν, οὐ νῦν, ὅτε
Μακεδόνας τοὺς ἐνεργεῖτας καὶ σωτήρας πυνθα-
11 νόμεθα πλησιάζειν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. ἔτι δ' 
ἀυτοῦ ταῦτ' ἀνακρονομένου, προσπεσόντες οἱ παρα-
κεκλημένοι τῶν νέων τούτων τε συνεκέντησαν
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον Σθενέλαον Ἀλκαμένη Θυέ-
στην Βιωνίδαν, ἑτέρους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ πλείους.
12 οὲ δὲ περὶ Πολυφόνταν καὶ τινες ἀμα τούτοις,
ἐμφρόνως προϊδόμενοι τὸ μέλλον, ἀπεχώρησαν
23 πρὸς τὸν Φιλίππον. ταῦτα δὲ πράξαντες εὑθέως
ἐπεμπὸν οἱ προεστῶτες ἐφοροὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
τοὺς κατηγορήσαντας πρὸς τὸν Φιλίππον τῶν
ἀνηρμένων καὶ παρακαλέσαντας αὐτὸν ἐπισχεὶν
τὴν παρουσίαν, ἐως ἃν ἐκ τοῦ γεγονότος κινήματος
εἰς τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν ἔλθῃ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν,
γινώσκειν δὲ διότι πρόκειται διατηρεῖν αὐτοῖς
πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ φιλάνθρωπα πρὸς Μακεδόνας·
2 οὶ καὶ συμμίσκαντες ἢδη περὶ τὸ Παρθένιον ὄρος
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of one of the other two, Adeimantus, as he was privy to all their projects and did not highly approve their attitude, were in much fear of his revealing all their designs to the king on his approach. Therefore, after a private conference with some of the younger men, they ordered by proclamation all those of military age to assemble in arms at the temple of Athene of the Brazen House as the Macedonians were advancing on the city. At an order so strange and unexpected all rapidly assembled, upon which Adeimantus, who disapproved of this proceeding, came forward and tried to address the people, pointing out that "These proclamations and orders to assemble in arms should have been made of late when we heard that our enemies the Aetolians were near our frontier, and not now when we learn that the Macedonians, our benefactors and preservers, are approaching with their king." While he was still haranguing in this fashion, those young men who had been appointed to the task by the ephors fell upon him and ran him through as well as Sthenelaus, Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and a good many other citizens. Polyphontas, however, and a few with him, foreseeing what was likely to occur, had wisely withdrawn and joined Philip. 23. After these proceedings the ephors now in power at once sent messengers to Philip bringing accusations against their victims, begging him to delay his arrival until the present disturbance had subsided and the town had resumed its normal condition, and informing him that it was their intention to maintain all their obligations to Macedonia and remain friendly. These messengers met the king near Mt. Parthenium and spoke
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όντι τῷ βασιλεί διελέχθησαν ἄκολούθως ταῖς 3 ἐντολαίς. ο δὲ διακούσας παρεκάλεσε τοὺς ἥκοντας κατὰ σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς οἶκον ἔπανοδον, καὶ δῆλον τοῖς ἐφόροις ὅτι κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς πορευθεὶς αὐτὸς μὲν ἐν Τεγέα ποιήσαται τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ἐκείνους δὲ οἴεται δεῖν τῇ ταχίστῃν ἐκπέμπειν ἀνδρας ἄξιοχρέους τοὺς κοινολογησομένες 4 νοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων. ποιησάντων δὲ τὸ προσταχθὲν τῶν ἀπαντησάντων, διακούσαντες τὰ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων ἐξέπεμψαν ἀνδρὰς δέκα πρὸς 5 τὸν Φίλιππον· οἱ καὶ πορευθέντες εἰς τὴν Τέγεαν καὶ παρελθόντες εἰς τὸ τοῦ βασιλέως συνέδριον, Ὠμίου προεστῶτος αὐτῶν, κατηγόρησαν μὲν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀδείμαντον ὃς αἰτίων γεγονότων τῆς 6 κινήσεως, πάντα δὲ ὑπισχοῦνται ποιήσειν αὐτοῖς τῶν Φίλιππων τὰ κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐν μηδενὶ φανήσεθαι δεύτεροι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐνόιαν τῶν δοκοῦστων ἀληθινῶν αὐτῷ 7 φιλῶν ὑπάρχειν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαίμονιοι ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις παραπλήσια διαλεγόμεναι μετέστησαν, οἱ δὲ μετέχοντες τοῦ συνεδρίου διεφέροντο πρὸς 8 ἀλλήλους ταῖς γνώμαις. καὶ τινὲς μὲν εἰδότες τὴν κακοπραγμοσύνην τῶν ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ, καὶ πεπεισμένοι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀδείμαντον ἀπολωλέναι διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐνόιαν τοὺς τε Λακεδαίμονιοὺς ἐπιβεβλήσατο κοινοπραγεῖν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, συνεβούλευσαν τῷ Φίλιππῳ παράδειγμα ποιῆσαι τοὺς Λακεδαίμονίους, χρησάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὃνπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐχρήσατο Θηβαῖοι 9 εὐθέως παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχήν ἐπερεῖ δὲ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ὀργὴν βαρυτέραν 358
according to their instructions. After listening to them, he bade them return home at once, and inform the ephors that for his own part he would continue his march and take up his quarters in Tegea, where he demanded that they should send him as soon as possible some persons of sufficient weight to discuss the present situation with him. The messengers obeyed, and the Lacedaemonian magistrates, on receiving the king's communication, dispatched ten envoys to Philip, the chief of the mission being Omias, who on reaching Tegea and presenting themselves before the king's council, laid the responsibility of the late disturbance on Adeimantus, and engaged themselves to observe faithfully the terms of the alliance with Philip, and be second to none of those who were regarded as his true friends in their devotion to him. So the Lacedaemonians after these and other similar assurances withdrew, upon which there was a difference of opinion among the members of the council. Some knowing the evil disposition of the Spartan government, and convinced that Adeimantus and the others had met their fate owing to their favouring Macedonia, and that the project of the Lacedaemonians was to join the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of Sparta, treating it in the same way as Alexander had treated Thebes at the outset of his reign. But some of the older councillors declared that such
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24 αὐτοῦ φίλοις. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἐὰν χρή τοῦ βασιλέως λέγειν τὰς τότε γνώμας. οὐ γὰρ εἰκός ἐπτακαϊδεκαέτη παῖδα περὶ τηλικοῦτων
2 δύνασθαι πραγμάτων διευκρινεῖν. ἀλλ' ἦμιν μὲν καθήκει τοῖς γράφουσι τὰς κυρούσας τὰ διαβούλια γνώμας ἀνατιθέναι τοῖς προεστῶσι τῶν ὅλων·
tοὺς μέντοι γε ἀκούοντας αὐτοὺς χρή συνυπονοεῖν διότι τῶν συνόντων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν παρακεί-
μένων, εἰκός ἔστω εἶναι τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποθέσεις
3 καὶ διαλήψεις, δὲν ἢ ὁπίσεις ὑποτεθεῖσαι' ἀν προσάπτοι τὴν τότε ῥηθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως
4 γνώμην. ὁ γὰρ Φίλιππος τὰ μὲν κατ' ἰδίαν τῶν
συμμάχων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήματα καθήκειν ἐφῄσειν
αὐτῷ μέχρι λόγου καὶ γραμμάτων διορθοῦν καὶ
5 συνεπισημαίνεσθαι. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινῆν ἀν-
ήκοντα συμμαχίαν, ταῦτ' ἔφη μόνα δεῖν κοινῆς
ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ διορθώσεως τυχόνως ὑπὸ πάντων.
6 Δακεδαιμονίων δὲ μηδὲν εἰς τὴν κοινῆν συμμαχίαν
ἔκφανες ἡμαρτηκότων, ἐπαγγελλομένων δὲ πάντα
καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ δίκαια πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ καλῶς ἔχον
εἶναι τὸ βουλευόμεθα τι περὶ αὐτῶν ἀπαραίητον.
7 καὶ γὰρ ἀτοπον τὸν μὲν πατέρα πολεμίων ὄντων
κρατήσαντα μηδὲν ποιῆσαι δεινὸν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐφ'
οὐτω μικρὰς αἰτίας ἀνήκεστον τι βουλεύσειθαί
8 περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπικυρωθείσης δὲ ταύτης τῆς γνώμης,
ὅτι δεῖ παριδεῖν τὸ γεγονός, εὐθέως ὃ βασιλεὺς
Πετραῖον τῶν αὐτοῦ φίλων ἀμα τοῖς περὶ τὸν
'Ωμίαν ἐξαπέστελλε παρακαλέσοντα τοὺς πολλοὺς
ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ Μακεδόνας εὐνοίας,
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vengeance was heavier than the offence deserved. Philip, they said, should punish the guilty parties and, removing them from office, place the government in the hands of his own friends. Finally the king spoke, if indeed we are to suppose that the opinion he delivered was his own; for it is scarcely probable that a boy of seventeen should be able to decide about such grave matters. It is, however, the duty of us writers to attribute to the supreme ruler the expression of opinion which prevailed at his council, while it is open for the reader to suspect that such decisions and the arguments on which they rest are due to his associates and especially to those closest to his person. Among these in the present case Aratus is the one to whom we may most plausibly attribute the opinion delivered by the king. Philip said that, as far as regarded injuries inflicted by the allies on themselves, it was not incumbent on him to go beyond correcting and censuring such either by word of mouth or by letter; but that only injuries inflicted on the whole alliance called for punishment and redress by the joint action of all. As the Lacedaemonians had not committed any manifest offence against the alliance as a whole, and had engaged to meet faithfully all their obligations to himself, it would not be right to treat them with excessive harshness. Considering indeed that his father after conquering them as enemies, had done them no hurt, it would ill become himself to take extreme vengeance on them for such a trifling fault. When the council had voted to act thus and overlook the incident, the king sent Petraeus, one of his friends, together with Omias, to exhort the people in Sparta to remain faithful to their friend-
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άμα δὲ δώσοντα καὶ ληψόμενον τοὺς ὀρκοὺς περὶ
9 συμμαχίας. αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀνα-
ζεύξας προῆγε πάλιν ὡς ἐπὶ Κορίνθου, καλὸν
dεῖγμα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ προαιρέσεως τοῖς συμμάχοις
ἐκτεθειμένος ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
ἀποφάσει.

25 Καταλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίων
παραγεγονότας εἰς τὴν Κόρινθον συνήδρευε καὶ
dιελάμβανε μετὰ τούτων τί δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ πώς
2 χρήσασθαι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. ἐγκαλοῦντων δὲ Βου-
τῶν μὲν ὅτι συλήσαειν τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Ἱτανίας
ιερὸν εἰρήνης ὑπαρχοῦσης, Φωκέων δὲ διότι
στρατεύσαντες ἐπὶ "Ἄμβρυσον καὶ Δαύλιον ἐπι-
3 βάλοντο καταλαβέσθαι τὰς πόλεις, Ἡπειρωτῶν
dὲ καθότι πορθήσαειν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν, Ἀκαρ-
νᾶνων δὲ παραδεικνύοντων τίνα τρόπον συντήσα-
μενοί πράξιν ἐπὶ Θύριοι νυκτὸς ἐτὶ καὶ προσβαλεῖν
4 τολμήσαειν τῇ πόλει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀχαιῶν
ἀπολογιζόμενοι ὃς καταλάβοντο μὲν τῆς Με-
gαλοπολίτιδος Κλάριον, πορθήσαειν δὲ διεξόντες
τὴν Πατρέων καὶ Φαραιῶν χώραν, διαρπάσαειν
δὲ Κύναιμαν, συλήσαειν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐν Δοῦσοι
'Αρτέμιδος ιερὸν, πολιορκήσαειν δὲ Κλειτορίους,
ἐπιβουλεύσαειν δὲ κατὰ μὲν θάλατταν Πύλω,
kata δὲ γῆν ἄρτι συνουκιζομένη τῇ Μεγάλῃ πόλει
5 σπεύδοντες μετὰ τῆς Ἰλλυρίων ἀνάστατον αὐτὴν
πούσας, διακοῦσας τούτων οἱ τῶν συμμάχων
σύνεδροι πάντες ὁμοφωνῶσαν ἐκφέρειν ἐβουλεύ-
6 σαντο τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τὸν πόλεμον. προθέμενοι δὲ
tὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας ἐν τῷ δόγματι παρα-
kατεβάλοντο ψήφισμα, προσδιασχύνοντες ὑπὶ συν-
ανασώσουσι τοῖς συμμάχοις εἰ τινα κατέχουσιν
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ship with himself and the Macedonians and to exchange oaths confirming the alliance. He himself broke up his camp and began to march back to Corinth, having in his decision about the Spartans given the allies an excellent specimen of the policy he meant to pursue.

25. As he found the deputies from the allied cities assembled at Corinth, he held a Council to deliberate on the measures to be taken with regard to the Aetolians. The Boeotians accused the Aetolians of having plundered the temple of Athene Itonia in time of peace, the Phocians of having marched upon Ambrysus and Daulium and attempted to seize both cities, and the Epirots of having pillaged their territory. The Arcadians pointed out how they had organized a coup de main against Thyrium and had gone so far as to attack the city under cover of night. The Achaeans related how they had occupied Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis, and during their passage through Achaea ravaged the country of Patrae and Pharae, how they had sacked Cynaetha and despoiled the temple of Artemis at Lusi, laid siege to Cleitor, and made attempts by sea on Pylos and by land on Megalopolis, which was only just in process of being repopulated, intending to reduce it again to desolation with the help of the Illyrians. The deputies of the allies, after hearing all these complaints, decided unanimously to make war on Aetolia. After reciting the above reasons in the preamble of their decree, they subjoined a declaration that they would recover for the allies any city
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αὐτῶν Ἀιτωλοῦ χώραν ἡ πόλιν, ἃφ’ οὗ Δημήτριος 7 ὁ Φιλίππος κατὰ φύσιν πατὴρ μετήλλαξε· παρα- 
Pλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἣναγκασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Ἀιτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, 
ὅτι πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν εἰς τὰ 
Pάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ πόλεις 
tὰς αὐτῶν, ἀφρουρίτους ἀφορολογήτους ἐλευθέρους 
ὄντας, πολιτείας καὶ νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς 
Pατρίοις. συνανακομμεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀμφι-
κτύσσων ἐγραψαί τους νόμους καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ 
ἰερὸν ἐξουσίαν, ἧν Ἀιτωλοῦ παρηρήμαται νῦν, 
βουλόμενοι τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐπικρατεῖν αὐτοῖ.

26 Τούτου δὲ τοῦ δόγματος κυρωθέντος κατὰ τὸ 
πρῶτον ἔτος τῆς ἐκατοστῆς καὶ τετταρακοστῆς 
ὀλυμπιάδος ὁ μὲν συμμαχικὸς προσαγορευόμενος 
pόλεμος ἀρχὴν εἰλήφει δικαίαν καὶ πρέπουσαν 
2 τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἀδικήμασιν, οἳ δὲ σύνεδροι παρα-
χρήμα προσβευτάς ἐξαπέστελλον πρὸς τοὺς συμμά-
χους, ἵνα παρ’ ἐκάστους διὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπικυρω-
thέντος τοῦ δόγματος ἐκφέρωσι πάντες τοῖς Ἀιτω-
3 λοῖς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πόλεμον. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ 
toῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Φιλίππος διασαφῶν, 
ἵν’ εἰ τι λέγειν ἔχουσι δίκαιον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐγκαλουμέ-

νων, ἐτι καὶ νῦν συνελθόντες διὰ λόγου ποιῶνται 
4 τῆν διεξαγωγῆν· εἰ δ’ ὑπειλήφαι, διότι χωρίς 
κοινοῦ δόγματος λεγατούσι καὶ πορθοῦσι πάντας, 
οὐκ ἀμυνεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄδικουμένους, εάν δ’ ἀμύ-

νωται, νομισθήσεσθαι τούτους κατάρχειν τοῦ 
5 πολέμου, πάντων αὐτοῦς εὐθειστάτους εἶναι. κομ-

σάμενοι δ’ οἱ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν ἄρχοντες τὴν ἐπιστολὴν 
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or land occupied by the Aetolians since the death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and likewise concerning those who had been compelled by circumstances to join the Aetolian League against their will, they pledged themselves that they should be reinstated in their ancient form of government, and should remain in possession of their cities and lands, without garrisons, exempt from tribute, and completely independent, in the enjoyment of their traditional constitution and laws. They also added a clause engaging to recover for the Amphictyonic Council its ancient laws, and its authority over the Delphic temple, of which it had been deprived by the Aetolians, who wished to control the affairs of the temple themselves.

26. This decree was passed in the first year of the 140th Olympiad and the war known as the Social War thus began, a just war and a fitting sequel to the crimes that had been committed. The Congress at once sent envoys to the allies, so that on the confirmation of the decree by the popular Assembly in each state they might all join in the war against the Aetolians. Philip also sent a letter to the Aetolians, informing them that, if they had any just defence against the accusations with which they had been charged, they still had time to meet and arrive at a settlement by conference. If, however, they imagined that because they pillaged and despoiled every part of Greece without any previous declaration of war by their League, the injured parties were not to retaliate, or if they retaliated should be considered to have broken the peace, they were the most simple-minded people in the world. The Aetolian magistrates on the receipt of this letter
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taúth, to méν pròtov élπísantes ouχ hèxein tov
Fílippov, suvèthento bêtìn hèmèran en h pròs to
6 'Ríon àpantìsouvi: gnòntes de πaráγμοιμενον,
ápèsteilavn graμmàtofòròn diàsàfoûntes òs ou
dûnàntai prò tìs tòn Æitwlvn suvòdov ì autìwv
7 ouìdèn úpèr tòn dòwn oìkonoumeìn. oì ì 'Aχaioi
suvèlhoûntes eìs tìn kàthìkoussan suvòdov to te
dógma pàntes èpektûrwsan kai to láfyròn èpektì-
rùxan kàtà tòn Æitwlvn. pròsèlthòn ton do kai
tòu båsuλéωs pròs tìn boulìn en Aìgìw kai
dialexhèntos dià pleìònov, tà rìthènta met' euνòias
àpèdeξantò kai tà pròutpàrkhonta fílànòrwpà
toùs prògònois ànànevûnto pròs autòn tòn
Fílippov.

27 Katà de tòus autòus kaiρòus Æitwloì, suvàfìantos
tòu tòn àrhxairesiòvn xhònov, stràtìghòn autòn
eìlontò Skòpavn, òs ègègoni pàntwv tòn pròe-
2 rìmènov àdikìmàtov ìautìos. úpèr òn ouk oìda
pòs chrë lègèv. to gár kòwv méν dògmàti mh
pòlèmèiν, pàndhìmei tôn stràtèvntatès àggwv kai
férew tà tòwv pélaç, kai kolàξew méν meðèna
tòw autíwv, stràtìghov ì oìréìseì kai tìmà
tòus pròesstòtav tàvòi tòuıàv èrgwv, èmov mév
3 dòkei tìs pàsvs gèmèv katòpragmòsùnìs: tì
går òn álllo tìs tàs toìautàs kakías óνòmàsei;
4 ðìløn ì oì sòtò tò leγòmenov èk tòutòw. Låkè-
daimònov tòw Kàdmìov Ì Fòibìdvò paràspòndh-
santos tòn méν àutìwv èξìmìwosan tìn dé frowà
ouk èξìgagov, wòsper luòmènì tìs àdikìas dià
tìs tòu pràzantos blàbhs, paròn tànàntìa pòièv
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at first, in the hope that Philip would not come, named a day on which they would meet him at Rhium, but on hearing that he was come there sent a courier to inform him that before the General Assembly of the Aetolians met they could take no steps on their own responsibility concerning any matters of state. The Achaeans, meeting in their regular annual Assembly, unanimously confirmed the decree and made a proclamation authorizing reprisals on the Aetolians. Upon the king's attending the Council at Aegium and addressing them at length, they received his speech favourably and renewed with Philip in person their friendly relations with the kings, his ancestors.

27. Meanwhile, it being the date of their annual election, the Aetolians elected as Strategus that very Scopas who had been the chief cause of all the outrages I have narrated above. I really scarcely find words in which to express myself about this matter. After declaring by a public decree that they were not going to war, to make an expedition in full force and pillage the countries of their neighbours and then, instead of punishing any of the guilty persons, to honour by electing to their chief offices the directors of these proceedings seems to me the very height of villainy; for how can we characterize otherwise such base conduct?—conduct the nature of which the following examples will serve to illustrate. When the Lacedaemonians gained possession of the Cadmea by the treachery of Phoebidas, they punished the guilty general but did not withdraw the garrison, as if the injustice of the act were atoned for by the perpetrator being made to suffer for it, while if they had chosen, they might have done just the reverse, for the Thebans
5 τούτο γὰρ διέφερε τοῖς Ὀθῆβαιοις. πάλιν ἐκήρυττον ἀφιέντες τὰς πόλεις ἐλευθέρας καὶ αὐτονόμους κατὰ τὴν ἔπ. Ἀνταλκίδου γενομένην εἰρήνην, τοὺς δ' ἀρμοστᾶς οὐκ ἔξηγον ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.

6 Μαντινεῖς φίλους οὖν καὶ συμμάχους ἀναστάτους ποιήσαντες οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀδικεῖν, ἐκ μιᾶς πόλεως εἰς πλείους αὐτοὺς διοικήσαντες, ἀνοίγω ἀκακίας . . . τὸ δοκεῖν, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς ἐπιμῆνη, μηδὲ τοὺς πέλας ὄραν. ἀμφοτέροις τοῦν ὁ ζήλος οὗτος τῆς πολιτείας αὐτίους κατέστη τῶν μεγίστων συμπτωμάτων: ὃν οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμή ζηλωτέον, οὐτε κατ' ἰδίαν οὔτε κοινῆ, τοὺς ὀρθῶς θουλευομένους.

9 Ὅ δ' ἐβασιλεύεις Φιλίππος χρηματίσασ τοῖς Ἀχαίοις ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπὶ Μακαδονίας, σπεύδων ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, οὐ μόνον τοῖσ συμμάχους ἄλλα πάσι τοῖς Ἑλλησι διὰ τοῦ προειρημένου ψηφίσματος καλᾶς ἐλπίδας ὑποδεικνύων πρότητος καὶ μεγαλοψυχίας βασιλικῆς.

28 Ταῦτα δ' ἐπράπτετο κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς καθ' οὐς Ἀννίβας, γεγονοῦς ἄδη κύριος τῶν ἐντὸς Ἰβηρος ποταμοῦ πάντων, ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὀρμήν ἐπὶ τὴν Ζακανθαίων πόλιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰς πρῶτας ἐπιβολὰς τὰς Ἀννίβου ταῖς Ἑλληνικαίς πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εὐθέως ἐπιπεπλέχθαι συνεβαινεν, δῆλον ώς ἐν τῇ προτέρα βύθισεν περὶ τούτων ἢν ἠμᾶς ἐναλλάξ ἤδει καὶ κατὰ παράθεσιν τοῖς Ἰβηρικοῖς πεποίησθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, ἀκολουθοῦντας τοῖς καιροῖς, ἐπει δὲ τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἐλλάδα καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τὰς μὲν 368
were concerned about the garrison, not about the man. Again by the terms of the peace of Antalcidas the same people proclaimed all Greek cities free and autonomous, but did not withdraw their harmosts from them, and again in expelling from their homes the Mantineans, who were their friends and allies, they maintained that they inflicted no wrong on them by transferring them from one city to several. In all this they exhibited their folly as well as their knavery, for they evidently thought that if a man shuts his own eyes his neighbours too are blind. Now to both states, the Aetolians and the Spartans, this unscrupulous policy resulted in the greatest calamities, and it should never be an object of imitation in the public or private life of men who are well advised.

King Philip now having finished his business with the Achaeans left with his army for Macedonia to hasten on the preparations for the war, having given by the above decree not only to the allies, but to all the Greeks a happy prospect of mildness in his rule and of that magnanimity which befits a king.

28. This took place at the same time that Hannibal, after subduing all Iberia south of the Ebro, began his attack on Saguntum. Now had there been any connexion at the outset between Hannibal's enterprise and the affairs of Greece it is evident that I should have included the latter in the previous Book, and, following the chronology, placed my narrative of them side by side in alternate sections with that of the affairs of Spain. But the fact being that the circumstances of Italy, Greece, and Asia
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ἀρχὰς τῶν πολέμων τούτων ἰδίας εἰλήφει τὰς δὲ συντελείας κοινᾶς, καὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκρίνομεν ποιήσασθαι κατ᾿ ἰδίαν, ἐως ἃν ἐπὶ τὸν καίρον ἐλθομεν τούτον ἐν ὧν συνεπλάκησαν αἱ προειρημέναι πράξεις ἀλλήλαις καὶ πρὸς ἐν τέλος

4 ἰδραύντο τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχειν (οὕτως γὰρ ἢ τε περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκάστων ἔσται διήγησις σαφῆς ἢ τε συμπλοκῇ καταφανῆς, περὶ ἢς ἐν ἀρχαῖς ἐνεδειξάμεθα, παραδείγματε πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι᾿ ὃς αἰτίας γέγονεν), λοιπὸν ἦδη κοινὴν ποιήσασθαι

5 περὶ πάντων τὴν ἴστορίαν. ἔγενετο δὲ ἢ συμπλοκῇ τῶν πράξεων περὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου συντελείαν κατὰ τὸ τρίτον ἔτος τῆς ἐκατοστης καὶ τετταρακοστῆς ὀλυμπιάδος. διὸ καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταύτα κοινὴ τοῖς καιροῖς ἀκολουθοῦντες ἑξηγησόμεθα, τὰ δὲ

6 πρὸ τοῦ κατ᾿ ἰδίαν, ὡς εἰπα, προσαναμνήσκοντες μόνον τῶν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ βύβλῳ δεδηλωμένων, ἵνα μὴ μόνον εὐπαρακολούθητος ἄλλα καὶ καταπληκτικὴ γίνηται τοῖς προσέχουσιν ἡ διήγησις.

29 Φιλιππος δὲ παραχεμάζων ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ κατ- ἐγραφε τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς τὴν μελλούσαν χρείαν ἐπιμελῶς, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις ἡσφαλίζετο τὰ πρὸς τοὺς

2 ύπερκειμένους τῆς Μακεδονίας βαββάρους. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα συνελθῶν πρὸς Σκερδυλαίδαν καὶ τολμη- ρῶς δοὺς αὐτὸν εἰς τὰς χείρας. διελέγετο περὶ

3 φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑποσχούμενος αὐτῷ συγκατασκευάσεων τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ καθηγορῶν τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν ὄντων εὐκαθηγορήτων, ῥαδίως ἐπεισε συγκωρεῖν

4 τοὺς παρακαλομένοις. μήποτε γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ κατ᾿ ἰδίαι ἀδικήματα τῶν κοινῶν, ἀλλὰ πλῆθει 370
were such that the beginnings of these wars were particular to each country, while their ends were common to all, I thought it proper to give a separate account of them, until reaching the date when these conflicts came into connexion with each other and began to tend towards one end—both the narratives of the beginnings of each war being thus made more lucid, and a conspicuous place being given to that subsequent interconnexion of all three, which I mentioned at the outset, indicating when, how, and for what reason it came about—and, then upon reaching this point to comprise all three wars in a single narrative. The interconnexion I speak of took place towards the end of the Social War in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. After this date therefore I shall give a general history of events in chronological order; but up to it, as I said, a separate account of each war, merely recapitulating the contemporary occurrences set forth in the previous Book, so that the whole narrative may not only be easy to follow but may make a due impression on my readers.

29. While wintering in Macedonia Philip spent his time in diligently levying troops for the coming campaign, and in securing his frontiers from attack by the barbarians of the interior. In the next place he met Scerdilaidas, fearlessly putting himself in his power, and made him offers of friendship and alliance. By promising on the one hand to aid him in subduing Illyria and on the other hand by bringing accusations against the Aetolians, which was no difficult matter, he easily persuaded him to agree to his proposals. Public crimes, as a fact, differ from private ones only in the extent and quantity of their
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μόνον καὶ μεγέθει τῶν συμβαινόντων. καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἴδιαν τὸ τῶν ῥαδιουργῶν καὶ κλεπτῶν φύλον τοῦτο μάλιστα τῷ τρόπῳ σφάλλεται, τῷ μῆ ποιεῖν ἄλληλοις τὰ δίκαια, καὶ συλλήβδην διὰ τὰς
5 εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀθεσίας. δὲ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ τούς Αἰτωλοὺς. συνθέμενοι γὰρ τῷ Σκερδι-
λαίδα δώσεως μέρος τῇ τῆς λείας, ἐὰν συνεισβάλῃ
6 μετ' αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν, πεισθέντος καὶ ποιή-
σαντος τούτῳ διαρπάσαντες τὴν τῶν Κυναιθέων
πόλιν καὶ πολλὰ περιελασάμενοι σῶματα καὶ
θρέμματα τὸν Σκερδιλαίδαν οὖνδενὸς μερίτην ἐποίη-
7 σαν τῶν ἁλόντων. διόπερ ὑποκαθημένης ἐκ τούτων
αὐτῷ τῆς ὀργῆς, βραχεά προσαναμνήσαντος τοῦ
Φιλίππου ταχέως ὑπῆκουσε καὶ συνέβεβην μεθέξειν
τῆς κοινῆς συμμαχίας, ἐφ' ὧν λαμβάνειν μὲν εἰκοσὶ
τάλαντα κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, πλεῖν δὲ λέμβοις τριάκοντα
καὶ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν.

30 'Ο μὲν οὖν Φιλίππος περὶ ταῦτα διέτριβεν, οἱ δὲ
ἐξαποσταλέντες πρέσβεις πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους
ἀφικόμενοι πρῶτον εἰς 'Ακαρνάνιαν ἐνετύγχανον
2 τούτοις. οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνανεῖς τὸ τε δόγμα γνησίως
συνεπεκύρωσαν καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ χώρας πόλεμον ἐξ-
ήνεγκαν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς: καίπερ τούτοις, εἰ καὶ
τισὶν ἐτέροις, δίκαιον ἦν συγγνώμην ἐχειν ὑπερ-
τιθεμένοις καὶ καταμέλλουσι καὶ καθόλου δεδιόσι
3 τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστυντών πόλεμον καὶ διὰ τὸ
παρακείσθαι μὲν συντερμονοῦντας τῇ τῶν Αἴτωλῶν
χώρᾳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ κατ' ἴδιαν εὔχειρώ-
τος ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ μικροῖς
ἐμπροσθεν χρόνους πεῖραν εἰληφέναι τῶν δενοτάτων
4 διὰ τὴν πρὸς Αἴτωλοὺς ἀπέχθειαν. ἀλλὰ μοι
dοκοῦσιν οἱ γνήσιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ'
results. In private life also the whole tribe of thieves and swindlers come to grief most frequently by not treating their confederates justly and generally speaking by perfidy towards each other, and this was what happened now to the Aetolians. They had agreed with Scerdilaïdas to give him a part of the spoil if he joined them in their invasion of Achaea, and when he consented and did so and they had sacked Cynaetha, carrying off a large booty of slaves and cattle, they gave him no share at all of their captures. As he had been nursing anger against them for this ever since, it only required a brief mention by Philip of this grievance to make him at once consent and agree to adhere to the general alliance on condition of receiving an annual sum of twenty talents, in consideration of which he was to attack the Aetolians by sea with thirty boats.

30. Philip, then, was thus occupied. Meanwhile the envoys sent to the allies proceeded first to Acarnania and communicated with the people. The Acarnanians acted with perfect straightforwardness, confirming the decree and agreeing to make war on the Aetolians from Acarnania, although they, if any people, might have been excused for deferring and hesitating and generally for dreading a war with a neighbouring state, and this for three reasons: the first being the immediate neighbourhood of Aetolia, the next and more important, their military weakness when isolated, but the gravest of all, the terrible suffering they had recently undergone owing to their hostility to the Aetolians. But really straight and honourable men, both in public and private, value, I think, no
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...
considerations above their duty, and this principle the Acarnanians are found to have maintained on most occasions more firmly than any other people in Greece, although their resources were but slender. No one, then, should hesitate to seek the alliance of this people in a crisis; rather it should be embraced with more eagerness than that of any other Greek people; for both in public and in private they are characterized by steadfastness and love of liberty. The Epirots, on the contrary, after receiving the envoys, while they also confirmed the decree and voted to make war on the Aetolians as soon as King Philip himself took the field, in their reply to the Aetolian embassy stated that they had passed a resolution to maintain peace with them, thus playing a part as ignoble as it was double-faced. Envoys were also sent to King Ptolemy requesting him neither to send funds to the Aetolians, nor to furnish them with any other supplies for use against Philip and the allies.

31. The Messenians, on whose account the war began, replied to the envoys sent to them, that seeing that Phigalea lay on their borders and was subject to the Aetolians, they would not undertake the war until this city had been detached from the Aetolians. This resolution was by no means generally approved, but was forced through by the ephors Oenis and Nicippus and certain other members of the oligarchical party, who in my opinion were much mistaken and took a course which was far from being correct. That war is a terrible thing I agree, but it is not so terrible that we should submit to anything in order to avoid it. For why do we
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ti kai thraσσυνομεν την ἱσηγορίαν και παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ὄνομα πάντες, εἰ μηδὲν
5 ἔσται προφυγοίτερον τῆς εἰρήνης; οὐδὲ γὰρ
Θηβαίους ἔπαινοῦμεν κατὰ τὰ Μηδικά, διότι τῶν
υπὲρ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ἀποστάντες κινδύνων τὰ Περσῶν
εἶλοντο διὰ τὸν φόβον, οὐδὲ Πίνδαρον τὸν συναπο-
φνάμενον αὐτοῖς ἀγεν ἐν τὴν ἱσυχίαν διὰ τῶν
ποιημάτων,
6 τὸ κοινὸν τις ἄστῶν ἐν εὐδία τιθεὶς
ἐρευνασάτω μεγαλάνορος ἱσυχίας τὸ φαιδρὸν φάος.

7 δόξας γὰρ παραγεναι πιθανῶς εἰρήκεναι, μετ' οὖ
πολὺ πάντων αἰσχίστην εὐρέθη και βλαβερωτάτην
8 πεποιημένος ἀπόφασιν· εἰρήνη γὰρ μετὰ μὲν τοῦ
dικαίου και πρόποντος κάλλιστον ἔστι κτῆμα καὶ
λυσιτελέστατον, μετὰ δὲ κακίας ἡ δειλίας ἐπονει-
dίστον πάντων αἰσχιστον καὶ βλαβερώτατον.

32 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων προστάτες, ὄντες ὁλιγ-
αρχικὸι καὶ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ παραυτὰ κατ' ἱδίαν
λυσιτελοὺς, φιλοτιμότερον τοῦ δέοντος ἀεὶ δι-
2 ἐκεύτο πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην. διὸ πολλὰς μὲν περι-
στάσεις καὶ καιροὺς ἔχοντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ φόβους
καὶ κινδύνους διωλίσθανεν· ἡθροίζετο δὲ κατὰ
tὴν πρόθεσιν ταύτην ἀεὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτοῖς, καὶ
μεγίσταις ἐποίουν παλαιέων τὴν πατρίδα συμφοραῖς.
3 δοκῶ δὲ ἐγγὺς τῆν αἰτίαν εἶναι ταύτην, ὅτι δυσὶ
γευτιώντες ἔθνει τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν κατὰ Πελο-
πόνησον, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν,
λέγω δὲ τῷ τε τῶν Ἀρκάδων καὶ τῷ τῶν Δακώνων,
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all vaunt our civic equality and liberty of speech and all that we mean by the word freedom, if nothing is more advantageous than peace? We do not indeed praise the Thebans because at the time of the Persian invasion they deserted Greece in the hour of peril and took the side of the Persians from fear, nor do we praise Pindar for confirming them in their resolution to remain inactive by the verses

Stablish in calm the common weal,  
Ye burghers all, and seek the light of lordly Peace that ever beameth bright.\(^a\)

For though at the time this advice seemed plausible it was not long before the decision he recommended proved to be the source of the deepest disaster and disgrace. Peace indeed, with justice and honour is the fairest and most profitable of possessions, but when joined with baseness and disgraceful cowardice, nothing is more infamous and hurtful.

32. The oligarchs who were then in power in Messenia, aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too warm advocates of peace. Consequently though they often found themselves in critical situations and were sometimes exposed to grave peril, they always managed to slip through without friction. But the sum of the evils caused by this policy of theirs continued to accumulate, and at last their country was forced to struggle with the worst calamities. The cause of this I believe to be, that living as they did on the borders of two of the greatest nations in the Peloponnese or even in Greece, the Arcadians and Laconians, of whom

\(^a\) Pindar probably meant civic peace and Polybius accuses him unjustly.

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4 καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐχθρῶς καὶ ἀκαταλλάκτως ἀεὶ ποτὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντος ἐξ οὗ καὶ κατέσχον τὴν χώραν, τοῦ δὲ φιλικῶς καὶ κηδεμονικῶς, οὕτε τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαίμονίους ἐχθραν εὐγενῶς ἀνελάμβανον
5 οὕτε τὴν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας φιλίαν. λοιπὸν ὅταν μὲν οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἥ πρὸς ἐτέρους πολεμοῦντες ἐν περισπασμοῖς ἦσαν, ἐγίνετο τὸ δὲν αὐτοῖς· ἦγον γὰρ τὴν εἰρήνην ἀεὶ παρευδιάζομενοι διὰ τὴν
6 τοῦ τόπου παράπτωσιν· ὅταν δὲ εὐσχολοι κάπερι-

παστοι Λακεδαίμονιοι γενηθέντες ἐτράπησαν πρὸς
7 τὸ βλάπτειν αὐτοὺς, οὕτ' αὐτοὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἀντ-

οθαλμεῖν ἔδυναν πρὸς τὸ βάρος τὸ Λακε-

dαίμονιον, οὕτε προκατεσκευασμένοι φίλους τοὺς

ἀληθιῶς αὐτοῖς πάντα συνυποστησομένους ἢ

δουλεύειν ἡγακάζοντο τούτοις ἄχθοφορούντες, ἢ

φεύγοντες τὴν δουλείαν ἀνάστατοι γίνεσθαι, λεί-

ποντες τὴν χώραν μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν,

8 ὅπερ ἦδη πλεονάκις αὐτοῖς συνέβη παθεῖν οὐ πάνω

9 πολλοῖς χρόνοις. εὔη μὲν οὖν οἶδεν ἀμφῶν 

τὴν 

νῦν ὑπάρχουσαν κατάστασιν Πελοποννησίους, ἦν

10 


μὴδενὸς δὲ τῶν 

λέγεσθαι μελλόντων· εάν δὲ 

ποτὲ κίνησιν καὶ μετάστασιν σχῆ ταῦτα, μίαν ὁρὼ

Μεσσηνίος καὶ Μεγαλοπολίταις ἐλπίδα τοῦ δύνα-

σθαι νέμεσθαι τὴν αὐτῶν χώραν τὸν πλείω χρόνον,

εάν συμφρονήσαντες κατὰ τὴν Ἐπαμνώνου γνώ-

μην παντὸς καυροῦ καὶ πράγματος ἐλωνταί κοινω-

νεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἀληθιῶς.

33 Ὅ δὲ λόγος οὕτως ἔχει μὲν ὑσώς καὶ διὰ τῶν

2 πάλαι γεγονότων πίστιν. οἱ γὰρ Μεσσηνίοι πρὸς
the latter had been their implacable enemies ever since their first occupation of the country, while the former were their friends and protectors, they were never thoroughly frank and whole-hearted either in their enmity to the Lacedaemonians or in their friendship to the Arcadians. Consequently when the attention of these two peoples was distracted by wars between themselves or against other states, the Messenians were not ill treated, for they enjoyed tranquillity and peace owing to their country lying outside the theatre of war. But whenever the Lacedaemonians, finding themselves again at leisure and undistracted, took to maltreating them, they could neither face the might of Sparta alone, nor had they secured for themselves friends who would be ready to stand by them in all circumstances, and consequently they were compelled either to be the slaves and carriers of the Lacedaemonians, or if they wished to avoid slavery, to break up their homes and abandon their country with their wives and children, a fate which has overtaken them more than once in a comparatively short period of time. Heaven grant that the present tranquillity of the Peloponnese may be firmly established, so that the advice I am about to give may not be required; but should there be a change and a recurrence of disturbances the only hope I see for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of being able to continue in possession of their countries, is for them, as Epaminondas advised, to be of one mind and resolve on whole-hearted co-operation in all circumstances and in all action.

33. This counsel may perhaps find some support from circumstances that took place many years previously. For besides many other things I might
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άλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ παρὰ τῶν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἀνκάιου βωμὸν ἀνέθεσαν στήλην ἐν τοῖς κατ᾽ Ἀριστομένην καυροῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Καλλισθένης φησίν, γράμματες τὸ γράμμα τοῦτο:

3 πάντως ὁ χρόνος εὑρεὶ δίκην ἄδικως βασιλῆι, εὑρεὶ δὲ Μεσσήνη σὺν Διὶ τὸν προδότην ῥημίως. χαλεπῶν δὲ λαθεῖν θεοὶ ἀνδρὶ ἑπίορκον. χαίρε, Ἴτε βασιλεῦ, καὶ σᾶς Ἀρκάδιαν.

4 Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐστερήθησαν, οἰονεὶ περὶ δευτέρας πατρίδος, ὡς γάρ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχόμενοι σώζειν τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, τούτ᾽ ἀνέθεσαν τὸ γράμμα. καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως ἐποίουν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον αὐτοὺς Ἀρκάδας ὑποδεξάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἐκπτωσιν τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱδίας ὑπὸ τὸν Ἀριστομένειον πόλεμον ὄμεστίους ἐποιήσαντο καὶ πολίτας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐφηφίσαντο τοῖς ἐν ἥλικίᾳ διδό·

5 ναι τῶν Μεσσηνίων, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἀναζητήσαντες τὴν Ἀριστοκράτους τοῦ βασίλεως προδόσιαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ καλομενῇ περὶ Τάφρον αὐτὸν τ᾽ ἀνεί.

6 λοι καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ πᾶν ἡφάνισαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τῶν πάλαι τὰ τελευταῖα γεγονότα μετὰ τὸν Μεγάλης πόλεως καὶ Μεσσήνης συνοικισμὸν ἰκανὴν ἃν παράσχοι πίστιν τοῖς ψφή ἧμῶν εἰρημέ·

7 νοῦς. καθ᾽ οὖς γὰρ καυροῖς, τῆς περὶ Μαυτίνειαν μάχης τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἀμφιδήριτον ἐχοῦσας τὴν νίκην διὰ τὸν Ἐπαμινώδους θάνατον, ἐκώλυνον Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετέχειν τῶν σπονδῶν Μεσσηνίων, ἀκμὴν σφετερίζομενοι ταῖς ἐλπίσι τῆς Μεσσηνίας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο διέσπευσαν Μεγαλοπολῖται καὶ πάντες οἱ κοινωνοῦντες Ἀρκάδων τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας

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BOOK IV. 33. 2-9

mention, the Messenians set up in the time of Aristomenes, as Callisthenes tells us, a pillar beside the altar of Zeus Lycaeus bearing the inscription:

Time faileth ne’er to find the unjust and bring
A righteous doom on an unrighteous king.
Messene now, with ease, for Zeus did speed,
Found out the traitor. Yea, ’tis hard indeed
For the forsworn to hide him from God’s eye.
All hail, O Zeus, the king; save Arcady.

It was, as a fact, after they had lost their own country that they dedicated this inscription praying the gods to save Arcadia as if it were a second fatherland to them. And in this they were quite justified; for the Arcadians not only received them on their expulsion from Messenia in the Aristomenian War, taking them to their homes and making them citizens, but passed a resolution to give their daughters in marriage to those Messenians who were of proper age. In addition to this, after holding an inquiry into the treachery of the king Aristocrates in the battle of the Trench, they put him and his whole family to death. But, apart from these remote events, my assertion derives sufficient support from the circumstances that followed the recent foundation of the cities of Megalopolis and Messene. For at the time when, after the battle of Mantinea, the result of which was doubtful owing to the death of Epaminondas, the Spartans refused to allow the Messenians to participate in the truce, as they still hoped to re-annex Messenia, the Megalopolitans and all the Arcadians in alliance with them were so active in

a For details see the account of the second Messenian war in Pausanias iv. 14-24.
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ὡστε Μεσσηνίους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων προσ-
δεχθήναι καὶ μετασχεῖν τῶν ὄρκων καὶ διαλύσεσιν,
Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους ἐκσπόνδους γενέσθαι
τῶν Ἑλλήνων. ἂ τίς οὖκ ἂν τῶν ἐπιγνομένων ἐν
νῷ τιθέμενοι νομίσειε καλῶς εἰρήσαται τὰ μικρῷ
πρότερον υφ’ ἡμῶν δεδηλωμένα;

10 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν Ἀρκάδων καὶ
Μεσσηνίων, ἵνα μημονεύσωτε τῶν συμβεβηκότων
αὐτοῖς περὶ τὰς πατρίδας ἀτυχημάτων ὑπὸ Λακε-
δαιμονίων ἀληθινῶς ἀντέχωντα τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς
12 εὐνοίας καὶ πίστεως, καὶ μὴτε φόβον ύφοράμενοι
μητ’ εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐγκαταλείπωσον ἀλλή-
λους ἐν ταῖς ὀλοσχεροῖς περιστάσεσιν.

34 Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐποίησαν τι
(τούτο γὰρ συνεχέσ ἦν τοῖς προειρημένοις). τέλος
γὰρ τοῦσπαρὰ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεισ ἀναποκρίτους
ἀπέστειλαν. οὕτως ἐξηπόρησαν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλογίας
2 καὶ κακίας τῆς αὐτῶν. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ’ ἀληθὲς
eῖναι, διὸτι πολλάκις τολμᾶν περιττὸν εἰς ἄνοιαν
3 καὶ τὸ μηδὲν καταντάν εἰσθην. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα μετὰ
ταῦτα, κατασταθέντων ἐφόρων ἄλλων, οἱ κινήσαν-
tes ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα καὶ γενόμενοι τῆς
προειρημένης σφαγῆς αὐτοῖο διεπέμποντο πρὸς
4 τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς, ἐπιστακαλεῖο πρεσβευτὴν. τῶν
de καὶ μάλ’ ἀσμένως ὑπακουοῦντων ἢκε μετ’
ὀλίγουν πρεσβευτῶν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα Μαχατᾶς.
5 καὶ παρατίκα προσήκει τοῖς ἐφόροις . . . οἰόμε-
nοι δεῖν τῷ τε Μαχατῷ δίδοσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ
tοὺς πολλοὺς, καὶ βασιλέας καθιστάναι κατὰ τὰ
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their efforts, that the Messenians were received by the allies and included in the general treaty of peace, while the Lacedaemonians alone among the Greeks were excluded from it. Anyone in the future who takes this into consideration will agree that the opinion I advanced a little above is correct. I have spoken at such length on the subject for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians, in order that, bearing in mind the misfortunes that have befallen their countries at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may adhere in the spirit as well as in the letter to their alliance and neither from fear of consequences or from a desire for peace desert each other in critical times.

34. To continue my account of the reception of the envoys, the Lacedaemonians acted in the manner usual with them, dismissing the envoys without making any reply at all; so utterly incapable were they of arriving at a decision owing to the absurdity and viciousness of their late policy. Indeed it seems to me very true the saying that excessive daring ends in mere senselessness and nothingness. Subsequently, however, on the appointment of new ephors, the original movers of the sedition and authors of the massacre I described above sent messengers to the Aetolians inviting them to negotiate. The Aetolians were quite happy to agree to this, and shortly afterwards Machatas arrived in Sparta as their envoy and at once presented himself before the ephors [accompanied by members of the party which had invited him who] demanded that they should grant Machatas access to the general assembly and appoint kings in accordance with the ancient constitution, for
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πάτρια, καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν τὸν πλείω χρόνου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καταλελυμένην τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν
8 ἀρχῆν. οἱ δὲ ἐφοροὶ δυσαρεστοῦμενοι μὲν τοῖς ὀλοίς πράγμασιν, οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὤρμην ἀντοφθαλμεῖν ἀλλὰ δεδιότες τὴν τῶν νέων συστρο-
φήν, περὶ μὲν τῶν βασιλέων ἔφασαν μετὰ ταῦτα βουλεύσεθαι, τῷ δὲ Μαχατᾶ συνεχώρησαν δώσειν
7 τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. συναχθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλῆθους παρ-
ελθὼν οἱ Μαχατᾶς παρεκάλει διὰ πλείονων αὐτοὺς
αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοῦς συμμαχίαν, εἰκῇ μὲν καὶ 
θρασέως κατηγορῶν Μακεδόνων, ἀλὸγως δὲ
8 καὶ ψευδῶς ἑγκωμίαξον τοὺς Αἰτωλοῦς. μετα-
στάντος δὲ τούτου πολλῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐτύγ-
χανε τὸ πράγμα· τυνὲς μὲν γὰρ συνηγόρουν τοῖς 
Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ συντίθεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς παρῆσαν
9 τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἔνιοι δὲ τούτους ἀντέλεγον. οὐ
μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τυνὲς ἐπιστήσαντες
τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τε τὰς Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων
εὐρεγείας ἐπὶ τε τὰς διὰ Χαρίζενον καὶ Τιμαίον
βλάβας, ὅτε στρατεύσαντες Αἰτωλοὶ πανδημεῖ 
κατέφθειραν μὲν αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν, ἐξηνδραπο-
δίσαντο δὲ τὰς περιοίκους, ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ τῇ 
Σπάρτῃ μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας τοὺς φυγάδας ἔπ-
10 αγαγόντες, ἐπὶ ἄλλης ἐγένοντο γνώμης, καὶ τέλος
ἐπείσθησαν τηρεῖν τὴν πρὸς Φίλιππον καὶ Μακε-
11 δόνας συμμαχίαν. γενομένων δὲ τούτων ὁ μὲν 
Μαχατᾶς ἀπρακτος ἐπανήγερε πάλιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν,
35 οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτοὶ γεγονότες τῆς κινήσεως, 
οὐδαμῶς εἰσὶ δυνάμενοι τοῖς παροῦσιν, αὐτὸς 
ἐπεβάλοντο πράγμα ποιεῖν πάντων ἀσεβέστατον,
2 φθείρατές τινας τῶν νέων. κατὰ γὰρ τινα θυσίαν

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BOOK IV. 34. 5 – 35. 2

they must no longer permit the royal house of the Heraclidae to be dethroned in defiance of law. The ephors, who were displeased by the whole proceeding, but were incapable of boldly confronting the party of violence as they were intimidated by the mob of young men, said that they would take time to decide about re-establishing the kings, but agreed to allow Machatas to address a meeting of the commons. On the people assembling, Machatas came forward and in a speech of some length exhorted them to declare for alliance with the Aetolians, bringing random and audacious accusations against the Macedonians and praising the Aetolians in terms as absurd as they were false. On his withdrawal an animated discussion took place, some speaking on behalf of the Aetolians and advising the conclusion of an alliance with them, while other speakers took the opposite view. However when some of the elder citizens reminded the people of the benefits conferred on them by Antigonus and the Macedonians and of the injuries they had received at the hands of Charixenus and Timaeus—when the Aetolians invading Laconia in full force devastated the country, enslaved the villages of the Perioeci and formed a plot to capture Sparta, combining fraud and force to reinstate the exiles—the people were brought round to another opinion, and finally persuaded to maintain their alliance with Philip and the Macedonians. Hereupon Machatas returned home without effecting his purpose; (35) but the original authors of the sedition had no mind to give way and again resolved to commit a most impious crime, having debauched for this purpose some of the younger men. At a certain sacrifice of ancient
Τὸ πάτριον ἐδει τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν πομπεύειν ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τῆς Χαλκο-οίκου νεών, τοὺς δὲ ἐφόρους συντελεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν θυσίαν, αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ τέμενος διατρίβοντας. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ τῶν πομπεύοντων ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς τινὲς τῶν νεανίσκων ἄφνω προσπεσόντες θύουσι τοὺς ἐφόρους ἀπέσφαξαν αὐτοὺς. καὶ τοῖς πάσι τοῖς καταφυγοῦσι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρεσκεύαζε τὸ ἱερὸν, κἂν θανάτου τις ἡ κατακεκριμένος· τότε δὲ διὰ τὴν ἁμότητα τῶν τολμώντων εἰς τούτῳ ἠλθε τοῖς προθέσεις ποιοῦντες ἀνείλον μὲν τοὺς περὶ Γυρίδαν τῶν γερόντων, ἐφυγάδευσαν δὲ τοὺς ἀντειπόντας τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, εἰλοντο δὲ εὐτῶν ἐφόρους, συνέβεντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς τὴν συμμαχίαν. ἐποίουν δὲ ταύτα, καὶ τὴν τε πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς ἀπέχθειαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς Μακεδόνας ἀχαριστίαν καὶ καθόλου τὴν πρὸς πάντας ἀλογίαν ὑπέμενον, οὐχ ἤκιστα διὰ Κλεομένη καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνον εὐνοιαν, ἐπελπι-ζοντες ἀεὶ καὶ προσδοκίαν ἔχοντες τῆς ἐκείνου παρουσίας ἀμα καὶ σωτηρίας. οὕτως οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιδεξίως ὁμιλεῖν τοῖς συμπερι-φερομένους οὐ μόνον παρόντες ἀλλὰ καὶ μακρὰν ἀφεστῶτες ἐγκαταλείποντι τινα καὶ λίαν ἰσχυρὰ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐνοίας αἰθύγματα. οὐ γε, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τότε, πολυτευόμενοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια σχέδου ἡδυ τρεῖς ἐναυτοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένους ἐκπτωσίν, οὐδ’ ἐπενόησαν οὐδὲποτε βασιλεῖς καταστήσατο τῆς Σπάρτης· ἀμα δὲ τῷ τὴν φήμην ἀφικέσθαι περὶ τῆς Κλεομένους τελευτής.
institution the citizens of military age had to form a procession in arms and march to the temple of Athene of the Brazen House, while the ephors remained in the sanctuary to perform the sacrificial rites. Certain of the young men who took part in the procession chose the moment when the ephors were sacrificing for suddenly attacking and slaying them. It must be remembered that the holy place secured the safety of anyone who took sanctuary in it, even if he were condemned to death; and yet its sanctity was held in such slight esteem by those who had the heart to do this savage deed, that all the ephors were butchered at the very altar and table of the goddess. Continuing to pursue their purpose, they next killed Gyridas, one of the elders, expelled those who had spoken against the Aetolians, chose new ephors from their own faction and concluded the alliance with the Aetolians. Their chief motive for all these proceedings and for exhibiting enmity to the Achaeans, ingratitude to Macedonia, and a general lack of consideration in their conduct to all mankind, was their attachment to Cleomenes, to whose safe return they were always looking forward with confidence. So true is it that men who have the faculty of tactfully treating those about them do not only arouse devotion to their persons when present, but even when far away keep the spark of loyalty bright and alive in the hearts of their adherents. These men, apart from other considerations, had now during the three years they had passed under their old constitution since the dethronement of Cleomenes never thought of appointing new kings of Sparta; but the moment the report of his death reached them they at once
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euthēws ὀρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ βασιλεῖς καθιστάναι τὰ τε
10 πλῆθη καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον. καὶ κατέ-
στησαν οἱ κοινωνοῦντες ἐφόροι τῆς αἰρέσεως τοὺς
στασιώτας, οἱ καὶ τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς συνθέμενοι
συμμαχίαν, ὑπὲρ ὅν τὸν ἀρτι λόγον ἐποιησάμην,
tὸν μὲν ἕνα νομίμως καὶ καθηκόντως, Ἀγησίπολυν,
ὅντα μὲν παῖδα τὴν ἥλκιαν, υἱὸν δὲ Ἀγησιπόλυδος
11 τοῦ Κλεομβρότου· τὸν δὲ συνεβαίνει βεβασιλευ-
κέναι, καθ' οὓς καίρους ἐξέπεσε δεινότητας ἐκ τῆς
ἀρχῆς, διὰ τὸ κατὰ γένος ὑπάρχειν ἐγνωστά τῆς
12 οἰκίας ταύτης. ἐπίτροπον δὲ τοῦ παιδὸς εἶλοντο
Κλεομήνην, Κλεομβρότου μὲν υἱὸν Ἀγησιπόλυδος
13 δὲ ἀδελφόν. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐτέρας οἰκίας οὐντὸν ἐκ
τῆς Ἰππομέδοντος θυγατρὸς Ἀρχιδάμῳ δυναῖν
παῖδων, ὅς ἦν υἱὸς Εὐδαμίδου, ξώντος δὲ καὶ
Ἰππομέδοντος ἀκμήν, ὅς ἦν υἱὸς Ἀγησιλάου τοῦ
Εὐδαμίδου, καὶ ἐτέρων δὲ πλεύσμων ἀπὸ τῆς
οἰκίας ὑπαρχόντων, ἀπωτέρῳ μὲν τῶν προειρημένων
προσηκόντων δὲ κατὰ γένος, τούτως μὲν ἀπαντᾷς
14 ὑπερεῖδων, Δυκοῦργον δὲ βασιλεὰ κατέστησαν,
οὐ τῶν προγόνων οὐδὲς ἐτετείχει τῆς προση-
γορίας· ὅς δὲ υἱὸς τῶν ἐφόρων τάλαντον
Ἡρακλέος ἀπόγονος καὶ βασιλεὺς ἐγενότει τῆς
15 Σπάρτης. οὔτως εὐώνα πανταχῇ τὰ καλὰ γέγονεν.
τοιγαροῦν οὐ παῖδες παῖδων, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι τῆς
ἀνοίας ἀπέτισαν τοὺς μισθοὺς οἱ καταστήσαντες.

36 ὃ δὲ Μαχατᾶς πυθόμενος τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους ἴκε πάλιν ὑποστρέψας εἰς τὴν
Σπάρτην, καὶ παρεκάλει τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ τοὺς
βασιλέας ἐξενεγκεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὸν πόλεμον
2 μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὔτως ἔφη λήξαι τὴν τῶν Λακεδαι-
μονίων φιλονεκίαν τῶν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπον δια-
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urged the people and the ephors to create kings. The ephors belonging to the faction of disorder whom I mentioned above, the same who had concluded the alliance with the Aetolians, hereupon made a choice which was legal and proper in the case of the one king, Agesipolis, still a minor, but the son of Agesipolis son of Cleombrotus who had succeeded to the throne on the deposition of Leonidas as being the next in blood of that house. They appointed to be the boy’s guardian Cleomenes, the son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis. But as for the other house, notwithstanding that Archidamus, the son of Eudamidas, had left two sons born to him by the daughter of Hippomedon and that Hippomedon, who was the son of Agesilaus and grandson of Eudamidas, was still alive, there being also other members of the house more distant than these, but of the blood royal, they passed over all these and nominated as king Lycurgus, none of whose ancestors had borne this title, but he by giving each of the ephors a talent became a descendant of Heracles and king of Sparta, so cheap everywhere had distinctions become. But it happened in consequence that not their children’s children, but the very men who made the appointment were the first to suffer for their folly.

36. When Machatas heard what had happened in Sparta, he returned there and urged the ephors and kings to make war on the Achaeans, for that he said was the only means of putting a stop to the factious policy of those Lacedaemonians who wished by any and every means to break the alliance with
κοπτόντων τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς συμμαχίαν, τὴν τε τῶν ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτους πραττόντων.
3 πεισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν βασιλέων ὁ μὲν Μαχατάς ἐπανήλθε συντετελεσμένος τὴν πρόθεσιν
4 διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῶν συμπράττοντων, δὲ δὲ Αυκούργος ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ τινὰς τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ἀργείαν, ἀφυλάκτως διακειμένων εἰς τέλος τῶν Ἀργείων διὰ τὴν
5 προὐπάρχουσαν κατάστασιν, καὶ Πολύχναν μὲν καὶ Πρασίας καὶ Λεύκας καὶ Κύφαντα προσπεσθῶν ἄφινο κατέσχεν, Γλυμπέσι δὲ καὶ Ζάρακι προσ-
6 πεσών ἀπέπεσε. τούτου δὲ τάντα πράξαντος ἐπεκήρυξαν τὸ λαφυρὸν οἱ Λακεδαίμονοι κατὰ τῶν Ἀχαίων. ἔπεισαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἁλείους οἱ περὶ τὸν Μαχατάν, παραπλήσια λέγοντες ἀπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαίμονίους, ἐξενεγκείν τοῖς Ἀχαίοις τὸν πόλεμον.
7 Παραδόξως δὲ καὶ κατὰ νοῦν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων προκεχωρηκότων οὐτοί μὲν εὐ
θαρσῶς ἐνέβαινον εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαίοι
8 τάναντια. Φίλιππος μὲν γὰρ, ἐφ᾽ ὃ τὰς ἐλπίδας εἴχον, ἀκμὴν ἐγώντο περὶ παρασκευὴν, Ἡπειρώται
d᾽ ἐμελλον πολέμεων, Μεσσήνιοι δ᾽ ἠσύχασαν εἰχον,
9 Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ, προσειληφότες τὴν Ἡλείων καὶ
Λακεδαίμονίων ἄγνοιαν, πανταχὸθεν περιείχον αὐ-
37 τοὺς τῷ πολέμῳ. Ἀράτω μὲν οὖν συνέβαινε κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον ὡς ἀρχὴν τῆν ἀρχήν, ὁ Ἀρατὸν
δὲ τὸν ψυχὸν αὐτοῦ καθεσταμένον ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαίων
2 παραλαμβάνει τὴν στρατηγίαν. Αἰτωλῶν δὲ ἐ-
στρατηγεῖ Σκόπας, δὲ δὲ χρόνος αὐτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς
μάλιστα τότε πως διήρητο· τὰς γὰρ ἀρχαιεσίας
Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν ἐποίουν μετὰ τὴν φθινοπωρίνην
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the Aetolians and of those in Aetolia who were working for the same end. Upon the ephors and kings consenting, Machatas returned, having accomplished his purpose owing to the blindness of those who supported him. Lycurgus now, taking the regular army and some others of the citizens, invaded Argolis, the Argives being quite off their guard owing to the prevailing tranquillity. By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta, but was repulsed in his attack on Glympes and Zarax. After these achievements of the king the Lacedaemonians proclaimed the right of reprisal against the Achaeans. Machatas also persuaded the Eleans by the same arguments that he had used at Sparta to make war on the Achaeans.

Owing to their cause having thus prospered beyond their expectations the Aetolians entered on the war with confidence. But it was quite the opposite with the Achaeans; for Philip, in whom they chiefly trusted, had not completed his preparations, the Epirots were putting off the commencement of hostilities, the Messenians were entirely inactive, and the Aetolians, supported by the mistaken policy of Elis and Sparta, had enclosed them in a circle of war. 37. Aratus' term of office was now expiring, and his son Aratus who had been elected in his place was on the point of succeeding him as strategus. Scopas was still the Aetolian strategus, his term of office being now about half through; for the Aetolians hold their elections after the autumn equinox, but the Achaeans in
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3 Πλειάδος ἐπιτολήν. ἦδη δὲ τῆς θερέιας ἐνισταμένης, καὶ μετεληφότος Ἀράτου τοῦ νεωτέρου τῆς ὁπταγήνας, ἀμα πάντα τὰ πράγματα τὰς ἐπιβολὰς ἐλάμβανε καὶ τὰς ἄρχας. Ἀννίβας μὲν γὰρ ἐνεχεῖρε κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους Ζάκανθαν πολιορκεῖν, Ὦμμαϊδοι δὲ Λεόκιον Αἰμίλιον εἰς τὴν Ἰλισιᾶ κατα δυνάμεως ἐξαπέστελλον ἐπὶ Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον· ὑπὲρ δὲν ἐν τῷ προτέρα

5 βύβλῳ δεδηλώκαμεν. Ἀντίοχος δὲ, Πτολεμαῖδα καὶ Τύρον παραδόντος αὐτῷ Θεοδότου, τοῖς κατὰ Κόλπην Συρίαν ἐγγράεσκον ἐπεβάλλετο. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνετο τοῦ πρὸς Ἀντίοχον

6 πολέμου. Ἀνκουργος δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων βουλόμενος ἀρχεσθαι Κλέομένει καὶ τῶν Μεγαλοπολίτῶν Ἀθήναιον ἐπολύρκει προσερτοπεδευκός. Ἀχαϊοὶ δὲ μισθοφόρους ἐπιπείς καὶ πεζοῦς ἣθρούζον

7 εἰς τὸν περιεστῶτα πόλεμον. Φίλιππος δὲ ἐκ Μακεδονίας εἰκότα μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐχὼν Μακεδόνων φαλαγγίτας μὲν μυρίους πελταστὰς δὲ πεντακισχίλιους, ἀμα δὲ τούτους ἐπιπείς ἀκτακοσίους.

8 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀπαντῆν ἐν τοιαῦτας ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ παρασκευαῖς· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ἔσχην ὜ρδοι Βυζαντίους πόλεμον διὰ τινας τοιαύ-

38 τας αἰτίας. Βυζαντίοι κατὰ μὲν βάλλαταν εὐκαιροτοῦν οἰκουσί τόπον καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πάντη τῶν ἐν τῇ καθ ἡμᾶς οἰκουμένη, κατὰ δὲ γῆν πρὸς ἀμφότερα πάντων ἀφυέστατον.

2 κατὰ μὲν γὰρ βάλλαταν οὕτως ἐπίκειται τῷ στρατεύοντος καὶ πρὸς ἐντούλων βουλήσεως. ἔχοντος δὲ τοῦ Πόντου τῆς ἔκεινων βουλήσεως.
early summer at about the time of the rising of the Pleiads. The date at which the younger Aratus 219 B.C. assumed office, summer being then well advanced, marked the commencement of activity in all quarters. As I narrated in the previous Book, Hannibal at this date was opening the siege of Saguntum and the Romans were dispatching Lucius Aemilius to Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos. Simultaneously Antiochus, Ptolemais and Tyre having been surrendered to him by Theodotus, was about to invade Coele-Syria, Ptolemy was preparing for the war against Antiochus, Lycurgus, wishing to rival Cleomenes at the outset of his campaign, had encamped before the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis and was investing it, the Achaeans were collecting mercenaries both horse and foot for the war which threatened them, and finally Philip was moving out of Macedonia with his forces consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed infantry, five thousand peltasts, and eight hundred horse, all the above being Macedonians.

Such were the projects and preparations on all sides, and at the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines for the following reasons. 38. The site of Byzantium is as regards the sea more favourable to security and prosperity than that of any other city in the world known to us, but as regards the land it is most disadvantageous in both respects. For, as concerning the sea, it completely blocks the mouth of the Pontus in such a manner that no one can sail in or out without the consent of the Byzantines. So that they have complete
πολλά τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον εὐχρήστων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώπωις πάντων εἰσὶ τούτων κύριοι Βυζάντιοι. 4 πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρείας τὰ τε ϑρέμματα καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς δουλείας ἁγομένων σωμάτων πλῆθος οἱ κατὰ τὸν Πόντον ἦμιν τόποι παρασκευάζουσι δαιμιλεστατον καὶ χρησιμωτατον ὁμολογουμένως, πρὸς δὲ περιουσίαν μὲλὶ κηρὸν 5 τάριχος ἀφθόνως ἦμιν χωρηγοῦσιν. δέχονται γε μὴν τῶν ἐν τοῖς παρ᾽ ἦμιν τόποις περιτευνότων ἐλαιον καὶ πάν οἶνου γένος. σιτω δ᾽ ἀμείβονται, ποτὲ μὲν εὐκαίρως διδόντες ποτὲ δὲ λαμβάνοντες. 6 πάντων δὴ τούτων ἡ κωλὺσθαι δέον ἢν ὀλοσχερὸς τοὺς Ἐλλήνας ἢ τελέως ἀλυσιτελῆ γίνεσθαι σφίσι τὴν ἄλλαγὴν αὐτῶν, Βυζαντίων ὡτοι βουλομένων ἐμελοκακεῖν καὶ συνδυάζειν ποτὲ μὲν Γαλάταις τοτὲ δὲ πλείονα Θραξίν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν μὴ κατοι- 7 κούντων τοὺς τόπους· διὰ τε γὰρ τὴν στενότητα τοῦ πόρου καὶ τὸ παρακείμενον πλῆθος τῶν βαρ- βάρων ἀπλοὺς ἃν ἦμιν ἢν ὁμολογουμένως ὁ Πόντος. 8 μέγιστα μὲν οὖν ὅσως αὐτοῖς ἐκείνους περιγίνεται λυσιτελῆ πρὸς τοὺς βίους διὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων 9 ἱδατησι. ἂπαν γὰρ τὸ μὲν περιτεύον παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔξαγωγῆς, τὸ δὲ λείπον εἰςαγωγῆς ἐτοίμον τυγχάνει καὶ λυσιτελοὺς ἀνευ πάσης κακοπαθείας 10 καὶ κινδύνου· πολλά γε μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐ- χρῆστα δι᾽ ἐκείνους, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν, ἀπαντᾷ. διὸ καὶ κοινῷ τινὲς ὡς ἐνεργέται πάντων ὑπάρχοντες εἰκότως ἃν ὦ μόνον χάριτος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπικουρίας κοινῆς τυγχάνοιεν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐλλήνων κατὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων περιστάσεις. 11 Ἐπεὶ δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις ἀγνοοεῖσθαι συνέβαινε 394
control over the supply of all those many products furnished by the Pontus which men in general require in their daily life. For as regards necess-
ities it is an undisputed fact that the most plentiful supplies and best qualities of cattle and slaves reach us from the countries lying round the Pontus, while among luxuries the same countries furnish us with abundance of honey, wax, and preserved fish, while of the superfluous produce of our countries they take olive-oil and every kind of wine. As for corn there is a give-and-take, they sometimes supply-
ing us when we require it and sometimes importing it from us. The Greeks, then, would entirely lose all this commerce or it would be quite unprofitable to them, if the Byzantines were disposed to be deliberately unfriendly to them, and had made common cause formerly with the Gauls and more especially at present with the Thracians, or if they had abandoned the place altogether. For, owing to the narrowness of the strait and the numbers of the barbarians on its banks, it would evidently be impossible for our ships to sail into the Pontus. Though perhaps the Byzantines themselves are the people who derive most financial benefit from the situation of their town, since they can readily export all their superfluous produce and import whatever they require on advantageous terms and without any danger or hardship, yet, as I said, they are of great service to other peoples. Therefore, as being the common benefactors of all, they naturally not only should meet with gratitude from the Greeks, but with general support when they are exposed to peril from the barbarians.

Now since the majority of people are unacquainted
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τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν εὑφυταν τοῦ τόπου διὰ τὸ μικρὸν ἐξω κείσθαι τῶν ἐπηκοποιμένων μερῶν τῆς οἰκου-

12 μένης, βουλόμεθα δὲ πάντες εἰδέναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτόπται γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐχόντων παρηλλαγμένων τι καὶ διαφέρον τόπων, εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, ἐννοίας γε καὶ τῶπους ἔχειν ἐν

13 αὐτοῖς ὃς ἐγγυστα τῆς ἀληθείας, ῥητέον ἂν εἰθεὶ τῷ συμβαίνον ἔστι καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τῆς τηλικαύτην καὶ τοιαύτην εὐπορίαν τῆς προειρημένης πόλεως.

39 Ὅ δ' καλούμενος Πόντος ἐξει τὴν μὲν περίμε-

τρον ἐγγυστα τῶν διαμυρίων καὶ διαχυλίων σταδίων, στόματα δὲ διῆτο κατὰ διάμετρον ἀλλήλοις κείμενα, τὸ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Προποντίδος τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Μαιώτιδος λίμνης, ἦτις αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν ὀκτακισχιλίων ἔχει

2 σταδίων τὴν περιγραφήν. εἰς δὲ τὰ προειρημένα κοιλώματα πολλῶν μὲν καὶ μεγάλων ποταμῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐκβαλλόντων, ἐτί δὲ μειζόνων καὶ πλειώνων ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, συμβαίνει τὴν μὲν Μαιώτων ἀναπληρομένην ὑπὸ τούτων βεῖν εἰς τὸν Πόντον διὰ τοῦ στόματος, τὸν δὲ Πόντον εἰς τὴν

3 Προποντίδα. καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν τῆς Μαιώτιδος στόμα Κιμμερικὸς Βόσπορος, δ' τὸ μὲν πλάτος ἔχει περὶ τριάκοντα στάδια τὸ δὲ μῆκος ἐξήκοντα,

4 πάν δ' ἐστὶν ἄλιτενες· τὸ δὲ τοῦ Πόντου παρα-

πλησίως ὄνομάζεται μὲν Βόσπορος Ὑπάτος, ἐςτὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν μῆκος ἐφ' ἐκατόν καὶ ἐκόσι στάδια, τὸ

5 δὲ πλάτος οὗ πάντη ταύτων. ἀρχεῖ δὲ τοῦ στο-

ματος ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς Προποντίδος τὸ κατὰ Καλ-

χοῦδονα διάστημα καὶ Βυζάντιον, δ' δεκατετάρων

6 ἔστι σταδίων, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Πόντου τὸ καλούμενον Ἰερόν, ἐφ' οὗ τόπου φασὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ Κόλχων ἀνακομιδῆν Ἰάσονα θύσαι πρῶτον τοῖς δώδεκα

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with the peculiar advantages of this site, as it lies somewhat outside those parts of the world which are generally visited, and as we all wish to have information about such matters, if possible visiting personally places so peculiar and interesting, but if this be out of our power, acquiring impressions and ideas of them as near the truth as possible, I had better state the facts of the case and explain what is the cause of the singular prosperity of this city.

39. The sea known as the Pontus is very nearly twenty-two thousand stades in circumference and has two mouths exactly opposite each other, one communicating with the Propontis and the other with the Palus Maeotis, which itself has a circumference of eight thousand stades. As many large rivers from Asia and still more numerous and larger ones from Europe fall into these two basins, the Maeotis being thus replenished flows into the Pontus and the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Palus Maeotis is called the Cimmerian Bosporus; it is thirty stades in width and sixty in length and is all of no great depth. The mouth of the Pontus is similarly called the Thracian Bosporus and is a hundred and twenty stades long and not of the same width throughout. From the side of the Propontis its beginning is the passage between Calchedon and Byzantium which is fourteen stades in width. On the side of the Pontus it begins at the so-called Holy Place, where they say that Jason on his voyage back from Colchis first sacrificed to the twelve gods.
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7 keimenoν Σαραπιείον τής Θράκης. τοῦ δὲ ρεῖν ἐξω κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τήν τε Μαίατιν καὶ τὸν Πόντον εἰσὶν αἰτία χιτταί, μία μὲν αὐτόθεν καὶ πάσι προφανῆς, καθ’ ἑν, πολλῶν εἰσπιπτόντων ῥευμάτων εἰς περιγραφὴν ἀγγείων ὁρυσμένων,

8 πλεῖον ἂεὶ καὶ πλεῖον γίνεται τὸ υγρόν, δὴ μηδεμίας μὲν ὑπαρχοῦσης ἐκρύσεως δέον ἂν ἤν προσαναβαίνων ἂεὶ μείζων καὶ πλείων τοῦ κοιλώματος περιλαμβάνειν τόπον, ὑπαρχοῦσών δ’ ἐκρύσεως ἀνάγκη τὸ προσγυμόμενον καὶ πλεονάζον ὑπερπίπτον ἄπορ-ρεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι συνεχῶς διὰ τῶν υπαρχόντων

9 στομάτων. δευτέρα δὲ, καθ’ ὑν, πολὺν καὶ παντο-δαπὸν χοῦν εἰσφερόντων εἰς τὰ προειρημένα κοι-λώματα τῶν ποταμῶν κατὰ τὰς τῶν ὁμβρῶν ἔπιτάσεις, ἐκπιεζόμενον τὸ υγρόν ὕπ’ ὑῶν συνισταμένων ἐγχωμάτων ἂεὶ προσαναβαίνει καὶ φέ-ρεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον διὰ τῶν υπαρχοῦσων

10 ἐκρύσεων. τῆς δ’ ἐγχώσεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιρρύσεως ἀδιαπαύστου καὶ συνεχοῦς γυμνομένης ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν, καὶ τὴν ἀπόρρυσιν ἀδιάπαυστον καὶ συνεχὴ γίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν στομάτων ἀναγκαῖον.

11 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀλήθειας αἰτία τοῦ ρεῖν ἐξω τὸν Πόντον αἰ' εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἐξ ἐμπορικῶν ἔχουσα διηγημάτων τὴν πίστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν 

40 theoriaς, ής ἀκριβεστέραν εὑρεῖν οὐ βάδουν. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔπι τῶν τόπον ἐπέστημεν, οὐδέν αἰφετέον ἁργον οὐδ’ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ φάσει κείμενον, ὡπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι ποιεῖν εἰσβάσθη διὰ τῶν συγγραφέων, ἀποδεικτικὴ δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ διηγήσει χρηστοῦ, ἵνα μηδεν ἀπορον ἀπολείπωμεν τῶν ζητουμένων τοῖς φιληκόσιοις. 398
This lies in Asia and is about twelve stades distant from the opposite point in Thrace the temple of Sarapis. There are two causes of the constant flow from the Palus Maeotis and the Pontus, one, at once evident to all, being that where many streams fall into basins of limited circumference the water constantly increases and, if there were no outlets, would continue to mount higher and occupy a larger area of the basin. In the case, however, of there being outlets the surplus water runs off by these channels. The second cause is that as the rivers carry down into these basins after heavy rains quantities of all kinds of alluvial matter, the water in the seas is forcibly displaced by the banks thus formed and continues to mount and flow out in like manner through the existing outlets. As the influx and deposit of alluvium by the rivers is constant, the outflow through the mouths must likewise be constant.

The true reasons then of the current flowing from the Pontus are these, depending as they do not on the reports of traders but on reasoning from the facts of nature, a more accurate method than which it is not easy to find. 40. But since our attention is now fixed on this subject, I must leave no point unelaborated and barely stated, as is the habit of most writers, but must rather give a description of the facts supported by proofs, so that no doubts may be left in the reader's mind. For this is the
2 τούτο γάρ ἃδιόν ἐστι τῶν νῦν καίρων, ἐν οἷς πάντων πλωτῶν καὶ πορευτῶν γεγονότων οὐκ ἂν ἦτι πρέπον εἰς ποιηταῖς καὶ μυθογράφοις χρήσθαι
3 μάρτυςι περί τῶν ἀγνοουμένων, ὅπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν πεποιήκασι περὶ τῶν πλείστων, ἀπίστους ἀμφισβητούμενων παρεχόμενοι βεβαιωτάς κατὰ τὸν Ἱράκλειτον, πειρατέον δὲ δὴ αὐτῆς τῆς ἱστορίας ἰκανὴν παριστάναι πίστιν τοῖς ἀκούοντις.
4 Φαμέν δὴ χώνυσθαι μὲν καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν τὸν Πόντον, χρόνῳ γε μὴν ὀλοσχερῶς ἐγχωσθήσεσθαι τὴν τε Μαιῶτιν καὶ τοῦτον, μενούσης γε δὴ τῆς αὐτῆς τάξεως περὶ τοὺς τόπους, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τῆς ἐγχώσεως ἐνεργοῦντων κατὰ τὸ συνεχές.
5 ὅταν γὰρ δὲ μὲν χρόνος ἀπείρος ἦ, τὰ δὲ κοιλώματα πάντῃ πάντως ὑρισμένα, δῆλον ὡς, κἂν τὸ τυχὸν
6 εἰσφέρηται, πληρωθήσονται τῷ χρόνῳ. κατὰ φύ̃ςιν γὰρ τὸ πεπερασμένον ἐν ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ συνεχῶς γνώμενον ἢ φθειρόμενον, κἂν κατ' ἐλάχιστον γίνη̃ ται (τοῦτο γὰρ νοεῖσθω νῦν), ἀνάγκη τελειωθῆναι
7 κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν. ὅταν δὲ μὴ τοῦ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ λίιν πολὺς τις εἰσφέρηται χοῦς, φανερὸν ὡς ὡν ποτὲ ταχέως δὲ συμβῆσται γενέσθαι τὸ νῦν δὴ
8 λεγόμενον ὡς ἡμῶν. ὅ δὴ καὶ φαίνεται γινόμενον. τὴν μὲν οὖν Μαιῶτιν ἢδη κεχώσθαι συμβαίνει: τὸ γὰρ τοι 'πλείστον αὐτῆς μέρος ἐν ἐπτά καὶ πέντε ὀργυαῖς ἐστιν, διὸ καὶ πλεῖν αὐτὴν οὐκέτι δίναται νανοὶ μεγάλαις χωρίς καθηγεμόνοις.
9 οὐσά τ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς θάλαττα σύρρους τῷ Πόντῳ, καθάπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ συμφωνοῦσιν, νῦν ἔστι λίμνη γλυκεία, τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκπεπεισμένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγχωμάτων, τῆς δὲ τῶν ποταμῶν εἰσβολῆς

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characteristic of the present age, in which, all parts of the world being accessible by land or sea, it is no longer proper to cite the testimony of poets and mythographers regarding matters of which we are ignorant, "offering," as Heraclitus says, "untrustworthy sureties for disputed facts," but we should aim at laying before our readers a narrative resting on its own credit.

I say then that the silting up of the Pontus has gone on from time immemorial and still continues, and that in course of time both this sea and the Palus Maeotis will be entirely filled, if the existing local conditions remain the same and the causes of the alluvial deposit continue to act. For time being infinite, and the area of these basins being certainly limited, it is evident that even if the accretions were quite insignificant, the seas will be filled up in time; for by the law of nature if a finite quantity continually grows or decreases in infinite time, even if the increase or decrease be infinitesimal—for this is what I now assume—it stands to reason that the process must finally be completed. But when, as in this case, the increase is no small one, but a very large quantity of soil is being deposited, it is evident that what I state will not happen at some remote date, but very shortly. And it is indeed visibly happening. As for the Palus Maeotis it is already silted up, the greater part of it varying in depth between five and seven fathoms, so that large ships can no longer navigate it without a pilot. And while it was once, as all ancient authorities agree, a sea continuous with the Pontus, it is now a fresh-water lake, the salt water having being forced out by the deposits and the inflow from the rivers prevailing.
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10 ἑπικρατούσης. ἦσται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν Πόντων
παραπλήσιον, καὶ γίνεται νῦν ἀλλ' οὐ λίαν τοὺς
πολλοῖς ἐστὶ καταφανὲς διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ
κοιλώματος. τοῖς μέντοι γε βραχέα συνεπιστή-
σασι καὶ νῦν ἦστι δῆλον τὸ γνώμενον. τοῦ γὰρ
'Iστρου πλείοσι στόμασιν ἀπὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς
tὸν Πόντον εἰσβάλλοντος, συμβαίνει πρὸς τοῦτον
σχεδὸν ἐπὶ χύλια στάδια συνεστάναι ταυτίαν ἡμέρας
дрόμον ἀπέχουσαν τῆς γῆς [ἡς νῦν συνέστηκεν]
2 ἐκ τῆς τοῖς στόμασιν εἰσφερομένης ὕλος. ἐφ' ἢν
ἐτί πελάγωι τρέχοντες οἱ πλέοντες τὸν Πόντον
λανθάνουσιν ἐποκέλλουνος νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους.
3 καλοῦσι δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ ναυτικοὶ Στήθη. τοῦ δὲ
μὴ παρ' αὐτὴν συνύστασθαι τὴν γῆν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ
πολὺ προσθεῖσθαι τὸν χοῦν ταῦτην νυμφέων
4 εἶναι τὴν αἰτίαν. ἐφ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ αἱ ῥύσεις τῶν
ποταμῶν διὰ τὴν βίαν τῆς φορᾶς ἑπικρατοῦσι καὶ
dιωθοῦνται τὴν θάλατταν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καὶ τὴν
γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ φερόμενα τοῖς βεῦσιν ἄναγκη
προσθεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν μονὴν μηδὲ στάσιν
5 ἀπλῶς. ὅταν δὲ διὰ τὸ βάθος ἦδη καὶ πλῆθος τῆς
θαλάττης ἐκλύνεται τὰ βεῦματα, τότ' εἰκὸς ἦδη κατὰ
φύσιν φερόμενον κάτω μονὴν καὶ στάσιν λαμ-
βάνειν τὸν χοῦν. δι' ᾧ δὴ τῶν μὲν λάβρων καὶ
μεγάλων ποταμῶν τὰ μὲν χώματα μακρὰν συνίστα-
tαι τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὴν χέρσον ἐστὶν ἀγχιβαθή, τῶν
d' ἐλαττώνων καὶ πρῶς βεῦντων παρ' αὐτὰς τὰς
6 εἰσβολάς οἱ θύνε συνίστανται. μάλιστα δ' ἐκδηλῶ
γίνεται τοῦτο κατὰ τὰς τῶν ὀμβρῶν ἐπιφοράς,
καὶ γὰρ τὰ τυχόντα τότε τῶν βεῦθρων, ἐπειδὰν
ἐπικρατήσωσι τοῦ κύματος κατὰ τὴν εἰσβολήν,
προσθοῦσι τὸν χοῦν εἰς θάλατταν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
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Some day it will be the same with the Pontus; in fact the thing is actually taking place, and although not very generally noticed owing to the large size of the basin, it is apparent to anyone who gives some slight attention to the matter. 41. For the Danube flowing from Europe and falling into the Pontus by several mouths, a bank formed of the matter discharged from these mouths and reaching out to sea for a day's journey, stretches for about a hundred miles opposite them, and ships navigating the Pontus, while still far out at sea, often at night when sailing unwarily run aground on certain parts of this belt, which are known to sailors as "The Paps." The reason why the deposit is not formed close to the land but is projected so far we must consider to be as follows. As far as the currents of the rivers prevail owing to their strength and force a way through the sea, the earth and all other matter carried down by the stream must continue to be pushed forward and not suffered to rest or subside at all; but when owing to the increasing depth and volume of the sea the rivers lose their force, then of course the earth sinks by its natural weight and settles. This is why in the case of large and swift rivers the deposits are formed at a distance, the sea near the coast being deep, but in that of small and sluggish streams the sand-banks are close to their mouths. This becomes especially evident during heavy rains; for then insignificant streams when they have overpowered the surge at their mouths push forward their mud out to sea for a
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ώσε τροὶ λόγῳ ἐκάστον γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀπόστασιν
8 τῇ βίᾳ τῶν ἐμπιπτόντων ἰχνεύματων. τῷ δὲ μεγέθει
τῆς προειρημένης ταυτίας καὶ καθόλου τῷ πλήθει
tῶν εἰσφερομένων λύθων καὶ ξύλων καὶ γῆς ὑπὸ
tῶν ποταμῶν ὑδάμως ἀπιστητέου, εὐθές γάρ,
9 θεωροῦντας ὑπὸ τὴν ὁμοφυή τῶν τυχόντα πεσμάρρουν
ἐν βραχεὶ χρόνω πολλάκις ἐκχαράδρουντα μὲν καὶ
dιακόπτοντα τόπους ἡλιβάτους, φέροντα δὲ πάν
gένος ὑλῆς καὶ γῆς καὶ λύθων, ἐπιχώσεις δὲ ποιοῦ-
μενον τηλικάυτας ὡστ' ἀλλοιοῦν ἐνίστε καὶ μὴ δὲ
γνώσκειν ἐν βραχεὶ χρόνῳ τὸς αὐτοῦ τόπους.

42 ἐξ ὥν οὐκ εἰκὸς θαυμάζειν πῶς οἱ τηλικοῦτοι καὶ
tουτοῦτοι ποταμὸν συνεχῶς ρέοντες ἀπεργάζονται
τι τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τέλος ἐκπληροῦν τὸν
2 Πόντον. οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον γενέσθαι
tοῦτο γε προφαίνεται κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.
3 σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ νῦν ἡ
Μαιώτις γλυκυτέρα τῆς Ποντικῆς θαλάττης, οὕτως
θεωρέται διαφέρουσα προφανῶς ἡ Ποντικὴ τῆς
4 καθ' ἴμας. ἐξ ὥν δὴλον ως, ὅταν ὁ χρόνος ἐν ὧν
πεπληρώθη οὐῳδεῖν τὴν Μαιῶτιν, τοῦτον λάβῃ
tὸν λόγον πρὸς τὸν χρόνον ὃν ἔχει τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ
κοιλώματος πρὸς τὸ κοίλωμα, τότε συμβῆσεται
καὶ τὸν Πόντον τεναγώδη καὶ γλυκύν καὶ λιμνώδη
5 γενέσθαι παραπλησίως τῇ Μαιώτιδι λίμνη. καὶ
θάττων δὲ τοῦτον ὑποληπτέον, ὅσῳ μείζονι καὶ
πλέονι εἰσὶν αἱ ρύοις τῶν εἰς τοῦτον ἐκπιπτόν-
tων ποταμῶν.

6 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἦμιν εἰρήσθω πρὸς τοὺς ἀπίστως
diakemένους, εἰ δὴ χώνυσθαι νῦν καὶ χωσθήσεσθαί
ποτε συμβῆσεται τῶν Πόντων, καὶ λίμνη καὶ τέναγος
7 ἔσται τῷ τηλικοῦτον πέλαγος. ἐτὶ δὲ μᾶλλον
404
distance exactly proportionate to the force of their currents. We must not at all refuse to believe in the extent of the bank at the mouth of the Danube and in the quantity of stones, timber, and earth carried down by the rivers in general. It would be folly to do so when we often see with our own eyes an insignificant torrent scooping out a bed and forcing its way through high ground, carrying down every kind of wood, stones, and earth and forming such vast deposits that the spot may in a short space of time be so changed in aspect as to be unrecognizable. 42. We should not therefore be surprised if such great rivers flowing continuously produce some such effect as I have stated, and finally fill up the Pontus; we must indeed anticipate this not as a probability but as a certainty if we reason rightly. The following is an indication of what may be expected. The Palus Maeotis is at present less salt than the Pontus, and we find that the Pontus correspondingly is decidedly less salt than the Mediterranean. From which it is evident that when a period has elapsed which stands to the time it takes to fill up the Palus Maeotis in the same proportion as the cubic capacity of the larger basin to that of the smaller, the Pontus will become, like the Palus Maeotis, a shallow fresh-water lake. We must indeed anticipate this result still earlier, since the rivers that fall into the Pontus are larger and more numerous.

What I have said may suffice to satisfy the doubts of those who are unwilling to believe that the Pontus is filling up and will be filled up, and that so large a sea will be converted into a shallow lake. But I speak especially in view
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eἰρήσθω καὶ τῆς τῶν πλοῖομένων ὑπολογίας καὶ περατείας χάρω, ὅταν μή παντὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ προσκεχθημέναι παιδικῶς ἀναγκαζώμεθα διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἔχοντες δὲ ἥχυν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπικρίνειν δυνάμεθα τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶς ἡ τοῦναντίον. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς εὐκαιρίας τῶν Βυζαντίων ἐπάνυμεν.

43 Τοῦ δὴ στόματος τοῦ τὸν Πόντον καὶ τὴν Προ-
pontída συνάπτοντος ὄντος ἐκατόν εἴκοσι σταδίων τὸ μήκος, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἔστη ὁ πόσον καὶ τοῦ μὲν Ἱεροῦ τὸ πρὸς τὸν Πόντον πέρας ὅριζοντος, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ Βυζάντιον διαστήματος τὸ πρὸς τὴν Προ-
pontída, μεταξὺ τούτων ἔστιν Ἰεραμίων τῆς Εὐ-
rώπης ἐπὶ προοχῆς τινος ἀκρωτηριαζοῦσις ἐν τῷ στόματι κείμενον, ὅ τῆς μὲν Ἰσίας ἀπέχει περὶ πέντε στάδια, κατὰ τὸν στενώτατον δὲ τόπον ὑπάρχει τοῦ παντὸς στόματος. ἢ καὶ Ξανδὸν ξεύξας φασὶ τὸν πόρον, καθ᾿ ὀν χρόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἐπὶ Σκύθας διάβασιν. κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τόπον ἀπὸ τοῦ Πόντου παραπλῆσιός ἔστιν ἡ φορὰ του ῥεύματος διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν παρ᾿ ἐκάτερον τὸ μέρος τῷ στόματι παρηκότων τόπων· ἐπάν δ᾿ εἰς τὸ τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰεραμίων, ἢ στενώτατον ἐφαμεν εἴναι, φερόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου καὶ συγκλείσμενος ὁ βαῖς βίᾳ προσπέσῃ, τότε δὴ τραπεῖς ὡσπερ ἀπὸ πληγῆς ἐμπίπτει τοῖς ἀντί-
5 περας τῆς Ἰσίας τόπους. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πάλιν, οἴον ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς, τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν ποιεῖται πρὸς τὰ περὶ τὰς Ἰσίας ἀκρὰ καλοῦμενα τῆς Εὐρώπης. ὃς ὅσοι ἀδιόκτισαν προσπήπτει πρὸς τὴν βοῦν καλομένην, ὃς ἐστὶ τῆς Ἰσίας τόπος, ἐφ᾿ ὃν ἐπιστήναι φασὶ πρῶτον οἱ μόθοι τῆς Ἰωνίας περαιω-
6
of the falsehoods and sensational tales of seafarers, so that we may not be obliged owing to ignorance to listen greedily like children to anything that is told us, but having now some traces of the truth in our minds may be more or less able to form an independent judgement as to the truth or falsehood of the reports made by this or that person.

43. I must now resume my account of the specially favourable situation of Byzantium. The channel connecting the Pontus and the Propontis being a hundred and twenty stades in length, as I just said, the Holy Place marking its termination towards the Pontus and the strait of Byzantium that towards the Propontis, half way between these on the European side stands the Hermaeum on a promontory running out into the channel at a distance of about five stades from Asia and situated at the narrowest part of the whole. It is here, they say, that Darius bridged the straits when he crossed to attack the Scythians. Now the force of the current from the Pontus has been so far uniform owing to the similarity of the country on each bank of the channel, but when it reaches the Hermaeum on the European side, which is, as I said, the narrowest point, this current from the Pontus being confined and sweeping strongly against the headland, rebounds as if from a blow, and dashes against the opposite coast of Asia. It now again recoils from this coast and is carried against the promontory on the European bank known as the Hearths, from which its force is once more deflected to the place on the Asiatic bank called the Cow, where legend says that Io first
7 θείσαν. πλὴν ὁ γε βοῦς τὸ τελευταίον ὄρμησας ἀπὸ τῆς Βοῦς ἔπεις αὐτὸ φέρεται τὸ Βυζάντιον, περισχισθεὶς δὲ περὶ τὴν πόλιν βραχὺ μὲν εἰς τὸν κόλπον αὐτοῦ διορίζει τὸν καλούμενον Κέρας, 8 τὸ δὲ πλείον πόλιν ἀπονεύει. διευνοεῖν μὲν οὖν οὐκέτι δύναται πρὸς τὴν ἀντίπερας χώραν, ἐφ’ ἢς ἐστὶ Καλχηδῶν· πλεονάκις γὰρ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν πεποιημένου καὶ τοῦ πόρου πλάτος ἔχουσι καὶ ἡδῆ περὶ τούτων τὸν τόπον ἐκλυόμενον ὁ βοῦς οὐκέτι βραχείας πρὸς ὅξειαν γωνίαν ποιεῖται τὰς ἀνακλάσεις ἐπὶ τὴν περαίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀμβλείαν, διὸπερ ἀπολιπών τὴν τῶν Καλχηδονίων
44 πόλιν φέρεται διὰ πόρου. καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν μὲν τῶν Βυζάντιων πόλιν εὐκαιροτάτην τὴν δὲ τῶν Καλχηδονίων τάναντια, τούτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ νῦν ὕφ’ ἡμῶν εἰρημένον, καὶ περὶ ἡς οὖσις ὡμοίας ἀμφότερας δοκοῦσι εἶναι τῆς θέσεως πρὸς τὴν ἐνυκαιρίαν. ἀλλ’ ὡμοὶς εἰς τὴν μὲν βουληθέντα καταπλεῦσ’ οὐ βάδιον, πρὸς ἡν δὲ, καὶ μὴ βούλῃ, φέρει κατ’ ἀνάγκην ὁ βοῦς, καθάπερ ἀρτίως εἴπο-
3 μέν. σημείων δὲ τούτων ἐκ Καλχηδόνος γὰρ οἱ βουλόμενοι διαίρεσιν εἰς Βυζάντιον οὐ δύνανται πλείω κατ’ εὐθείαν διὰ τὸν μεταξὺ βόου, ἀλλὰ παράγουσιν ἐπὶ τε τὴν Βοῦς καὶ τὴν καλομένην
4 Χρυσόπολιν, ἣν Ἀθηναίοι τότε κατασχόντες Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμη, παραγωγιάζειν ἐπεβάλλοντο πρῶτον τοὺς εἰς Πόντον πλέοντας, τὸ δ’ ἐμπροσθεν ἀφίασι κατὰ βοῦν, ὡς φέρονται κατ’ ἀνάγκην πρὸς τὸ
5 Βυζάντιον. ὡμοία δὲ τούτως καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐπὶ θάτερα πλοῦν ἐστὶ τῆς Βυζάντιων πόλεως. 6 ἄν τε γὰρ ἄφ’ Ἑλλησπόντου τρέχῃ τις τοῖς νότοις ἃν τ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τοῖς 408
found a footing after crossing. Finally the current runs rapidly from the Cow to Byzantium itself, and dividing into two near the city, sends off its smaller branch into the gulf known as the Horn, while the larger branch is again deflected. It has however, no longer sufficient force to reach the coast opposite, on which stands Calchedon; for as it has now several times crossed and recrossed the channel, which here is already of considerable width, the current has now become feebler, and ceases to make short rebounds to the opposite coast at an acute angle, but is rather deflected at an obtuse angle. It therefore fails to reach Calchedon and flows out through the strait. 44. What therefore makes the situation of Byzantium so favourable and that of Calchedon the reverse is the fact here stated. To look at them indeed you would say they were equally well placed, but nevertheless it is not easy to reach Calchedon by sea, if one wishes, while to Byzantium the current carries one whether one wishes or not, as I just said. Evidence of this is that those who wish to cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail in a straight course owing to the current between, but steer obliquely for the Cow and the place called Chrysopolis—which the Athenians once occupied by the advice of Alcibiades and used it when they first attempted to levy toll on vessels bound for the Pontus—and from hence commit themselves to the current which perforce carries them to Byzantium. The approaches by sea to Byzantium from the other side are equally favourable. For those sailing with a south wind from the Hellespont, or from the Pontus to the
πάντα μὲν τὴν Ἑὐρώπην ἕκ τῆς Βυζαντίων πόλεως ὅρθος ἀμα δὲ εὐπαρακόμιστος ἐστι οὐ πλοῦς ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς Προποντίδος στενὰ κατ᾽ Ἀβιδον καὶ Σηστόν, κάκειθεν ὦσαντως πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Βυ-
7 ζάντιον, ἀπὸ δὲ Καλχηδόνος παρὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τὰναντία τοῦτος διὰ τὸ κολπώδη τῶν παράπλουν ὑπάρχει Καὶ προτείνεις πολὺ τὴν τῶν Κυζικηνῶν ἕως ἔραν. ἀφ᾽ Ἐλλησπόντου γὰρ ψεφόμενον εἰς Καλχηδόνα χρήσασθαι τῷ παρὰ τὴν Ἑὐρώπην πλῶ, κἂπετα συνεγγύζοντα τοῖς κατὰ Βυζάντιον τόποις κάμπτει καὶ προστρέχεις πρὸς τὴν Καλχη-
δόνα διὰ τὸν βοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα δυσχερές. ὅμοιως δὲ πάλιν ἐκπλέοντα προστρέχεις εὐθέως τῆ Ὁράκη τελέως ἂδύνατον διὰ τὸν μεταξὺ ῥοῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀνέμους ἑκατέρους ἀντιπίπτειν
10 πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, ἐπειδὴ πρεισχάγει μὲν εἰς τὸν Πόντον νότος ἔσάγει δὲ βορέας, καὶ τούτους ἀνάγκη χρήσαθαι πρὸς ἑκάτερον τὸν ῥόμον τοῖς ἀνέμοις.

11 Τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐυκαιρίαν ποιοῦντα Βυζαντίους ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ τὴν κατὰ γῆν ἀκαρίαν 
45 τὰ μέλλοντα ῥήθησθαι. τῆς γὰρ Ὁράκης κύκλῳ περιεχούσης αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν οὔτως ὡς ἐκ θαλάσσης εἰς θάλασσαν καθήκειν ἀΐδιον ἐχουσί
2 πόλεμον καὶ δυσχερῆ πρὸς τούτους. οὔτε γὰρ παρασκευασμένου καὶ κρατήσαντες αὐτῶν εἰσάπαξ ἀποτρίφασθαι τὸν πόλεμον οἷοί τ᾽ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος 
3 καὶ τῶν ὀχλῶν καὶ τῶν δυναστῶν. ’Εάν [τε] γὰρ ἐνὸς περιγένωνται, τρεῖς ἐπιβιαίνουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν 
4 τούτων χώραν ἄλλοι βαρύτεροι δυνάσται. καὶ

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Hellespont with the Etesian winds, find the course from Byzantium along the European coast to the commencement of the narrows at Sestus and Abydus a straight and easy one, and so is the return voyage to Byzantium. But the voyage from Calchedon along the Asiatic coast is the reverse of this, because one must follow the shores of a deep gulf, and the headland formed by the territory of Cyzicus runs out to a great distance. Nor can ships sailing from the Hellespont to Calchedon easily coast along Europe and then on approaching Byzantium turn and make for Calchedon, as the current and the circumstances mentioned above make it difficult. And similarly it is quite impossible for a ship leaving Calchedon to make the coast of Thrace at once owing to the current between, and owing to the wind. Both the south and north winds are adverse to both the attempts, since the south wind will carry one towards the Pontus and the north wind away from it, and these are the winds one must avail oneself of for the voyage from Calchedon to Hellespont or for the voyage back.

Such are the causes of the favourable position of Byzantium as regards the sea; its disadvantages on the land side being as follows. 45. As Thrace encompasses their territory so effectually as to extend from one sea to the other, they are engaged in perpetual and most difficult warfare with its inhabitants. They cannot on the one hand rid themselves of the war once for all by a carefully prepared attack resulting in victory, owing to the great number of the chieftains and their followers. For if they get the better of one, three other more powerful chieftains are sure to invade their territory.
Τὰ ΗΊΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ ὈΠΟΛΒΙΟΥ

μὴν οὖδ' εἰξαντες καὶ συγκαταβάντες εἰς φόρους καὶ συνθήκας οὐδέν ποιοῦσι πλέον· ἂν γὰρ ἐνὶ πρὸς τινὶ, πενταπλασίους δὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολέ-μίους εὑρίσκουσι. διόπερ ἀμιὺς συνέχονται καὶ 

τοιοὶ καὶ βαρβάρους πολέμους· τί γὰρ ἐπισφαλέστερον ἀστυγε- 

τονοὶ καὶ βαρβάρους πολέμους; τί δενότερον; οὖ 

μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις τὸ παράπαν κακοὶς παλαιόντες 

κατὰ γῆν, χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρεπομένων 

τῶν πολέμων κακῶν, ὑπομένουσι τινα καὶ τιμωρίαν 

7 Ταντάλειον κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν. ἔχοντες γὰρ χῶ- 

ραν γενναιότατην, ὅταν διαπονήσωσί ταύτην καὶ 

γένηται τὸ τῶν καρπῶν πλῆθος τῷ κάλλει διαφέρον, 

κάπειτα παραγενήθεντες οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν 

catatheirwos tois de synathroisantes apopherosi, 

8 τότε δὴ, χωρίς τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς δαπάνης, καὶ 

tin katafthorain thewmenoi dia to kallos tōn 

carpōn sketliázousi kai barēws fērous to συμ- 

βαίνου.

9 Ἕλλῃ διακῆς δικαίων πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, προσεπιγε- 


νομέων δὲ Γαλατῶν αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ Κομοντόριον 

46 εἰς πᾶν ἑλθον περιστάσεως. οὕτω δὲ ἐκίνησαν 


μὲν ἀμα τοῖς περὶ Βρέννον ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας, δια- 


φυγόντες δὲ τῶν περὶ Δελφοὺς κίνδυνον καὶ παρα- 


γενόμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἑλλησποντοῦν εἰς μὲν τὴν 


Ἀσίαν οὐκ ἐπεραιώθησαν, αὐτοῦ δὲ κατέμεναν 


dia to filoxwrhias tōs peri to Bvlantion topois. 

2 οἱ καὶ κρατήσαντες τῶν Ὀρκιῶν, καὶ κατασκευα-

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Nor are they at all better off if they give way and agree to terms and the payment of tribute; for the very fact of their making concessions to one chief raises against them enemies many times more numerous. So that they are, as I said, involved in a warfare both perpetual and most difficult; for what can be more full of peril, what more terrible than a war with near neighbours who are at the same time barbarians? Nay, such being in general the adverse circumstances against which they have to struggle on land, they have in addition to the other evils attendant on war to suffer too something like the torments of Tantalus that Homer describes; for, owners as they are of a most fertile country, when they have carefully cultivated it and a superb harvest is the result, and when the barbarians now appear and destroy part of the crops, collecting and carrying off the rest, then indeed, apart from their lost toil and expense, the very beauty of the harvest when they witness its destruction adds to their indignation and distress.

In spite of all, however, they continued to bear the burden to which they had grown accustomed of the war with the Thracians, without departing from their ancient engagements to the Greek states. But when they were attacked also by the Gauls under Comontorius, they found themselves in very grave danger. 46. These Gauls had quitted their homes together with Brennus and his Gauls, and after escaping from the disaster at Delphi reached the Hellespont, where instead of crossing to Asia, they remained on the spot, as they took a fancy to the country near Byzantium. Here when they had conquered the Thracians and had established
σάμενοι βασιλείον τὴν Τύλιν, εἰς ὀλοσχερὴ κίνδυνον
3 ἡγον τοὺς Βυζαντίους. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταῖς ἐφόδοις αὐτῶν, ταῖς κατὰ Κομοντόριον τὸν
πρῶτον βασιλεύσαντα, δῷρα διετέλευσι οἱ Βυζαντιοι
dιδόντες ἀνὰ τρισχιλίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ποτὲ
de καὶ μυρίων χρυσοὺς, ἐφ' ὃ μὴ καταφθειρεν
4 τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν. τέλος δ' ἤναγκάσθησαν ὁγδοη-
kοντα τάλαντα συγχωρῆσαι φόρον τελείων κατ' ἐν-
αυτὸν ἕως εἰς Καυάρον, ἐφ' ο才可以 καταλύθη μὲν ἡ
βασιλεία, τὸ δὲ γένος αὐτῶν ἐξεφθάρη πάν ὑπὸ
5 Ὀρακὼν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐπικρατηθέν. ἐν οἷς καυροῖς
ὑπὸ τῶν φόρων πιεζούμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπρέ-
σβευν πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας, δεόμενοι σφίς βοιθεῖν
καὶ συγχωρηγεῖν εἰς τοὺς περιστώτας καυροὺς.
6 τῶν δὲ πλείστων παρολιγορούντων ἐνεχείρησαν
ἀπαναγκασθέντες παραγωγιάζειν τοὺς εἰς τὸν
47 Πόντον πλέοντας. μεγάλης δὲ γενομένης τῆς
ἀλυστελίας καὶ δυσχρηστίας πᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ τέλος
πράττεν τοὺς Βυζαντίους τῶν ἔκαστον ἐκ τοῦ
Πόντου, δεινον ἡγοῦντο, καὶ πάντες ἐνεκάλουν οἱ
πλοῖζόμενοι τοῖς Ὀρδίοις διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τούτους
2 προεστάναι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν. ἐξ οὐ δυνέται
φῦναι τὸν πόλεμον ὑπὲρ οὐ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἱστορεῖν
μέλλομεν.
3 Οἱ γὰρ Ὀρδίοι συνεξεγερθέντες ἁμα μὲν διὰ τὴν
σφετέραν βλάβην ἁμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν πέλας
ἐλάττωσιν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παραλαβόντες τοὺς
συμμάχους ἐπρέσβευν πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους,
ἀξιοῦντες καταλῦσειν αὐτοὺς τὸ παραγώγιον.
4 οὐκ ἐντετειμένων δὲ τοῖς ὀλοις, ἀλλὰ πεπεισμένων
dίκαια λέγειν ἐκ τῆς ἀντικαταστάσεως τῆς γενο-
μένης παρ' αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ τὸν 'Εκατόδωρον καὶ
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BOOK IV. 46. 2 – 47. 4

their capital at Tylis, they placed the Byzantines in extreme danger. At first, during the inroads made under Comontorius the first king, the Byzantines continued to pay on each occasion three thousand, five thousand, and sometimes even ten thousand gold pieces to save their territory from being laid waste, and finally they were compelled to consent to pay an annual tribute of eighty talents down to the reign of Cavarus, during which the kingdom came to an end and the whole tribe were in their turn conquered by the Thracians and annihilated. It was in these times that, being hard pressed by the tribute, they at first sent embassies to the Greeks imploring them to help them and contribute to relieve them in their distress and danger. But when most states paid no attention to their solicitations they were driven by sheer necessity to begin exacting duties from vessels trading with the Pontus. 47. When general inconvenience and loss of profit was caused by the Byzantines levying duties on exports from the Pontus, all the traders were aggrieved and brought their complaint before the Rhodians who were considered the supreme authority in maritime matters. This was the origin of the war the history of which I am about to tell.

For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss they suffered themselves and the detriment to neighbouring states, at first together with their allies sent an embassy to Byzantium demanding the abolition of the duty. The Byzantines were not disposed to make any concession, being convinced of the justice of their cause by the terms in which Hecatodorus and Olympiodorus, their chief magis-
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

'Ολυμπιώδωρον πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ῥώδιων πρεσβευτὰς
5 (οὕτω γὰρ τότε προεστασαν τοῦ τῶν Βυζαντίων πολιτεύματος), τότε μὲν ἀπηλλάγησαν οἱ Ῥώδιοι
6 περάναντες οὐδὲν, ἐπανελθόντες δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἐψηφίσαντο τοῖς Βυζαντίοις διὰ τὰς προειρημένας
7 αἰτίας. καὶ παραυτικά πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστελλον
πρὸς Προυσίαν παρακαλοῦντες καὶ τούτον εἰς τοὺς πόλεμον. ἦδεσαν γὰρ τὸν Προυσίαν παρα-
48 τριβόμενον ἐκ τινῶν πρὸς τοὺς Βυζαντίους. τὸ
δὲ παραπλήγιον ἐποίοι καὶ Βυζαντίων πρὸς τε
gὰρ ᾿Ατταλοῦ καὶ πρὸς Ἀχαίον ἐπέμπον πρέσβεις,
2 δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν. ο μὲν οὖν ᾿Ατταλος ἦν
πρόθυμος, εἴχε δὲ βραχεῖαν τότε ῥοπὴν ὡς ἄν ὑπ’
Ἁχαιοῦ συνεληλαμένος εἰς τὴν πατρῴαν ἀρχὴν.
3 ὁ δὲ ᾿Αχαῖος κρατῶν μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταῦρου,
βασιλέα δὲ προσφάτως αὐτὸν ἀναδειχώσ ἐπηγ-
4 γέλλετο βοηθήσειν, ὑπάρχων δ’ ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς
προαρέσεως τοῖς μὲν Βυζαντίοις μεγάλην ἐλπίδα
παρεσκεύαζε, τοῖς δὲ Ῥώδιοις καὶ Προυσία τά-
5 ναντία κατάπληξιν. ᾿Αχαῖος γὰρ ήν μὲν ᾿Αντιό-
χου συγγενής τοῦ παρειληφότος τὴν ἐν Συρίᾳ
βασιλείαν, ἑγκρατής δ’ ἐγένετο τῆς προειρημένης
6 δυναστείας διά τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. Σελεύκου
μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βλου, ὅς ήν ᾿Αντιόχου τοῦ
προειρημένου πατήρ, διαδεξαμένου δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν
Σελεύκου προειρήσατο τῶν υἱῶν, ἡμα τούτων διὰ
tῆς οἰκείοτητας συνυπερῆβαλε τὸν Ταῦρον δυσὶ
mάλιστα τῶν ἔτεσι πρότερον τῶν νῦν λεγομένων
7 καὶ ῥών. Σελευκὸς γὰρ ὁ νέος ως βαττὸν παρέλαβε
τὴν βασιλείαν, πυνθανόμενος ᾿Ατταλοῦ πᾶςαν
ηδὴ τὴν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταῦρου δυναστείαν υφ’
αὐτοῦ πεποιήθαι, παρωρμήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς ωφετε-
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trates at the time, replied to the Rhodian envoys. The Rhodians therefore took their departure without having accomplished anything, and on their return war was declared by Rhodes on Byzantium for the reasons above stated. They at once sent envoys to Prusias pressing him to take part in the war, for they knew that for various reasons he was offended with the Byzantines. 48. The Byzantines took similar measures, sending envoys asking for help to Attalus and Achaeus. Attalus was heartily disposed to help, but his support at this time was of very little weight, as he had been confined within the limits of his ancestral dominions by Achaeus. But Achaeus, who was now master of all the country on this side of the Taurus and had recently assumed the royal title, promised his aid, and his decision to do so greatly raised the hopes of the Byzantines, while on the contrary, it alarmed Prusias and the Rhodians. Achaeus was a relative of that Antiochus who had just succeeded to the throne of Syria and had acquired the dominion I stated by the following means. When on the death of Seleucus, father of this Antiochus, his eldest son Seleucus succeeded him, Achaeus in his quality of a kinsman accompanied the king on his expedition across the Taurus about two years before the time I am speaking of. For the young Seleucus, immediately on ascending the throne, having learnt that Attalus had appropriated all his dominions on this side Taurus hastened there to defend his interests. He crossed
8 ροις πράγμασιν, ὑπερβαλῶν δὲ μεγάλη δυνάμει τοῦ Ταύρου, καὶ δολοφονηθέεις ὑπὸ τὸ Ἄπατουρίου τοῦ Γαλάτου καὶ Νικάνορος, μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον.

9 Ἀχαῖος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίοτητα τὸν φόνον αὐτοῦ μετήλθε παραχρῆμα, τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικάνορα καὶ τὸν Ἄπατουρίου ἀποκτεῖνας, τῶν τε δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ὀλιγον πραγμάτων φρονήματι καὶ μεγαλο-

10 ψύχωσ προεόστη. τῶν γὰρ κατὰν παροῦντων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀχλῶν ὀρμῆς συνεργοῦσις εἰς τὸ διάδημα περιβέθαι, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ προέλετο ποιῆσαι, τηρῶν δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ νεω-

11 τῆ πταῖ τοῦ Ταύρου πάσαν. τῶν δὲ πραγμά-

12 των αὐτῶ γεράγοντο εὐροοῦντων, ἑπεὶ τὸν μὲν Ἄλταλον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ Πέργαμον συνέκλεισε τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πάντων ἡ γεγραφή, ἑπαρθές τοῖς εὐτυχήσαι παρὰ πόδας ἕξωκείλε, καὶ διάδημα περιβέθαι καὶ βασιλέα προσαγορεύσας αὐτὸν βαρύτατος ἢ τότε καὶ φοβερῶτατος τῶν ἐπὶ μάλιστα τοῦτε Βυζαντίου πιστεύοντες ἀνεδέξαντο τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Ῥοδίους καὶ Προσίαν πόλεμον.

49 'Ο δὲ Προσίας ἐνεκάλει μὲν πρότερον τοῖς Βυζαντίοις ὅτι ψήφισσαν των εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ ταύτας οὐχ ἀνετίθεσαν ἀλλ' εἰς ἐπισυρμόν καὶ λήθῃν ἀγοῖεν, δυσπρέπεται δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσαν προσενέγκασθαι φιλονεικίαν εἰς τὸ διαλύσαι τὴν Ἀχαῖοῦ πρὸς Ἄλταλον ἐχθραν καὶ τοῦ πόλεμον, νομίζων κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἀλοιποτελῆ τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν ὑπάρχειν τὴν ἐκείνους φιλίαν.

3 ἡρέθιζε δ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν Βυζαντίους πρὸς μὲν Ἄλταλον εἰς τοὺς τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἀγώνας τοὺς.
the Taurus at the head of a great army, but perished assassinated by the Gaul Apaturius and Nicanor. Achaeus, as his kinsman, at once avenged his murder by putting Nicanor and Apaturius to death, and taking the command of the army and the direction of affairs in his hands, conducted both with prudence and magnanimity. For though the opportunity was favourable and he was eagerly urged by the troops to assume the diadem, he decided not to do so, and holding the throne for the younger brother Antiochus, advanced energetically and recovered the whole of the country on this side of Taurus. But when he met with a success that surpassed his expectations, having shut up Attalus in Pergamus itself and made himself master of all the rest of the country he was so elated by his good fortune that in a very short space of time he swerved clean away from rectitude, and having assumed the diadem and styled himself king he was at this moment the most imposing and formidable of all the kings and potentates on this side Taurus. This was the man on whom the Byzantines most relied when they undertook the war against Rhodes and Prusias.

49. One of Prusias's grievances against the Byzantines was that after having voted certain statues of him they had never erected them, but had neglected and finally forgotten the matter. He was likewise displeased with them for having employed every effort to reconcile Achaeus with Attalus and put an end to the war between them, thinking that a friendship between these two princes was in many ways prejudicial to his own interests. He was also irritated because it was said that the Byzantines had sent to Attalus representatives to take part in the
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συνθύσοντας ἔξαπεσταλκέναι, πρὸς αὐτὸν δ' εἰς
τὰ Σωτήρια μηδένα πεπομφέναι. διόπερ ἐκ πάντων
τούτων ὑποκουρομένης παρ' αὐτῷ τῆς ὀργῆς
ἀσμενός ἐπελάβετο τῆς τῶν Ἑρωῖν προφάσεως,
kai συγκαταθέμενοι τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς ἐκεῖνοὺς
μὲν ἦσε δεῖν κατὰ θάλατταν πολεμεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ
κατὰ γῆν ὁὐκ ἐλάττω βλάψειν ἐδοξεῖ τοὺς ὑπεναν-
tίους.

5 'Ο μὲν οὖν Ἑρωῖν πρὸς Βυζαντίους πόλεμος
διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτην ἐλαβεῖ τὴν ἀρχήν· οἱ δὲ
Βυζαντίοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐρρωμένους ἐπολέμουν,
pεπεισμένου τὸν μὲν 'Αχαίων σφίσει βοηθείων, αὐτὸι
dὲ τὸν Τιβώτην ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἐπαγαγόντες
ἀντιπεριστήσειν τῷ Προσφίδος φόβοις καὶ κυδύνους,

2 δὲ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην ὀρμήν πολεμῶν παρ-
eῖλετο μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ καλούμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ στόματος

3 Ἰερόν, ὁ Βυζαντίου μικρὸς ἀνώτερον χρόνος
μεγάλων ὁμησάμενοι χρημάτων ἐσφητερίζαντο διὰ
τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τόπου, βουλόμενοι μηδεμίαν
ἀφομην μηδενὶ καταλιπεῖν μήτε κατὰ τῶν εἰς
τὸν Πόντον πλεοντῶν ἐμπόρων μήτε περὶ τοὺς
δούλους καὶ τὰς ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς θαλάττης ἐργασίας,

4 παρείλετο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας χώραν, ἣν
κατείχον Βυζαντίου τῆς Μυσίας πολλοὺς ἱδή.

5 χρόνους. οἱ δὲ Ὑφόγοι πληρώσαντες ναῦς ἔξι, ἀμα
δὲ ταύτας παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων προσλαβόντες
τέταρας, καὶ ναύαρχον προχειρισάμενοι Ξενόφαντον,

6 ὕπλευν ἐφ' Ἐλλησπόντου δέκα ναυσίν. καὶ ταῖς
μὲν λοιπαῖς ὁμοιώτες περὶ Σηστὸν ἐκόλυνον τοὺς
πλέοντας εἰς τὸν Πόντον, μα' δ' ἐκπλεύσας ὁ
ναύαρχος κατεπείραζε τῶν Βυζαντίων, εἰ πως ἡδη

7 μεταμέλειντο καταπεπληγμένου τῶν πόλεμον. τῶν

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sacrifice held at the festival of Athene, whereas they had sent none to himself when he celebrated the Soteria. Therefore as he continued to nurse resentment for all these offences, he gladly availed himself of the pretext offered by the Rhodians and came to an agreement with their envoys demanding that they should undertake to carry on the war by sea, while he himself hoped to be able to damage the enemy no less severely on land.

Such were the causes and such was the beginning of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium. 50. The Byzantines at first fought with great vigour, being confident that Achaeus would come to help them and trusting by bringing Tiboetes from Macedonia to throw Prusias in his turn into alarm and peril. For Prusias having begun the war with the feelings I have indicated had taken the place called “The Holy Place” on the Bosporus, which a few years previously they had acquired by purchase for a large sum, owing to its favourable situation, as they did not wish to leave anyone any base from which to attack traders with the Pontus or interfere with the slave-trade or the fishing. He had also seized their Asiatic territory, a part of Mysia which had long been in their possession. The Rhodians, manning six ships and getting four others from the allies, appointed Xenophantus admiral and sailed for the Hellespont with the ten ships. Anchoring the rest off Sestos to prevent the passage of vessels bound for the Pontus, the admiral left in one to find out if the Byzantines were already sufficiently alarmed at the war to have changed their minds.
δ’ οὖ προσεχόντων ἀπέπλευσε καὶ παραλαβὼν τὰς
λοιπὰς ναῦς ἀπῆρε πᾶσας εἰς τὴν ’Ῥόδον. οἱ δὲ
Βυζάντιοι πρὸς τε τὸν ’Αχαιούν ἔπεμπον ἀξιοῦντες
βοηθεῖν, ἐπὶ τε τὸν Τιβούτην ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς
ἀξιοῦνας αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας. ἐδόκει γὰρ ὦν ἦττον ἢ
Βιθυνῶν ἄρχη Τιβούτη καθῆκεν ἤ Προυσία
διὰ τὸ πατρὸς ἀδελφὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τῷ Προυσίᾳ.
οἱ δὲ ’Ῥόδιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν Βυζαντίων
ὑπόστασιν, πραγματικῶς διενοθήσαν πρὸς τὸ
καθίκεσθαι τῆς προθέσεως. ὅρωντες γὰρ τὸ συν-
έχον τοῖς Βυζαντίοις τῆς ὑπομονῆς τοῦ πολέμου
κείμενον ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ’Αχαιοῦ ἐπίσιων, θεωροῦν-
tες δὲ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ’Αχαιοῦ κατεχόμενον ἐν
’Αλεξανδρείᾳ, τὸν δ’ ’Αχαιοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιοῦ-
μενον τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς σωτηρίαν, ἐπεβάλοντο
προσβεβεῖν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαίον καὶ παρατείσθαι
τὸν ’Ανδρόμαχον, καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐκ παρέργου
τοῦτο πεποιηκότες, τότε δ’ ἀληθινῶς σπεύδοντες
ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος, ἢν προσενεγκάμενοι πρὸς
τὸν ’Αχαιοῦ τὴν χάριν ταύτην ὑπόχρεων αὐτὸν
ποιῆσωνταί πρὸς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλοῦμενον. δ’ δὲ
Πτολεμαῖος παραγενομένων τῶν πρέπεισθαι ἐβου-
λεῦτο μὲν παρακατέχειν τὸν ’Ανδρόμαχον, ἐλπίζων
αὐτῷ χρῆσεθαί πρὸς καίρον διὰ τὸ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸν
’Αντίοχον ἀκριτα μένειν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ τὸν ’Αχαιοῦ
ἀναδειχθάτως προσφάτως αὐτὸν βασιλεὰ πραγμάτων
ἐιναι κύριον ἱκανῶν των· ἢν γὰρ ’Ανδρόμαχος
’Αχαιοῦ μὲν πατήρ, ἀδελφὸς δὲ Λαοδίκης τῆς
Σελεύκου γυναικὸς. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα προσκλώνω τοῖς
’Ῥοδίοις δ’ Πτολεμαῖος κατὰ τὴν οἰλὴν αἴρεσιν, καὶ
πάντα σπεύδων χαρίζεσθαι, συνεχώρησε καὶ παρ-
έδωκε τὸν ’Ανδρόμαχον αὐτοῖς ἀποκομίζειν ὑς τὸν
But as they paid no attention to his overtures, he sailed away and picking up the rest of his ships, left for Rhodes with the whole squadron. The Byzantines kept on sending to Achaeus, demanding succour, and sent a mission to bring Tiboetes from Macedonia; for Tiboetes was considered to have just as good a claim to the throne of Bithynia as Prusias, as he was his uncle on the father’s side. The Rhodians seeing that the Byzantines stood firm, thought of a plan for attaining their purpose likely to prove very efficient. 51. For observing that the chief cause of the Byzantines’ resolute endurance of the war lay in their hopes of support from Achaeus, and knowing that Achaeus’ father was a prisoner at Alexandria and that Achaeus above all things desired his deliverance, they decided to send an embassy to Ptolemy begging him to give up Andromachus. They had indeed previously made this request without insisting much on it, but now they pressed it most seriously, in order that by doing this favour to Achaeus they might put him under such an obligation that he would do all they demanded. Ptolemy, on the arrival of the embassy, deliberated as to retaining Andromachus, whom he hoped to make use of at the proper time, considering that his differences with Antiochus had not yet been decided, and that Achaeus, who had just proclaimed himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in certain important matters; for Andromachus was Achaeus’ father and brother of Laodice the wife of Seleucus. But nevertheless, as his sympathies in general were with the Rhodians and he was anxious to do them any favour, he yielded and gave up Andromachus
ΤΟΙΩΝ. ΟΙ Δ’ ΕΠΙΤΕΛΕΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ ΤΟΥΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΕΠΙ-
ΜΕΤΡΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΤΟῈΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΑΧΑΙΟΝ ΤΙΜΑΣ ΤΙΝΑΣ,
ΠΑΡΕΙΛΑΝΤΟ ΤΗΝ ΔΟΣΕΧΕΡΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ ἘΛΠΙΔΑ ΤΩΝ ΒΥΖΑΝ-
ΤΙΩΝ. ΣΥΝΕΚΥΡΗΣΕ ΔΕ ΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΤΟῈΣ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΙΝ
ἈΤΟΠΟΝ ὁ γὰρ ΤΙΒΟΙΤΗΣ ΚΑΤΑΓΏΜΕΝΟΣ ἘΚ ΤΗΣ
ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑΣ ἙΣΦΗΛΕ ῬΑΣ ἘΠΙΒΟΛΑΣ ΑὐΤΩΝ, ΜΕΤ-
ΑΛΛΑΞΑΣ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ. ΟΥ ΣΥΜΒΑΝΤΟΙ ΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΙ
ΤΑΙΣ ὈΡΜΑΙΣ ἈΝΕΠΕΣΟΝ, Ο ΔΕ ΠΡΟΣΙΑΣ ἘΠΙΡΡΩΣΘΕΙΣ
ΤΑΙΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΝ ἘΛΠΙΣΩΝ ἌΜΑ ΜΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΣ ἈΠΟ
ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤ’ ἈΣΙΑΝ ΜΕΡΩΝ ἘΠΟΛΕΜΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΕΚΕΙΤΟ
ΤΟΙΣ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΣΙΝ ἘΝΕΡΓΩΣ, ἌΜΑ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΘΡΑΚΑΣ
ΜΙΣΘΩΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ ΟΥΚ ΕΙᾼ ΤΑΣ ΠΥΛΑΣ ΕΞΕΝΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ
ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΥΣ ἈΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΥΡΩΠΗΝ ΜΕΡΩΝ.
ΟΙ ΔΕ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΦΕΤΕΡΩΝ ἘΛΠΙΔΩΝ ἘΦΕΝΕΜΕΝΟΙ,
ΤΟΙ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΙ ΠΟΥΝΟῦΝΤΕΣ ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΘΕΝ, ΕΞΑΓΩΓΗΝ
52 ΠΕΡΙΕΒΛΕΠΟΝ ΕΥΣΧΗΜΟΝΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ. ΚΑΝΑΡΟΥ
ΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΓΑΛΑΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΠΑΡΑΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΥ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΞΟΝΤΟΣ ΔΙΑΛΥΣΑΙ ΤΟΝ
ΠΟΛΕΜΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΤΑΣ ΧΕΙΡΑΣ ΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΩΣ,
ΣΥΝΕΧΩΡΗΣΑΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΙΣ Ο ΤΕ ΠΡΟΣΙΑΣ
ΟΙ ΤΕ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΙ. ΠΥΘΟΜΕΝΟΙ Δ’ ΟΙ ‘ΡΟΔΙΟΙ ΤΗΝ ΤΕ
ΤΟΥ ΚΑΝΑΡΟΥ ΣΠΟΥΔΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ἘΝΤΡΟΠΗΝ ΤΟΥ
ΠΡΟΣΙΟΥ, ΣΠΟΥΔΑΞΟΝΤΕΣ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΘΕΣΟΝ
ΕΠΙ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΑΓΑΓΕΙΝ, ΠΡΟΣΒΕΤΗΝ ΜΕΝ ἈΡΙΔΙΚΗΝ
ΠΡΟΕΧΕΡΙΣΑΝΤΟ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΥΣ, ΠΟΛΕΜΟΚΛΗ
ΔΕ ΤΡΕΙΣ ΕΧΟΝΤΑ ΤΡΥΓΕΙΣ ΌΜΟΙ ΣΥΝΑΠΕΣΤΕΙΛΑΝ,
ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΙ, ΤΟ ΔΗ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΔΟΡΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ
ΚΗΡΥΚΕΙΟΝ ἌΜΑ ΠΕΜΠΕΙΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΥΣ.
4 ΕΠΙΦΑΝΕΝΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ἘΓΕΝΟΝΤΟ ΔΙΑΛΥΣΕΙΣ ἘΠΙ
ΚΩΘΩΝΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΛΙΓΕΝΟΥΣ ἘΡΩΜΗΝΙΟΝΟΥΝΤΟΣ ἘΝ
ΤΩ ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΩ, ΠΡΟΣ ΜΕΝ ‘ΡΟΔΙΟΥΣ ἈΠΛΑΙ, ΒΥΖΑΝΤΙΟΥΣ
ΜΕΝ ΜΗΔΕΝΑ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ ΤΟ ΔΙΑΓΩΓΙΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ
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to them to conduct back to his son. Having accomplished this and in addition conferred certain honours on Achaeus they deprived the Byzantines of their most important source of hope. At the same time the Byzantines met with another mischance; for Tiboetes on his way from Macedonia foiled their hopes by his death, upon which the Byzantines relaxed their efforts, while Prusias, fortified in his expectations of success in the war, at one and the same time was himself attacking the enemy from Asia with his whole energy, and on the European side, by hiring the services of the Thracians, prevented the Byzantines from venturing out of their gates. The Byzantines, all their hopes being now defeated, were suffering on all sides from the war and began to look about for an honourable solution of the questions at issue. 52. Accordingly when Cavarus, the Gallic king, came to Byzantium and did his best to put an end to the war, intervening heartily to part the combatants, both Prusias and the Byzantines yielded to his exhortations. The Rhodians, on hearing of Cavarus's efforts and Prusias's compliance and being anxious to effect their purpose at once, appointed Aridices as envoy to Byzantium and at the same time dispatched Polemocles with three triremes, wishing, as we say, to send the Byzantines the spear and the herald's staff at once. a Upon their appearance treaties were made in the year of Cothon, son of Calligeiton, hieromnemon b in Byzantium, that with the Rhodians being simple and as follows: "The Byzantines engage not to levy toll on ships bound

a That is, war and peace; the iron hand in the velvet glove.

b The eponymous annual magistrate.
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Πόντον πλεόντων, 'Ροδίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτου γενομένον τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς Βυζαν-
τίους, πρὸς δὲ Προουσίαν τοιαύτα τινὲς, εἶναι Προου-
σία καὶ Βυζαντίους εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν εἰς τὸν ἀπαντὰ χρόνον, μὴ στρατευεῖν δὲ μὴτε Βυζαντίους ἐπὶ Προουσίαν πρόσω μηδεὶν μὴτε Προουσίαν ἐπὶ
7 Βυζαντίους, ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Προουσίαν Βυζαντίους τὰς τε χώρας καὶ τὰ φρούρια καὶ τοὺς λαιοὺς καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ σώματα χωρίς λύτρων, πρὸς δὲ τούτους τὰ πλοία τὰ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ληφθέντα τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τὰ βέλη τὰ καταληφθέντ’ εἰς τοὺς ἐρυμασὶ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔξολα καὶ τὴν λυθίαν καὶ τὸν κέραμον τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Ἰεροῦ χωρίου (ὁ γὰρ
8 Προουσίας, ἀγωνιῶν τὴν τοῦ Τιβοῖτον κάθοδον, πάντα καθελε τὰ δοκοῦντα τῶν φρουρίων εὑ-
9 καίρως πρὸς τι κείσθαι). ἐπαναγκάσαι δὲ Προουσίαν καὶ ὅσα τινὲς τῶν Βιθυνίων εἶχον ἐκ τῆς Μυσίας χώρας τῆς ὑπὸ Βυζαντίους ταπτομένης ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς γεωργοῖς.

10 Ὁ μὲν οὖν 'Ροδίους καὶ Προουσία πρὸς Βυζαντίους συνόπτας πόλεμος τοιαύτας ἐλαβὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸ τέλος: κατὰ δὲ τὸν καίρον τούτον Κνῶσσιοι πρεσβεύσαντες πρὸς 'Ροδίους ἐπέεισαν τὰς τε μετὰ Πολεμοκλέους ναῦς καὶ τρία τῶν ἀφράκτων προσ-
2 κατασπάσαντας αὐτοῖς ἀποστείλας. γενομένου δὲ τούτου καὶ τῶν πλοίων ἄφικμένων εἰς τὴν Κρήτην, καὶ ἔχοντων ὑπούλιαν τῶν Ἑλευθερναίων ὃτι τὸν πολιτήν αὐτῶν Τιμαρχοῦ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πολεμοκλῆ χαιρεῖµενοι τοῖς Κνωσσίωις ἀνηρήκασι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ῥύσια κατήγγειλαν τοῖς 'Ροδίους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν.

3 Περιέπεσον δὲ καὶ Λύττιοι βραχὺ πρὸ τούτων τῶν

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for the Pontus, and on this condition the Rhodians and their allies shall be at peace with the Byzantines." The terms they made with Prusias were these: "There is to be peace and friendship for all time between Prusias and the Byzantines and in no manner are the Byzantines to make war on Prusias or Prusias on the Byzantines. Prusias is to give up to the Byzantines the lands, the fortresses, the people, and the slaves taken from the enemy free from ransom, and in addition the ships taken at the outset of the war, the missiles captured in the forts; likewise the timbers, building stones, and tiles taken from the Holy Place"—for Prusias, dreading the return of Tiboetes, had destroyed all strong places that seemed favourably situated for any hostile design—"Prusias is to compel any Bithynians occupying lands in that part of Mysia subject to Byzantium to give these up to the farmers."

53. Such was the beginning and such the end of the war of Prusias and the Rhodians with Byzantium. At about the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians and persuaded them to send the squadron under Polemocles to them with three undecked vessels in addition. Upon this, when the fleet arrived in Crete, the people of Eleuthernae, conceiving a suspicion that Polemocles to please the Cnossians had killed Timarchus one of their citizens, first of all proclaimed reprisals against the Rhodians and next made open war on them.

A little before this the people of Lyttus had met
καὶ ἐστὶν συμφορά. καθόλου γὰρ τὰ κατὰ τὴν σύμπασαν Κρήτην ὑπήρχεν ἐν τοιαύτῃ τινὶ τότε
καταστάσει. Κυνώσσοιοι συμμφοράσαντες Γορτυνίοις
πᾶσαν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν Κρήτην ύφ᾽ αὑτοὺς πλὴν τῆς
Λυττίων πόλεως, μόνης δὲ ταύτης ἀπειθούσης
ἐπεβάλοντο πολεμεῖν, σπεύδοντες αὐτὴν εἰς τέλος
ἀνάστατον ποιῆσαι καὶ παραδείγματος καὶ φόβου
χάριν τῶν ἄλλων Κρηταιῶν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον
ἐπολέμουν πάντες οἱ Κρηταιεῖς τοῖς Λυττίοις·
ἐγγενομένης δὲ φιλοτιμίας ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων,
ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ Κρητάιν, ἐστασίασαν πρὸς τοὺς
ἀλλούς, καὶ Πολυρρήνιοι μὲν καὶ Κερέται καὶ
Λαππαῖοι πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ Ὄρμοι μετ᾽ Ἀρκάδων
ἀμφιθετῶν ἀποστάσατε τῆς τῶν Κυνώσσιων φιλίας
ἐγνωσαν τοῖς Λυττίοις συμμαχεῖν, τῶν δὲ Γορτυνίων
οἱ μὲν πρεσβύτατοι τὰ τῶν Κυνώσσιων οἱ δὲ
νεώτεροι τὰ τῶν Λυττίων αἰροῦμεν διεστασάσαν
πρὸς ἀλλήλους. οἱ δὲ Κυνώσσοι, παραδόξου γεγο-
νότος αὑτοῖς τοῦ περὶ τοὺς συμμάχους κωνίματος,
ἐπιστῶσαι χιλίους ἐξ Αἰτωλίας ἀνδρᾶς κατὰ
συμμαχίαν. οὐ γενομένου παρατίκα τῶν Γορτυ-
νίων οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καταλαμβανόμενοι τὴν ἀκραν
εἰσάγωντο τοὺς τε Κυνώσσιους καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλούς,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐξεβαλον τοὺς δ᾽ ἀπέκτειναν τῶν νέων,
τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν τοῖς Κυνώσσοις. κατὰ
dὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καρυός Λυττίων εξωδεκότων εἰς
tὴν πολεμίαν πανδημεί, συνυοῦσαντες οἱ Κυνώσσοι
tὸ γεγονὸς καταλαμβάνονται τὴν Λυττον ἐρήμουν
οὐσαν τῶν βοηθῶντων· καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ
τὰς γυναῖκας εἰς Κυνώσσον ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν δὲ
πόλιν ἐμπρήσαντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες καὶ λωβη-
σάμενοι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπανῆλθον. οἶ δὲ
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with an irremediable disaster. The general condition of affairs in Crete had been as follows. The Cnossians in alliance with the Gortynians had subjected the whole of Crete with the exception of Lyttus. This being the only city that refused obedience, they undertook a war against it with the object of its final extermination as an example and terror to the rest of Crete. At first all the Cretans took part in the war against Lyttus, but jealousy having sprung up from some trifling cause, as is common with the Cretans, some separated from the rest, the people of Polyrhena, Ceraeae, Lappa, Horium, and Arcadia a unanimously abandoning the alliance with Cnossus and deciding to take the part of Lyttus, while Gortyna was in a state of civil war, the elder citizens taking the part of Cnossus and the younger that of Lyttus. The Cnossians, whom these disturbances among their allies took by surprise, obtained the assistance of a thousand Aetolians in virtue of their alliance, and once these had arrived the elder Gortynians, seizing the citadel and introducing the Cnossians and Aetolians, exiled or put to death the younger men and delivered the city to the Cnossians. 54. At about the same time the Lyttians having left with their whole force for an expedition into the enemy’s country, the Cnossians getting word of it seized on Lyttus which was left without defenders, and having sent off the women and children to Cnossus, and burnt, demolished, and in every way they could wrecked the town, returned

*a The town in Crete of that name.
Δύττου παραγενόμενοι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξοδείας, καὶ συνθεασάμενοι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οὕτως περιπαθεῖς ἔγενοντο ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὡστε μηδὲ εἰς ἐνεδρίαν μηδένα τολμῆσαι τῶν παρόντων εἰς τὴν πατρίδα. πάντες δὲ περιπορευθέντες αὐτὴν κύκλῳ, καὶ πολλάκις ἀνοιμάξαντες καὶ κατολοφυράμενοι τὴν τε τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν τύχην, αὕτως ἐξ ἀναστροφῆς ἐπανῆλθοι εἰς τὴν τῶν Δαππαίων πόλιν. φιλανθρώπως δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας τῶν Δαππαίων ὑποδεξαμένων, οὕτω μὲν ἀντὶ πολιτῶν ἀπόλιδες ἐν ἡμέρα μιᾷ καὶ ξένων γεγονότες ἐπολέμουν πρὸς τοὺς Κυνοσίους ἀμα 6 τοῖς συμμάχοις, Δύττος δ’ ἡ Δακεδαμονίων μὲν ἀποκοσ οὐσα καὶ συγγενῆς, ἀρχαίατατη δὲ τῶν κατὰ Κρήτην πόλεων, ἄνδρας δ’ ὁμολογουμένως ἄριστους ἀεὶ τρέφουσα Κρηταιενων, οὕτως ἀρδην καὶ παράλογως ἀνηρπάσθη.

55 Πολυρρήνιοι δὲ καὶ Δαππαίοι καὶ πάντες οἱ τούτων σύμμαχοι, θεωροῦντες τοὺς Κυνοσίους ἀντεχομένους τῆς τῶν Αἵτωλων συμμαχίας, τοὺς δ’ Αἵτωλους ὑποτελείς πολεμίους ὀντας τῷ τε βασιλεί Φιλίππῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, πέμπουσι πρέσβεις πρὸς τε τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς περὶ βοη- 2 θείας καὶ συμμαχίας. οἱ δ’ Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Φίλ- ἱππος εἰς τε τῆς κοινῆς συμμαχίας αὐτοὺς προσ- εδέξαντο καὶ βοήθειαν ἐξαπέστειλαν, Ἰλιριοῦς μὲν τετρακοσίους, ὃν ἦγεῖτο Πλάτωρ, Ἀχαιοὺς δὲ 3 διακοσίους, Φωκέας ἐκατόν, οἱ καὶ παραγενόμενοι μεγάλην ἑπονήσαντ’ ἐπίδοσιν τοῖς Πολυρρήνιοις καὶ τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις. πάνυ γὰρ ἐν βραχεὶ χρόνω τειχηρίες καταστήσαντες τοὺς τ’ Ἐλευθερ- ναίους καὶ Κυδωνιάτας ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς Ἀπτεραίους 430
home. When the Lyttians came back to their city from the expedition and saw what had happened, they were so much affected that none of them had the heart even to enter his native town, but one and all after marching round it and many times bewailing and lamenting the fate of their country and themselves, turned their backs on it and retired to Lappa. The Lappaeans received them with the utmost kindness and cordiality; and thus having become in one day cityless aliens instead of citizens they went on fighting against Cnossus with the other allies. Thus was Lyttus, a colony of the Spartans and allied to them by blood, the most ancient city in Crete, and ever, as all acknowledged, the breeding-place of her bravest men, utterly and unexpectedly made away with.

55. The Polyrrhenians, Lappaeans, and all their allies seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians who were the enemies of King Philip and the Achaeans, sent envoys to the king and to the League requesting their assistance and alliance. The Achaeans and Philip hereupon received them into the general confederacy and sent them as support four hundred Illyrians under the command of Plator, two hundred Achaeans and one hundred Phocians. The arrival of this force was of the greatest advantage to the Polyrrhenians and their allies; for in a very short space of time they shut the Eleuthernians, Cydoniats, and Aptaeans
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5 ἡνάγκασαν ἀποστάντας τὴς τῶν Κνωσσίων συμμαχίας κοινωνήσαι σφίξαι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐλπίδων. τούτων δὲ γενομένων ἐξαπέστειλαν Πολυφρήνιοι μὲν καὶ μετὰ τούτων οἱ σύμμαχοι Φιλίττων καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαῖοις πεντακοσίων Κρήτιας, Κνωσσόι δὲ μικρῷ πρότερον ἐξαπεστάλκεισαν χιλίους τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς· οἱ καὶ συνεπολέμουσιν ἀμφότεροι τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον. κατελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τὸν λιμένα τῶν Φαιστίων οἱ τῶν Γορτυνίων φυγάδες, ὦμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτῶν τῶν Γορτυνίων παραβόλως διακατείχον, καὶ προσεπολέμουσιν ἐκ τούτων ὀρμώμενοι τῶν τότων τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει.

56 Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Κρήτην ἐν τούτοις ἦν· περὶ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καὶ Μιθριδάτης ἐξῆνεγκε Σιναπεῦσιν πόλεμον, καὶ τις οἶνον ἀρχῇ τότε καὶ πρόφασις ἐγένετο τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀχθείσης. 2 ἄτυχίας Σιναπεῦσιν. εἰς δὲ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον προσβευσάντων αὐτῶν πρὸς Ῥοδίους καὶ παρακλούντων βοήθειν, ἔδοξε τοῖς Ῥοδίοις προχειρίσσασθαι τρεῖς ἄνδρας, καὶ δούναι τοὺς δραχμῶν δεκατέταρας μυρίας, τοὺς δὲ λαβόντας παρασκευάσαι τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπιτίθεια τοῖς Σιναπεῦσιν. 3 οἱ δὲ καταστάθαντες ἠτοίμασαν οἶνον κεράμια μύρα, τριχὸς εἰργασμένης τάλαντα τριακόσια, νεύρων εἰργασμένων ἑκατὸν τάλαντα, πανοπλίας χιλίας, χρυσοῦς ἐπισήμους τρισχίλιους, ἐτὶ δὲ 4 λιθοφόρους τέτταρας καὶ τοὺς ἀφέτας τοῦτοι. δὲ καὶ λαβόντες οἱ τῶν Σιναπεῶν πρέσβεις ἐπανηλθοῦν. ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σιναπεῖς ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ μὴ πολιορκεῖν σφᾶς δ Μιθριδάτης ἐγχειρήσῃ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν· διὸ καὶ τὰς παρασκευὰς πρὸς 5 τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐποιοῦντο πάσας. ὡ δὲ Σινώπη 432
inside their walls and compelled them to desert the alliance of Cnossus and share their fortunes. After this success the Polyrrhenians and their allies sent to Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, while the Cnossians had a little earlier sent a thousand to the Aetolians and both these Cretan forces continued to take part in the present war. The Gortynian exiles seized on the harbour of Phaestus and even audaciously continued to hold that of Gortyna itself, and from both these positions made war on those in the city.

56. Such was the state of affairs in Crete. At the same period Mithridates too went to war with Sinope, and this proved as it were the beginning and first occasion of the misfortunes which finally befall this city. The Sinopeans sent an embassy to Rhodes begging for assistance towards this war and the Rhodians passed a decree to appoint three commissioners and to place in their hands a sum of 140,000 drachmae on receiving which they were to supply the requirements of the Sinopeans. The commissioners got ready ten thousand jars of wine, three hundred talents of prepared hair, a hundred talents of prepared bow-string, a thousand complete suits of armour, three thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with their artillerymen, on receiving which the Sinopean envoys returned home. These things were sent because the Sinopeans were in great dread of Mithridates undertaking the siege of the city by land and sea, and they therefore were making all their preparations with this view. Sinope lies 433
κεῖται μὲν ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ Πόντου παρὰ τὸν εἰς Φάσων πλοῦν, οὐκεῖται δ' ἐπὶ των χερρονῆσου προτευούσης εἰς τὸ πέλαγος, ἦς τὸν μὲν αὐχένα τὸν συνάπτοντα πρὸς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὃς ἐστὶν οὗ πλεῖον δυνέων σταδίων, ἡ πόλις ἐπικειμένη.

6 διακλείει κυρίως: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τῆς χερρονήσου πρόκειται μὲν εἰς τὸ πέλαγος, ἐστὶ δ' ἐπίπεδον καὶ πανεύφοδον ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, κύκλω δ' ἐκ θαλάττης ἀπότομον καὶ δυσπροσόμοιον καὶ παντελῶς.

7 ὅλγας ἔχον προσβάσεις, διόπερ ἀγωνιότες οἱ Σιωπεῖς μὴ ποτὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἁσίας πλευρὰν ὁ Μιθριδάτης συστησάμενος ἔργα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀπέναντι ταύτης ὁμοίως ποιησάμενος ἀπόβασιν κατὰ θάλατταν εἰς τοὺς ὀμαλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὑπερκειμένους τῆς πόλεως τόπους, ἐγχειρησίᾳ πολυρκείν.

8 αὐτοῦς, ἐπεβάλοντο τῆς χερρονήσου κύκλῳ τὸ νησίζον ὄχυρον, ἀποσταυρώντες καὶ περιχαρακούντες τὰς ἐκ θαλάττης προσβάσεις, ἀμα δὲ καὶ βέλη καὶ στρατιώτας τιθέντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐυκαίρους τῶν τόπων· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ πάν μέγεθος αὐτῆς οὗ πολύ, τελεώς δ' ἐυκατακράτητον καὶ μέτρων.

57 Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Σιωπῆς ἐν τούτοις ἤν, ὃ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος ἀναζεύγας ἐκ Μακεδονίας μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως (ἐν γὰρ ταύταις ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς ἀπελιπαμεν ἀρτι τῶν συμμαχικῶν πόλεμον) ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ Θεσσαλίας καὶ τῆς Ἡπείρου, σπεύδων ταύτη.

2 ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰσβολὴν τὴν εἰς Αἰτωλίαν. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καὶ Δωρίμαχος κατὰ τὸν καὶ τοῦτον ἔχοντες πράξει κατὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀιγειρατῶν πόλεως, ἀθροίσαντες τῶν Αἰτωλῶν περὶ χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους εἰς Οἰάνθειαν τῆς Αἰτωλίας, ἥ κεῖται καταντικρῆ τῆς προειρημένης πόλεως, καὶ πορθμεῖα.
on the southern shore of the Pontus on the route to the Phasis and is situated on a peninsula running out to the open sea. The neck of this peninsula connecting it with Asia is not more than two stades in width and is absolutely closed by the city which is situated upon it; the rest of the peninsula runs out to the open sea and is flat and affords an easy approach to the town, but on its sea face it is very steep, difficult to anchor off, and with very few approaches from the sea. The Sinopeans were fearful lest Mithridates should lay siege to them by throwing up works on the side of the city next Asia, while at the same time effecting a disembarkation on the opposite side and occupying the flat ground overlooking the city; and consequently they busied themselves with strengthening all round that part of the peninsula which was washed by the sea, blocking up the approaches from the sea by means of stakes and stockades and placing soldiers and stores of missiles at suitable spots, the whole peninsula being of no great size but quite easily defensible by a moderate force.

57. Such was the situation at Sinope. But King Philip starting from Macedonia with his army—for it was here that I interrupted my account of operations in the Social War—marched on Thessaly and Epirus with the view of invading Aetolia from thence. Alexander and Dorimachus at this time having formed a project for surprising Aegeira, had collected about twelve hundred Aetolians at Oeantheia in Aetolia, which is situated just opposite Aegeira, and

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τούτως ἐτοιμάσαντες, πλοῦν ἐτήρουν πρὸς τὴν
3 ἐπιβολὴν. τῶν γὰρ ἡπτομοληκότων τις ἡ Ἀιτω-
λίας, καὶ πλεῖω χρόνον διατετριφῶς παρά τοῖς
Αἰγειράταις καὶ συντεθεωρήκως τοὺς φυλάττοντας
τὸν ἀπ’ Αἰγίου πυλῶνα μεθυσκομένους καὶ ὀβάθμως
4 διεξάγοντας τὰ κατὰ τὴν φυλακὴν, πλεονάκις
παραβαλλόμενος καὶ διαβαίνων πρὸς τοὺς περὶ
Δωρίμαχον ἐξεκέκλητο πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀυτοῦ ἀτε
λίαν οἰκείους ὀντας τῶν τοιούτων ἐγχειρημάτων.
5 Ὑ δὲ τῶν Αἰγειρατῶν πόλεις ἐκτιστά πεῖν τῆς
Πελοποννήσου κατὰ τὸν Κορινθιακὸν κόλπον μεταξὺ
tῆς Αἰγινὼς καὶ Σικυωνίων πόλεως, κείται δ’ ἐπὶ
λόφων ἐρυμνῶν καὶ δυσβάτων, νεείς δὲ τῇ θέσει
πρὸς τὸν Παρνασσὸν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς
ἀντιπέρα χώρας, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ὃς ἐπτα
6 στάδια. παραπεσόντος δὲ πλοῦ τοῖς περὶ τὸν
Δωρίμαχον ἀνήχθησαν, καὶ καθορμίζονται νυκτὸς
ἐτὶ πρὸς τὸν παρὰ τὴν πόλιν καταρρέοντα ποταμὸν.
7 οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἄλεξανδρον καὶ Δωρίμαχον,
ἀμα δὲ τούτους Ἀρχίδαμον τὸν Πανταλέοντος
νύὸν, ἔχοντες περὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν
προσέβαινον πρὸς τὴν πόλιν κατὰ τὴν ἀπ’ Αἰγίου
8 φέρουσαν ὁδὸν. ὡς δὲ αὐτόμολος ἔχων ἐκκυσά
τους ἐπιτηδειοτάτους, διανύσας ταῖς ἀνοδίαις τοὺς
κρημνοὺς βάττον τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν,
καὶ διαδός διὰ τῶν ὕδρορροίας, ἐτὶ κοιμώμενος
9 κατέλαβε τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυλῶνος. κατασφάξας δ’
αὐτοὺς ἀκμὴν ἐν ταῖς κοίταις ὀντας, καὶ διακόψας
τοῖς πελέκεσι τοὺς μοχλοὺς, ἀνέψει τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς
tὰς πύλας. οἱ δὲ παρευσπεσόντες λαμπρῶς ἀπερι-
νοῦτος ἐχρῆσαντο τοῖς πράγμασιν. ὡ καὶ παρα-
tων ἐγένετο τοῖς μὲν Αἰγειράταις τῆς σωτηρίας,
having provided transports for this force were waiting for favourable weather to cross and make the attack. For a certain Aetolian deserter, who had spent some time at Aegeira and had noticed that the guards of the Aegium gate were constantly drunk and neglectful of their watch, had several times at some risk crossed over to Dorimachus and urged him to make the attempt, well knowing that such an enterprise was quite in his line. Aegeira is situated in the Peloponnese on the gulf of Corinth between Aegium and Sicyon and is built on steep hills difficult of access, looking towards Parnassus and that part of the opposite coast, its distance from the sea being about seven stades. The weather being now favourable, Dorimachus set sail and anchored while it was still night at the mouth of the river which flows by the town. Then those with Alexander and Dorimachus and with them Archidamus the son of Pantaleon, now took the main body of the Aetolians and approached the city by the road leading from Aegium. The deserter with twenty picked men, leaving the path and mounting the precipice quicker than the others as he knew the ground, got in through an aqueduct and found the guard of the gate still asleep. Having killed them before they could rise from their beds and cut through the bolts with axes, he opened the gates to the Aetolians. They dashed brilliantly into the city, but afterwards conducted matters with such an entire lack of caution that finally the Aegeirans were saved and they themselves destroyed.
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11 τοῖς δ' Αιτωλοῖς τῆς ἀπωλείας. ὑπολαμβάνοντες γὰρ τοῦτο τέλος εἶναι τοῦ κατασχεῖν ἄλλοτρίαν πόλιν, τὸ γενέσθαι τῶν πυλῶν πόλεως, τούτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχρωντο τοῖς πράγμασι. διὸ καὶ βραχύν παντελῶς χρόνον ἀθρόοι συμπείναντες περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, λοιπὸν ἐκπαθεῖς ὄντες πρὸς τὰς ὁφελείας διέρρευσαν, καὶ παρευσπίστησαν εἰς τὰς οἰκίας

2 διήρπαζον τοὺς βίους ἦδη φωτὸς ὄντως. οἱ δ' Ἀιγειρᾶται, τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῖς ἀνελπίστου καὶ παραδόξου τελέως συμβεβηκότος, οῖς μὲν ἐπέστησαν οἱ πολέμιοι κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας, ἐκπλαγεῖς καὶ περί- φοβοι γενόμενοι πάντες ἐτρέποντο πρὸς φυγὴν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ὡς ἦδη βεβαίως αὐτῆς κεκρατημένης

3 ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ὅσοι δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἄκουόντες εἰς ἀκεραίων τῶν οἰκίων ἐξεβοῦθι, πάντες εἰς τὴν ἀκραν συνέτρεχον. οὐτοὶ μὲν οὐν αἰε ἀποίδους ἐγίνοντο καὶ θαρσαλώτεροι, τὸ δὲ τῶν Αιτωλῶν σύστρεμμα τούπποι, ἐλάττων καὶ ταραχωδέστερον

5 διὰ τὰς προειρήμενας αὐτίας. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα συν- ὀρώντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Δωρίμαχον ἦδη τὸν περιεστώτα κίνδυνον αὐτοὺς, συντραφέντες ὁμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς κατέχοντας τὴν ἀκραν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τῇ θραυ- τητῇ καὶ τόλμῃ καταπληξάμενοι τρέμασθαι τοὺς

6 ἠθυσρομένους ἐπὶ τὴν βοῦθειαν. οἱ δ' Ἀιγειρᾶται παρακαλέσαντες σφάδας αὐτούς ἑμύόντο καὶ συν-

7 επλέκοντο τοῖς Αιτωλοῖς γενναίως. οὕτως δὲ τῆς ἄκρας ἀπειχίστον καὶ τῆς συμπλοκῆς ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα γνωμόνης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἦν ἄγων ὅλον εἰκός, ἀτε τῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ τέκνων τῶν δ' ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἄγων ὑμεῦνων, τέλος γε μὴν ἐτράπησαν οἱ παρεισπεπτωκότες τῶν Αιτωλῶν.

8 οἱ δ' Ἀιγειρᾶται λαβόντες ἀφορμὴν ἐγκληματος 438
For considering that the occupation of a foreign city is finished when one is once within the gates, they acted on this principle, (58) so that, after keeping together for only quite a short time in the neighbourhood of the market-place, their passion for plunder caused them to disperse, and, breaking into the houses, they began to plunder the property, it being now daylight. The people of Aegeira had been entirely taken by surprise, and now those whose houses had been attacked by the enemy were all in the utmost state of terror and consternation, and fled out of the town in which they supposed the enemy to be already securely established. Those, however, who came to assist on hearing the shouting and whose houses were still intact, all ran to the citadel. Here they gradually increased in numbers and gained courage, while the collected force of the Aetolians on the contrary became ever smaller and more disordered for the reasons above-mentioned. But Dorimachus, seeing now the danger that menaced them, got his men together and attacked the occupants of the citadel, thinking that by this bold and vigorous effort he would intimidate and put to flight those who had gathered to defend the city. But the Aegiratans, cheering each other on, resisted and met the Aetolian attack most gallantly. The citadel was unwalled, and the combat was a hand-to-hand one between man and man, so that at first there was a struggle as desperate as one would expect when the one side is fighting for their country and children and the other for their lives, but at the end the Aetolian invaders were put to flight. The pursuit of the enemy by the Aegiratans, who took advantage of their higher
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ένεργῶς ἐπέκειντο καὶ καταπληκτικῶς τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐξ οὗ συνέβη τοὺς πλείστους τῶν Αἰτωλῶν διὰ τὴν πτοίαν αὐτοῦς ὑφ’ αὐτῶν φεύγοντας ἐν ταῖς πύλαις συμπατηθήναι. ὦ μὲν οὖν Ἅλεξανδρὸς ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ κατ’ αὐτὸν ἔπεσε τὸν κίνδυνον, ὦ δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ἐν τῷ περὶ τὰς πύλας ωθημώ καὶ πυγμῷ διεφθάρη, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὸ μὲν συνεπατήθη, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν φεύγον ταῖς ἀνοδίαις ἐξετραχηλίσθη. τὸ δὲ καὶ διασωθὲν αὐτῶν μέρος πρὸς τὰς ναῦς, ἐφεξῆς τὰ ὅπλα παναίσχυν ἃμα δ’ ἀνελπίστως ἐποιήσατο τὸν ἀπόπλουν.

12 Ἀγέιραται μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν ὀλιγωρίαν ἀποβαλόντες τὴν πατρίδα, διὰ τὴν εὐψυχίαν καὶ γεναιότητα πάλιν ἔσωσαν παραδόξως: κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Εὐριπίδας, δς ἦν ἀπεσταλμένος ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγὸς τοῖς Ἡλείοις, καταδραμὼν τὴν Δυμαιίων καὶ Φαραιέων ἔτι δὲ τὴν τῶν Τριταιέων χώραν, καὶ περιελασάμενος λείας πλῆθος ἴκανον, ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ὅσον ἦν ἡλικία τῆς Ἡλείας. ὁ δὲ Μίκκος ὁ Δυμαῖος, ὅσπερ ἐτύγχανε κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ὑποστράτηγος ὅν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἐκβοηθήσας παιδημεί τοὺς τε Δυμαιίους καὶ Φαραιεῖς ἀμα δὲ καὶ Τριταῖες ἔχων,

3 προσέκειτο τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπαλλαττομένοις. ἐνεργότερον δ’ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς ἐνέδραν ἐσφάλη καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπέβαλε τῶν ἄνδρων τετταράκοντα μὲν γὰρ ἔπεσον, ἐάλωσαν δὲ περὶ διακοσίους τῶν πεζῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐριπίδας ποιήσας τοῦτο τὸ προτέρημα, καὶ μετεωρίσθεις ἐπὶ τῷ γεγονότι, μετ’ ὀλίγας ἦμερας αὐτίς ἐξελθὼν κατέλαβε παρὰ τὸν Ἄραξον φρούριον τῶν Δυμαιῶν εὐκαιρον τὸ καλούμενον 440
position, was so vigorous and formidable, that most of the Aetolians owing to the state of panic they were in trampled each other to death in the gate. Alexander fell fighting in the actual engagement and Archidamus perished in the suffocating crush at the gate. The rest of the Aetolians were either trampled to death there or were dashed to pieces in their attempt to escape down the cliffs where there was no path. The survivors who reached the ships after throwing away their shields managed, beyond hope and with the stigma of this disgrace, to sail away. Thus did the Aegiratans lose their city by their negligence, and recover it again beyond hope by their courage and valour.

59. About the same time Euripidas, whom the Aetolians had sent to the Eleans to command their forces, after an inroad on the territory of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, in which he had collected a considerable amount of booty, was on his way back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who was at this time the sub-strategus of the Achaeans, taking with him the complete levies of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, marched out and attacked the enemy as they were retiring. Pressing on too vigorously he fell into an ambush and was defeated with considerable loss, forty of his infantry being killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Euripidas, elated by this success, made another expedition a few days afterwards and took a fort of the Dymaeans called “The Wall,” favourably situated near the Araxus and

BOOK IV. 58. 8 – 59. 4
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5 Τείχος, ο Φασίν οι μύθοι το παλαιόν Ἦρακλεα πολεμοῦντα τοῖς Ἦλειοις ἐποικοδομῆσαι, βουλό-
60 μενον ὀρμητηρίῳ χρῆσθαι τούτῳ κατ' αὐτῶν. οἱ 
δὲ Δυμαῖοι καὶ Φαραῖες καὶ Τριταιεῖς ἠλαττωμένοι 
μὲν περὶ τὴν βοήθειαν, δεδιότες δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἐκ 
τῆς τοῦ φρουρίου καταλήψεως, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 
ἐπεμπον ἀγγέλους πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, 
δηλοῦντες τὰ γεγονότα καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν, 
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς 
2 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐξισώσοντας. οἱ δὲ "Αρατος οὗτο 
τὸ ἔννοικὸν ἔδυνατο συστήσασθαι διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὸν 
Κλεομενικὸν πόλεμον ἐλλελούτεναι τινὰ τῶν ὁμο- 
νών τοὺς Ἀχαιῶν τοῖς μισθοφόροις, καθόλου τε 
ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ συλλήβδην πάσι τοῖς τοῦ πολέ-
μου πράγμασιν ἀτόλμως ἐχρῆτο καὶ νωθρῶς.
3 διόπερ ο οἱ τὸν Λυκοδρύγος εἰλὲ τὸ τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν 
Ἀθήναιον, ο οἱ Ἕλληνες ἡξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις 
4 Γόρτυναν τῆς Τελεθουσίας. οἱ τοῖς Δυμαῖοι καὶ 
Φαραῖες καὶ Τριταιεῖς, δυσελπιστήσαντες ἐπὶ ταῖς 
τοῦ στρατηγοῦ βοηθείαις, συνεφρονήσαν ἀλλήλοις 
eis τὸ τὰς μὲν κοινὰς εἰσφορὰς τοῖς Ἀχαιῶις μὴ 
5 τελεῖν, ἱδία δὲ συστήσασθαι μισθοφόρους, πεζοὺς 
μὲν τρικοσίους ἡπτεῖς δὲ πεντήκοντα, καὶ διὰ 
6 τοῦτων ἀσφαλίζεσθαι τὴν χώραν. τούτῳ δὲ πρά-
ξαντες ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς πραγμάτων 
ἐνδεχομένως ἐδοξαν βεβουλεῦσαι, περὶ τῶν 
κοινῶν τάναντια: πονηρὰς γὰρ ἐφόδου καὶ προφά-
σεως τοῖς βουλομένοις διαλύει τὸ ἐδώκον 
7 ἀρχηγοὶ καὶ καθηγεμόνες γεγονέναι. ταύτης δὲ 
τῆς πράξεως τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον τῆς αὐτίας ἐπὶ τὸν 
στρατηγὸν ἀν τὶς ἀναφέροι δικαίως τὸν ὀλυγροῦντα 
καὶ καταμέλλοντα καὶ προϊέμενον ἀεὶ τοὺς δεομένους. 
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fabled to have been built long ago by Heracles when he was making war on the Eleans to use as a place of arms against them. 60. The Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, thus worsted in their attack on the invaders and afraid of what might happen owing to the occupation of the fort, at first dispatched messengers to the strategus of the Achaeans informing him of what had occurred and begging for help, and subsequently sent a formal embassy with the same request. Aratus could not get a foreign force together, as after the Cleomenic War the Achaeans had not paid their mercenaries in full, and in general he exhibited a great lack of daring and energy in his plans and his whole conduct of the war. So that Lycurgus took the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and Euripidas, in addition to his previous successes, captured Gortyna in the territory of Telphusa. Hereupon the peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea, despairing of help from the strategus, came to an agreement with each other to refuse to pay their contributions to the Achaean League and to collect a private mercenary force of three hundred foot and fifty horse with which to secure the safety of their lands. In acting thus they were thought to have taken a proper course as regards their own affairs, but the reverse of this as regards the League; for they thus became the initiators and establishers of an evil precedent and pretext of which anyone who wished to dissolve the League could avail himself. It is true that the greater part of the blame for this action of theirs rested on the Strategus, guilty as he was of habitual negligence, delay, and inattention to
8 πᾶς γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων, ἐως μὲν ἀν τινος ἐλπίδος ἀντέχηται παρὰ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ συμμάχων, προσανέχει φιλεῖ ταύτας, ὅταν δὲ δυσχρηστῶν ἀπογυν, τὸτ᾿ ἦδη βοήθειν ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν. διὸ καὶ Τριταῖοι καὶ Φαραιεῖοι καὶ Δυμαῖοι, ὅτι μὲν ἰδίᾳ συνεστήσαντο μισθοφόρους καταμέλλοντος τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἤγεμόνος, οὐκ ἐγκλητέον, ὅτι δὲ τὰς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν εἰσφοράς ἀπεισιαίναν πολλοὶ, ἐφρεῖν γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἰδίᾳ χρείαν μὴ παραλιπεῶν, εὐκαιροῦντας γε δὴ καὶ δυναμένους, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν πολιτείαν δίκαια συντηρεῖν, ἀλλὰς τε δὴ καὶ κομίδης ὑπαρχοῦσης ἀδιαπτῶτον κατὰ τοὺς κοινοὺς νόμους, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, γεγονότας ἄρχηγος τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συστήματος.

61 Ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος διελθὼν τὴν Ὑπερίωναν ἐν τούτοις ἦν, καὶ ἔμενεν τὸ ἐν τῆς Μακεδόνῃ πανδημεῖ καὶ τοὺς οἰκείας ἀυτῶν συνηντηκότας σφενδονήσας τριακοσίοις, ἐπὶ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ Πολυρρηνίων ἀπεσταλμένους Κρῆτας πεντακοσίοις, προῆγε, καὶ διελθὼν τὴν Ἡπειρον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀμβρακικῶν χώραν. εἰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἀφεῖλεν τὰς καὶ παραδόξως ἐπίπεσον δυνάμει βαρεία τοῖς ὀλίοις πράγμασιν ἐπιτεθείκει τέλος· νῦν δὲ πεισθεῖς τοῖς Ἡπειρώταις πρῶτον ἐκπολιορκῆσαι τὸν Ἀμβρακον, ἐδωκε τοῖς Ἀλτωλοίς ἀναστροφὴν εἰς τὸ καὶ στήναι καὶ προ- νοθηναι τι καὶ παραπεπευσθαί πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.

5 οἱ γὰρ Ἡπειρώται τὸ σφέτερον ἀναγκαίοτερον τυ- θέμενοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ μεγάλως 444
requests. For everyone in the hour of danger, as long as he keeps up any hope of assistance from his allies and friends, reposes his confidence on this, but when he abandons it in his distress he is forced to do all in his power to help himself. We should therefore not find fault with the Tritaeans, Pharaeans, and Dymaeans for hiring a private force when the Head of their confederacy delayed to take action, but they must be blamed for refusing to pay their contribution to the League. While duly considering their own interests, especially as they could well afford to do so, they should have observed their engagements to the League; especially as according to the common laws they were perfectly assured of recovery; and above all considering they were the actual founders of the Confederacy.

61. Such was the state of affairs in the Peloponnese. Meanwhile King Philip, after passing through Thessaly, had arrived in Epirus. Uniting with his Macedonians the complete levy of the Epirots, three hundred slingers who had joined him from Achaea and five hundred Cretans sent by the Polyrrhenians, he advanced and passing through Epirus reached Ambracia. Had he only not turned aside but advanced rapidly into the interior of Aetolia, he would by thus suddenly and unexpectedly invading with so formidable a force have put an end to the whole war. But as it was, letting himself be persuaded by the Epirots to take Ambracus in the first place, he gave the Aetolians leisure to collect themselves, to take precautionary measures and to make preparations for the future. For the Epirots, setting their own particular advantage above that of the
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σπουδάζοντες υφ' αυτούς ποιήσασθαι τὸν Ἀμβρακον, ἑδέοντο τοῦ Φιλίππου ποιήσασθαι πολιορκίαν

6 περὶ τὸ χωρίον καὶ τοῦτο πρότερον ἐξελεύν, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ κομίσασθαι τὴν Ἀμβρακίαν παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, τοῦτο δὲ γενέσθαι μόνως ἂν ἐλπίζοντες, εἰ τοῦ προειρημένου τόπου κυριεύσαντες

7 ἐπικαθήσατε τῇ πόλει. ὃς ἤρε Ἀμβρακόσ ἐστι μὲν χωρίον εὗ κατεσκευασμένον καὶ προτειχίσμασι καὶ τείχει, κείται δὲ ἐν λίμναις, μίαν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας στενὴν καὶ χωστὴν ἔχων πρόσοδον, ἐπίκειται δὲ εὐκαίρως τῇ τε χώρα τῶν Ἀμβρακιωτῶν καὶ τῇ πόλει.

8 Φιλίππος μὲν οὖν πεισθεὶς Ἡπειρώταις, καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας περὶ τὸν Ἀμβρακον, ἐγένετο περὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν.

62 Σκόπας δὲ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς πανθημεῖ, καὶ ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν διὰ Θεσπαλίας, ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Μακεδονίαν, καὶ τὸν τε σῖτον ἐπιπορευόμενος τὸν κατὰ τὴν Πιερίαν ἐφθειρε, καὶ λείας περιβαλόμενος πλῆθος ἐπανῆγε,

2 ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Θίων. ἐκλιπόντων δὲ τῶν κατοικοῦντων τὸν τόπον, εἰσελθὼν τὰ τείχη κατέσκαψε καὶ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον, πρὸς δὲ τούτων ἐνέπρησε τὰς στοὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ τέμενος, καὶ τὰ λυπτα διέφθειρε τῶν ἀναθημάτων, ὡσ πρὸς κόσμον ἥ χρείαν ὑπήρχε τοῖς εἰς τὰς πανηγύρεις συμπορευμένοις. ἀνέτρεψε δὲ καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας

3 τῶν βασιλέων ἀπάσας. οὐδός μὲν οὖν εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν ἐνστασιν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τὴν πρώτην πράξιν ὃς μόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς

4 θεοῖς πόλεμον ἐξενοῦχως ἐπανῆγε, καὶ παραγενομένος εἰς Αἰτωλίαν οὐχ ὡς ἡσθηκὼς ἀλλ᾽ ὃς

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allies and exceedingly eager to get Ambracus into their possession, implored Philip to besiege and capture this place in the first instance. They regarded it as of the highest importance to recover Ambracia from the Aetolians, and the only way they hoped to do so was by making themselves masters of this place and laying siege to the city of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by outworks and a wall and lies in a lake with only one narrow approach from the town, and it is so situated as to command effectually both the country and the town.

62. Philip, then, acting as the Epirots wished and encamping before Ambracus, began to make preparations for its siege. But while he was thus employed, Scopas raised a general levy of the Aetolians and marching through Thessaly invaded Macedonia, where he destroyed the crops in Pieria and after collecting a quantity of booty, turned back and marched towards Dium. On its inhabitants deserting this place he entered it and demolished the walls, houses, and gymnasion, burning also the colonnade round the sanctuary and destroying all the other monuments of piety which served for adornment or for the convenience of those who frequented the festival. He also threw down all the royal statues. Having thus at the very outset of the war and by his first action made war not only on men but on the gods, he now returned, and on reaching Aetolia, just as if he had not been guilty
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άγαθος ἄνηρ εἰς τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα γεγονὼς ἐτυμῆτο καὶ περιβλέπετο, πλήρεις ἐλπίδων κενῶν καὶ φρονήματος ἀλόγου πεποιηκὼς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς·

5 ἦσον γὰρ ἐκ τούτων διάληψιν ὦς τῆς μὲν Αἰτωλίας οὐδ' ἐγγίζειν τολμήσαντος οὐδενός, αὐτοὶ δὲ πορθήσοντες ἀδεώς οὐ μόνον τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καθάπερ ἔθος ἦν αὐτοῖς, ἄλλα καὶ τὴν Θεσσαλίαν καὶ τὴν

63 Μακεδονίαν. Φίλιππος δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν ἀκούσας, καὶ παραχρῆμα τῆς Ἡπειρωτῶν ἀγνοίας καὶ φιλονεικίας τάπιχειρα κεκοιμημένος, ἐπολιόρκει  

2 τὸν Ἀμβρακον. χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς τε χώμασιν ἑνεργῶς καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ παρασκευῇ ταχέως κατεπλήξατο τοὺς ἐνόντας, καὶ παρέλαβε τὸ χωρίον  

3 ἐν ᾗμέραις τετταράκοντα ταῖς πάσαις. ἀφεῖς δὲ τοὺς φυλάττοντας ὑποσπόνδους, ὄντας εἰς πεντακοσίους Αἰτωλῶν, τὴν μὲν τῶν Ἡπειρωτῶν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπλήρωσε παραδοὺς τὸν Ἀμβρακον,  

4 αὐτὸς δὲ ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν προῆγε παρὰ Χαράδραν, σπειδῶν διαβήσαι τὸν Ἁμβρακικῶν καλούμενον κόλπον, οὗ στενώτατον ἐστὶ, κατὰ τὸ  

5 τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων ἱερὸν καλούμενον Ἀκτιν. ὁ γὰρ προειρημένος κόλπος ἐκπίπτει μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Σικελικοῦ πελάγους μεταξὶ τῆς Ἡπείρου καὶ  

6 τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας στενῶ παντελῶς στόματι (λείπει γὰρ τῶν πέντε σταδίων), προβαίνων δ' εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιαν κατὰ μὲν τὸ πλάτος ἐφ' ἐκατόν στάδια κεῖται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μῆκος ἀπὸ τοῦ πελάγους προ-

πίπτει περὶ τριακάσιμα στάδια. διορίζει δὲ τὴν Ἡπείρου καὶ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας, ἔχων τὴν μὲν Ὡ Ἡπείρου ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτῶν τὴν δ' Ἀκαρνανίαν  

7 ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας. περαυῶσας δὲ κατὰ τὸ προ-

ειρημένον στόμα τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ διελθὼν τὴν 448
of an impious outrage, but had done a great public service, he was universally honoured and admired, having succeeded in filling the Aetolians with empty hopes and foolish arrogance. For henceforth they had the notion that no one would ever dare even to approach Aetolia, but that they themselves might pillage unhindered not only the Peloponnese, as had been their constant practice, but Thessaly and Macedonia also. 63. Philip received the news from Macedonia, and having thus at once reaped the fruits of the folly and selfishness of the Epirots, began to besiege Ambracus. Pushing on his earthworks and other operations energetically he soon intimidated the defenders and in forty days captured the place. Letting the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart on terms, he satisfied the desire of the Epirots by handing over Ambracus to them, and himself advanced with his army by way of Charadra, with the object of crossing the gulf of Ambracia at its narrowest point by the Acarnanian temple called Actium. For this gulf is an inlet of the Sicilian sea between Epirus and Acarnania, entered by a quite narrow mouth, less than five stades across, but as it advances into the interior it expands to a width of a hundred stades and it reaches inland to a distance of three hundred stades from the sea. It divides Epirus from Acarnania, Epirus lying north of it and Acarnania south. After taking his army across at its mouth and passing through
8 πεζούς δισχιλίους ἵππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους: περὶ-
στρατοπεδεύσας δὲ τὴν προειρημένην πόλιν, καὶ
προσβολάς ἐνεργοὺς καὶ καταπληκτικὰς ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας πουσάμενος, παρέλαβε καθ’ ὀμολογίαν,
ἀφεῖς ὑποσπόνδους τοὺς ἐνότας τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν.
9 τῆς δ’ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς, ὡς ἔτι μενοῦσης ἀναλῶτον
τῆς πόλεως, ἥκον βοηθοῦντες πεντακόσιοι τῶν
Ἀιτωλῶν: ὅπερ τὴν παρουσίαν προαιραθῶμεν ὁ
βασιλεὺς, καθεῖς ἐπὶ τινας τόπους εὐκαίρους
ἐνέδρας, τοὺς μὲν πλείους αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε τοὺς δὲ
λοιποὺς ὑποχειρίσει ἔλαβε πλὴν τελέως ὁλίγων.
10 μετὰ δὲ ταύτα συνομετρήσας εἰς τριάκονθ’ ἡμέρας
τῆς δύναμις ἐκ τοῦ περικαταληφθέντος αὐτοῦ (πολὺ
γαρ πλήθος ἐν ταῖς Φοιτίαις εὐρέθη συνηθροισμένον)
προῆγε ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν Στρατικῆν.
11 ἀποσχῶν δὲ τῆς πόλεως περὶ δέκα στάδια κατε-
στρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὸν Ἀχελώον ποταμόν, ὀρμῶ-
μενος δ’ ἐντεύθεν ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθει τὴν χώραν, οὐδὲνὸς
ἐπεξεύρεσα τολμῶντος τῶν ὑπεννυμίων.

64 Οἱ δ’ Ἀχαιοὶ κατὰ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους πιε-
ζόμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ, τὸν δὲ βασιλέα πυνθανόμενοι
σύνεγγυς εἶναι, πέμπουσι πρόσβεις ἄξιούντες βοή-
τεὶν· οἱ καὶ συμμίακτες ἐτὶ περὶ Στράτων ὀντὶ
tῷ Φιλίππῳ τὰ τε λοιπὰ διελέγοντο κατὰ τὰς
ἐντόλας, καὶ τὰς ωφελείας ὑποδεικνύτες τῷ στρα-
τοπέδῳ τὰ ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας ἐπείθθοι αὐτὸν διαβάντα
3 τὸ Ῥίον ἐμβάλειν εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν. ὅπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς
διακούσας τοὺς μὲν προσβεντᾶς παρακατέσχε, φήσας
βουλεύσεσθαι περὶ τῶν παρακλομένων, αὐτὸς δ’ ἀναζευξας προῆγε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν
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Acarnania Philip reached the Aetolian city called Phoetiae, having been reinforced by two thousand Acarnanian foot and two hundred horse. He encamped before this city and delivered for two days a series of assaults so vigorous and formidable that the Aetolian garrison surrendered upon conditions and were dismissed unhurt. During the following night a force of five hundred Aetolians arrived to help under the impression that the city still held out. The king got word of their approach and, placing an ambuscade in a favourable spot, killed the greater number of them and took all the rest prisoners, except a very few. After this, having distributed enough of the captured corn to his troops to last thirty days—a large quantity having been found stored at Phoetiae—he advanced, marching on the territory of Stratus. Stopping at a distance of ten stades from the town he encamped by the river Achelous, and making forays from there, laid waste the country unopposed, none of the enemy venturing to come out to attack him.

64. The Achaeans at this time, finding themselves hard pressed by the war and learning that the king was close at hand, sent envoys asking for help. Encountering the king while still before Stratus they delivered the message with which they had been charged, and pointing out to him the large booty that his army would take in the enemy’s country, tried to persuade him to cross at Rhium and invade Elis. The king after listening to them kept the envoys with him, saying he would give their request consideration, and breaking up his camp advanced in the direction of Metropolis and
4 ὡς ἐπὶ Μητροπόλεως καὶ Κωνώτης. οἱ δ’ Αἰτωλοὶ τὴν μὲν ἄκραν τῆς Μητροπόλεως κατείχον, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐξέλισσον. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐμπρήσας τὴν Μητρόπολιν προῆς κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἐπὶ τὴν
5 Κωνώτην. τῶν δ’ Αἰτωλῶν ἱππεῶν ἀθροισθέντων καὶ τολμησάντων ἀπαντῶν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ διάβασιν, ἢ κεῖται πρὸ τῆς πόλεως εἰκοσι στάδια διέχουσα, καὶ πεπεισμένων ἡ κωλύσεως τελείως ἡ κακοποιήσεως πολλὰ τοὺς Μακεδόνας περὶ τὴν
6 ἐκβασιν, συννοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ὁ βασιλεὺς παρήγγειλε τοῖς πελτασταῖς πρῶτοις ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκβασιν ἀθρόος
7 κατὰ τάγμα συνησικότας. τῶν δὲ πεθαρχοῦντων, ἀμα τῷ τὴν πρώτην διαβήναι σημαίαν βραχέα ταύτης καταπειράσαντες οἱ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἱππεῖς,
8 ἐν τῷ ταύτης τε μεῖναι συναπτίσασαν καὶ τὴν δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην διαβαίνουσας συμφράττειν τοῖς ὁπλίσ τρός τὴν ύφεστῶσαν, ἀπραγοῦντες καὶ
dυσχρήσως ἀπαλλάττοντες ἀπεχώρουν πρὸς τὴν
9 πόλιν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦν τὸ μὲν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν φρόνημα συμπεθευγός εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἤγε τὴν ἰσο-
χίαν, ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐπιδιαβὰς τῶν στρατεύματι, καὶ
10 πορθῆσας ἀδεώς καὶ ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἤκεν εἰς τὴν Ἰθωρίαν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ χωρίον ὁ κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς παρόδου κυρίως, ὁχυρωτήτω ὑπὸ φυσικῆ καὶ
11 χειροποιήτω διαφέρει. συνεγγύσους δ’ αυτοῖς καταπλαγέντες οἱ φυλάττοντες εξελίσσον τὸν τόπον· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς κυριεύσας τοῦ τόπου εἰς ἔδαφος
65 μεύσας καταφέρειν. διελθὼν δὲ τὰ στενὰ τὸ λοιπὸν ἦν βάδην καὶ πραιεῖαν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν,
Conope. The Aetolians held to the citadel of Metro-
polis, abandoning the town, which the king burnt
and then continued his advance on Conope. When
a body of Aetolian cavalry ventured to meet him, at
the ford of the river which runs in front of the town
at a distance of about twenty stades from it, trusting
either to prevent his passage entirely or to inflict
considerable damage on the Macedonians as they
were crossing, the king, perceiving their design,
ordered his peltasts to enter the river first and land
on the other bank in close order shield to shield
and company by company. His orders were obeyed,
and as soon as the first company had passed, the
Aetolian cavalry, after a feeble attack on it, finding
that it stood firm with shields interlocked and that
the second and third companies as they landed closed
up with it, were unable to effect anything, and seeing
that they were getting into difficulties made off for
the town; and henceforth the Aetolians, with all
their haughty spirit, kept quiet within the shelter
of their walls. Philip crossed with his army, and
having pillaged this country too unopposed, advanced
on Ithoria. This is a place absolutely commanding
the road through the pass and of singular natural
and artificial strength; but on his approach the
garrison were terror-stricken and abandoned it. The
king on obtaining possession of it razed it to the
ground, and ordered his advanced guards to demolish
likewise the other small forts in the country. 65.
Having passed through the defile he continued to
advance slowly and quietly, giving his troops leisure
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αναστροφήν διδοὺς τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς
2 χῶρας ὡφελείας. γέμοντος δὲ τοῦ στρατοπέδου
πάντων τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, ἦκε πρὸς τοὺς Ὀινιάδας.
3 καταστρατοπεδεύσας δὲ πρὸς τὸ Παιάνιον τοῦτο
πρῶτον ἐξελείν ἐκρίνει ποιησάμενος δὲ προσβολάς
συνεχεῖς εἶλεν αὐτῷ κατὰ κράτος, πόλιν κατὰ μὲν
τὸν περίβολον οὐ μεγάλην (ἐλάττων γὰρ ἣν ἔπτα
σταδίων), κατὰ δὲ τὴν σύμπασαν κατασκευὴν
οἰκίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ πύργων οὐδ’ ὅποιας ἦττω.
4 ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν τείχος κατέσκαψε πᾶν εἰς ἔδαφος,
τὰς δ’ οἰκήσεις διαλύων τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὸν κέραμον
eἰς σχέδιας καθήμοροι τῷ ποταμῷ μετὰ πολλῆς
5 φιλοτιμίας εἰς τοὺς Ὀινιάδας. οἶ δ’ Αἰτωλοὶ τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο διατηρεῖν τὴν ἀκραν τὴν
ἐν τοῖς Ὀινιάδαις, ἀσφαλισάμενοι τείχες καὶ τῇ
λοιπῇ κατασκευῇ χυσεγιζόντος δὲ τοῦ Φιλίππου
6 καταπλαγέντες ἐξεχώρησαν. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς παρα-
λαβὼν καὶ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν, εξ αὐτῆς προελθὼν
κατεστρατοπέδευσε τῆς Καλυδώνιας πρὸς τὶ χωρίον
ὀχυρὸν, δ’ καλεῖται μὲν Ἡλαος ἤσφαλισται δὲ
τείχες καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς παρασκευαῖς διαφερότως,
Ἀττάλου τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ κατασκευὴν ἀναδεξαμένου
7 τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. γενόμενοι δὲ καὶ τούτου κύριοι
κατὰ κράτος οἱ Μακεδόνες, καὶ πᾶσαν κατασύραντες
8 τὴν Καλυδώνιαν, ἦκον πάλιν εἰς τοὺς Ὀινιάδας. ὁ
δὲ Φιλίππος συνθεσάμενος τὴν ἐυκαιρίαν τοῦ
tόπου πρὸς τε τάλλα καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τὰς εἰς
Πελοπόννησον διαβάσεις, ἐπεβάλετο τείχιζεν τὴν
9 πόλιν. τοὺς γὰρ Ὀινιάδας κείσανε συμβαίνει παρὰ
θάλασσαν, ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας τῷ
πρὸς Ἀἰτωλοὺς συνάπτοντι, περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν τοῦ
10 Κορυθιακοῦ κόλπου. τῆς δὲ Πελοπόννησου τέτα-
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to pillage the country, and when he reached Oeniadae his army was abundantly furnished with provisions of every kind. Encamping before Paeonium he determined to capture this city in the first place and after several assaults took it by storm. It is a town of no great size, being less than seven stades in circumference, but inferior to none in the fine construction of its houses, walls, and towers. Philip razed the wall to the ground, and taking down the houses made the timbers and tiles into rafts and sent down the stones on them with the greatest care to Oeniadae. The Aetolians at first determined to hold the citadel of Oeniadae, feeling themselves safe behind walls furnished with all other defences, but on Philip’s approach took fright and retired. The king, taking possession of this town too, advanced from it and encamped before a strong place in the territory of Calydon called Elaus admirably fortified by walls and other defences, Attalus having undertaken for the Aetolians the expense of construction. The Macedonians assaulted and took this place also and after laying waste the whole territory of Calydon returned to Oeniadae. But Philip, observing the natural advantages of the spot both in other respects and as a point from which to cross to the Peloponnese, conceived the plan of fortifying the town. Oeniadae lies at the extreme border of Acarnania on the coast of Aetolia, just at the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The part of the Peloponnese facing it is the coast.
κταί μὲν ἡ πόλις καταντικρυ τῆς παραλίας τῆς τῶν Δυμαίων, ἐγγυστα δ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχει τοῖς κατὰ τὸν Ἀραξὸν τόποις· ἀπέχει γὰρ οὗ πλεῖον ἐκατὸν
11 σταδίων. εἰς δ' ἐβλέπας τὴν τε ἀκραν καθ’ αὐτὴν ἡσαλίσατο, καὶ τῷ λιμένι καὶ τοῖς νεώριοις ὦμοι
τεῖχος περιβαλῶν ἐνεχείρει συνάψαι πρὸς τὴν ἀκραν,
χρώμενος πρὸς τὴν οἰκονομίαν ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ Παναίου παρασκευαῖς.

66 Ἐτι δὲ περὶ ταῦτα γνωμένου τοῦ βασιλέως
παρῆν ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἀγγελος διασαφῶν ὅτι
συμβαίνει τοὺς Δαρδανείς, ὑπονοοκότας τὴν
eis Πελοπόννησον αὐτοῦ στρατείαν, ἀθροίζων
δυνάμεις καὶ παρασκευὴν ποιεῖσθαι μεγάλην, κεκρι-
2 κότας ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν. ἀκούσας δὲ
taῦτα, καὶ νομίσας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι βοηθεῖν κατὰ
tάχος τῆς Μακεδονίας, τοὺς μὲν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν
πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλε, δοὺς ἀπόκρισιν ὅτι τοῖς προσ-
ηγγελμένοις ἐπαρκέσας οὐδὲν προηγειατέρον ποιή-
σεται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῦ βοηθεῖν σφίζαι κατὰ δύναμιν,
3 αὐτῶς δ' ἀναζευξάς μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν
ἐπάνοδον ἥπερ καὶ τὴν παρουσίαν ἐπεποίητο.
4 μέλλοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ διαβαίνειν τῶν Ἀμβρακικῶν
κόλπου ἐν Ἀκαρνανίας εἰς Ὁπειρὸν παρῆν ἔπο
ἔνος λέμβου Δημήτριος ὁ Φάριος, ἐκκυπτικῶς
ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἐκ τῆς Ἰλυρίδος· ὑπέρ ὧν ἐν τοῖς
5 πρὸ τούτων ἡμῶν δεδηλώτατι. τούτον μὲν οὖν
Φίλιππος ἀποδεξάμενος φιλανθρώπος ἐκέλευσε
πλεῖν ὃς ἐπὶ Κόρινθον κάκειθεν ἤκειν διὰ Ἡπείρους
eis Μακεδονίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ διαβὰς εἰς τὴν Ὁπειρὸν
6 προῆγε κατὰ τὸ συνεχές εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. παραγενο-
μένου δ' αὐτοῦ τῆς Μακεδονίας εἰς Πέλλαν, ἀκού-
σαντες οἱ Δαρδανοὶ παρὰ Θρακῶν τινῶν αὐτομόλων
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territory of Dyme, the nearest point being the promontory of Araxus which is not more than a hundred stades distant. Looking to these facts Philip fortified the citadel separately and surrounding the harbour and dockyards with a wall he intended to connect them with the citadel, using the building material he had brought down from Paeonium for the work.

66. But while the king was still thus engaged, a post arrived from Macedonia informing him that the Dardani, understanding that he contemplated a campaign in the Peloponnese, were collecting forces and making great preparations with the intention of invading Macedonia. On hearing this, he thought it necessary to hasten back to the help of Macedonia, and now dismissing the Achaean envoys with the reply that when he had done what was called for by the intelligence he had received he would make it his first object to assist them as far as was within his power, he broke up his camp and returned home with all speed by the same route as that by which he had come. As he was about to cross the Gulf of Ambracia from Acarnania to Epirus, Demetrius of Pharus appeared in a single frigate, having been driven by the Romans from Illyria, as I narrated in a previous Book. Philip received him kindly and bade him sail for Corinth and from thence make his way to Macedonia through Thessaly, while he himself crossed to Epirus and continued his advance. When he reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani, hearing of his arrival from some Thracian deserters,
καταπλαγέντες παρα-
χρήμα διέλυσαν τὴν στρατείαν, καὶ περ ἐκδήπου γεγονός
7 ὁντες τῆς Μακεδονίας. Φίλιππος δὲ πυθόμενος
tῆς τῶν Δαρδανέων μετάνοιαν τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας
dιαφήκε πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ὀπώρας συγκομιδὴν,
αὐτὸς δὲ πορευθεὶς εἰς Θεσσαλίαν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος
tοῦ θέρους ἐν Λαρίσῃ διήγεν.
8 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Αἰμίλιος ἐκ τῆς
Ἰλλυρίδος εἰσῆγε λαμπρῶς εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τὸν
θρίαμβον, Ἀντίβας δὲ Ζάκανθαν ἥρηκὼς κατὰ
κράτος διέλυσε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς παραχειμασίαν,
9 Ῥωμαιοὶ δὲ, προσπεσοῦσας αὐτοῖς τῆς Ζακανθαίων
ἀλώσεως, προσβεβαία ἐπεμπον ἐξαιτήσωτας Ἀν-
νίβοις παρὰ Καρκηδόνιων, ἀμα δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον
παρεσκευάζοντο, καταστήσαντες ὑπάτους Πόλιον
10 Κορνήλιον καὶ Τιβέριον Σεμπρώνιον. ὑπὲρ δὲν
ήμεις τὰ μὲν κατὰ μέρος ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ βύβλῳ
dεδηλώκαμεν· νῦν δὲ ἀναμνήσεως χάριν αὐτὰ προ-
ηγεγκάμεθα κατὰ τὴν ἑξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαγγελλὼν, ἵνα
gνωσκηται τὰ κατὰλληλα τῶν πραγμάτων.
11 Καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐτὸς ἐλήγε τῆς ὑποκειμένης
67 ὀλυμπιάδος, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ἀιτωλοῖς ἤδη τῶν
ἀρχαίρεσιν καθηκόντων στρατηγὸς Ἰρέθη Δωρί-
μαχος, δς παραυτικά τὴν ἀρχὴν παραλαβὼν καὶ
toûs Αἴτωλους ἀθροίσας μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐνέβαλεν
eis toûs ἀνω τόπους τῆς Ἡπείρου καὶ τὴν χώραν
2 ἐδήνυ, θυμικώτερον χρώμενος τῇ καταβορα· τὸ
γάρ πλεῖον οὐ τῆς σφετέρας ὕφελιας ἀλλὰ τῆς
tῶν Ἡπειρωτῶν βλάβης χάριν ἐκαστα συνετελεῖ.
3 παραγενόμενος δὲ πρὸς τὸ περὶ Δωδώνην ἱερὸν
tὰς τε στοὰς ἐνέπρησε καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναθημάτων
dιεφθείρε, κατέσκαψε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν οἰκίαν,
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took fright and at once dismissed their army, although they were now close to Macedonia. Philip, on learning that the Dardani had abandoned their project, sent home all his Macedonians to gather in the harvest and returning to Thessaly spent the rest of the summer at Larisa.

It was at this same time that Aemilius, on his return from Illyria, celebrated a splendid triumph in Rome, that Hannibal after taking Saguntum by assault dismissed his army to winter quarters, that the Romans on hearing of the fall of Saguntum sent ambassadors to Carthage demanding that Hannibal should be given up to them, and at the same time began to prepare for war after electing as Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus. All these matters I have dealt with in detail in my previous Book, and now merely recall them to my readers in pursuance of my original plan that they may know what events were contemporaneous.

67. And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to its close. It was now the date for the elections in Aetolia, and Dorimachus was chosen strategus. As soon as he entered on office he summoned the Aetolians to arms and invading upper Epirus laid the country waste, carrying out the work of destruction in a thoroughly vindictive spirit; for the measures he took were all not so much meant to secure booty for himself as to inflict damage on the Epirots. On reaching the temple of Dodona he burnt the porticoes, destroyed many of the votive offerings and demolished the sacred building, so that
4 ὧστε μὴ ἐιρήνης ὅρον μήτε πολέμου πρὸς Ἀιτωλούς ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς περιστάσεσι παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς.

5 Ὑστος μὲν ὡς ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτα διαπραξάμενος ἐπανήγειν αὖθις εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν· τοῦ δὲ χειμῶνος ἐτὶ προβαίνοντος, καὶ πάντων ἀπηλπικότων τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Φιλίππου διὰ τὸν καιρὸν, ἀναλαβὼν ὁ βασιλεὺς χαλκάσπιδας μὲν τρισχίλιον πελταστὰς δὲ δισχίλιοι καὶ Κρήτας τριακοσίους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἵππεις τοὺς περὶ τὴν αὐλήν εἰς τετρακοσίους,

6 προῆγεν ἀπὸ Δαρίσης· καὶ διαβιβάσας τούτους ἐκ Θεσσαλίας εἰς Εὐβοιαν κάκειθεν εἰς Κύνον ἥκε διὰ τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Μεγάριδος εἰς Κόρινθον περὶ τροπὰς χειμερινὰς, ἐνεργὸν καὶ λαθραῖαν πεποιημένος τὴν παρουσίαν ὡς τε μηδένα Πελο-

7 πονησίων ὑπονοήσαι τὸ γεγονός. κλέισας δὲ τὰς πύλας τοῦ Κορίνθου καὶ διαλαβὼν τὰς ὁδοὺς φυλακαῖς, τῇ κατὰ πόδας Ἄρατον μὲν τὸν προσβότερον ὡς αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ Σικυόνος μετεπέμπτεν, γράμματα τε πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ἐξαπέστελλεν, ἐν οἷς διεσάφει πότε καὶ ποῦ δεῖσην συναντὰν πάντας ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς·

8 ταῦτα δ’ οἰκονομήσας ἀνέζευξε, καὶ προελθὼν κατεστρατοπέδευσε τῆς Φιλισίας περὶ τὸ Διοσκοῦ-

68 κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καίρους Εὐριπίδας, ἔχων Ἡλείων δύο λόχους μετὰ τῶν πειρατῶν καὶ 
misdoφόρων, ὡς εἶναι τοὺς πάντας εἰς δισχίλιον καὶ διακοσίους, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις ἱππεῖς ἐκατόν, ὀρμήσας ἐκ Ψωφίδος, ἐποιεῖτο τῇ πορείᾳ διὰ τῆς 
Φενίκης καὶ Στυμφαλίας, οὐδὲν μὲν εἶδως τῶν κατὰ τὸν Φιλίππον, βουλόμενος δὲ κατασύραι τὴν
we may say that for the Aetolians no restrictions exist either in peace or war, but that in both circumstances they pursue their designs in defiance of the common usages and principles of mankind.

Dorimachus after this and similar exploits returned home. As the winter was now advanced, everyone had given up any hope of Philip's reappearance owing to the season, but suddenly the king taking with him three thousand of his brazen-shielded hoplites, two thousand peltasts, three hundred Cretans, and about four hundred of his horse guards, started from Larisa. Transporting this force from Thessaly to Euboea and thence to Cynus, he passed through Boeotia and Megaris and reached Corinth about the winter solstice, having marched with such expedition and secrecy that no one in the Peloponnese was aware of what had happened. Shutting the gates of Corinth and posting patrols in the streets, he sent next day to Sicyon for the elder Aratus, at the same time dispatching letters to the strategus of the Achaeans and to the different cities informing them at what date and place he required them all to meet him in arms. After making these arrangements he left Corinth, and advancing encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri in the territory of Phlius.

68. Just at this time Euripidas with two companies of Eleans together with his freebooters and mercenaries, so that his whole force of infantry numbered about two thousand two hundred, and with a hundred horsemen, had left Psophis and was marching through the territories of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing of Philip's arrival, but bent on laying waste
2 τῶν Σικυωνίων χώραν. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς τῆς αὐτῆς ἐν ἤ συνέβαινε στρατοπεδεύειν τὸν Φιλιππον περὶ τὸ Διοσκούριον, παρηλλαχός τὴν στρατοπεδείαν τοῦ βασιλέως περὶ τὴν ἐωθινὴν ἐμβάλλειν οἶδ' τ' ἢ ἦν εἰς τὴν Σικυωνίαν. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Φιλιπποῦ Κρητῶν τινες ἀπολεούσαν τὰς τάξεις καὶ διπυρεύνοντες περὶ τὰς προνομείας ἐμπίπτουσιν εἰς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν. οὕς ἀνακρίνας καὶ συνεις τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Μακεδόνων ὁ προειρημένος, οὐδενὶ ποιήσας φανερὸν οὐδὲν τῶν προσπεπτυκότων, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς αὖθις ἀνέλυε τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἐν ἡπερ ἤκεν, βουλο- 5 μενος, ἀμα δὲ καὶ κατελπίζων κατασχήθησον τοὺς Μακεδόνας διεκβαλῶν τὴν Στυμφαλίαν καὶ συνάψας ταῖς ὑπερκειμέναις δυσχωρίας. ὃ δὲ βασιλεὺς οὐδὲν εἰδὼς τῶν περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτοὺ πρόθεσιν ἀναξεύσας τὴν ἐωθινὴν προ- ήγε, κρίνων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν παρ' αὐτὸν 7 τὸν Στυμφαλον ὡς ἔπι τὰς Καβύας· ἐνθάδε γὰρ ἐγεγράφει τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς συναθροίζεσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων. τῆς δὲ πρωτοπορείας τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπι- βαλούσης ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τὴν περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἀπελαυρον, ἦ πρόκειται τῆς τῶν Στυμφαλίων πόλεως περὶ δέκα στάδια, ἀμα συνεκύρησε καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἡλείων πρωτοπορείαν συμπεσεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐριπίδας συνοισάσας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐκ τῶν προσηγγελμένων, παραλαβὼν μεθ' ἕαυτοῦ τινας τῶν ὕπεσιν καὶ διαδρας τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν Ψωφίδα 69 ὅπλων. τῆς δὲ πρωτοπορείας τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐπι- βαλούσης ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τὴν περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἀπελαυρον, ἦ πρόκειται τῆς τῶν Στυμφαλίων πόλεως περὶ δέκα στάδια, ἀμα συνεκύρησε καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἡλείων πρωτοπορείαν συμπεσεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν 2 ὑπερβολήν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Εὐριπίδας συνοισάσας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐκ τῶν προσηγγελμένων, παραλαβὼν μεθ' ἕαυτοῦ τινας τῶν ὕπεσιν καὶ διαδρας τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν Ψωφίδα 3 ταῖς ἀνοδίαις· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Ἡλείων ἐγκατελειμμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ προεστῶτος καὶ γεγονὸς ἐκπλαγεῖς ἐπὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι κατὰ πορείαν ἐμενε, 462
the district round Sicyon. On the very night on which Philip was encamped near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed close by the king’s camp in the early morning and was just about to invade the territory of Sicyon. But some of Philip’s Cretans, who had left their ranks and were prowling about in search of plunder, fell in with Euripidas’ force. He questioned them, and on learning of the arrival of the Macedonians, without revealing the news to a soul, he led his force back by the road along which he had come, with the wish and hope of getting a start of the Macedonians and thus passing through the territory of Stymphalus and gaining the difficult highland country above it. The king, quite ignorant also of the enemy’s vicinity and simply in pursuance of his plan, broke up his camp early in the morning and advanced, intending to march past Stymphalus itself in the direction of Caphyae; for it was there that he had written to the Achaeans to assemble in arms. 69. As the advanced guard of the Macedonians was coming over the hill near the place called Apelaurus, about ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, it so happened that the advanced guard of the Eleans converged on the pass also. Euripidas, who understood what had happened from the intelligence he had previously received, took a few horsemen with him and escaping from the danger retreated across country to Psophis. The rest of the Eleans, thus deserted by their commander and thoroughly alarmed by what had occurred, remained in marching order at a loss what to do or
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διαπορούμενον τὶ δεὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πὴ τρέπεσθαι.

4 τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον αὐτῶν οἱ προεστῶτες ὑπελάμβανον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αὐτῶν τινας συνεπιβεβηκονήκειν. καὶ μάλιστ’ ἦταν ἀυτοὺς οἱ χαλκάστιδες.

5 Μεγαλοπολίτας γὰρ εἶναι τούτους ἐδόξαζον διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος ὁπλοῦς κεχρῆσθαι τοὺς προερχόμενος ἐν τῷ περὶ Σελλασίαν πρὸς Κλεομένη κινδύνω, καθοπλισαντος Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς τὴν

6 παροῦσαν χρείαν. διότι περὶ ἀπεχώρουν τηροῦντες τὰς τάξεις πρὸς τινας ὑπερδεξίους τόπους, οὐκ ἀπελπίζοντες τὴν σωτηρίαν. ἀμα δὲ τῷ προσάγουντας αὐτοῖς τῶν Μακεδόνας σύνεγγυς γενέσθαι λαβόντες ἐννοιαν τοῦ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὄντος, πάντες

7 ὃρμησαν πρὸς φυγὴν ῥίφαντες τὰ ὄπλα. ζωγρία μὲν σὸν ἐάλωσαν αὐτῶν περὶ χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν διεφθάρη πλῆθος, τὸ μὲν ὕπο τῶν Μακεδόνων τὸ δὲ ὕπο τῶν κρημνῶν. διέφυγον δ’

8 οὐ πλείους τῶν ἔκατον. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος τὰ τε σκῦλα καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους εἰς Κόρινθον ἀποπέμβας

9 εἶχε τῶν προκειμένων. τοῖς δὲ Πελοποννησίους πᾶσι παράδοξον ἔφανῃ τὸ γεγονός: ἀμα γὰρ ἦκουν τὴν παρουσίαν καὶ τὴν νίκην τοῦ βασιλέως.

70 Ποιησάμενος δὲ τὴν πορείαν διὰ τῆς Ἀρκάδιας, καὶ πολλὰς ἀναδεξάμενος χιόνας καὶ ταλαιπωρίας ἐν ταῖς περὶ τῶν Ὀλυμπολαίς, τῇ τρίτῃ

2 τῶν ἡμερῶν κατήρη νῦκτωρ εἰς Καφύας. θεραπεύσας δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ δὺ ἡμέρας ἑνταῦθα, καὶ προσαναλαβὼν Ἀρατοῦ τὸν νεῷτον καὶ τοὺς ἀμα τούτῳ συνθροισμένους τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὥστε εἶναι τὴν ὀλην δύναμιν εἰς τοὺς μυρίους, προῆγε διὰ τῆς Κλειτορίας ὡς ἐπὶ Ψωφίδος, συναθροιζών ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν διεπορεύετο βέλη καὶ κλίμακας. 464
what direction to take. At first, I must explain, their officers thought it was an Achaean force which had come to oppose them, taken in chiefly by the brazen-shielded hoplites whom they supposed to be Megalopolitans, as the contingent from there had carried such shields in the battle at Sellasia against Cleomenes, King Antigonus having thus armed them for the occasion. They therefore kept their ranks and began to retire to some higher ground, not despairing of safety. But as soon as the Macedonians advancing on them drew close, they realized the truth and all took to flight throwing away their shields. About twelve hundred of them were made prisoners and the remainder perished, either at the hands of the Macedonians or by falling down the precipices, only about a hundred escaping. Philip, sending the prisoners and captured arms back to Corinth, continued his march. This event exceedingly astonished all the Peloponnesians, who heard at one and the same time of the king’s arrival and of his victory.

70. Marching through Arcadia and encountering heavy snowstorms and many hardships in crossing the pass of Mount Olygyrtus, he reached Caphyae in the night of the third day. Having rested his troops here for two days and being joined by the younger Aratus and the Achaeans he had collected, so that his whole force was now about ten thousand strong, he advanced on Psophis through the territory of Cleitor, collecting missiles and ladders from the towns he passed through. Psophis is an undisputably
3 ἡ δὲ Ψωφίς ἔστι μὲν ὄμολογούμενον καὶ παλαιὸν Ἀρκάδων κτίσμα τῆς Ἀζανίδος, κείται δὲ τῆς μὲν συμπάσης Πελοποννήσου κατὰ τὴν μεσόγαιον, αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐπὶ τοὺς πρὸς δυσμᾶς πέρασιν, συνάπτουσα τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἐσχατίας
4 κατοικοῦσι τῶν προσεπερίων 'Αχαιῶν. ἔπικειται δ' εὐφυῶς τῇ τῶν Ἰλείων χώρᾳ, μεθ' ὧν συνέβαινε
5 τότε πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτὴν. πρὸς ἦν Φίλιππος τρι- ταῖος ἐκ τῶν Καρυῶν διανύσας κατεστρατοπέδευεν περὶ τοὺς ἀπέναντι τῆς πόλεως ὑπερκεμένους βουνοὺς, ἀφ' ὧν ἦν κατοπτεύειν τὴν τῇ πόλιν ὄλην ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τοὺς πέριξ αὐτῆς τόπους.
6 συνθεωρῶν δὲ τὴν ὁχυρότητα τῆς Ψωφίδος ὅ
7 βασιλεὺς ἦπορεύτο τί χρῆ ποιεῖν. τὴν γὰρ ἄφ' ἐσπέρας πλευράν αὐτῆς καταφέρεται λάβρος χει- μάρρους ποταμός, ὅσ κατά τὸ πλείστον μέρος τοῦ χειμώνος ἄβατός ἦστιν, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἐχυράν καὶ δυσπρόσδοχον τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ κολώματος, ὁ κατὰ βραχὺ τῷ χρόνῳ κατεί-
8 γασται φερόμενος ἐξ ὑπερδεξίων τοίποιν. παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἴδοις πλευρὰν ἔχει τὸν Ἐρύμανθον, μέγαν καὶ λάβρον ποταμόν, ὑπέρ οὖ νολύς καὶ ὑπὸ πολλῶν
9 τεθρύληται λόγος. τοῦ δὲ χεμάρρου προσπίπτοντος πρὸς τὸν Ἐρύμανθον ὑπὸ τὸ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν μέρος τῆς πόλεως, συμβαίνει τὰς μὲν τρεῖς ἐπι- φανείας αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τῶν ποταμῶν περιλαμβανο-
10 μένας ἀσφαλίζεσθαι τὸν προειρήμενον τρόπον. τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ, τῇ πρὸς ἄρκτον, βουνοὶ ἐρυμνοὶ ἔπικειται τετειχισμένος, ἀκρὰς εὐφυῶς καὶ πραγ- ματικῆς λαμβάνων τάξιν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τείχη διαφέροντα τῷ μεγέθει καὶ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς.
11 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις βοήθειαν συνέβαινε παρὰ τῶν 466
Arcadian foundation of great antiquity in the district of Azanis lying in the interior of the Peloponnese taken as a whole, but on the western borders of Arcadia itself and coterminous with the up-country of western Achaea. It commands with great advantage the territory of the Eleans, with whom it was then politically united. Philip, reaching it in three days from Caphyae, encamped on the hills opposite, from which one can securely view the whole town and its environs. When he observed the great strength of Psophis, the king was at a loss what to do; for on its western side there descends a violent torrent, impassable for the greater part of the winter, and rendering the city very strongly protected and difficult of approach on this side, owing to the depth of the bed it has gradually formed for itself, descending as it does from a height. On the eastern side of the town flows the Erymanthus, a large and rapid stream of which many fables are told by various authors. The torrent falls into the Erymanthus to the south of the city, so that three faces of the city are surrounded and protected by the rivers in the manner I have described. On the fourth or northern side rises a steep hill protected by walls, serving very efficiently as a natural citadel. The town has also walls of unusual size and admirable construction, and besides all these advantages it had just received a reinforce-
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'Ἡλείων εἰσπεπτωκέναι, καὶ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν ἔκ τῆς φυγῆς διασεσωμένον ὑπάρχειν ἐν αὐτῇ.

71 Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντα συνωρῶν καὶ συνλογιζόμενος ὁ Φίλιππος τὰ μὲν ἀφίστατο τοῖς λογισμοῖς τοῦ βιαζομένου καὶ πολιορκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, τὰ δὲ προ-

2 θύμισ εἴχε, τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ὅρων τοῦ τόπου καὶ ὁ σον γὰρ ἑπέκειτο τοῖς 'Ἁχαιοῖς τότε καὶ τοῖς Ἀρκάσι καὶ πολεμητήριον ὑπήρχε τοῖς 'Ἡλείοις ἀσφαλές, κατὰ τοσοῦτον πᾶλιν κρατηθέν ἐμελλὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀρκάδων προκεῖσθαι κατὰ δὲ τῶν 'Ἡλείων ὀρμητήριον ὑπάρξειν τοῖς συμμάχοις εὐκαιρον.

3 διόπερ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος ὀρμήσας τῇ γνώμῃ παρῆγγελλε τοῖς Μακεδόσων ἁμα τῷ φωτι πᾶσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι καὶ διεσκευασμένοις ἐτοίμους ὑπ- ἄρχειν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαβὰς τὴν κατὰ τὸν 'Ερυ-

4 μανθὸν γέφυραν, οὔδενὸς ἐμποδῶν στάντος διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἥκε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν ἑνεργῶς καὶ καταπληκτικῶς. οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδαν καὶ πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν δυσπό-

5 ροὺς ἐπὶ τοὺς συμβαίνουσι τῷ πεπεῖσθαι μήτ' ἂν ἐξ ἐφόδου τολμήσαι τοὺς πολεμίους προσβαλεῖν καὶ βιαζεῖσθαι πρὸς οὕτως ὀχυρὰν πόλιν μήτε χρόνιον ἄν συστήσασθαι πολιορκίαν διὰ τὴν τοῦ καρφοῦ περίστασιν. ἀμα δὲ ταῦτα λογιζόμενοι διηγίστουν ἀλλήλοις, δεδοῖτε μη πράξειν ὁ Φίλιππος εἰς διὰ τῶν ἐνυδῶν συνεσταμένος κατὰ τῆς πολεως.

7 ἔπει δ' οὔδεν ἐώρων τοιότον ἐξ αὐτῶν γνώμουν, ἀρμῆσαν οἱ μὲν πλείους ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη βοηθήσουτε, οἱ δὲ μυσθοφόροι τῶν 'Ἡλείων κατὰ τινα πῦλην ὑπερδεξιον ἐξῆλθον ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι τοῖς πο-

8 λεμίους. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς διατάξας κατὰ τρεῖς τόπους τοὺς προσοισούστας τῷ τείχει τὰς κλίμακας, 468
ment of Eleans, and Euripidas was present having taken refuge there after his flight.

71. Philip observing and reflecting on all this, was on the one hand deterred by his judgement from any attempt to carry the town by force or besiege it, but was again strongly disposed thereto when he considered the advantages of its situation. For just as it was now a menace to Achaea and Arcadia and a secure place of arms for the Eleans, so, if it were taken, it would be a bulwark defending Arcadia and an excellent base of operations for the allies against Elis. These considerations finally prevailed, and he gave orders to the Macedonians to get all of them their breakfasts at daybreak and then prepare for action and hold themselves in readiness. This having been done, he crossed the bridge over the Erymanthus, no one opposing him owing to the unexpectedness of the movement, and unhesitatingly marched on the town in formidible array. Euripidas and all in the town were wholly taken aback by this, as they had been convinced that the enemy would neither venture to attempt to assault by storm such a strong city, nor would open a lengthy siege at this disadvantageous season of the year. In this very conviction they now began to entertain suspicions of each other, fearing lest Philip had arranged with some of those inside the city for its betrayal. But when they saw no signs of any such project among themselves, the greater number of them ran to the walls to help, while the mercenaries of the Eleans issued from one of the gates higher up the hill to attack the enemy. The king ordered the bearers of the scaling-ladders to set them up at three separate
καὶ τούτοις ὁμοίως μερίσας τοὺς ἄλλους Μακεδόνας, μετὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν σαλπιγκτῶν ἀποδοὺς ἐκάστοις τὸ σύνθημα πανταχόθεν ἁμα τὴν προσβολὴν ἐπουεῖτο 9 τοῖς τείχεσι. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἠμύνοντο γενναίως οἱ κατέχοντες τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν κλιμάκων ἀπέρριπτον· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἢ τε χορηγία τῶν βελῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἐπιτηδείως ἐνελειπεν ὡς ἂν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς παρασκευῆς γεγενημένης, οἱ τε Μακεδόνες οὐ κατεπλήττοντο τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ βιθέντος ἀπὸ τῶν κλιμάκων χώραν ὁ κατόπιν ἀμελλήτως ἐπέβαινεν, 10 τέλος οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τραπέντες ἐφευγον πάντες πρὸς τὴν ἄκροπολιν, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες ἐπέβησαν τοῦ τείχους, οἱ δὲ Κρῆτες πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ὑπερδέξιον πύλην ἐπέεξοθόντας τῶν μισθοφόρων συμμίξαντες ἤναγκασάν αὐτοὺς οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ῥύμαντας τὰ ὅπλα φεύγειν. 11 οἶς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ προσφέροντες τὰς χεῖρας συνεισέπεσον διὰ τῆς πύλης· ἔξ οὐδεμίᾳ πανταχόθεν ἁμα καταληφθήναι τὴν πόλιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ψωφίδιοι μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν, ἀμα δὲ τούτοις οἱ περὶ τῶν ἔρυμπδαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λουτὸν πλῆθος τῶν διασωλομένων. 12 οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες εἰσπεσόντες τὴν μὲν ἐνδομενίαν ἄπασαν ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων παραχρήμα διήρπασαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ταῖς οἰκίαις ἐπισκηνώσαντες κατείχον 13 χόθεν ἁμα καταληφθήναι τὴν πόλιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ψωφίδιοι μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν ἄκραν, ἁμα δὲ τούτοις οἱ περὶ τῶν Εὔρυπδαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λουτὸν πλῆθος τῶν διασωλομένων. 14 οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες εἰσπεσόντες τὴν μὲν ἐνδομενίαν ἄπασαν ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων παραχρήμα διήρπασαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ταῖς οἰκίαις ἐπισκηνώσαντες κατείχον 15 τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ συμπεφευγότες εἰς τὴν ἄκροπολιν, οὐδεμίας σφίζαν παρασκευῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης, προορώ- μενοι τὸ μέλλον ἐγνωσάν ἐγχειρίζειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς 16 τῷ Φιλίππῳ. πέμψαντες οὖν κήρυκα πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα, καὶ λαβόντες συγχώρημα περὶ πρεσβείας, ἐξαπέστειλαν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ μετὰ τούτων 470
spots, and similarly dividing the rest of his Macedonians into three bodies, gave the signal by the sound of trumpet and attacked the wall simultaneously from every side. At first the holders of the city offered a stout resistance and threw down many of the assailants from the ladders, but when their supply of missiles and other requisites began to fall short—their preparations having been made on the spur of the moment—and the Macedonians were showing no signs of fear, the place of each man thrown off the ladder being instantly taken by the man next behind him, the defenders at length turned their backs and all fled to the citadel, while of the king's forces the Macedonians mounted the walls, and the Cretans, attacking the mercenaries who had sallied from the upper gate, forced them to fly in disorder, throwing away their shields. Pressing close on their heels and cutting them down, they entered the gate together with them, and thus the city was taken from every side at once. The Psophidians with their wives and children retreated to the citadel together with Euripidas' force and the rest of the fugitives, (72) and the Macedonians, breaking into the houses, pillaged them at once of all their contents and afterwards lodged in them and took regular possession of the town. The fugitives in the citadel, as they were not prepared for a siege, decided to anticipate matters by surrendering to Philip. They therefore sent a herald to the king; and on obtaining a safe-conduct for an embassy dispatched the magistrates accompanied by Euripidas on this
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Εὐριπίδαν. οἱ καὶ ποιησάμενοι σπονδάς ἔλαβον τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς συμπεφυγόσιν ὁμοί ξένους καὶ πολίταις. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν αὐτῖς ἐπανῆλθον ὅθεν ὠρμησαν, ἔχοντες παράγγελμα μένειν κατὰ χώραν ἐως ἣν ἡ δύναμις ἀναζεύξῃ, μή τινες ἀπειθήσαντες τῶν στρατιωτῶν διαρτᾶσσον αὐτοῖς. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἐπιγενομένης χιόνος ἁγγάκασθη μένειν ἐπὶ τόπου τινὰς ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς συναγαγὼν τοὺς παρόντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἀχρότητα καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἐπεδείκνυε τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν ἔνεστώτα πόλεμον, ἀπελογίσατο δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰρέσιν καὶ τὴν εὐνοίαν ἣν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσιν ἐφή καὶ νῦν παραχωρεῖν καὶ διδόναι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὴν πόλιν προκείσθαι γὰρ αὐτῷ τὰ δυνατὰ χαρίς ἔχοντα καὶ μηθὲν ἔλλειπεν προδομιάς. ἐφ᾽ οἷς εὐχαριστοῦντων αὐτῶν τοῖς τε περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον καὶ τῶν πολλῶν, διαλύσας τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ὁ μὲν Φίλιππος μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀναζεύξας ἐπὶ Λασίσσως ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν, οἱ δὲ Ψωφίδιοι καταβάντες ἐκ τῆς ἀκρας ἐκομίσαντο τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις ἐκαστοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐυριπίδαν ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸν Κόρινθον κάκειθεν εἰς Ἀιτωλίαν. τῶν δὲ Ἀχαϊκῶν ἀρχόντων οἱ παρόντες ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν ἀκραν ἐπέστησαν μετὰ φυλακῆς ἑκανῆς Πρόλαον Σικυώνιον, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν πόλιν Πυθίαν Πελλινέα. 

καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Ψωφίδα τούτου ἐπετελέσθη τὸν τρόπον οἱ δὲ παραφυλαττότενς τὸν Λασιῶνα τῶν Ἡλείων συνέντες τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Μακεδόνων, πεπυσμένοι δὲ καὶ τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὴν Ψωφίδα, παραχρῆμα τὴν πόλιν ἔξελιπον. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ὡς θάττων ἥκε, ταῦτα μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου παρέλαβεν, συναύξων δὲ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἢν ἔιχε
mission, who made terms with the king, securing the lives and liberties of all the fugitives both natives and foreigners. They then returned whence they came with orders for all to remain where they were until the departure of the army, lest any of the soldiery might disobey orders and plunder them. The king, owing to a snow-fall, was obliged to remain here for several days, in the course of which he called a meeting of the Achaens present, and first of all pointing out to them the strength of the town and its excellent situation for the purposes of the present war, and next protesting his affection and esteem for their state, finally told them that he now handed over the city to the Achaens as a free gift, it being his purpose to favour them by all means in his power and never fail to consult their interests. Aratus and the Achaean troops having expressed their thanks to him for this, Philip dismissed the meeting and departed with his army, marching towards Lasion. Hereupon, the Psophidians coming down from the citadel, their city and houses were restored to them, and Euripidas went away to Corinth and thence back to Aetolia. The Achaean magistrates present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel with an adequate garrison and Pythias of Pellene in command of the town.

73. So ended the incident of Psophis. The Elean garrison of Lasion, hearing of the approach of the Macedonians and learning what had befallen Psophis, at once abandoned the town. The king took the city immediately on his arrival and, as a further testimony of his generous intentions towards the
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πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος, παρέδωκε καὶ τὸν Δασιώνα τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Στράτουν ἐκλιπόντων τῶν Ἡλείων ἀποκατέστησε τοῖς Τελφουσίοις.

3 ταῦτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἤκε πεμπταῖος εἰς Ὄλυμπιάν. θύσας δὲ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοὺς ἤγεμόνας ἑστιάσας, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὴν λουτὴν προσαναπάύσας δύναμιν ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας, μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀν-

4 εἶχεν καὶ προελθὼν εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν τὰς μὲν προ-

νομὰς ἐπαφῆκε κατὰ τῆς χώρας, αὐτὸς δὲ κατ-

εστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἀρτεμίσιον.

5 προσδεξάμενος δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὴν λείαν μετέβη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Διοσκούριον.

Δησυμένης δὲ τῆς χώρας πολὺ μὲν ἢν τὸ τῶν ἀλισκομένων πλῆθος, ἐτὶ δὲ πλέον τὸ συμφεύγων εἰς τὰς παρακεμένας κώμας καὶ τοὺς ἐρυμνοὺς τῶν

6 τόπων. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὴν τῶν Ἡλείων χώραν δια-

φεροῦτως οἰκεῖσθαι καὶ γέμεων σωμάτων καὶ κατα-

7 σκευῆς παρὰ τὴν Ἀλλήν Πελοπόννησον. ἐναι γὰρ αὐτῶν οὕτως στέργουσι τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν βίων ὥστε τναὶ ἐπὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς γενέας, ἔχοντας ἴκανας οὐσίας, μῆ παραβεβληκέναι τὸ παράπαν εἰς

8 ἀλίαν. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μεγάλην ποιεῖσθαι στουδῆν καὶ πρόνοιαν τοὺς πολιτευμένους τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας κατοικοῦντων, ὡς τὸ τέκαιον αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τόπον διεξάγηται καὶ τῶν πρὸς βιωτικὰς χρείας

9 μηδὲν ἔλλειπῃ. δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι πάντα ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος μὲν τῆς χώρας τὸ παλαιὸν ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ νομοθετῆσαι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὸν ὑπάρχοντά

10 ποτὲ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἵερον βίων, ὁτε λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων συγχώρημα διὰ τὸν ἀγώνα τῶν Ὀλυμπίων ἵεραν καὶ ἀπόρθητον ὄκουν τὴν Ἡλείαν, ἀπειροὶ παντὸς ὄντες δεινοῦ καὶ πάσης πολεμικῆς 474
League, gave up Lasion also to the Achaeans. He likewise restored to the Telphusians the town of Stratus, which had been evacuated by the Eleans, and after completing these arrangements reached Olympia five days later, where he sacrificed to the god and entertained his captains, and, having given all his army a three days’ rest, again moved on. Advancing into Elis he sent out foraging parties to scour the country, and himself encamped at the place called the Artemisium, where he waited for the booty and then went on to the Dioscurium.

When the country was plundered, the number of captives was great, and still more numerous were those who escaped to the neighbouring villages and strong places. For Elis is much more thickly inhabited and more full of slaves and farm stock than any other part of the Peloponnese. Some of the Eleans in fact are so fond of country life, that though men of substance, they have not for two or three generations shown their faces in the law-courts, and this because those who occupy themselves with politics show the greatest concern for their fellow-citizens in the country and see that justice is done to them on the spot, and that they are plentifully furnished with all the necessaries of life. As it seems to me, they have adopted such a system from old time and legislated accordingly in a measure because of the large extent of their territory, but chiefly owing to the sacrosanct life they formerly led, having, ever since the Greeks conferred immunity on them owing to the Olympian games, dwelt in a country which was holy and safe from pillage, with no experience of danger and entirely unmenaced
74 περιστάσεως. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τὴν Ἀρκάδων ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ Λασιώνος καὶ τῆς Πισάτιδος πάσης ἀναγκασθέντες ἐπαμύνειν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ
2 μεταλαβεῖν τὰς ἀγωγὰς τῶν βίων, ουκέτι περὶ τοῦ πάλιν ἀνακτήσασθαι παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν παλαιὰν καὶ πάτριον ἀυλίαν οὐδὲ τὴν τυχούσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔσχον, ἀλλ’ ἐμειναν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ποιοῦν.
3 μενοὶ πρόνοιαν· εἰ γάρ, ἤς πάντες εὐχόμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς τυχεῖν, καὶ πᾶν ὑπομένομεν ἵμειρόντες αὐτῆς μετασχεῖν, καὶ μόνον τοῦτο τῶν νομίζομένων ἄγαθῶν ἀναμφισβήτητόν ἐστι παρ’ ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δὴ τὴν εἰρήνην, ταύτην δυνάμενοι τινες μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ καθήκοντος παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀδήριτον κτάσθαι παραλιγγρόσιν ἢ προοργιαίτερον τι ποιοῦντα τούτον, πῶς
4 οὐκ ἂν ὀμολογομιμένως ἀγνοεῖν δόξαιες; νη Δί’, ἀλλ’ ἵσως εὐεπίθετοι τοὺς πολεμεῖν καὶ παρασπονδέων προθεμένοις ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀγωγῆς
5 γίνονται τῶν βίων. ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο μὲν σπάνιον, κἂν ποτε γένηται, δυνάμενον κουνῆς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
6 τυγχάνειν ἐπικουρίας· πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀδικίας ὑπογενομένης τοῖς βίοις χορηγίας, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ὑπάρξειν πάντα χρόνον ἐν εἰρήνῃ διάγος, δήλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦπόρησαν ἔξειν καὶ μισθοφόρων
7 τῶν κατὰ τόπους ἢ καιροὺς παρεφεδρεύοντων. νῦν δὲ τὸ σπάνιον καὶ παράδοξον δεδίτες, ἐν συνεχέσι πολέμωις καὶ καταφθορᾶς τῆς τε χώραν ἔχουσι καὶ τοὺς βίους.
8 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἤμιν τῆς Ἑλείων ὑπομνήσεως εἰρήσθω χάρων, ἐπειδή τὰ τῶν καιρῶν οὐδεποτε πρότερον εὐφυεστέραν διάθεσιν ἔσχετε τῆς νῦν 476
by war. 74. But later, when, owing to the Arcadians disputing their possession of Lasion and all the territory of Pisa, they were compelled to defend their country and change their mode of life, they never afterwards showed the least concern to recover from the Greeks their ancient heritage of inviolability, but remained as they now were, acting wrongly in my judgement in thus neglecting their future interests. Peace is a blessing for which we all pray to the gods; we submit to every suffering from the desire to attain it, and it is the only one of the so-called good things in life to which no man refuses this title. If then there be any people which, while able by right and with all honour to obtain from the Greeks perpetual and undisputed peace, neglect this object or esteem any other of greater importance, everyone would surely agree that they are much in the wrong. Perhaps indeed they might plead that such a manner of life exposes them to the attack of neighbours bent on war and regardless of treaties. But this is a thing not likely to happen often and claiming if it does occur the aid of all the Greeks; while to secure themselves against any local and temporary damage, amidst a plentiful supply of wealth, such as will probably be theirs if they enjoy constant peace, they will be in no want of foreign mercenary soldiers to protect them at the place and time required. But now simply from fear of rare and improbable perils they expose their country and their properties to constant war and devastation. Let this be taken as said to remind the Eleans of the duty they owe themselves; since a more favourable opportunity never offered itself than the present for
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πρὸς τὸ παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην κτήσασθαι τὴν ἁσυλίαν· τὴν δὲ χώραν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προ-εἶπον, ἐτι τῆς παλαιῶς συνήθειας οἶον αἰθυγμάτων

75 ἐμμενόντων οἶκους διαφερόντως Ἡλείοι. διὸ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φιλίππου παρουσίαν ἀπλετον μὲν ἢν τὸ τῶν ἄλισκομένων πλῆθος, ἐτι δὲ πλεῖον τὸ τῶν

2 συμπεφυγότων. πλείστη δ’ ἀποσκευὴ καὶ πλείστως ὀχλος ἡθροίσθη σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων εἰς τὸ χωρίον δ’ καλοῦσι Θαλάμας, διὰ τὸ τὴν τε χώραν τὴν πέριξ αὐτοῦ στενῆν εἶναι καὶ δυσέμβολον τὸ

3 τε χωρίον ἀπραγμάτευτον καὶ δυσπρόσοδον. ἄκουσθον δ’ ὀ βασίλευς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμπεφυγότων εἰς τὸν προερημένον τόπον, καὶ κρίνας μηδὲν ἀβασάνιστον μηδ’ ἀπέραντον ἀπολυτεῖν, τοῖς μὲν μισθοφόροις προκατελάβετο τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς εὐσβολῆς εὑρίσκειν.

4 φυσὶς κευμένος τῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν ἀποσκευὴν καταληγῶν ἐν τῷ χάρακι καὶ τὸ πλεῖον μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς πελταστὰς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους προῆγε διὰ τῶν στενῶν, οὐδὲνος δὲ κυλώντος

5 ἦκε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον. καταπλαγέντων δὲ τῶν συμπεφυγότων τὴν ἐφοδιῶν ἢτ θ ἀφοῦ πᾶσαν πολεμικὴν χρείαν ἀπείρως καὶ ἀπαρασκεύως διακεμένων, ἄμα δὲ καὶ συνδεδραμικότος ὀχλος

6 συρφέτωδος, ταχέως παράδοςον αὐτοῦς· ἐν οἷς ἦσαν καὶ μισθοφόροι διακόσιοι μεγάδες, οὐς ἦκεν

7 ἐχων Ἀμφίδαμος ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἡλείων. ὁ δὲ Φιλίππος κυριεύσας ἀποσκευής τε πολλῆς καὶ σωμάτων πλείονων ἢ πεντακισχιλίων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῆς τετράποδος λείας ἀναρίθμητον ἐξελασάμενος πλῆθος, τότε μὲν ἐπανήλθε πρὸς χάρακα,

8 μετὰ δὲ ταύτα τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπεργεμούσης αὐτῶ παντοδαπῆς ὑφελείας βαρὺς ὃν καὶ δύσχρηστος
recovering by universal consent their immunity from pillage.

But, as I said above, since some sparks of their old habits are still alive, Elis is an exceedingly populous country; (75) and therefore, upon Philip's entering it, the number of captives was enormous, and the fugitives were still more numerous. A quantity of property and a vast crowd of slaves and cattle were collected at a place they call Thalamae or The Recess, because the approaches to it are narrow and difficult and the place itself secluded and not easily entered. The king, hearing of the numbers of fugitives who had taken refuge in this place and deciding to leave nothing unattempted or half-accomplished, occupied with his mercenaries such spots as commanded the approach, and himself, leaving his baggage and the greater part of his forces in the camp, advanced through the defile with his peltasts and light-armed infantry. He reached the place without encountering any opposition, and the fugitives, thrown into great dismay by the attack, as they had no knowledge of military matters and had made no preparations, and as it was a mixed rabble which had collected in the place, soon surrendered, among them being two hundred mercenaries of various nationalities brought there by Amphidamus the Elean Strategus. Philip, having captured a large amount of movable property, and more than five thousand persons, and having also driven off vast numbers of cattle, now returned to his camp, and shortly, as his army was loaded with booty of every variety and had become unwieldy

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76 Ἀπελλῆς δὲ, ὅτι ἦν μὲν εἰς τῶν ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου καταλειφθέντων ἑπταρτῶν τοῦ παιδὸς, πλείστων δὲ ἔτυγχαν τότε δυνάμενος παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ, βουλθεῖς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐθνὸς ἀγαγεῖν εἰς παραπλησίαν διάθεσιν τῇ Θεταλῶν ἐπεβάλετο πράγμα ποιεῖν μοχθηρόν. Θεταλοὶ γὰρ ἔδοκον μὲν κατὰ νόμους πολιτεύειν καὶ πολὺ διαφέρειν Μακεδόνων, διέφερον δὲ οὐδὲν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὁμοίως ἔπαυγον Μακεδόσι καὶ πᾶν ἔποιον τὸ προστατήμενον τοῖς βασιλικοῖς. διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἀρμοζόμενος τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁ προειρημένος ἐπεβάλετο κατα-πειράξειν τῶν συστρατευμένων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐπέτρεψε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῶν σταθμῶν ἀεὶ τοὺς προκατέχοντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καταλύσεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν λείαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

5 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὰς χείρας προσέφερε διὰ τῶν ὑπηρετῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τυχοῦσας αἰτίαις, τοὺς δὲ συναγανακτοῦντας ἤ προσβοηθοῦντας τοῖς μαστηγομένοις παρὼν αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν ἄλυσιν ἀπῆγε,

6 πεπεισμένος διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λήσειν εἰς συνηθεῖαν ἀγαγῶν τοῦ μηδέν ἣνεῖσθαι δεινῶν, ὁ ποτ' ἀν πάσχῃ τις ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ ταῦτα μικρόις χρόνοις πρότερον μετ' Ἀντιγόνου συνεστρατευμένος, καὶ τεθεαμένος τοὺς Ἀχαιῶς ὅτι παντὸς δεινοῦ λαβεῖν πείραν ύπέμειναν ἐφ' ὧ μὴ ποιεῖν Κλεομένει τὸ προστατευόμενον. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα συστραφεῖν των Ἀχαιων καὶ διασαφούντων τὴν Ἀπελλοῦ βουλήν, ἦκον ἐπὶ τὸν Φιλίππου οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον, 480
and useless in the field, he for this reason retired
and again encamped at Olympia.

76. One of the guardians of the young Philip left
by Antigonus was Apelles, who had at this time very
great influence with the king. He now entered on
the base project of reducing the Achaeans to a
position similar to that of the Thessalians. For the
Thessalians, though supposed to be governed con-
stitutionally and much more liberally than the Mace-
donians, were as a fact treated in just the same way
and obeyed all the orders of the king’s ministers.
Apelles, therefore, in furtherance of this design began
to test the temper of the Achaean contingent. He
began by allowing the Macedonians to eject from
their quarters such Achaeans as had secured billets,
and also to appropriate their share of the booty.
He next began to inflict personal chastisement on
Achaeans by the hands of his subordinates for quite
trivial reasons, and himself carried off to bondage
anyone who protested against the floggings or
attempted to help the victims, being persuaded that
by these means he would gradually and imperceptibly
accustom them to submit without remonstrance to
any treatment the king chose to inflict on them—
and this in spite of the fact that he had shortly
before made the campaign with Antigonus, and seen
how the Achaeans were ready to face any danger
rather than obey the behests of Cleomenes. Some
of the young Achaeans, however, met together, and
coming before Aratus, pointed out the design that
Apelles was pursuing, whereupon Aratus approached
κρίναντες ἐν ἀρχαῖς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διόστασθαί
καὶ μὴ καταμέλλειν. ἐντυχόντων δ’ αὐτῶν τῷ
βασιλεῖ περὶ τούτων, διακόουσα ὁ Φίλιππος τὰ
γεγονότα τοὺς μὲν νεανίσκους παρεκάλει θαρρεῖν
ὡς οὖνδε ναῦτας αὐτοῖς ἐτὶ συμβησομένον τοιούτου
τῷ δ’ Ἀπελλῆ παρῆγγειλε μηδὲν ἐπιτάττειν τοῖς
Ἀχαιοῖς χωρίς τῆς τοῦ στρατηγοῦ γνώμης.

77 Φίλιππος μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν τῇν πρὸς
τοὺς ἐν ὑπάλληλοις συνδιατρίβοντας καὶ κατὰ τὴν
ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πράξει καὶ τόλμας οὐ μόνον
παρὰ τοῖς στρατευομένοις ἄλλα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς
λοιποῖς πάσι Πελοποννησίωις εὐδοκίμει. βασιλεῖα
γὰρ πλείονα ἀφορμαῖς ἐκ φύσεως κεχορηγημένον
πρὸς πραγμάτων κατάκτησιν οὐκ εὐμαρέσει εὑρεῖν.
καὶ γὰρ ἀγχόνου καὶ μνήμη καὶ χάρις ἐπὴν αὐτῶ
διαφέρουσα, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἐπίφασι βασιλική
cαι δύναμις, τὸ δὲ μέγιστο, πράξει καὶ τόλμα
πολεμικῆ. καὶ τὶ δὴ ποτ’ ὅν τὸ ταύτα πάντα
καταγωγισάμενον καὶ ποιήσαν ἐκ βασιλέως εὐφυοῦς
tύραννον ἀγνίον, οὐκ εὐχερέως διὰ βραχέων δηλώσαι.
διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων σκέπτεσθαι καὶ διαποτεί
ἄλλος ἀρμόσει καιρὸς μάλλον τοῦ νῦν ἐνεστῶτος.

5 ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐκ τῆς Ὀλυμπίας ἀναζεύξας τὴν
ἐπὶ Φαραῖαν παρῆν εἰς Τελφουσαν κακεῖθεν εἰς
Ἡραίαν. καὶ τὴν μὲν λείαιν ἑλαφροτόλειν, τὴν
dὲ γέφυραν ἐπεσκεύαζε τὴν κατὰ τὸν Ἀλφείνον,
βουλόμενος ταὐτὴ ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰς τὴν Τριφυλίαν
ἐισβολῆν. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοῖς καιροὺς Δωρίμαχος
ὁ τῶν Αἴτωλῶν στρατηγὸς, δειμένως τῶν Ἡλείων
σφίς βοήθειν πορθουμένοις, ἐξακοσίους Αἴτωλοὺς
καὶ στρατηγὸν Φιλλίδαν αὐτοῖς ἐξέπεμψεν ὁς
παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν, καὶ παραλαβὼν
482
Philip, judging it better in such a matter to express his disapproval at the outset and without delay. He laid the matter before the king, who, when made aware of the circumstances, bade the young men lay aside all fear, since nothing of the kind would occur again, and ordered Apelles to issue no orders to the Achaeans without consulting their strategus.

77. Philip, then, both by his behaviour to those with whom he was associated in the camp and by his ability and daring in the field, was winning a high reputation not only among those serving with him but among all the rest of the Peloponnesians. For it would be difficult to find a prince more richly endowed by nature with the qualities requisite for the attainment of power. He possessed a quick intelligence, a retentive memory, and great personal charm, as well as the presence and authority that becomes a king, and above all ability and courage as a general. What indeed it was that defeated all these advantages, and turned a king of such good natural parts into a savage tyrant, is not easy to explain in a few words, and therefore the examination and discussion of the matter must be left for a more suitable occasion than the present.

Setting out from Olympia by the road leading to Pharaea, Philip reached first Telphusa and thence Heraea. Here he held a sale of the booty and repaired the bridge over the Alpheus, intending to invade Triphylia by this road. At about the same time Dorimachus, the Aetolian strategus, on the Eleans requesting him to come to the aid of their country which was being ravaged, dispatched six hundred Aetolians under the command of Phillidas. On reaching Elis, he took over the Elean mercen-
Τούς μισθοφόρους τῶν Ἡλείων ὄντας εἰς πεντακοσίους καὶ πολιτικοὺς χιλίους, ἀμα δὲ τούτους τοὺς
8 Ταραντίνους, ἦκε βοηθῶν εἰς τὴν Τριφυλίαν, ἡ τῆς μὲν προσηγορίας τέτευχε ταύτης ἀπὸ Τριφυλίου τῶν Ἀρκάδος παιδῶν ἐνός, κεῖται δὲ τῆς Πελοποννήσου παρὰ θάλατταν μεταξὺ τῆς Ἡλείων καὶ Μεσσηνίων χώρας, τέτραππα δὲ εἰς τὸ Διμυκὸν πέλαγος, ἐσχατεύουσα τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ὡς πρὸς
9 χειμερινὰς δύσεις, ἔχει δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ πόλεις ταύτας, Σαμικὸν Λέπρεων ὧς ὸπανν Τυπανέας
10 Πύργον Αἰτίου Βώλακα Στυλάγγιον Φρίξαν. Ὅν ὀλίγους χρόνους πρότερον ἐπικρατήσαντες Ἡλείων προσελάβωντο καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀλιφερέων πόλιν, ὁδον εἰς ἀρχὴς ὑπ᾽ Ἀρκάδιαν καὶ Μεγάλην πόλιν, Λυδιάδου τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρὸς τινας ἵδιας πράξεις ἄλλαγῆν δόντος τοῖς Ἡλείωι. πλὴν ὁ γε Φιλλίδας τοὺς μὲν Ἡλείους εἰς Λέπρεων τοὺς δὲ μισθοφόρους εἰς Ἁλίφεραν ἀποστείλας, αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς Αἴτωλους ἐχὼν ἐν
2 Τυπανέας ἐκαραδόκει τὸ συμβησίσμενον. ὃ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀποθέμενος τὴν ἀποσκευήν καὶ διαβάς τῇ γεφύρᾳ τὸν Ἀλιφείου ποταμόν, ὃς ρεῖ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν Ἡραεών πόλιν, ἦκε πρὸς τὴν Ἀλίφεραν,
3 ἦ κεῖται μὲν ἐπὶ λόφου κρημνώδους πανταχόθεν, ἐχοντος πλειῶν ἡ δέκα σταδίων πρόσβασιν, ἔχει δ᾽ ἀκραν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κορυφῇ τοῦ σύμπαντος λόφου καὶ χαλκοῦν Ἀθηνᾶς ἀνδριάντα κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει
4 διαφέροντα, οὗ τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν, ἀπὸ πολλὰς προθέσεως ἡ χορηγίας ἐλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κατασκευῆς, ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἑγχώριοις (οὗτο γὰρ πόθεν οὗτε τὸς ἀνέθηκεν εὐρίσκεται τραυμάδως), τὸ μέντοι γε τῆς τέχνης ἀποτέλεσμα 484
aries, about five hundred in number, and one thousand citizen soldiers, as well as the Tarentines,\(^a\) and came to help Triphylia. This district derives its name from Triphylus, one of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea and forming the extreme south-west portion of Arcadia. It contains the following towns: Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgus, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, and Phrixia, all of which the Eleans had annexed, adding to them Alipheira which had originally belonged to Arcadia proper, but had been given to the Eleans during his tyranny by Lydiades of Megalopolis in return for certain private services they rendered him.

78. Phillidas now sent the Eleans to Lepreum and the mercenaries to Alipheira, and remained himself with his Aetolians in Typaneae to see what would happen. The king, after ridding himself of his heavy baggage, crossed by the bridge the Alpheus which runs past Heraea and arrived at Alipheira. This city lies on a hill defended on all sides by precipices, the ascent of which is more than ten stades. It has a citadel on the summit of the whole hill and a bronze statue of Athena, remarkable for its size and beauty. The origin of this statue—from what motive and at whose expense it was made—is a subject of dispute among the natives themselves, as there is nothing to show definitely who dedicated it and why; but all agree as to the

\(^a\) A particular kind of light mercenary cavalry were so called, whether they came from Tarentum or not.
6 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπιγενομένης ᾠμέρας αἰθοίου καὶ λαμπράς διαστάξεως ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθικὴν ὁ βασιλεὺς κατὰ πλείους τόπους τοὺς τε τὰς κλίμακας φέροντας καὶ 7 τὰς τῶν μισθοφόρων ἐφεδρείας πρὸ τούτων, ἔπι δὲ τοῖς προερημένοις τοὺς Μακεδόνας διηρημένους κατόπιν ἐκάστους ἐπιστήμας, ἀμα τῷ τὸν ἀμον ἐπιβάλλειν πάσι προσέταξε προσβαίνειν πρὸς τὸν 8 λόφον. ποιοῦντων δὲ τὸ παραγγελθέν ἐκθύμως καὶ καταπληκτικῶς τῶν Μακεδόνων, συνεβαίνει τοὺς Ἀλιφερείς πρὸς τούτους ὁρμάν ἄει καὶ συντρέ- χειν τοὺς τόπους οἰς μάλιστα τοὺς Μακεδόνας 9 ἐὑρὼν προσπελάξοντας. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καυρὸν τοῦτον αὐτὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔχων τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους διὰ τινῶν κρημνῶν ἔλαβε πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἄκρας 10 προάστειον ἀναβάς. ἀποδοθέντος δὲ τοῦ συνθή- ματος, πάντες ἀμα προσερείςαντες τὰς κλίμακας 11 κατεπείραξαν τῆς πόλεως. πρῶτος μὲν οὐν ὁ βασιλεὺς κατέσχε τὸ προάστειον τῆς ἄκρας, ἐφείτων καταλαβὼν τοῦτον δ’ ἐμπιπτραμένου προ- ἱδόμενοι τὸ μέλλον οἱ τοῖς τείχεσιν ἐπαμύνοντες, καὶ περιδεῖες γενόμενοι μὴ τῆς ἄκρας προκατα- ληφθείσης στερηθῶσι καὶ τῆς τελευταίας ἔληπτος, ἀρμήσαν ἀπολυόντες τὰ τείχη ψεύγειν πρὸς τὴν 12 ἄκραπολιν. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες γενόμενον τοῦτον παραχρήμα καὶ τῶν τείχῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐκ- 13 ῥίευσαν. μετὰ δὲ ταύτα διαπρεπεθευσαμένων τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον, δοὺς τῆν ἀσφάλειαν παρέλαβε καὶ ταύτην καθ’ ὀμολογίαν.

79 Συντελεσθέντων δὲ τούτων καταπλαγεῖς γε-
excellence of the workmanship, it being one of the most magnificent and artistic statues in existence, the work of Hecatodorus and Sostratus.

The next day broke bright and cloudless, and at early dawn the king distributed at various points the ladder-bearers supported by the mercenaries in front, and dividing his Macedonians placed a body of them in the rear of each party. As soon as the sun was visible, he ordered them all to advance on the hill, and the Macedonians, executing his orders with great alacrity and in formidable style, the Alipheirians kept always running to whatever spots they saw the Macedonians approaching. But the king meanwhile with a picked force managed by climbing some precipitous rocks to reach unperceived the suburb of the citadel. The signal was now given and all at one and the same time planted the ladders against the walls and began the assault of the town. The king was the first to enter, taking the suburb of the citadel, which he found unoccupied, and when this suburb was in flames, the defenders of the walls, seeing what was likely to happen and in dread lest with the fall of the citadel they should find their last hope gone, left the walls and rushed to take refuge within it. Upon this the Macedonians at once captured the walls and the town; and afterwards the garrison of the citadel sent commissioners to Philip and, on his promising to spare their lives, they surrendered it to him by treaty.

79. All the people of Triphylia were much alarmed
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γονότες πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν Τριψυλίαν ἐβουλεύοντο
2 περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἰδίων πατρίδων. ὃ δὲ Φιλλίδας ἐκλιπὼν τὰς Τυπανέας, προσδιαρράσας τινὰς τῶν οἰκίων, ἀπεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ Λέπτρεον.
3 ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίχειρα τότε τοὺς Αἰτωλῶν ἐγίνετο συμμάχους, τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαστάτοις καιροῖς ἐγκαταλείπεσθαι προφανῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαρραγέντας ἡ προδοθέντας τούτους περιπήπτευν ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἃ τοῖς κρατήθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν
4 πολεμίων οὐφείλεται πάσχειν. οἱ δὲ Τυπανεῖται παρέδοσαν τῷ Φιλίππῳ τὴν πόλιν. τούτους δὲ τὸ παραπλήσιον ἐποίησαν οἱ τὴν "Υπαναν κατοικοῦντες. άμα δὲ τούτους Φιαλεῖς, ἀκούοντες τὰ περὶ τὴν Τριψυλίαν καὶ ὑπαραστούμενοι τῇ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συμμαχίᾳ, κατέλαβον μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν
6 τὸν περὶ τὸ πολεμάρχιον τόπον. οἱ δὲ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πειραταῖς, διατριβοῦντες εἰς ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῆς Μεσσηνίας ὀφελείας, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἷοὶ τῇ ἡσαν ἐγχειρεῖν καὶ κατατολμᾶν τῶν Φιαλέων,
7 ὀρῶντες δὲ τοὺς πολίτας ὀμοθυμαδόν ἀθροιζομένους πρὸς τὴν βοήθειαν ἀπέστησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, σπειράμενοι δὲ καὶ λαβόντες τὰς αὐτῶν ἀποσκευὰς
8 ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. οἱ δὲ Φιαλεῖς διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Φιλίππον ἐνεχείρισαν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πόλιν.

80 Ἔτι δὴ τούτων πραττομένων οἱ Λεπτεῖατα καταλαβόμενοι τὸπον τινὰ τῆς πόλεως ἥζιον ἐκχωρεῖν τῆς ἀκρας καὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς Ἡλείους καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ Δακεδαμονίων. ἣκε γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνων αὐτοῖς
2 βοήθεια. τὸ μὲν ὅπεν πρῶτον οἱ περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν οὐ προσεῖχον, ἀλλ' ἐμενων ὡς καταπληξόμενοι 488
by this achievement of Philip and began to consider how best to save themselves and their own cities. Phillidas now returned to Lepreum, evacuating Typaneae after plundering some of the houses. For this was the reward that the allies of the Aetolians used then to receive; not only to be barefacedly deserted in the hour of need, but to be plundered or betrayed and suffer at the hands of their allies the treatment that the vanquished may expect from their enemies. The people of Typaneae now gave up their city to Philip and those of Hypana followed their example. At the same time the Phigalians, hearing the news from Triphylia and ill-pleased with the Aetolian alliance, rose in arms and seized on the ground round the Polemarch’s office. The Aetolian freebooters, who had quartered themselves in the city for the purpose of plundering Messenia, were at first disposed to put a bold face on it and attack the Phigalians, but when the citizens came flocking with one accord to the rescue, they desisted from their project, and came to terms, leaving the city with their possessions, upon which the Phigalians sent deputies to Philip and delivered themselves and the town into his hands.

80. While these transactions were in progress, the people of Lepreum, seizing on a certain position in the city, demanded the evacuation of the citadel and city by the Eleans, Aetolians, and Lacedaemonians (for a reinforcement had come from Sparta also). Phillidas at first paid no heed to the request but remained where he was, thinking to overawe
3 τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως εἰς μὲν τὴν Φιλελεύνα μετὰ στρατιωτῶν ἐξαποστείλαντος, αὐτοῦ δὲ προάγοντος εἰς τὸ Δέτρεον καὶ συνεγγύζοντος ἢδη τῇ πόλει, συνείτες οἱ περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν ἐταπεινώθησαν, οἱ δὲ Δεπρεάται
4 προσεπερρώθησαν ταῖς ὀρμαῖς. καλὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο Δεπρεάταις ἔργον πέπρακται, τὸ χιλίων μὲν ἔνδον ὄντων Ἦλειων, χιλίων δὲ σὺν τοῖς πειραταῖς Ἀἰτωλῶν, πεντακοσίων δὲ μισθοφόρων, διακοσίων δὲ Λακεδαμιονίων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῆς ἀκρας κατεχομένης, ὃμως ἀντιπούσασθαι τῆς ἕαυτῶν πατρίδος καὶ μὴ προέσθαι τὰς σφετέρας
5 ἑλπίδας. οὐ δὲ Φιλλίδας ὄρων τοὺς Δεπρεάτας ἀνδρωδῶς ύφισταμένους καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐγγίζοντας, ἐξεχώρησε τῆς πόλεως ἀμα τοῖς
6 Ἦλειοι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Λακεδαμιονίων. οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν Κρήτες διὰ τῆς Μεσσηνίας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐπανήλθον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν ἐποιούντο τὴν ἀπόλυσων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
7 Σαμικόν. τὸ δὲ τῶν Δεπρεάτων πλῆθος ἑγκρατεῖς γεγονός τῆς πατρίδος ἐξαπέστελλε προσβευτάς,
8 ἐγχειρίζον τῷ Φιλίππῳ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσας τὰ γεγονότα τὴν μὲν λοιπὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸ Δέτρεον ἀπέστειλε, τοὺς δὲ πελταστὰς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους ἀναλαβὼν ἥγειτο, συνάψας σπεῦδων
9 τοῖς περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν. καταλαβὼν δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀποσκευὴς ἑγκρατῆς ἐγένετο πάσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φιλλίδαν κατετάχθησαν εἰς τὸ Σαμικόν παρα-
10 πεσόντες. προσστρατοπεδεύσας δὲ τῷ χωρίῳ, καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπιστασάμενος ἐκ τοῦ Δετρεοῦ δύναμιν, ἔμφασιν ἐποίηε τοῖς ἔνδον ὡς πολιορκή-
11 σων τὸ χωρίον. οἱ δὲ Ἀἰτωλοὶ μετὰ τῶν Ἦλειων 490
the citizens. But when the king, having sent Taurion with some troops to Phigalia, advanced in person to Lepreum and was approaching the town, Phillidas on hearing of it lost his assurance, while the people of the town were strengthened in their resolution. It was indeed a fine action on the part of the Lepreates, with no less than a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians counting the freebooters, five hundred mercenaries and two hundred Lacedaemonians within the walls and with the citadel occupied, yet to strive to vindicate their country's freedom and not abandon hope. Phillidas, when he saw that the Lepreatans were gallantly holding out and that the Macedonians were approaching, quitted the city accompanied by the Eleans and the Lacedaemonian contingent. Those Cretans whom the Spartans had sent returned home by way of Messenia, while Phillidas retired in the direction of Samicum. The people of Lepreum being now masters of their city, sent envoys to Philip placing it in his hands. The king, on hearing of what had taken place, sent the rest of his forces to Lepreum, but placing himself at the head of his peltasts and light infantry, started in the hope of encountering Phillidas. He came up with him and captured all his baggage-train, but Phillidas and his men succeeded in throwing themselves into Samicum in time. Encamping before this place and fetching up the rest of his forces from Lepreum, Philip gave those within the impression of being about to besiege them. The Aetolians and Eleans had nothing
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οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ἔτοιμον πρὸς πολιορκίαν πλὴν χερῶν, καταπλαγέντες τὴν περίστασιν ἐλάλουν
12 περὶ ἁσφαλείας πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον. λαβόντες δὲ συγχώρημα μετὰ τῶν ὀπλών ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀπόλυσιν, οὗτοι μὲν ὄρμησαν εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τοῦ μὲν Σαμίκου παρατίκα κύριος
13 ἐγένετο, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα, παραγενομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεθ᾽ ἱκετηρίας, παρέλαβε Φρίξαν Στυλάγγιον Αἴπιον Βιόλακα Πύργον Ἐπι-
14 τάλιον. ταύτα δὲ διαπραξάμενος ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὸ Λέπρεον, πᾶσαν ύφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν πεποιημένος
15 τὴν Τριφυλίαν ἐν ἡμέραις ἔξ. παρακαλέσας δὲ τοὺς Λεπρεάτας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καρῷ, καὶ φυλακῆς εἰσαγαγὼν εἰς τὴν ἀκραν, ἀνέξευσε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐφ᾽ Ἡραίας, ἀπολυσαὶ ἐπιμελητὴν
16 τῆς Τριφυλίας Λάδικον τὸν Ἀκαρνάνα. παρα-

γενόμενος δ᾽ εἰς τὴν προερημένην πόλιν τὴν μὲν λείαν διένεμε πᾶσαν, τὴν δ᾽ ἀποσκευὴν ἀνα-

λάβων ἐκ τῆς Ἡραίας ἠλθεὶ μέσου χειμώνος εἰς

Μεγάλην πόλιν.

81 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καυροὺς Φίλιππος ἐπράττε

τὰ κατὰ τὴν Τριφυλίαν, καὶ Χείλων ὁ Λακεδαι-

μόνος ὑπολαμβάνων αὐτῷ καθῆκεν κατὰ γένος

τὴν βασιλείαν, καὶ βαρέως φέρων τὴν γεγενημένην

ὑπεροψίαν περὶ αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐφόρων ἐν τῇ κατὰ

τὸν Λυκοῦργον κρίσει περὶ τῆς βασιλείας, κινεῖν

2 ἐπεβάλετο τὰ καθεστῶτα. νομίσας δὲ, εἰ τὴν ὅδον

τὴν αὐτὴν ἐλθοὺς Κλεομένει καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς

ὑποδείξει τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς κληρονομίας καὶ τῶν

ἀναδασμῶν, ταχέως ἐπακολουθήσειν αὐτῷ τὸ

3 πλῆθος, ὄρμησε πρὸς τὴν πράξιν. συμφρονήσας
dὲ περὶ τούτων πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ λαβὼν

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wherewith to meet a siege but their numbers only, and alarmed by the prospect began to treat with Philip for their lives and liberties. On receiving permission to withdraw with their arms they marched off for Elis; and the king thus at once became master of Samicum, and afterwards, when representatives of the other towns came begging for grace, he took possession of Phrixia, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax, Pyrgus, and Epitalium, and after these achievements returned again to Lepreum, having in the space of six days subdued the whole of Triphylia. After addressing the Lepreates in a manner suitable to the occasion, and placing a garrison in the citadel, he left with his army for Heraea, leaving Ladicus the Acarnanian in charge of Triphylia. On his arrival at Heraea he divided all the booty, and picking up here his heavy baggage reached Megalopolis in mid-winter.

81. At the same time that Philip was operating in Triphylia, Cheilon, the Lacedaemonian, considering that he was the lawful heir to the throne and deeply resenting having been passed over by the ephors when they selected Lycurgus as king, resolved to bring about a revolution. Thinking that if he followed in Cleomenes' footsteps and held out to the multitude the hope of allotments and redivision of the land, he would soon have the masses behind him, he set to work on his design. Having come to an understanding with his friends on this subject
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κοινωνίας τῆς τόλμης εἰς διακοσίους τὸ πλῆθος,
4 ἑγώνετο πρὸς τῷ συντελεῖν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν. θεωρῶν
δὲ μέγιστον ἐμπόδιον ὑπάρχον αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν
ἐπιβολὴν τὸν Λυκοῦργον καὶ τοὺς ἐφόρους τοὺς
περιβέντας ἑκαίνῳ τὴν βασιλείαν, ἀφ' ἤρμησε πρῶτον
5 ἐπὶ τούτους. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἐφόρους δειπνοῦντας
καταλαβὼν πάντας αὐτοῦ κατέσφαξε, τῆς τύχης
τὴν ἀρμόζοναν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέσις δίκην· καὶ γὰρ
ὑφ' οὗ καὶ ὑπὲρ οὗ ταῦτ' ἐπαθον, δικαίως αὐτοὺς
6 ἅν τις φήσει πεποιθέναι. ὁ δὲ Χείλων τὰ κατὰ
τούτους συντελεσάμενοι παρῆν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ
Λυκοῦργου, καὶ κατέλαβε μὲν ἕνδον, οὐ μὴν
7 ἐδυνήθη γ' ἐγκρατῆς αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι· διὰ γάρ
τῶν οἰκετῶν καὶ γειτόνων ἐκκλαπεῖς καὶ διαδράς
ἐλαθεν αὐτοῦ. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἀνεκχώρησε ταῖς
ἀνοδίαις εἰς τὴν ἐν τῇ Τριπόλει προσαγορευμένην
8 Πελλήνην· ὁ δὲ Χείλων ἀπεσφαλμένος τοῦ κυ-
ριωτάτου πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἄθυμως διέκειτο,
9 πράττει δ' ὅμως ἡγακάζετο τὸ συνεχές. διόπερ
εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν εἰσβαλῶν τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς προσ-
έφερε τὰς χείρας, τοὺς δ' οἰκείους καὶ φίλους
παρεκάλει, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ὑπεδείκνυε τὰς ἀρτί
10 ῥήθεισας ἐπιδίας. οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος αὐτῷ,
τάνατία δὲ συστρεφόμενων ἐπ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων, συννοῆσα τὸ γυνόμενον ἀπεχώρει λαθραίως,
καὶ διελθὼν τὴν χώραν ἦκε μόνος εἰς τὴν Ἀχαίαν
11 ἐκπεπτωκὼς. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαίμονιοι, δείσαντες τὴν
τοῦ Φιλίππου παρουσίαν, τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας
ἀπεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὸ τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν Ἀθή-
ναιον κατασκάφαντες ἐξέλιπον.
12 Λακεδαίμονιοι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Λυκοῦργου
νομοθεσίας καλλίστη χρησάμενοι πολιτείᾳ καὶ
494
and secured the co-operation of about two hundred in the venture, he entered on the execution of the project. Perceiving that the greatest hindrance to the success of his plot lay in Lycurgus and the ephors who had set him on the throne, he directed his attack first on them. Falling on the ephors while they were at supper he slew them all on the spot, chance thus visiting them with the fitting penalty for their crime. For when we consider the person at whose hands and the person for whose sake they suffered death we must confess that they met with their deserts. Cheilon, after thus disposing of the ephors, hastened to the house of Lycurgus, where he found the king, but failed to get possession of his person; for he was smuggled out by some servants and neighbours, and got away unperceived, escaping afterwards across country to Pellene in the Tripolis. Cheilon, thus baulked of his most important object, had now little heart for his enterprise, but still was forced to continue its pursuit. He therefore advanced into the agora, cutting down his enemies, calling upon his relatives and friends to join him, and tempting the rest of the people by those hopes and promises I just spoke of. But as no one listened to him, but on the contrary a hostile crowd collected, as soon as he perceived how matters stood, he left Sparta secretly, and passing through Laconia arrived in Achaea, alone and an exile. The Lacedaemonians, now dreading the arrival of Philip, brought in all property from the country and evacuated the Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis after razing it to the ground.

Thus the Lacedaemonians who ever since the legislation of Lycurgus had enjoyed the best form
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καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον μὲν πόνων καὶ στάσεων ἐμφυλών πείραν εἶχον, πλεῖστοι δὲ ἔπαλαισαν ἀναδασμοῖς καὶ φυγαῖς, πικροτάτης δὲ δουλείας πείραν ἐλαβον ἐως τῆς Νάβιδος τυραννίδος, οἱ τὸ πρῶτον οὐδὲ τοῦνομα δυνατέντες ἀνασχέσθαι μακρίων αὐτῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν πάλαι καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον πρὶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον μέρος ὑπὸ πολλών εὑρηταί τάδε, ἑναργείστατα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀφ' οὗ Κλεομήνης ὀλοσχέρως κατέλυε τὸ πάτριον πολέμιμα. οὐν δ' ὑπὸ ἡμῶν ῥηθήσεται κατὰ τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας αἰς καιρούς.

82 Ὁ δὲ Φιλιππος ἀναζεύξας ἐκ τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ Τεγέας παρῆν εἰς Ἀργος, κακεὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τοῦ χειμῶνος διέτριβε, κατὰ τὴν λοιπὴν ἀναστροφὴν καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις τεθαυμασμένος ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐν ταῖς προειρημέναις στρατείαις. ὁ δὲ Ἄπελλῆς οὐδ' ὃς ἔληγε τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἀλλ' οἶδ' τ' ἔν ἄγεων ὑπὸ τὸν ἦγουν τῷ κατὰ βραχὺ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς.

3 ὅρων δὲ τῇ τουιατῇ προθέτει τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον ἐμποδῶν ἰσταμένοις καὶ τὸν Φιλιππον αὐτοῖς προσέχοντα, καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ διὰ τὰ τὴν πρὸς Ἀντίγονον σύστασιν καὶ διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἵσχυσιν, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἐπιδεξιότητα καὶ νουνέχειαν τάνδρός, περὶ τούτους ἐπεβάλετο γίνεσθαι καὶ κακοπραγμονεῖν τουσθενεῖν τῶν πόλεων ἐπεσπάσατο, καὶ λαμβάνων εἰς τὰς 496
of government and had the greatest power until the battle of Leuctra, when chance henceforth turned against them, and their system of government instead of improving began to go rapidly from bad to worse, finally had more experience than any other people of civic trouble and discord. No other nation was so harassed by banishment of citizens and confiscations of property, none had to submit to more cruel servitude culminating in the tyranny of Nabis, although formerly they could not even bear to hear the word "tyrant" mentioned. However, the ancient history of Sparta and the subsequent history of her elevation and decline has been narrated by many. The progress of the latter is most conspicuous since the entire subversion of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes; and I shall continue to speak of it whenever the occasion offers.

82. Leaving Megalopolis and passing through Tegea, Philip arrived at Argos, where he spent the rest of the winter, having won in this campaign universal admiration for a correctness of conduct and a brilliancy of achievement beyond his years. Apelles, however, had by no means given up his project, but was bent on gradually bringing the Achaeans under the yoke. Seeing that the elder and younger Aratus stood in the way of this design and that Philip paid great regard to them, especially to the elder owing to his former friendship with Antigonus and his great influence with the Achaean, but still more owing to his talent and discernment, he formed a plan of damaging their credit in the following manner. Inquiring first of all the names of Aratus' political opponents in each city, he sent for them, and when he made their acquaintance
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5 χεῖρας ἐψυχαγώγει καὶ παρεκάλει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διὰ καὶ τῶν Φίλιππως, προσεπι-

dεικνύων αὐτῷ παρ’ ἐκαστόν ὡς ἕαν μὲν Ἄρατῳ προσέχῃ, χρήσεται τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἐγ-

γραπτόν συμμαχίαν, εάν δ’ αὐτῷ πείθηται καὶ τουίτους προσλαμβάνῃ φίλους, χρήσεται πᾶσι

6 Πελοποννησίους κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν. περὶ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων εὐθὺς ἐστοῦδαξε, βουλόμενος

touις τυπαὶ περιποίησαι τὴν στρατηγίαν, τοὺς δὲ πειθεὶς Φίλιππον παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τὰς

7 τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀρχαιρεσίας εἰς Αἰγίνον ὡς εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν ἀμα ποιοῦμενον τὴν πορείαν. πεισθέντος

d’ αὐτῷ τοῦ βασιλέως, παρὼν αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ καιροῦ, καὶ τοὺς μὲν παρακαλῶν οἷς δ’ ἀνατευόμενος,

μόλις μὲν ἦνυσε, κατεκράτησε δ’ οὖν ὰμώς τοῦ γενέσθαι στρατηγὸν Ἐπήρατον Φαραέα, τὸν ἐ

8 Ἡλείαν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς ὑπόθεσεως. δὴ δὴ καὶ πείθει Φίλιππον παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τὰς

tῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀρχαιρεσίας εἰς Αἰγίνον ὡς εἰς τὴν Ἡλείαν ἀμα ποιοῦμενον τὴν πορείαν. πεισθέντος

d’ αὐτῷ τοῦ βασιλέως, παρὼν αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τοῦ καιροῦ, καὶ τοὺς μὲν παρακαλῶν οἷς δ’ ἀνατευόμενος,

μόλις μὲν ἦνυσε, κατεκράτησε δ’ οὖν ὰμώς τοῦ γενέσθαι στρατηγὸν Ἐπήρατον Φαραέα, τὸν ἐ

Τμόξενον ἐκπεσεῖν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἡλείαν ἐσφαγόμενον.
began to cajole them and solicit their friendship. He also presented them to Philip pointing out to him in the case of each that if he gave ear to Aratus he must deal with the Achaean s according to the letter of the treaty of alliance; “but” he would say, “if you listen to me and secure the friendship of such men as this, you will be able to treat all the Peloponnesians exactly as you wish.” He at once began to occupy himself with the approaching election, wishing to procure the office of strategus for one of these men and oust Aratus and his son from affairs. With this object he persuaded Philip 213 B.C. to be present at Aegium for the Achaean elections, under the pretence that it was a station on his march to Elis. The king having consented to this, Apelles himself came for the occasion, and partly by solicitations partly by threats contrived, with difficulty it is true, to bring in as strategus Eperatus of Pharae. Timoxenus, the candidate nominated by Aratus, being defeated.

83. After this the king left Aegium and marching through Patrae and Dyme came to a fort called “The Wall,” which defends the territory of Dyme, but which, as I said above, had been a short time before seized by Euripidas. Being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for Dyme, he encamped before it with his whole army. The Elean garrison in dismay surrendered the fort, which, though not a large place, was admirably fortified. Its circumference did not exceed one and a half stades, but the wall was nowhere less than thirty cubits in height.
ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΣ ΟΙ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΕΣ 47

5 ἔλαττον. παραδοὺς δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς Δυμαίοις ἐπήει πορθῶν τὴν τῶν Ἡλείων χώραν. φθείρας δὲ ταύτην, καὶ πολλὴν περιβαλόμενος λείαν, ἐπανῆλθε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Δύμην.

84 Ὅδε ὁ Απελλῆς δοκῶν ἦνικεν τι τῆς προθέσεως τῷ δὲ αὐτοῦ καθεστάσθαι τὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγόν, αὖθις ἐνεχείρει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον, βουλόμενος εἰς τέλος ἀποσπάσαι τὸν Φίλιππον ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς φιλίας. ἐπεβάλετο δὲ τὴν διαβολὴν πλάττειν διὰ τουάτης τινὸς ἐπινοίας.

2 Ἀμφίδαμος ὁ τῶν Ἡλείων στρατηγός, ἐν ταῖς Ὀλάμαις ἄλοις ἀμὸς τοῖς συμπεφυγοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον ἦμιν ἐρρήθη περὶ τούτων, ὡς ἤκε μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰχμάλωτων ἀγόμενος εἰς Ὁλυμπίαν, ἔσπευσε διὰ τῶν εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν τῷ βασιλεί, τυχῶν δὲ τοῦτον διελέγετο, φάσκων εἰναι δυνατὸς ἐπαγαγέσθαι τοὺς Ἡλείους εἰς τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν. δὲ δὲ Φίλιππος πεισθεὶς

4 ἐξαπέστειλε τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον χωρίς λύτρων, κελεύσας ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι τοῖς Ἡλείοις, εἰν ἐλλωνται τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίαν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν αἰχμάλωτα πάντα χωρίς λύτρων ἀποδώσει, τῇ δὲ χώρᾳ τὴν ἀσφάλειαν αὐτὸς ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς παρα-

5 σκευάσει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἀφρουρήτους ἀφορολογήτους, χρωμένους τοῖς ἱδίοις

6 πολιτεύμασι, διατηρήσει. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἡλείοι διακούσαντες τούτων οὐδὲν προσέσχον, καὶ περὶ ἐπισταστικῶν καὶ μεγάλων εἰναι δοκοῦντων τῶν

7 προτεινομένων. Ὅδε ὁ Απελλῆς ἐκ τοῦτοι τοῦ πράγματος πλάσας τὴν διαβολὴν προσήγεικ τῷ Φίλιππῳ, φάσκων τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον οὐκ εἰλικρινὴ τὴν φιλίαν ἀγεῖν πρὸς Μακεδόνας οὖθεν 500
Handing it over to the Dymeans he advanced, laying waste the territory of Elis. After pillaging it and collecting a quantity of booty he returned with his army to Dyme.

84. Apelles, thinking that he had succeeded so far in his plan, by the election of the Achaean strategus through his influence, renewed his attack on Aratus with the view of entirely alienating Philip from him. He devised the following plan for trumping up a false accusation against him. Amphidamus, the Elean strategus, had been captured at Thalamae together with the other fugitives, as I above narrated, and when he was brought to Olympia with the rest of the prisoners begged urgently through certain persons for an interview with Philip, and on this being granted, he discoursed at some length stating that it was in his power to gain over the Eleans to the king's side and persuade them to enter into alliance with him. Philip, believing this, sent back Amphidamus without ransom, bidding him promise the Eleans that if they joined him he would return all captured men and animals without ransom, would assure the future safety of the country from any outside attack, and would maintain the Eleans in freedom without garrison or tribute and in the enjoyment of their own form of government. Attractive and generous as these offers seemed, the Eleans refused to listen to them, and Apelles, founding his false accusation on this circumstance, brought it before Philip, telling him that Aratus was not sincere in his friendship for the
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8 ἀληθινῶς εὑνοεῖν αὐτῷ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν τῆς Ἡλείων ἀλλοτριότητος τούτους αἰτίους γεγονέναι. καθ' ὅν γὰρ καίρων Ἀμφιδαμον ἐξ Ὁλυμπίας εἰς Ἡλικιαν ἀπέστειλεν, τούτους ἐφῄ κατ' ἑδίαν λαβόντας ἐπιτρίψαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον, καὶ λέγειν ὅτι κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον συμφέρει τοῖς Πελοποννησίωις τὸ

9 γενέσθαι Φίλιππον Ἡλείων κύριον· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν πάνθ' ὑπεριδόντας τὰ προτεινόμενα τοὺς Ἡλείους διατηρεῖν μὲν τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς φιλίαν, ὑπομένειν δὲ τὸν πρὸς Μακεδόνας πόλεμον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον Φίλιππος δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους καλεῖν ἑκέλευε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον καὶ λέγειν ἑναντίον ἑκεῖνων ταῦτα τὸν Ἀπελλήν. τῶν δὲ παραγενομένων ἐλεγε τὰ προερημένα τολμηρῶς καὶ καταπληκτικῶς ὁ Ἀπελλής, καὶ τι προσεπείπε τοιοῦτον ἔτι σιωπῶντος τοῦ βασιλέως· ἑπείπερ οὕτως ἀχαρίστους ὑμᾶς ὁ βασιλεύς, ὁ Ἀρατε, καὶ λίαν ἀγνώμονας εὑρίσκει, κρίνει συναγαγών τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ περὶ τούτων ἀπολογισμοὺς ποιησάμενος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι πάλιν εἰς

4 Μακεδονίαν· ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτερος Ἄρατος ὑπολαβὼν καθόλου μὲν ἥξιον τὸν Φίλιππον μηδενὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἄξεως μηδὲ ἀκρίτως μηδέποτε πι-

5 στείεται, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τινὸς τῶν φίλων καὶ συμμάχων προσπέσει τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ, τὸν ἀκριβέστερον ἐλεγχὸν ποιεῖσθαι πρὶν ἢ δέξασθαι τὴν διαβολὴν· καὶ γὰρ βασιλικὸν εἶναι τὸ τουστε καὶ πρὸς πάν

6 συμφέρον. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἥξιον περὶ τῶν ὑπ' Ἀπελλοῦ λεγομένων καλεῖν τοὺς ἀκριστοσ, ἁγεῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον τὸν ἐρημώτα πρὸς αὐτόν, μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν τῶν δυνατῶν εἰς τὸ γνῶναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, πρὶν ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἀνακαλύπτει τι τοῦτων. 502
Macedonians or really attached to the king; for it was to him on the present occasion that the coldness of the Eleans was due: for he had when Amphidamus was sent from Olympia to Elis taken him apart and set him against the project, saying that it was by no means in the interest of the Peloponnesians that Philip should become master of Elis; this was why the Eleans had ignored all the king’s offers and remaining faithful to their alliance with the Aetolians, chosen to persist in the war against the Macedonians. 85. On receiving this report, Philip first ordered Apelles to summon Aratus and say the same thing in his presence, and when Aratus arrived, Apelles repeated his accusation in a confident and threatening manner, adding, before the king had spoken, some such words as these: “Since, Aratus, the king finds you to be so ungrateful and to have shown so little consideration for him he has decided to call a meeting of the Achaeans and after laying this matter before them to return to Macedonia.” Hereupon the elder Aratus, interrupting him, exhorted Philip to make it a general principle never to give credence to reports rashly or without duly weighing the evidence; and especially when it was a friend or ally against whom he heard anything said, to examine most closely into the accusation, before accepting it. This he said was conduct becoming a king and in every way to his interest. Therefore he begged him now as regarded Apelles’ allegation to summon those who had heard the words attributed to him spoken, to demand the attendance of Apelles’ informant, and to take every possible means of getting at the truth before making any public statement to the Achaeans. 86. Upon the
86 τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως εὐαρεστήσαντος τοῖς λεγομένοις, καὶ φήσαντος οὐκ ὁλυγωρήσειν ἀλλ’ ἐξετάσειν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἤμεραις οἱ μὲν Ἀπελλῆς οὐδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν προσῆγε τοῖς εἰρημένοις, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τῶν "Ἀρατον ἐγένετο τις συγκύρημα τοιοῦτον. οἱ γὰρ Ἡλεῖοι, καθ’ ὅν καίρων ὁ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν ἐπόρθει τὴν χώραν, ὑποπτεύσαντες τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον ἐπεβάλλοντο συλλαβεῖν καὶ δήσαντες εἰς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν ἐκπέμπειν. δὲ προαιρόμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ἀπεχώρησε τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα πυθαγόμενος τὸν Φίλιππον ἐν τῇ Δύμῃ περὶ τὴν τῶν λαθρῶν οἰκονομίαν διατρίβειν, ἐσπευσε πρὸς τοῦτον διαπεσείν. οὗτοι οἱ περὶ τῶν "Ἀρατον, ἀκούσαντες τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον ἐκ τῆς Ἡλίδος ἐκπεπτωκότα παρείναι, γενόμενοι περιχαρεῖς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς συνεϊδέναι, προσελθόντες ὄφον δὲ τῶν βασιλέα καλεῖν τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον καὶ γὰρ εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν κατηγορομένων ἔκεινον βέλτιστα πρὸς ὅν ἔρρηθη, καὶ δηλώσει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, πεφυγότα μὲν εἴς οἰκον διὰ τὸν Φίλιππον, τὰς δὲ ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα τῆς σωτηρίας κατὰ τὸ παρόν ἐν ἐκεῖνῳ. πεισθεῖς δὲ τοῖς λεγομένοις ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ μεταπεμψάμενος τὸν Ἀμφίδαμον, ἐβρεῖ τὴν διαβολὴν οὕσαν πευδὴ. διὸ καὶ τὸν μὲν "Ἀρατον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας οἱ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπεδέχετο καὶ κατηξίου, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἀπελλῆς λοξότερον εἴχε· τῇ γε μὴν ὀλοσχερεῖ προκατεχόμενος ἀποδοξῆ πολλὰ παρορᾶν ἦναγκάζετο τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γινομένων.

87 ὁ δὲ Ἀπελλῆς οὐδαμῶς ἀφίστατο τῆς προθέσεως, ἀλλ’ ἀμα μὲν τὸν Ταυρίωνα τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελο-
king's consenting to this and engaging not to neglect the matter, but to make inquiries, they separated. During the days that followed Apelles produced no proof of his assertions, and now a happy accident, most helpful to Aratus, occurred. The Eleans, at the time when Philip was ravaging their country, conceived suspicions of Amphidamus and formed the design of arresting him and sending him in chains to Aetolia. But, getting intelligence of their project, he first fled to Olympia and then, when he heard that Philip was in Dyme engaged in dealing with the booty, he hastened to escape to him there. Aratus, in consequence, when he heard that Amphidamus had fled from Elis and arrived, was exceedingly joyful, as he had nothing on his conscience, and coming to the king, demanded that Amphidamus should be summoned: "For the man," he said, "who knew best about the accusation was he to whom he was said to have spoken the words, and Amphidamus would be sure to tell the truth, as he had been exiled from his home for Philip's sake and depended on him now for his safety." On the king's consenting and sending for Amphidamus, he found the charge to be false, and henceforward he continued to like and esteem Aratus more and more, while becoming a little suspicious of Apelles. Prepossessed, however, as he was by his long prejudice in favour of this minister, he could not but overlook many of his errors.

87. Apelles, however, by no means desisted from his design, but in the first place began to traduce Taurion, who had been entrusted with the super-
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2 ἡπειρὼν τεταγμένον διέβαλλεν, οὐ ψέγων ἀλλ' ἐπαίνων καὶ φάσκων ἐπιτήδευον αὐτὸν εἶναι μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις συνδιατρίβειν, βουλόμενος ἔτερον ἐπισταθῆναι δι' αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐν

3 Πελοποννήσῳ πράγμασιν. καὶνὸς γὰρ δὴ τις οὕτως εὐρήται τρόποι διαβολῆς, τὸ μὴ ψέγουτας ἀλλ' ἐπαυνοῦντας λυμαίνεσθαι τοὺς πέλας· εὐρήται δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον τοιαύτη κακεντρέχεια καὶ βασκανία καὶ δόλος ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς αὐλὰς διατριβοῦντος καὶ τῆς τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλους ζηλοτυπίας

4 καὶ πλεονεξίας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς θεραπείας τεταγμένον Ἀλέξανδρον, ὅτε λάβοι καυρόν, διέδακεν, βουλόμενος καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸ σώμα φυλακῆν τοῦ βασιλέως δι' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ καθόλου κινήσαι τὴν ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου καταλεί-

6 φθείσαν διάταξιν. Ἀντίγονος γὰρ καλῶς μὲν ἔως προεύθυνε τῆς τε βασιλείας καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ, καλῶς δὲ τὸν βίον μεταλλάττων προευθύνη πρὸς τὸ μέλλον περὶ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀπολιτῶν γὰρ διαθήκην ἐγραφεὶ Μακεδόνων ὑπὲρ τῶν διμη-

7 μένων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος διέταξε, πῶς καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐκαστα δεήσεως χειριζεσθαι, βουλόμενος μηδεὶς ἀφορμὴν καταλιπεῖν τοῖς περὶ τὴν αὐλὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλοτιμίας καὶ

8 στάσεως. ἐν οἷς τῶν τότε συντραπευμένων αὐτὸς μὲν Ἀπελλῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις ἀπελέειπτο, Λεόντιος δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, Μεγαλέας 8' ἐπὶ τοῦ γραμματείου, Ταυρίων δ' ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον, Ἀλέξανδρος δ' ἐπὶ τῆς θεραπείας.

9 τοῦ μὲν οὖν Λεόντιον καὶ Μεγαλέαν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ εἶχεν ὀλοσχερῶς, τῶν δ' Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Ταυρίωνα μεταστητισμένος ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας ἐσπευδὲ καὶ 506
vision of Peloponnesian affairs, not indeed by finding fault with him, but by praising him and saying that he was a most proper person to be attached to the king’s person in the camp, his object being to get some one else appointed by his influence to this post. This is indeed a new kind of calumny, to damage the fortunes of one’s neighbours not by blame but by praise, and this variety of malice, envy, and trickery is especially and primarily the invention of courtiers to serve their mutual jealousies and ambitions. He also, whenever he had an opportunity, used to traduce Alexander, the Captain of the Body-guard, wishing to be himself charged with the protection of the king’s person, and generally to subvert all the arrangements established by the testament of Antigonus. For not only was Antigonus during his lifetime a good ruler and an excellent guardian of his son, but on his death, he made admirable dispositions for the future regarding everything. In his will he gave to his people an account of his administration, and left orders how and by whom each matter was to be managed with the view of leaving no pretext for rivalries and quarrels among the courtiers. Of those officers who were on Antigonus’ staff at the time Apelles was left one of the king’s guardians, Leontius was made Captain of the Peltasts, Megaleas Secretary in Chief, Taurion High Commissioner for the Peloponnese, and Alexander Captain of the Body-guard. Apelles had Leontius and Megaleas entirely at his disposal, and his purpose was to remove Alexander and Taurion
τάντα καὶ τάλλα πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν
10 ἰδίων φιλῶν χειρίζειν. ὁ δὲ καὶ ῥαδίως ἄν ἐπετέλεσε
μὴ παρασκευάσας ἀνταγωνιστὴν Ἀρατον αὐτῷ.
νῦν δὲ ταχέως πείραν ἔλαβε τῆς σφετέρας ἀφρο-
11 σύνης καὶ πλεονεξίας· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐπεβάλετο
πρᾶξι κατὰ τῶν πέλας, τούτ’ ἔπαθε καὶ λίαν ἐν
12 πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ. πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ τούτῳ
συνέβη γενέσθαι, κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν ὑπερθησόμεθα,
καὶ καταστρέψομεν τὴν βιβλον ταύτην, ἐν δὲ τοῖς
ἐξῆς πειρασόμεθα σαφῶς ὑπὲρ ἐκάστων ἐξαγ-
13 γέλλειν. Φίλιππος δὲ τὰ προειρημένα διαταξά-

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from their posts and direct these and all other matters through himself and his friends. And he would easily have accomplished this, had he not invited the opposition of Aratus; but as it was he was soon to experience the consequence of his folly and greed of power; for what he had plotted to bring upon his colleagues, he had to suffer himself within a very short space of time. As to how and by what means this happened, I shall defer speaking for the present and bring this Book to a close; but in subsequent ones I shall try to give a clear account of the whole matter. Philip, after making the arrangements I mentioned, returned to Argos and there spent the remainder of the winter with his friends, dismissing his troops to Macedonia.
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